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THE CAVALRY JOURNAL



LONDON
THE ROYAL UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION, WHITEHALL, S.W.



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FRANCIS H. D. C. WHITMORE



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
FRANCIS H. D. C. WHITMORE

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JANUARY to OCTOBER, 1913

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A VIEW ON THE BORDERS OF BASUTOLAND.

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WITH SANCTION OF THE ARMY COUNCIL, AND UNDER DIRECTION OF
FIELD-MARSHAL SIR J. D. P. FRENCH, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.
CHIEF OF THE IMPERIAL GENERAL STAFF
ASSISTED BY LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR R. S. S. BADEN-POWELL, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.
MAJOR-GENERAL E. H. H. ALLENBY, C.B., INSPECTOR OF CAVALRY
AND COLONEL N. M. SMYTH, V.C.

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THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

JANUARY 1913

CHARACTER TRAINING

By 'XENOPHON II'

'The Moral is to the Physical as three to one.'—NAPOLEON.

EDUCATION comprises moral, physical, and mental education. For many years after the introduction of compulsory education in England the so-called education of the people only consisted of an attempt to give them certain mental attainments, irrespective of whether these would be of use to them in their after lives or not. In the Army, however, physical training has long received careful attention, and is now most thorough and efficient. But what can we say of the moral or character training either in our schools or in the Army?

Our public schools give good character training by means of games and sports, by the school life and public opinion of the school, by democratic tendencies which ensure individuals being judged on their own merits irrespective of wealth or birth, by the good example of past members, masters and senior boys of the school, and by the discipline enforced by seniors on juniors.

The same factors continue to influence the young officer on joining a regiment, and, excepting that he talks and thinks of hunting and polo instead of cricket and football, his moral education and the formation of his character continue in a natural sequence. If he has learned to be unselfish though self-reliant at school, he can be trusted to play the game in war—provided that he has studied his profession. He will also do his best in peace for the training and welfare of those under his command.

But the average recruit has had few of these advantages before joining. He may have reached some degree of mental attainments at his Board school, but what has he learned of patriotism, religion, duty or unselfishness; and what chance has he had of developing his character? Character is the essential which enables a man to remain calm and determined when his nerves are strung taut by dangers, real or imaginary, whilst his body is insufficiently nourished or his faculties are overtaxed. In such times of trial it is only the men of determined character and natural or acquired bravery that will succeed. In recent years we have seen the institution, or rather the initiation, of the Boy Scout movement, designed to make up for some of the deficiencies in our moral education, but we have not yet arrived at a sufficiently enlightened period for the mass of our democracy to recognise their duty to the State.

Considering the lack of character training and the conditions under which our recruits have lived before enlisting, is it not marvellous that 75 per cent. of them become the excellent fellows that they are before they leave the Army? A good regiment sets a stamp on a man just as a good public school or university stamps a boy.

Let us analyse the difference between the time-expired man and the recruit, and then let us consider what we can do to help our recruits in the development of their character. We cannot say, as in the past in the case of Cromwell's and other armies known to fame, that it is religious enthusiasm that has so altered our man whilst he has been passing through the Army. Neither is it exactly patriotism, though probably having served abroad and found the British Flag and tongue universally prominent may have instilled in him a proper pride in that flag.

Our soldiers learn in the Army self-respect and unselfishness, they look upon their regiment as their home and their comrades as their brothers, and they respect themselves because others respect them. In the South African War our men had no animosity against the Boers, yet they fought them willingly because they realised that it was their duty to the Empire to do so. There is, however, no burking the fact that they were not prepared to suffer the same losses with unimpaired moral that were borne without wincing by our forefathers in the Peninsula. Consider the assault of Badajos, in which there were 4,000 casualties out of less than 12,000 men engaged! Yet there were

surrenders in South Africa when not even 20 per cent., let alone 33 per cent., of casualties had been suffered. What then is the good of our boasted education if it brings our men up soft and tends to degeneracy of character and inferior moral staying power?

Self-respect, love of his regiment and comrades, and consciousness of his duty are the mainstays of the trained soldier. Bravery may be natural and hereditary like other qualities, or it may be acquired by a reasoning mind by associating with brave men and hearing and reading of brave deeds. Natural bravery, however, is very liable to depend on a man's health and varying external influences. A brave man one day may be a coward the next day, just as men who normally enjoy very high spirits occasionally suffer from acute depression.

Reasoned bravery is a higher military virtue than natural bravery, because it shows a better balanced mind and is more reliable at all times and under all circumstances.

What can officers do to increase the military virtue of their men?

Let us return to our motto of 'self-respect and love of regiment and comrades' as being the seeds of military virtue usual in our soldiers under existing conditions.

These seeds must be cultivated till they enlarge themselves and expand so as to include a love of our whole Army and our country, not merely our own Squadron or Regiment.

We must start the culture of these seeds in the recruit.

Firstly, then, an officer or N.C.O. must convince his recruit from the start that he is a friend who is trying to help him to learn the rudiments of a noble profession and not an usher or a bully on the look-out to make the recruit's life a burden to him. Under all circumstances must the men know that even-handed justice will be theirs and that every case will be adjudged on its merits. Extreme good humour and patience, and entire absence of vindictiveness and absolute impartiality, are essential. An occasional word of praise for honest effort may do more good than frequent fault-finding.

Secondly, officers and N.C.O.s must join in games, sports, and competitions with their men so as to earn respect for themselves for what they can do rather than for their rank.

Games and sports promote a healthy tone in the squadron barrack room and a keen but friendly rivalry in the Army.

By attention to the two above points we shall get a healthy man

with a healthy mind bent on doing his best. As he grows older and wins his cross-guns, his cross-swords, and eventually a "full arm," his self-respect and love of his regiment will increase.

There is nothing new in what is written above, but it is sometimes in danger of being forgotten.

Then there is another thing that is sometimes done and sometimes not done. Teach the recruit the history of his regiment, especially dwelling on the character of the regimental heroes; impress on him what hardy, brave, and reliable men they were—how they fought on half-rations in tropical heat, or frost and snow, and against what odds; how they looked after their horses and marched on foot to save them; how detachments sacrificed themselves to save their regiments and individuals to save detachments; how they overcame toil and hardship as steadfastly as they surmounted dangers. There is nothing which aids the development of character more than the study of lives of great men, *e.g.* Drake, Nelson, Cromwell, Harry Smith, John Nicholson, Hodson, Sir John Moore, and many others.

Short lectures may be given on these and many humbler heroes, calling attention to the 'character' which upheld them and pulled them through difficulties.

Finally, we may help to make our men patriotic by dipping into history and showing them how England has always been the champion of liberty for all her subjects, and the pioneer of civilisation whose progress has been marked by the bones of her sons in every corner of the globe.

It is by our own example and by such care for the character training of our men that the little plant of self-respect will grow into the strong tree of patriotism, and we shall again produce men whose 'moral' will enable them to defeat Continental conscripts in three to one superiority, as did our forebears under Wellington.



STAR-BEARINGS.

PRACTICAL APPLICATION FOR RAPID NIGHT MARCHES AND OPERATIONS.

By Lieut.-Colonel W. A. TILNEY, *17th (D.C.O.) Lancers.*

EVERYONE realises the increased and great importance of night operations and that the system of guides and compasses is too slow and unreliable for rapid movements across country.

The object of this article is to show how the heavens can be used as a watch and compass on a starlit night, and rapid reconnaissances and marches made direct across the plains of India and any other open country by the simple method of working out the bearings of a few first-magnitude stars beforehand.

Now, how does the Colonial, Bushman, Basuto, traverse long distances at night without any instruments?—by one of the most ancient methods, which incidentally is mentioned in the Bible, namely, by star-bearings used naturally and instinctively. What is the advantage of this method over the ordinary compass?

The advantage is great, for the faster you go the more accurate your march will probably be; and only last spring thirteen patrols of the 17th Lancers started from Sialkot on an unknown rectangular course of 20 miles, which the winner covered in the excellent time of 1 hour 31 minutes, and eleven out of the thirteen finished the course in under two hours.

The idea is to make out beforehand the bearings of certain well-known first-magnitude stars at particular times during the night on which the reconnaissance or march is to be made, and with this in your pocket you can get along as fast as the ground will allow, and all being true bearings you cannot go wrong so long as you trust the heavens.

Before this system was devised in 1908 the only way to get star-bearings was with the sextant or theodolite and logarithms—an impossible operation for the Cavalry soldier. As most of you know, star bearings are being generally adopted in the Navy and liners for

navigation purposes, and I am indebted to Captain Smith, the writer of nautical tables, and Captain Armytage, who accompanied the North and South Pole Expeditions, for the two methods I will endeavour to describe, but the idea which I conceived during the South African war was primarily worked out by Mr. Reeves, of the Royal Geographical Society.

Now, the sun being a star ninety-two millions of miles away and yet 275,000 times nearer than any other fixed star, we must be able to use it during the day, before you can understand the course of the remote of the first magnitude at night.

The sun, as we all know, rises about the east. Three hours after rising it is south-east, six hours (*i.e.* at noon) south, and three hours after south-west, and at nightfall about west. If you have the correct time you do not require a compass when the sun is shining.

The course of fixed stars which rise due east are exactly similar, whereas those that rise at other points in the eastern horizon have different, yet constant, paths in the heavens.

Remember we are only dealing with about twelve fixed stars and have nothing to do with the planets, moon, &c. You can readily recognise fixed stars from planets, for the former twinkle, whereas the latter shine with a moonlike appearance, and they are as you know similar to our moon.

Now with this method no abstruse calculations have to be made for use in any latitude, you only have to learn the names of twelve stars at most (eight are generally sufficient), and when you have learnt their ways you can go anywhere you like on a starlit night without a compass.

The only calculation requisite is the following :—

To find the hour angle, *i.e.* the position of the stars in the heavens, at the time we want to march.

Take Whitaker's Almanack; look up the pages giving one hundred fixed stars—take, say, Aldebaran; look up its right ascension, and then turn to the day of the month on which you wish to make the night operations, say December 1, and under the heading "The Sun" you see a column headed "Sidereal Time at Noon." Subtract this sidereal time at noon from the star's right ascension thus :—

	Hr.	Min.
Right ascension	4	31
Sidereal time	16	40

N.B.—If right ascension is less than sidereal time at noon you add 24 hours to right ascension before subtracting, so we have:—

	Hr.	Min.
Right ascension	28	31
Sidereal time	16	40
	<hr/>	
	11	51 from noon.

This is the time at which the star attains its highest altitude during the night, and it is called its meridian passage.

Now if we obtain the difference between the time at which we wish to march and the 11 hrs. 51 min. we obtain the hour angle of the star at that hour. Thus:—

Hr.	Min.
11	51
9	0
<hr/>	
2	51

But is this hour angle east or west of the meridian? It must be east, for the star's highest altitude is not reached till 11.51; so it is gradually rising from the east to that altitude.

METHOD NO. 1

How to get your star-bearings from this hour angle with the aid of a navigator's star globe. This is convenient enough for Staff use, but not sufficiently portable and handy for regimental officers, rank and file, &c. But I put this method first to enable you to grasp the general idea and the course of the first-magnitude stars in the heavens. First set your globe for the latitude of the place—thus Delhi, latitude 29. Revolve the globe to the star's hour angle, 9 P.M., and you have all the stars arranged in their proper places and can read off the bearings of Aldebaran thus:—

9.0 P.M.,	bearing 100 degrees east from true north.
9.30 P.M.	„ 102° 5 „ „ „
10.0 P.M.	„ 105 „ „ „

Now having gone, say, four miles, you wish to change your direction

to the east and use another star—for Aldebaran is getting too high in the heavens—Procyon is a suitable star:—


10.0 P.M. Procyon due east.

10.30 P.M. „ 95 eastwards from the true north.

11.0 P.M. „ 105 „ „ „

We teach the regimental scouts to measure 15 degrees of horizon with their hand and make the allowance for the changes in the bearing according to the direction of march. A stick-measure will suit the purpose better.

Say the direction of your march is 105 degrees eastwards: at 10 P.M. one hand-measure of 15 degrees must be allowed; at 10.30 P.M. 10 degrees, *i.e.* one-third of your hand-measure, and so on.



The first-magnitude stars we use are as follows:—

Let us start with Rigel, the largest star of Orion, and the southern corner of that beautiful constellation. Aldebaran rises just behind the Pleiades (the large bunch of stars). North of Aldebaran is Capella. As the night goes on we have Procyon rising almost due east in this latitude; Castor and Pollux N.E.; Sirius E.S.E. When Aldebaran reaches its meridian passage, Regulus rises 10 degrees north of east, and Canopus is rising S.S.E. An hour after that, say 1 A.M., the Great Bear rises N.N.E.. At 3 A.M. Arcturus rises E.N.E. At 4 P.M. Spica

rises E.S.E.; then we have Vega rising in daylight N.E.; Antares E.S.E. Then during the day Altair and Fomalhaut.

So we must be able to recognise Aldebaran, Rigel, Capella, Castor, Sirius, Canopus, Arcturus, Spica, Vega, Altair, Fomalhaut, North Star, Southern Cross, and with that lot you can go anywhere in the world on a starlit night. In the latitude of the British Isles eight are sufficient.

Four years ago at the Cavalry School I was asked, 'What do you do if there are no stars?' and the answer is an obvious one—you cannot march by them.

METHOD NO 2

By Blackburne's A. B. C. Tables and Whitaker's Almanack.

By Whitaker we have found the hour angle at 9 P.M. for, say, Procyon is 5 hr. 55 min. east.

By Table A take the number given010 S.
„ Table B „ „ „ „088 N.
	<hr/>
	.078 N.

Add like, subtract unlike numbers, and the correction must be named according to the greatest factor. So it is .078 north, and by Table C we read the bearing 86 north of true east.

Other bearings are read in a similar manner; and it is simplicity itself to make out bearings for every half hour the star is visible by subtracting the half hour from your hour angle if it is east and adding if west, thus:—

STAR PROCYON (December 1, 1912)

	Hour angle M.	
9.0 P.M.	5	55
9.30 P.M.	5	25
10.0 P.M.	4	55
10.30 P.M.	4	25

Of course, if you do not change your latitude, in a short experience you can spot the bearings of the stars you have studied at a glance, and so are just as much at home at night as any Bushman or Basuto.

THE HORSEMEN OF BASUTOLAND

BY THE SOUTH AFRICAN SUB-EDITOR

THE cattle-owning Kaffirs of South Africa have brought what is known as the native problem to its present acute stage, and chief among these cattle-owning people are the Bantu inhabitants of the all too independent mountain fastness of Basutoland.

This little territory, with an area of 10,293 square miles, has a population of 1,300 Europeans and 403,111 natives, and the rapid increase of this prolific community may be gauged by a comparison of the Census for 1911 with that of 1904 :—

	1911	1904	Increase
Cattle	432,748	209,883	222,865
Horses	86,610	63,677	22,933
Ploughs	22,848	14,388	8,460
Sheep and goats	2,350,689	—	—
People per square mile	38.97	33.78	—
Occupied huts	10.86	8.42	—
Persons to occupied hut	3.61	4.01	—

There are 22,000 Basutos in addition who are always sent from Basutoland, mostly employed in mines.

It is evident that this country is crammed to starvation-point. A bad harvest thrusts thousands below the bread line, yet we find polygamy practised by 10,000 men. In the provinces of the Union 85,000 more black men practise polygamy, thus increasing their race out of all proportion to the white population. The problem of the overflow of black humanity has to be faced by the white man, for the 197 native chiefs of Basutoland are incapable of coping with it. If too abrupt a policy is forced on the African, such as the suppression of barbarous abuses, a sudden rush to arms is likely to result. Out of the 200,000 males of the Basuto nation 130,000 are capable of bearing the assegai, but there are not more than 50,000 rifles and muskets and 69,000 horses fit for war. In Basutoland there are 70,000

professed Christians who are firmly attached to the European missionaries, but it would be a mistake to imagine that the Christian Basutos would not strike home in defence of their native mountains, for they are characterised by superior grit to their heathen brethren. We may, however, discount at least half of the possible warriors as ineffective owing to want of organisation.

The Basuto pony is famous throughout the sub-continent for his stamina and sure-footedness. He is the product of over one hundred years of breeding with repeated infusions of good blood, including more than one out-cross of Arabian blood. The pony was originally acquired for the same reasons that rifles were acquired by the Basutos, and they show the same reluctance to part with either. A few ponies, it is true, are sold and replaced by cattle, but neither force nor persuasion of the white man has succeeded, after repeated efforts, in tempting the Basutos to consider their rifles as undesirable relics of a past barbarism. A strong feeling prevails among the neighbouring white population that it is intolerable that Basutoland should be in a political position which enables it to evade the civilising influences of the Union Government.

The suggestion is sometimes put forward that cattle-owning natives who decline to do their share of work for the benefit of South Africa should be segregated in suitable reserves or 'repatriated' to the tropical forests of the Zambesi. The question of the effective taxation or suppression of native 'undesirables' has also claimed the attention of politicians, but probably all that can be expected in the near future is that the Union Government should continue its just and fearless administration, but with greater firmness, reconciling as much as possible the claims of the Kaffir with the plain necessity of preserving white dominance, and recognising the necessity and utility of the subject race in the balanced structure of society.

We are much indebted to Captain A. S. Langley, Natal Carbineers, for the painting 'A View on the Borders of Basutoland,' which is reproduced as the frontispiece of this number.

THE BALKANS.

By 'GIPSY.'

THE area in which the war has been fought is no new one for battles between Christian and Moslem, and the present war is practically the direct descendant of those which have preceded it. It is impossible to give anything like a complete history of the national events which led up to the war, but a very brief outline may be of interest.

For something like two hundred years the Turk ruled Europe up to the line of the Danube. Bulgaria and Servia alike lay under his heel, so much so that in Bulgaria even the claim to a national language was not admitted by those who at that time studied these matters.

The history of the renaissance of Bulgaria is one of extreme interest; it sprang directly from a single man, a monk, who in a monastery in the deepest valley of the Balkans had succeeded to the charge of some of the archives of the old Bulgarian nation. In his mind the germ of nationality was implanted. He spent his whole life in writing a short book of Bulgarian history and in re-writing a grammar of the language. In all only about thirty-seven copies of the book were made. A few Bulgarians while exiles attained prosperity in more civilized lands, fostered and financed the idea, schools sprung up all over the country, and from these elementary schools the revival of the Bulgarian national spirit is directly traceable. But although the spirit was existent, the means were not available to throw off the Turkish yoke. Disconnected efforts were made, and were invariably succeeded by wholesale massacres by the Turkish masters. The rivers of the country literally ran red with blood for periods of weeks at a stretch. There seemed small chance of Bulgaria ever shaking off the yoke until Mr. Gladstone started his celebrated campaign on the Bulgarian atrocities. His speeches shook Europe, and the whole civilized world determined that the yoke of the Mahommedan should no longer rest on the necks of these Christian peoples. But, though all Europe was ready to approve of any action, there was only one country, Russia, which was willing to make good its words by war.

In 1877 the Russian Armies invaded the Turkish Empire as it

then was, crossing the Danube near Rustchuk. They were delayed for many months by the lines of Plevna and by their own false conception of what war really meant, but eventually their armies passed through Sofia and Phillipopolis and one advanced nearly along the same route as the Bulgarian Army in the present war has adopted, to the gates of Constantinople. It was after this war that the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, of which we read so much in the papers nowadays were made. The Treaty of San Stefano was the Turkish idea of what a settlement should be. Generally speaking, it may be said that it threw back the Turkish frontier almost to Constantinople itself. Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, and Bulgaria were all to form one vast State, a fief to the Sultan, but with autonomous government under a Christian ruler. No doubt Russia was not entirely disinterested in this proposal. Probably she foresaw and hoped that this Bulgarian State in which there would be a large Slav population would itself come under the influence of Russia and might eventually be absorbed into it. The Bulgarians at that time were quite willing for this solution, but the Great Powers of Europe had other ideas. The chief among them, Great Britain, could not see a solution of the Balkans which would lead inevitably to the preponderance of Russian influence at Constantinople. At that time, Great Britain repeated the policy which she is now trying to give effect to again in Persia. She determined that Turkey should be left with a very large measure of her previous domination in the hope that she would regenerate and take her place among the great nations of Europe. It was this policy which Lord Salisbury, years later, called 'putting his money on the wrong horse,' but the horse ran a race, halting, perhaps, but still alive, until the present year. In the Treaty of Berlin, which Russia was forced to accept by the influence of the other Great Powers, Bulgaria with Eastern Rumelia was made autonomous, and in the celebrated 23rd article a definite promise was given that Macedonia should be granted such reforms that her Christian people would live in security. The subsequent history of the political negotiations is merely one long record of promises by the Turks, made to be broken, of threats by the Great Powers never given effect to, and of massacres, sometimes of the Turks and sometimes of the Christians in Macedonia and in old Servia. Now, it is well to remember that the inhabitants of Macedonia are closely akin to those of Bulgaria—there is a good deal of inter-marriage—the exiles and refugees of Macedonia have fled for years across

the borders of Bulgaria, spreading tales, probably exaggerated, of the iniquities of the Turk and appealing for the assistance of the Balkan States. The Balkan States themselves were practically only in a state of adolescence—there was little settled government—revolutions and revolts were of frequent occurrence.

The first elected Prince of Bulgaria was forced to leave the country and to abdicate his throne because he endeavoured to thwart the influence which Russia was trying to exert in the policy of Bulgaria. King Milan of Servia was practically forced by his own people to abdicate the throne and become the Commander-in-Chief of the Army which owed allegiance to his own son. That son was, himself, murdered by his own people as late as 1904. In Bulgaria, again, Stambouloff, by far the greatest figure which has arisen from the ranks of the Bulgarians themselves, who finally succeeded in throwing off the Russian yoke, was assassinated in the streets of Sofia at the instigation of his political opponents, but, though these revolutions and assassinations show that Bulgaria and Servia were not civilized in the sense that we understand civilization, still they had all the elements of an intensely virile race. Their birth rate is steadily increasing. The peasants are hardy, contented, and prosperous in so far that they have small difficulty in obtaining the little that satisfies them, and through the whole nation there runs fierce hatred of the Turk—they remember the history of their own sufferings—they were taught in schools, of their greatness as a nation before the Turks had conquered them, and they believed firmly that it was to be reserved to them to re-establish Christianity throughout the whole of the Balkan Peninsula. So that as far as the people themselves were concerned there was every factor which made for successful war.

The succeeding Governments of Bulgaria have long devoted their primary attention to the development of Bulgaria's armed force. They realize that it is a small nation with powerful neighbours, and that its only hope of being permitted to work out its own salvation as a people was to be strong enough to offer a considerable threat to any attempt at conquest. Their military history was practically confined to two wars. A large contingent had fought with the Russians against the Turks in 1877; they had borne the brunt of the fighting in the passes of the Balkans, and they had found that the Turk was not a dangerous opponent. Later on, war had broken out between Servia and Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian Army had achieved a rapid

and complete success. The extent to which the Army was organized is evident when we consider the population of the country and its armed force: the population is between four and five millions, much less than that of London, and it places in the field an army of 500,000 armed men, rather more than three times the Expeditionary Force of the British Empire, and it does this at a cost of a military budget of something between one and two millions a year, including all indirect charges, less than that of our Territorial Army. All this demands a very great sacrifice from the people. The sacrifice was made willingly enough, but the lever always used was the ostensible one of resistance against Turkish invasion, the real one the hope that in time Bulgaria would conquer Turkey.

It was for this reason that the revolution in Turkey in 1908, at the accession to power of the Young Turks full of promises of reforms, of democracy, and of civilized government in their States, filled the Bulgarian rulers with something little less than alarm. They felt that the Bulgarian people, sooner or later, might well begin to grumble at the strain of military service and taxation; if Turkey were going to be civilized and become a 'good neighbour,' the reason for the Army ceased to exist. The country looked to King Ferdinand, who is also the Foreign Minister, for some explanation or announcement, and Ferdinand responded by a *coup d'état* at Tirnova, where, to the astonishment of the whole civilized world, he proclaimed himself independent of Turkey and king in his own rights. The consequent political trouble again justified the military burden on the people, but it could only be a temporary relief, and probably if we had insight into the minds of the Bulgarian statesmen we would find that at that time war with Turkey came from the range of probabilities into that of certainties within a measurable number of years. Certainly shortly after that the first negotiations began to be made for the Balkan States alliance. Ferdinand, who is probably the ablest diplomatist in Europe, with the exception of William II. of Germany, began to estimate how far he could refuse to listen to the admonitions of that collection of international jealousies called 'the concert of Europe.'

Recent events hardly require recapitulation now. I do not think, myself, that either Ferdinand or his allies intended to have war this year. Anyhow, it is a fact that the Bulgarian General Staff as late as April of the present year gave an official statement that the Bulgarian Army was not yet ready for war. But a curious collection

of political circumstances forced the hands of the Government; it was what theologians call Providence, and more cynically minded people call chance. For first we had the Italian war with Tripoli, and the Bulgarians and Servians began to think that it probably was the best time, when Turkey was attacked in one of her outposts, to press the issue nearer home. Then there was the great massacre near Palanka, within a very few miles of the Bulgarian frontier, and refugees streamed into the country. The massacre was in fact only an incident of a long series, but it inflamed the people. Then came the incredible folly of the Turkish mobilisation, heralded in all the press of Europe as a triumph of the Turkish re-organisation, of some 60,000 men for manœuvres near the Bulgarian frontier. Just at this moment, Ferdinand and his Allies had decided to do a bit of political bluff; their idea was, not war, but that by making representations, and by showing the Great Powers that the Balkan States were united, they would force 'the concert of Europe' itself to grant some measure of reforms to Macedonia—reforms which would inevitably lead to greater assistance being given to the Allies by Macedonia against the Turk if and when war should come about. But the people of Bulgaria proved too strong for their ruler. Ferdinand is not, personally, a popular king; the people regard him as a most useful public servant, they realise that his foreign policy has raised Bulgaria from a small and unimportant principality into a kingdom. But gratitude has small part in their philosophy, and nobody knew better than Ferdinand himself that if he failed his country on one important issue he would most certainly be thrown out of the country with as little ceremony as was accorded his predecessor. This brings us down to the political circumstances that led up to the war, and perhaps it is well to refresh our memories as regards the armed strength of the Powers.

It is very easy to be wise after the event, and probably many people are now wondering how they ever thought Turkey had any chance whatsoever of winning; but the fact remains that almost every War Office in Europe had definitely advised their respective Governments that if war did break out the inevitable result would be victory for the Turks. Now before we criticise the General Staffs for this astoundingly wrong prognostication, let us see what data they had to go on. It was known that Bulgaria had a mobilised strength of nine divisions in the first line, nine reserve brigades in the second line, and the ordinary landsturm or national guard in the third line. Servia

on a similar organisation could muster five divisions, and Greece could add what was estimated at four, although the organisation was not complete. You will find a total of eighteen divisions of the Field Army. There were in addition four Cavalry brigades. Now eighteen divisions is no mean force: it is three times our own expeditionary adventure, but against it the Turks could produce the somewhat alarming total, on paper, of 101 divisions, 14 Cavalry brigades, and something like 1150 guns. It is quite true that many of these divisions were in the Far Eastern parts of the Turkish Empire, but in Europe itself they had 73 divisions at least. Then it was also known that General von der Goltz had devoted many years of his life to re-organising the Turkish Army on the German system.

It was known also that the one item which was never stinted in the Turkish budget was their army estimates, so it is perhaps small wonder if the gentlemen of the various General Staffs in their offices at the capitals of their respective nations did a simple sum of subtraction and produced an alarming preponderance in favour of the Turks. But there is something far more important than numbers in war—more important even than organisation—and that is national spirit. National spirit is not a thing you can put on paper—you cannot add and subtract it—you can travel through countries in peace, and you can form an opinion about it; the opinion as likely as not will be quite wrong, because the test of national spirit only comes with war. Still, in our own army there were not lacking officers who had seen both Bulgarians and Turks, and who had studied their organisation, who offered advice gratuitously to the War Office and were equally gratuitously laughed at for saying, at the beginning anyhow, that the Bulgarians would win. We have not yet got details of the Turkish mobilisation; all we know is that it failed. Various reasons for its failure have been advanced. The most probable one is, I think, that the system was over-elaborated for the material. It is like the automatic gun: you can produce a weapon that inside a room does wonders, but you take it out in the open air and a little bit of dust gets into one of the springs and the whole thing is useless. Anyhow, all we know is that out of this immense total of 101 divisions, Turkey only managed to assemble for the initial fights at Adrianople, Kirk Killise, and Lule Burgas something that approximated in strength to six divisions.

*THE ENLISTED CLASSES OF THE INDIAN CAVALRY**(Continued)*

By CAPTAIN R. W. W. GRIMSHAW, 34th (P.A.V.O.) Poona Horse

MAHRATTAS

THE Mahratta claims descent from the Aryans. Their stock, however, has been undoubtedly more highly diluted with pre-Aryan blood than the Rajputs. This remarkable race inhabit the western highlands of the Deccan as well as the low country lying between the Western Ghauts and the coast, known as the Konkan. Hence the terms Deccani and Konkani Mahratta. These divisions are purely geographical, and not very well defined at that. This part of India is, so to speak, the cradle of the race. Mahrattas in no inconsiderable numbers are found all over Western and Central India, from Delhi southwards—remnants of the great Mahratta confederacy which overran India on the decline of the Moghul authority. The history of the rise of the Mahrattas under the brilliant Sivajee, their daring exploits, their hill forts perched upon many almost inaccessible crags amidst the Western Ghauts, and finally the consummation of Sivajee's prophecy that the Mahratta Horse would water their mounts in the Indus and Hugli affords ample material for reflection. Here one sees a homely quiet people of the soil transformed like the Sikhs into a veritable nation in arms at the exhortation of one remarkable man, a vivid example that, given a cause and leadership, any intellectual community (and the Mahrattas are intellectual) can rise to great heights.

The Mahratta of pre-Sivajee days was no more a natural warrior by vocation than the Sikh, and yet his bitter hatred of the Mussalman so inflamed his mind that in the space of a few years he trampled underfoot the Moghul Empire, and the Mahratta ditch at Calcutta bears ample testimony to the terror they inspired.

There are few authorities who dispute the fact that had not the British inadvertently appeared on the scene at the psychological moment a Mahratta confederacy would have dominated India from Peshawur to Cape Comorin. Even to-day, if one excludes the Nizam's dominions, the three great feudatory states of Gwalior, Baroda, and Indore are ruled by Mahrattas. The decisive battles of Assaye in the south and of Laswari in the north set a limit to Mahratta ambition, which at one time bid fair to threaten that of the British. Their complete overthrow was finally brought about at the battle of Kirkee. Only once again did they attempt to take the initiative against the British—namely, in their abortive attack on Koregaum, described by one distinguished writer as the Thermopylæ of India.

One is impelled to the conclusion that the reason for the remarkable rise to power of this race lies in the many natural gifts of the Mahratta. His crafty and extremely supple mind, infinite patience under adversity, frugality, and general hardihood all combine to give him an ascendancy over his fellow Indians, but he requires leadership. In the whole of their history they have produced only two really remarkable men—namely, Sivajee and Mahajee Scindia, and Sivajee really produced the Mahrattas.

Scoffers have described the Mahratta soldiery of Sivajee as mere bloodthirsty freebooters, and probably they were, but their energy and enterprise was too much for the Moghul Dynasty, and their final subjection cost the East India Company many crores of rupees and much loss of life.

The Deccani Mahratta—that is, the man from the Western Highlands—is considered to make the best soldier, and he certainly should make a good one. The Kumbi (Mahratta cultivator) has many vicissitudes to encounter owing to erratic rainfall, and by no means lives in the lap of idle and enervating luxury. Only one squadron exists in the cavalry, namely, in the 31st Lancers. This seems a great pity, as the Mahratta makes *par excellence* a light Cavalry soldier and is thoroughly imbued with the stirring traditions of Sivajee warriors, and no power that has ever arisen in India, other than perhaps the British, has wielded the mounted arm with such unerring relentlessness.

Even if one is inclined to discredit the immense distances stated to have been covered by the Mahratta Horse, one must admit a certain percentage of truth, and some of their swarm-like charges were not

only most creditable but extremely effective. One has heard it stated that the Mahratta does not stand the climate of Northern India. In reply it can be pointed out that no inconsiderable number of Mahrattas took part in the Afghan Campaigns of 1842 and 1879, and in the former campaign Outram, who took with him a troop of Cavalry composed almost exclusively of men from the Deccan in his pursuit of Dost Mohammed Khan over the Bamian Pass in very severe weather, has left it on public record that these men showed no signs whatever of distress during the ordeal. Again, as far as the writer can ascertain, the only existing squadron, which, by the way, is at present quartered in one of the most northerly stations in India, shows no symptoms of suffering due to severity of climate. In this connection it may not be out of place to observe that when a class recruited in the Punjab objects to serve in the more southern stations such objection almost meets with approbation, and is at once condoned on the plea that the man dislikes serving so far from his home. If a class recruited in Southern India objects to serving on the North-West Frontier it is stigmatised as lacking in moral. The question of serving some 1500 miles from home is not permitted to bulk quite so large.

One frequently hears of the supposed-to-be value of 'tradition' in forming a soldier's character, and yet only seven squadrons are recruited from the two classes in India which have behind them a Cavalry tradition, namely, the Rahtore Rajputs and the Mahrattas. The former are of comparatively recent introduction (1893), and six squadrons is probably representative of all that care to avail themselves of what must be to them a new departure, but the latter would appear to be under-recruited, and one can only assume that the now irreparable mistake of neglecting or, indeed, abandoning this source, was occasioned by an illogical hankering to pander to the dictates of fashion set by those in high places some years ago, who were prone to condemn all and everything that did not hail from the land of the five rivers. The writer holds no brief for the Mahrattas, but he would inquire if a single charge of serious misconduct, other than of an individual character, can be sustained against this class on active service. Surely that, and that only, should form the prescribed test and not the petty artificialities that often loom rather vividly during peace time. The Mahratta does not fill the eye like a Pathan or Sikh, being of small stature and careless of his non-military apparel. As

far as Cavalry is concerned, if one excepts one squadron, the recruiting connection has been lost. It is only by maintaining a sound recruiting connection that the evils of advancing civilisation, with its concomitant highly paid unofficial 'billets,' can be successfully combated.

It is often forgotten that 'what to do with our boys' offers quite as perplexing a problem to the Indian parent as to the English.

Nowadays trade undoubtedly offers many openings that did not exist fifty years ago, but it is not so easy to place a son in a trade giving a suitable position (many are barred by caste considerations) as is sometimes imagined, and the writer was informed by a Mahratta officer of standing that many a younger son would willingly offer himself for enlistment if there existed better prospects in the way of promotion. It may interest some readers, however, to know that quite a large number of Indian officers of the few Mahratta Infantry regiments still remaining commenced their career in the Cavalry, and transferred owing to being hopelessly blocked.

This would indicate that, were a wider field open to them, material might be found to fill the ranks of more than one squadron.

The average Mahratta is of spare build, but of great endurance and very frugal in his habits. He is generally good-looking, and in the Army wears a small moustache. He is a good horseman and horsemaster. The most interesting peculiarity of the Mahratta is that he carries a surname like Europeans. For example, Scindia, Holkar, and Geikwar are the surmanes of the three Mahratta rulers of Gwalior, Indore, and Baroda. No other class enlisted by us in Indian Cavalry carry surnames like the Mahratta.

The Mahrattas are exceptionally intelligent, and consequently make excellent reconnoiters and scouts, but like all intelligent beings they are pretty useful at everything. Their chief drawback is, that when gathered together they are rather fond of intrigue.

The mutiny was hatched at Poona (the Mahratta capital), the son of the last Peishwa being the perfidious Nana Sahib. In justice, however, to the Mahrattas as a community, it must be mentioned that, although the Nana Sahib and a few leading Mahrattas were active participators in that great upheaval, the community as a whole remained perfectly loyal, a loyalty which was of infinite value to the British Government, since it enabled the latter to keep open the more southern section of the trunk road to Agra, which in those days was

the main artery of communication, in fact the only one, connecting the port of Bombay and its important arsenal with the centre of disturbance. Had the Mahrattas thrown in their lot with the Bengal Army, they could have completely paralysed all reinforcements sent north from Western and South-Western India.

The Mahratta is very tolerant of caste prejudices, and gives no trouble about such matters either in quarters or in the field. They speak a language called Mahratti, using the Nagri character. There is little resemblance between it and Hindustani, but most of those who have an Army connection know Hindustani of sorts. They will eat anything in reason except, of course, beef. They are almost entirely given over to agricultural pursuits and exercise a discriminating care in their matrimonial alliances, which preserves their racial characteristics.

DECCANI AND MADRAS MAHOMETANS

In addition to the one squadron of Mahrattas there exist six more squadrons drawn from the southern portion of the Indian Peninsula—namely, Deccani and Madras Mahometans. They are distributed as follows :—

26th, 27th, 28th Light Cavalries, one squadron each, designated Deccani and Madras Mahometans; the 20th, two squadrons, and the 29th, one squadron, designated Deccani Mahometans. Nowadays Deccani and Madras Mahometans, for all practical purposes, may be considered as one. Formerly the term Madras Mussulman was essentially reserved for those who were enlisted in the Carnatic in contradistinction to the Deccani who came from the uplands of the Deccan. It was generally conceded that the Deccani was the superior. Here again there existed no valid reasons based on war service results for thus differentiating between them. Probably the prefixing of the six cryptic letters M-a-d-r-a-s had more to do with it than anything else.

The origin of these two classes is identical and is briefly as follows :—

Until the latter end of the thirteenth century 'Islam' was practically unknown south of the Nerbudda and Mahanudi rivers. From thence onwards Southern India was overrun by successive waves of

Mahometan invasion, and during the Bahmani Dynasty (1347 to 1526) great numbers of Persians, Tartars, Moghuls, and Arabs were introduced.

Many of these settled in the country, and from them spring the Deccani and Madras Mahometan. A few, very few, are of pure descent, that is, are descendents of Mahometans who mated with Mahometans; by far and away the majority spring from stock which is the result of intermarriage with Hindu women of the country. Others again are direct converts.

The general details concerning all Mahometans enlisted in the Cavalry (see October number) give the main divisions into which this community is divided, and it is not intended to enlarge on them here other than to observe that a considerably higher percentage of class 1 (converts and descendents of converts and of mixed parentage) find their way into the Mahometan squadrons enlisted in the Deccan than they do into squadrons enlisted in other parts of India.

It must be remembered that neither the Deccani nor Madras Mahometans ever formed a race, or even one distinct homogeneous kingdom like the Mahrattas, and consequently they are not, and never have been, imbued with any racial or territorial *esprit de corps*; still, they are proud of their connection with the early Mahometan conquerors and pre-British ruling power, a pride which gives to the better class of Mahometan such as is enlisted in the Cavalry, a distinctive superiority of manner and address which is often noticeably absent from the Hindu of similar social standing.

The Deccani Mussulmans are of light, active build and make most dashing Cavalry soldiers. They are fearless horsemen and exceptionally good at shooting, scouting, reconnoitring, and skill-at-arms. They display great aptitude for all games requiring hand, eye, and horsemanship, and are easily made into expert polo players, where their dashing horsemanship helps them greatly.

As a community they are probably the most intelligent of all the Mahometan ones enlisted into Cavalry. If efficiency in peace is any criterion for efficiency in war, this class ought to do well. Like the Mahrattas, however, their popularity is waning, if not actually extinct, which is a great pity. They have always done well on service, and in the 'fifties were thought very highly of by men like Jacob and Outram.

Trade is opening up for them more remunerative employment than soldiering, but with care and good management there ought to be no great difficulty in maintaining the six squadrons that still remain. Both the Mahratta and Deccani Mahometans are sufficiently accustomed to hill and plain to enable them to adapt themselves to almost any terrain.

The young Deccani is a cheery youth with plenty of spirit, grit, and *savoir-faire*, and is most easy to train to all Cavalry duties, which, as a rule, they take an interest and pride in. They are not devoted to agricultural pursuits like the Mahratta, and tend to congregate in the larger villages and towns. They speak Hindustani, and also Mahratti if they happen to come from a Mahratta-speaking district, in fact it has been suggested by some that the Deccani Mahometan owes his 'slimness of mind' to his having rubbed shoulders for so many years with the crafty Mahratta.

HINDUSTANI MAHOMETANS

This class, which chiefly comes from the United Provinces and the late Delhi division of the Punjab, is so closely allied to the Deccani and Madras Mahometan that it will not be out of place to deal with it here (see illustrations). Like the Deccani and Madras Mahometan, the Hindustani is a product of the invading hosts of Islam. Like them he can be divided into the three divisions enumerated in the October number of this JOURNAL, from which division (2), consisting of Sayyids, Shaiks, Moghuls, and Pathans, most of the *personnel* enlisted into the Indian Cavalry is supplied. In fact, all that has been said of the Deccani may be applied to the Hindustani, except that as the latter were nearer imperial Delhi they have retained their Mahometan idiosyncrasies and purity to a greater extent than their more southern cousins. They vary considerably in their intellectual and physical capacities. Some are exceptionally capable and robust, others the reverse. There are still nominally sixteen squadrons of them in the Indian Cavalry, and until quite recently they were looked upon as the flower of the Indian mounted forces. They do not, however, seem to be as popular as they once were, although nothing can be brought against them for lack of martial qualities on service, seeing the important *rôle* they have played in the founding of British power in India. If they are con-

demned now they are condemned untried, and for reasons that may be productive of grave political results hereafter. It is not intended in this paper to discuss problems of recruiting, but seeing that this quarter's contribution touches on three classes, two of which were at one time much more largely enlisted, namely, Mahrattas and Deccani Mahometans, whilst a third has unquestionably fallen from high favour, one is prompted to inquire where this process of permitting certain classes to become unpopular is to cease. Is the Durand line to mark the final recruiting boundary both for Cavalry and Infantry? Has not the time arrived when some tightening of the reins is required if we are to preserve for our Army the martial qualities of the races eminently suited for the mounted arm? Once let rumour abroad that the employer has lost, or is losing, the confidence of the employee, and the entire fabric on which military discipline and success depends falls to the ground, and both parties must *ipso facto* fail in any ordeal.

Year by year, as already pointed out, trade is opening up a wider and more profitable field of employment than soldiering, but this state of affairs is not confined to south of the Indus, but is rapidly permeating the most remote regions, and to-day one meets many a transfrontier Pathan in the stokehold of a P. and O. steamship.

A quarter of a century hence, and sooner if the much-talked-of railway to India is constructed, this invasion of commercialism will have spread to Afghanistan as thoroughly as it now has to India proper; and even if temporary relief is obtained by shifting still further north the centre of gravity of Cavalry recruiting, sooner or later finality must be arrived at, and having cast aside classes eminently suited for the mounted arm by tradition, custom, and three generations of service it may become necessary to revert to them. Apart from the danger of any further concentration of recruiting amongst tribes who embrace a religious belief admittedly the most susceptible to fanatical outbursts, it would seem preferable to prepare for the inevitable and keep what exists from the deteriorating effects of commercialism. It is merely a matter of insistence and example. The everyday incidents of a life in a military saddle deters the cowardly degenerate from accepting a military career, and preserves the man that serves and his offspring (if cared for) from becoming a poltroon.

During the writer's three years' closest observation at the Cavalry School of every class represented in the mounted arm, he has failed to

detect any difference whatsoever amongst them in what one might term class valour. Possibly the sterner realities of the battlefield are necessary. *En passant* it may be noted that Napoleon in his maxims placed personal courage least of the three great attributes necessary in a soldier, and if one takes into consideration the other two and adds intelligence, there would probably be found a balance in favour of the three communities just dealt with. A fool, however plucky, is more dangerous than useful to the mounted arm. 'Dash,' and as much of it that can be obtained, is essential, but 'dash' is the sum of three attributes—firstly, a quick decision which enables a fleeting opportunity to be seized and turned to account; secondly, ability and resolution to carry out the decision; and thirdly, a temperament which strongly desires an armed conflict. Few will deny that intelligence must play an important *rôle* in all that is summed up in 'dash,' and how many are there who, without the test of actual warfare, will affirm that the classes whose popularity seem to be on the wane are so lacking in that temperament desiring an armed conflict that their replacement is a vital necessity? Sound discipline in the past conquered India for the British with an Army composed of an intelligent but almost outcast *personnel*. No amount of discipline can produce intelligence. Possibly some reader may maintain that it is a dangerous policy to await the issue of a war before remedying a possibly defective *personnel*.

The writer would inquire what proof can be adduced demonstrating that such defects exist—what peace test is applied, and how, which determines that a community which until quite recently possessed undoubted warlike potentialities is now lacking in that respect? Another factor at work in undermining the popularity of certain classes is the very prevalent idea that if an Indian officer or non-commissioned officer's son starts off with the mental equipment his father retired with, such son is deteriorated. Times without number one hears the remark, 'Oh, so-and-so is a smart youth, but not the man his father was.' If one inquires, as the writer has on more than one occasion, what the father did to merit this distinction one finds little to warrant it. It is rarely, if ever, founded on his merits as a leader in battle. This is to be expected, as for the past thirty years there has been no fighting in which the Indian Cavalry took a conspicuous part or suffered losses likely to effect its 'moral.' At the risk of inviting derision the writer

ventures to maintain that this assumption that dash and intelligence cannot go hand in hand is a mere shibboleth founded on no war experience. If it is true, then the sooner every military educational establishment in India, which, presumably, exist for cultivating and guiding intelligence, is razed to the ground the better. What is urgently required is an organised system by which the Army itself, and especially Cavalry, ensures that the offspring of the present generation of soldiers are brought up as intelligent soldiers and thus counteract any tendency for them to drift into Babu commercialism. Such a question, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.

MAHOMETAN RAJPUTS

(Rangars and Khaimkhanis)

This class can be conveniently divided into two well-known divisions, namely, Rangars and Khaimkhanis, the former largely predominating. These two divisions are very similar in tradition, customs, and characteristics. The former are chiefly found in the north-west of the United Provinces, the Delhi Division of the Punjab, and the more northerly feudatory States of Rajputana, whilst the Khaimkhanis may be localised to the territories of the Maharajahs of Jaipur, Jodhpore, and Ulwar.

Rangars have been recognised as a valuable recruiting source for the Indian Cavalry for over half a century, whilst the inclusion of the comparatively small community known as Khaimkhanis only dates back twenty years. Needless to say, however, both classes have been enlisted for local military service from time immemorial.

Both Rangars and Khaimkhanis are of pure Rajput extraction, and their claims to this distinction can easily be authenticated by a perusal of their clan genealogical tree. The former are descended from various Rajput clans, whilst the latter are exclusively descended from Chohan Rajputs (see previous numbers).

The term Rangar means a turncoat, and they received this appellation at the hands of their Rajput cousins when they broke away from Hinduism and accepted the teachings of the Prophet. The exact dates and reason for the change are, as may be easily imagined, somewhat obscure, but it is generally accepted that the Khaimkhanis went over in or about the reign of the Emperor Pherozeshah, whilst the

bulk of the Rangars seceded in the reign of Alimgir. Both communities maintain that they embraced the Mahometan creed of their own free will and not under compulsion, and the Khaimkhanis further maintain that one of the conditions that they exacted was that they need neither eat with, nor intermarry with, any Mahometan other than their own particular community. There is always some sympathy for those who are forced to accept a new doctrine under the exigencies of acute oppression which is withheld from those who voluntarily secede, and possibly the term Rangar was made use of by their Hindu cousins to express their contempt for an unnecessary backsliding at a time when everything connected with Islam was an unutterable abomination to the Hindu.

However, be the origin of the word Rangar what it may, the term was in general use until a few years ago, and as far as the writer can ascertain few of those to whom it was applied resented its use, and even to-day if one casually asks a Mahometan Rajput what he is, more often than not one will receive the reply 'I am a Rangar,' and quite naturally. The man may be a turncoat, but presumably he considered there was something meretorious in changing his faith, otherwise he would not have done so except by compulsion. However, a paternal Government has decreed that the obnoxious term shall be expunged from all official documents and use, and Mahometan Rajput substituted therefor. It may be mentioned that in some parts of the United Provinces and Punjab this class is known as Khanzada.

In the early days of his conversion the Rangar maintained nearly all his Rajput idiosyncrasies, but naturally with the lapse of time these have somewhat faded out and nowadays he has distinct characteristics of his own. Like most Mahometans enlisted in the Indian Army he and the Khaimkhanis belong to the Sunni division, but beyond that few of the general remarks on Mahometans published in the October number apply to the Mahometan Rajput. The Rangar makes a quite steady soldier, full of go when roused. He is a good shot, horseman, scout, and horsemaster, and nowadays there is a tendency for him to supplant the Hindustani Mahometan. His quiet demeanour is sometimes mistaken for 'undue meekness,' which is quite an error. In the Cavalry they grow the hair of their face in a distinctive manner of their own, in fact one can generally tell a Rangar or Khaimkhani by the way he dresses his beard. During the past few years there has

been a noticeable tendency for all classes, other than the Sikh, to shave the chin and only retain a moustache. This is due to the more strenuous training now demanded which curtails the time available for attention to the niceties of arranging an ample beard (quite a serious undertaking for a smart N.C.O. or officer who has 'ideas' on the subject).

The following units enlist this class: 3rd, 4th, 33rd, 38th, 39th, and 42nd Deolis one squadron each, the 32nd two squadrons. They are to be found, however, in many other units which enlist Hindustani Mahometans, especially the 21st, 22nd, 23rd, and 25th. It will be noticed that with the exception of the 42nd Deolis all are described in the official Army List as Mahometan Rajputs; the 42nd Deolis still retain the name Rangar—possibly an oversight.

The Khaimkhani derives his name from the following circumstance :

Of six Chohan Rajput brothers three seceded from Hinduism; one of these Khaim Singh, the eldest, changed the Singh to Khan, and from him and his other two brothers are descended Khaimkhanis. Being much more closely in touch with that portion of Rajputana which so strictly preserves the purity of its Rajput families the Khaimkhanis have maintained their Rajput traits more closely than the Rangars, so much so that until a few years ago it was no uncommon occurrence to meet with Khaimkhani youths who had not been circumcised. Further, Hindus and Khaimkhanis attend one another's entertainments freely, meeting on the friendliest of terms in a manner not often seen outside the great presidency capitals, where, of course, the levelling-up process incidental to all great cities forces the better classes into much closer contact than in out-of-the-way villages in the wastes of Rajputana. In appearance and manner they closely resemble Rangars, and in the Cavalry dress their beards the same way, although many of them do not grow a beard at all. The Jodhpore Imperial Service Lancers have a squadron of them who shave and dress exactly like their Rahtore cousins, and it is extremely difficult for one not acquainted with them to tell a Khaimkhani from a Rahtore. As a rule the Khaimkhani speaks a purer and more clearly pronounced Hindustani. They are extremely strict about their matrimonial affairs, and although they cannot follow the strict rules of exogamy practised by the Rajputs they do so as far as their restricted community permits.

Their marriage ceremonies are still very Hindu in ritual. Their clan registers are kept with great precision, and in this respect they are far stricter than other Mahometan Rajputs. In their own country they avoid as far as possible eating with anyone not on their clan registers, but in the Army will mess with any Mussulman. Previous to their conversion they intermarried with the flower of the Rajput race, but as only a comparatively small number broke away their marriage circle is somewhat restricted.

They do not give their daughters in marriage to Mahometans other than Khaimkhanis, but do now and again accept daughters from amongst certain Rangar families. Khaimkhanis have the same antipathy to handling agricultural implements that Rajputs have, but do not carry their objections to quite such lengths. Their women are in strict purdah, however.

The Khaimkhani is an excellent horseman, and is naturally endowed with the same graceful seat that the Rahtore possesses. This is to be expected as they live the same life, and the perpetual riding of the camel from early youth gives to their limbs the necessary suppleness and symmetry. Their country is almost desert and is very similar to that of Marwar (in fact many of them are inhabitants of Marwar), but possibly with not quite so much of the 'abode of death' about it.

The Khaimkhanis speak Hindustani fairly well, and many of the better educated write it in both Persian and Nagri characters, but the latter is the more common. They are the only Mahometans that the writer is aware of, enlisted in Cavalry, who write the Nagri character in preference to Persian.

NOTES ON ILLUSTRATIONS.

17. Hindustani Mahometan Trooper in ordinary mufti, after joining the army.
18. Khaimkhani Officer.
19. Khaimkhani apparelled for a local gathering.
20. Hindustani Dafadar in drill-order.
21. Khaimkhani Trooper in drill-order.
22. Khaimkhani Trooper in mufti, after joining the army.
23. Khaimkhani recruit in ordinary village attire.
24. Hindustani Indian Officer in ordinary mufti.





ON SHOEING

By VET.-CAPTAIN G. B. C. REES-MOGG, *1st Life Guards*

BEFORE commencing to discuss Lieut.-Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson's article on Shoeing I shall, as briefly as possible, describe the anatomy and physiology of the horse's foot, as I consider it vitally important for everyone to thoroughly understand the various parts of the foot, nearly all of which have a special function to perform.

The foot of the horse consists of a variety of living structures, differing in form and texture and enclosed in a horny covering called the hoof.

It can be divided into two parts:—

- I. The insensitive, or horn.
- II. The sensitive, or vascular.

I.—THE INSENSITIVE, OR HORN

The wall (figs. 1 and 2) covers the front and sides of the foot.

It extends from the coronet downwards and slightly outwards, so that its lower circumference is greater than its upper. At the heels the wall is turned in upon itself and passes forwards towards the centre of the foot until it becomes lost in the structure of the sole.

Thus the wall is an incomplete circle of horn, the circle being broken at the posterior part of the foot, and the piece of wall which might have completed the circle is sharply bent on itself and caused to run in practically the opposite direction. When we consider this arrangement it is easy to see the advantages gained by it.

The hoof is not a rigid body, but a yielding one.

It would be difficult to understand how any lateral movement could take place had the wall been a complete circle.

A. These turned-in portions of the wall are called the bars (fig. 2, B), and serve two purposes: (a) They increase the bearing surface of the wall, and by embracing a part of the sole on each side they afford an increased solidity to the union of the wall with the rest of the hoof; (b) they act as buttresses, preventing the shrinking in of the heels. The

lower border of the wall is the chief bearing surface of the foot. It encircles the sole, than which it is usually more prominent. If we detach the wall its inner surface is seen to consist of a number of thin horny projections, running parallel to each other from above downwards and forwards. These are called the horny laminae (fig. 1, B).

A section of wall shows variations in its thickness (fig. 3). *It is thickest at the toe, becoming gradually thinner towards the heels, thus affording strength and solidity to resist wear at one part as well as pliancy at another to ward off concussion.*

If the wall were as thick at the heels as at the toe it would have been a rigid box. It will be shown that it is a yielding box, and that the yielding which occurs corresponds to the thin wall of the heel.

The reason why the wall is thick at the toe is that this is the region of the greatest friction and also owing to the wear and tear of the foot at this part. The final propulsion is given to the body by the toe, so the toe is the last part to leave the ground.

Two physical conditions have therefore to be provided for in the wall, viz. *elasticity of the posterior part and toughness of the anterior part.* The first is provided by the wall being thinner (fig. 3) at the heels than elsewhere; but besides being thinner the wall of the heel contains more moisture than the wall of the toe, and this moisture ensures elasticity.

The layers of the wall are hardest externally, becoming softer as they approach the inner surface, a condition due to the outer layers being exposed to friction and evaporation.

This is a simple and valuable provision of Nature which should not be interfered with. (Figs. 4 and 5.)

The hard outer layer is best adapted to withstand wear, and its density protects the deeper layers from evaporation. This maintains the whole wall at the degree of softness and toughness which best preserves elasticity and strength of horn.

B. The sole (figs. 1, 2, and 6) is that division of the hoof which forms the floor of the foot. It is slightly arched and posteriorly is divided by a triangular space, into which the frog fits. Its structure is fibrous.

Use is to afford protection to the sensitive parts above it. Under the influence of the body weight the sole becomes slightly flatter. When we come to study the expansion of the foot the object of this flattening will be more apparent.

The sole grows from the sensitive sole.

C. The Frog (figs. 1, 2, and 7) is the smallest division of the hoof and is a triangular-shaped body filling up the space between the bars. Its base is rounded and prominent. The point of the frog, much the harder part, extends forward to the centre of the sole.

Though situated between the bars, the frog is only attached to their upper border, the sides remaining free and separate. Thus, on each side is formed a deep fissure, *which permits the frog to expand laterally* when compressed, without the entire force being continued to the sides of the foot. The frog is elastic and when pressed upon must expand.

The centre of the frog presents a depression or cleft caused by the doubling in of the horn. The cleft should be shallow and rounded. It serves two purposes: it increases the mobility of the frog, and, by breaking the regularity of the surface, affords a secure foothold on level surface. The frog is not a thick solid mass, but a layer of horn following the outline of the structures within, which are similarly prominent and irregular in surface. In structure the frog is composed of a peculiar soft elastic horn, possessing something of the character and appearance of indiarubber. It contains much more moisture than that of any other part of the foot, and it is this moisture which confers on it its peculiar soft, pliable condition.

II.—THE SENSITIVE, OR VASCULAR

A. The Sensitive Laminæ (figs. 8 L and 10 L).—Corresponding to the horny leaves on the inside of the wall, the sensitive foot presents an arrangement of minute parallel folds which are called the sensitive laminæ. In laminitis the wall of the toe is often pushed forward out of position by a horny mass formed by the laminæ, and so there arises the deformity of an excessive thickness of toe (fig. 27).

B. The Coronary Band (figs. 8 E and 10 K).—This is a convex band which runs round the upper border of the foot and is turned downwards and inwards at the heels. It is the source from which the wall is produced.

C. The Sensitive Sole (figs. 9 and 10) is that portion of the quick to which the sole is attached. It is scarlet in colour.

D. The Sensitive Frog (figs. 8 F and 10) in structure resembles the sensitive sole, but its papillæ are much smaller and the surface is

D

smoother. The irregular prominent surface of the frog, with its cleft and the space at each side of it, is exactly reproduced on the sensitive frog, as might be expected, for the one is moulded on the other. It is not attached to the bones of the foot, except by its point, but is situated between the two posterior branches of the coffin bone, and has as a basis a mass of soft tissue which forms an important cushion or pad, viz. the frog pad or plantar cushion.

E. Frog Pad (figs. 10, 11, and 12).—It forms the bulbs of the heels and is the soft basis upon which is spread the sensitive frog. It extends from side to side of the foot between the two lateral cartilages, and fills up the space within the hoof behind the body of the coffin bone. Its structure may be described roughly as consisting of a network of fibrous bands, having the interstices filled up with elastic tissue. Down the centre of the pad runs a vertical partition of inelastic fibres; from this strong fibrous bands pass to each cartilage, and so the whole of the back part of the foot is tied together. The heels and quarters may be pressed together to some extent, but they are prevented from being forced asunder by the fibrous connections of the frog pad. During progression the downward movement of the coronet bone is provided for by this soft pad, and so is an upward movement of the frog when an excessive bearing is placed upon it. The frog pad serves other purposes besides those we have just referred to.

It is essentially a cushion or pad to prevent jar or concussion, and it also plays an important part in the action of the foot.

Uses of the Frog Pad or Plantar Cushion

This is one of the chief anti-concussion mechanisms in the foot. It is there to break the jar, and it does so by receiving, in conjunction with the posterior wall, the impact of the foot on coming to the ground; this is imparted to the plantar cushion, and through the lateral cartilages to the wall of the foot, which bulges, or, as it is termed, expands.

In breaking the jar (not only to the foot but to the whole limb) it is assisted by its elastic, rubber-like nature. The foot pad needs, for its perfectly healthy condition, contact with the ground. If the frog pad be kept off the ground the part atrophies, the heels contract, the foot is rendered smaller, and the frog pad becomes diseased. This wasted condition of the pad and narrow foot may be restored by pressure. But that pressure must be ground pressure.




FIG. 1.—SECTION OF HORSE'S HOOF.

A, Wall; B, Horny Laminae; C, Groove; D, White Line; E, Inner Surface of Sole; F, Frog; G, Periople.



FIG. 2.—GROUND SURFACE OF THE FOOT.

A, Sole; B, Bars; C, Frog; D, Seat of corn; E, Crust or wall.




FIG. 4.

A, Crust rasped low down.



FIG. 5.

A, Crust rasped high up.



FIG. 6.—THE SOLE WITH FROG REMOVED.




FIG. 3.—TRANSVERSE SECTION OF WALL, SHOWING VARIATION IN THICKNESS.




FIG. 7.—THE FROG, DETACHED FROM THE SOLE.



FIG. 8.

A, The wall or crust; B, Insensitive sole; D, Sensitive sole; C, Insensitive frog; F, Sensitive frog; E, Coronary band; G, Small pastern bone; H, Great pastern bone; I, Flexor perforans tendon; X, Seat of sprain in navicular disease; O, Navicular bone; L, Sensitive laminae; LL, Insensitive laminae; K, Os pedis; M, Long inferior sesamoid ligament; N, Extensor pedis tendon.

The apparent position of the Os pedis pointing down so much at the toe is due to the section being made in the centre of the bone, where it is most concave. The lateral appearance would be flat.



FIG. 9.—THE SENSITIVE SOLE.

It is possible, by means of a bar shoe, to throw considerable pressure on the pad and heels, but the foot still contracts; it is only when the pad is bearing on the ground that it continues in a healthy condition and retains its normal size. Foot-pad pressure is, therefore, one of the rules in shoeing if the part is to be able to exercise its natural functions.

F. Lateral Cartilages (figs. 13 and 16) are situated one on either side of the foot, partly within and partly without the hoof. They form the basis upon which the back part of the wall is moulded, and being elastic permit a certain amount of movement in the posterior parts of the foot. If the coffin bone filled the whole hoof the foot would be too rigid. Between the two lateral cartilages and behind the coffin bone is a large space, which is filled up by a mass of soft tissue, viz. the frog pad, which has been already described.

Function of the Lateral Cartilages

(1) They form an elastic wall to the sensitive foot and afford attachment to the vascular laminæ.

(2) As the foot increases in width (expansion) the cartilages carry outwards the sensitive laminæ which are attached, and so prevent any disturbance of the union of the insensitive and sensitive laminæ.

(3) Large venous vessels pass through and close to the cartilages of the foot, and the movements of the cartilages assist the venous circulation.

(4) The object of having lateral cartilages in the foot is to admit of expansion under the influence of the body-weight. This increase in the width of the foot is brought about by pressure on the frog pad, which widens and presses on the bars at H (fig. 16), and at the same time tends to flatten the plantar cushion, both of which factors force the cartilages slightly outwards.

G. The Coronary Cushion is another mass of tissue of a similar nature to the frog pad. It is situated just above the upper border of the hoof and gives to the coronet its prominence and elasticity. It contains many vessels and nerves (figs. 14, 15).

Anti-Concussion Mechanism (fig. 16).

The whole physiology of the foot is a consideration of the factors whereby the parts are saved from concussion in spite of wear, tear, and jar. The mechanisms which exist in the foot to save concussion

are not only intended for the protection of the foot, but also to save the limb. They are as follows :—

- (i) The yielding articulation in the pedal joint.
- (ii) The increase in the width of the foot when the heels come to the ground, known as expansion.
- (iii) The elastic foot pad.
- (iv) The slight descent of the pedal bone, and with it of the sole.

Expansion (figs. 17 and 18)

In all fast paces, when the foot comes to the ground the posterior wall and foot pad first receive the weight. Under the influence of the body-weight the foot pad is compressed and becomes wider. The plantar cushion, with which it is closely in contact, is also compressed and becomes wider. The effect of this increase in width is that the foot pad presses on the bars, while the plantar cushion presses on the cartilages, both yielding laterally, force apart the wall at the heels.

When the weight is taken off the foot the heels return to their original position and the foot becomes narrower. The increase in width which the foot undergoes is something very small, about $\frac{1}{8}$ inch. The area over which the wall expands can be seen in fig. 17. The shaded portion of the heel represents the part which yields laterally. Small as the increase is, it still makes all the difference between a yielding and an unyielding block of horn being brought to the ground; it 'gives' instead of offering resistance, and this 'give' is sufficient to prevent the hoof from being fractured, while the pad, which has largely caused the expansion, has acted as a buffer and assisted to destroy concussion. There is no point in the physiology of the foot which has given rise to greater discussion than the question of expansion, but its existence has been proved by Lungwitz in Germany and F. Smith in this country.

I now intend discussing various statements made by Lieut.-Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson.

1. The Colonel seems to have been exceptionally unlucky in having 9 horses suffering from laminitis. On looking through the report of the Army Veterinary Service for 1911-12, I find that there were only 173 admissions for laminitis, 4 destructions, and 32 cast out of the total strength of 22,750 horses, which is a very small percentage. Perhaps it might be possible that some of the 9 were not cases of laminitis.

2. "Applying the principles of a common-sense theory to shoeing."

I assert that the whole paper fails to disclose any principles. It describes a practice of shoeing founded on error and opposed to all principles.

The practice recommended is the very simple one of leaving the heels of the foot disproportionately high, which, of course, tends to destroy the function of the frog and distorts the shape of the foot (figs. 19, 20, 21, and 22).

3. "Everyone knows the ideal foot."—I regret to say that I do not. Very many horses have anything but good-shaped feet, but still remain sound for life; and, *per contra*, there are many cases of chronic foot lameness in horses that have the best-shaped feet.

4. "Walk on its toes, which coming first in contact with the ground."

No horse in health ever brings his toe down first. Instantaneous photography has shown that on level ground at all paces the horse touches the ground first with the heel. Nature arranged the parts of the hoof accordingly (*vide* Frog, Frog Pad and Uses).

5. "A deal of manual exertion is required in rasping down a month's growth from the toe end of the sole."

The sole ought never to be touched at all, and the practice of rasping it cannot be too strongly condemned. As will be seen under 'Anatomy of the Sole,' it is there for one purpose, viz. for protection to the sensitive parts above it. It cannot, therefore, be too thick.

6. "In the Diagrams 1 and 2 *re* Centre of Gravity" (fig. 26).

The perpendicular line is quite arbitrary and may be put anywhere, according to the theory of the draughtsman. Of course, both diagrams are exaggerated.

7. "The extra length of foot and the long leverage ensuing will cause the walls gradually to become concave."

This is a most astounding statement to make. If this were true, every horse that is turned out to grass and whose toes grow a great length would get his walls concave, and more or less deformity of the foot would result.

The concavity of the wall is due to alteration in the sensitive foot, and is not in any way due to the length of the toe.

8. "Hence that often mysterious lameness, &c., sometimes diagnosed laminitis, sometimes unexplained."




FIG. 10.

Perpendicular mesial section of right fore-foot (the position of the lower bones is shown rather too upright). *A*, lower end of great metacarpus; *B*, suffraginis or pastern bone; *C*, inner sesamoid bone (to render the bone visible a portion of the intersesamoid ligament has been removed); *D*, coronet bone; *E*, pedal bone; *F*, navicular bone; *a*, extensor pedis tendon; *b*, superior sesamoid or suspensory ligament; *b'*, inferior sesamoid ligament; *c*, flexor pedis perforatus tendon; *c'*, great sesamoid sheath; *d*, flexor pedis perforans tendon; *e*, capsular ligament of the fetlock joint; *f*, capsular ligament of pastern joint; *g* and *g'*, capsular ligament of coffin joint; *h*, bursa of flexor pedis perforans; *i*, plantar cushion; *j*, portion of plantar cushion forming the bulb of the heel; *k*, coronary band; *l*, sensitive wall; *m*, sensitive sole; *n*, sensitive frog; *o*, horny wall; *p*, horny sole; *q*, horny frog; *r*, ergot at base of fetlock; *s*, skin.



FIG. 17.—DIAGRAM TO ILLUSTRATE THE EXPANSION OF THE FOOT (LUNGWITZ.)



FIG. 14.—ANTERO-LATERAL VIEW OF BONES OF FOOT.

A, lower end of metacarpus; *B*, pastern; *C*, outer sesamoid; *D*, coronet; *E*, pedal bone.



FIG. 12.—LONGITUDINAL SECTION OF THE FOOT.

1, The corona; 2, the pedis; 3, the navicular; 4, the horn wall; 5, the horn sole; 6, 6, the foot-pad; 7, 7, the plantar cushion; 8, the perforans tendon passing under the navicular bone, to be inserted in pedis; 9, the wall-secreting substance; 10, the extensor pedis tendon; 11, junction of wall and sole, the 'white line.'




FIG. 11.—SECTION OF FOOT SHOWING THE FROG-PAD, AT EACH SIDE THE CUT EDGE OF THE LATERAL CARTILAGE.



FIG. 13.—THE LATERAL CARTILAGE.



FIG. 15.—SECTION OF FOOT.




FIG. 16.—PORTION OF THE WALL REMOVED, TO SHOW THE POSITION OF THE RIGID AND ELASTIC SENSITIVE FOOT.

A, wall of the foot; *B*, the lateral cartilage; *G*, a line which represents the coronet; *C*, the pedal bone—the line of union between the pedal bone and lateral cartilage is well seen; *F*, is a portion of the corona; *D*, a portion of the sole exposed by the removal of the wall; *E*, the heel of the wall left at its plantar surface to show the arrangement of the bar, *H*, which passes behind and within the lateral cartilage *B*. The figure, which is accurately drawn from a photograph, is intended to show what an extensive surface the lateral cartilage presents, and the variety of surfaces to which the sensitive laminae are attached; they cover *B*, *C*, and *F*, the latter in the living animal being the position of the extensor pedis tendon and lateral ligament of the foot, to which the laminae are attached. Further, the figure shows the division of the internal foot into an elastic and a rigid portion.

I would suggest that when this lameness is not mythical it cannot be explained.

9. "Perpetual pressure and the foot drops."

Unfortunately, the majority of cases of mysterious lameness occur in the best of feet, with perfect walls and no rings or marks, and no drop.

On the other hand, rings or marks are often found on the feet of perfectly sound horses.

10. "Allow the heels to grow."

If the heels are allowed to grow beyond the frog, then the frog and frog pad (Nature's wonderful shock absorber) atrophy, and cannot do the work that they are meant to do (*vide* Uses of Frog Pad above); the frog cannot come to the ground, and the foot cannot expand (*vide* Expansion above).

11. "In the case of a horse which is actually lame from 'this so-called' laminitis."

I do not understand what the Colonel means by "so-called."

12. "The sole of the foot at the toe must be rasped until it almost bleeds."—As I have said in No. 5, the sole ought not to be rasped, and to rasp a sole until it nearly bleeds is unjustifiable.

13. "No laminitis except temporarily from stomachic troubles."

I should like to ask the Colonel, What are the stomach troubles which cause temporary laminitis? When laminitis does occur from gastro-intestinal derangement it is usually acute and by no means temporary.

14. "Owing to the more upright position of the pastern and fetlock there will be less strain on the ligaments and tendons."

Owing to the upright position of the pastern the weight is directed towards the front of the foot, causing it to fall more immediately on the bony columns, and much of the elastic reaction of the tendinous and ligamentous structures behind is lost to the limb. I think this is a good example of the cure being worse than the disease (fig. 23).

15. "The shape desired. Note the upright wall, the high heel, and the circular shape" (fig. 24).

I do not consider this the shape desired by any means. Even if it were, no more detrimental practice could be adopted than the systematic attempt to bring all horses' feet to this form, *as feet vary in shape as much as other parts of the body*.

16. "Re the nails."—Why does the Colonel like one nail (fig. 24)




FIG. 18.—DIAGRAMS TO SHOW THE AREA OVER WHICH THE WALL EXPANDS, AND TO ILLUSTRATE THE RETREAT OF THE ANTERIOR CORONARY EDGE OF THE HOOF, AND THE SINKING OF THE HEELS (LUNGWITZ).

A, The unbroken outline shows the shape of the foot with no weight on it; the dotted outline illustrates the retreat of the coronary edge in front and sinking of the heels; B, In this figure the hoof is looked at from above; the unbroken outline is the coronary edge from heel to heel. The dotted line shows the change in shape it undergoes under the influence of the weight of the body; in A the shaded part of the wall is to illustrate the area which expands.



FIG. 23.—UPRIGHT FOOT.




FIG. 19.—A PROPORTIONATE HOOF.




FIG. 20.—A DISPROPORTIONATE HOOF—HEELS TOO LOW.




FIG. 21.—A DISPROPORTIONATE HOOF—HEELS TOO HIGH.




FIG. 22.—A 'STUMPED-UP' TOE.




FIG. 24.—THE SHAPE DESIRED. (Note the upright wall, the high heel, and the circular shape.)



FIG. 25.—FULLER AND SEATED—OUT SHOE.




FIG. 26.



FIG. 27.—SECTION OF HOOF IN LAMINITIS.

to be at the very front of the toe and one over the seat of corn each side? The latter I consider would be very likely to produce corns. *Vide* fig. 25 for nails to be in their proper place.

17. "It is possible that the horse may move as if shin sore."

I consider that the horse is *foot* sore.

18. "It is possible that the horse may move as if *shin* sore for months."—Thus the writer confesses that his cure may cause lameness for months.

19. "Nature's wonderful shock absorber, the pastern joint."

I have never heard that the pastern joint was Nature's wonderful shock absorber. It has no more power to do this than the shoulder joint. Nature's wonderful shock absorber is the frog and the frog pad (*vide* Frog Pad and its Use above).

20. "*Re* the number of cases."

I should like to know how many cases occurred of sore feet, as the Colonel has already confessed that the cure often causes horses, previously sound, no doubt, to go lame for months.

21. "The truth is that any foot can be made and kept in a more or less perfect shape."

I think the *artificial* shape is more accurate than perfect, and I think that continuous attempts to reduce by shortening natural forms of feet to an artificial ideal are simply mischievous.

22. "To-day I say without exaggeration that, under the present methods in this regiment, there is only one shape (of feet), and that more or less a perfect one."

Judging by the writer's diagram of a perfect shape, it means that he likes the heels to be too high, and that by mechanical means it is possible to alter the shape and growth of the horse's foot.

My best thanks are due to the following :—

To Mr. Hunting, F.R.C.V.S. London, and to Mr. Wallis Hoare, F.R.C.V.S., Cork, for giving me many suggestions. To Major-General F. Smith, C.B., D.S.O., and Mr. Hunting, whose books on physiology and shoeing have been of the greatest service to me. Nearly all the pictures have been taken from these two books. To Mr. Macqueen, F.R.C.V.S., Professor of Surgery at the Royal Veterinary College, who kindly read over the proof copy and made various corrections and improvements.

REMOUNT TRAINING

By MAJOR PERCY HAMBRO, 15th (*The King's*) *Hussars*

THE pace of modern war is largely responsible for the increased demands on the power of endurance of the troop horse. It therefore behoves all nations to study closely the training of their remounts in peace, to see if this strain cannot be overcome or lessened by better methods, as, if not, full value will not be obtained from the Cavalry during the campaign.

To-day the aim of all remount training must be not merely to fit the horse to take his place in the ranks, but also to prepare him to undergo the hardships of war. Fitness for the ranks, which was in the past considered sufficient, may be defined as meaning that a horse when trained was capable of maintaining a controlled pace in the required direction across any country, either alone or when maintaining cohesion in the ranks. Little or no attention was paid to educating the horse to move in balance at all paces when in the ranks, nor was the provision of muscular energy in the early stages of the training considered essential. Yet both must now be recognised as obligatory for war fitness, as all agree that to obtain the full value from Cavalry in war the highest development of peace training for man and horse is essential.

Here we are mainly concerned with the horse. To secure the high standard demanded by war it should be an axiom that every remount at an early stage of his career in the Service should be fully muscled and taught to move at all paces properly balanced; and to ascertain whether the remount has reached this stage of training he should undergo carefully selected tests; partly because by this means errors in war training are brought out in peace, also because a horse once fully muscled and balanced can be more quickly brought back into war condition.

Research proves that all movement produces heat, which results

in fatigue, and that this fatigue can be minimised if the heat caused by movement is lessened; and the way to lessen heat is to make all movement in balance. Cavalry schools are demonstrating the value of balance for horses, and that balance can only be secured by first securing adequate muscular power.

To England in particular the provision of muscular power is of importance, as our island position entails at the outset of a campaign a diminution of strength varying according to the length of the voyage.

The English training reports show that during the last few years the distances covered by Infantry battalions have been gradually increasing, and with the increased distance has come increased rapidity, with no diminution of vital energy. Now these are the very points in which we wish the troop horse to excel. Two questions arise, How has this increased efficiency been brought about, and How can we secure the same results for the troop horse?

It is easiest to answer these questions in the correct sequence, and the answer to the first admits of no doubt. It is because the recruit on joining is put through a carefully graded course of instruction, with suitable food, which builds up his muscular system and teaches him when carrying his equipment to march properly balanced—*i.e.* to march without bringing any undue strain on any portion of his system. In these few words lies the answer to our second question. The secret of success with the man is the secret of success with the horse. Admit this, and it is clear that what we require is peace training and feeding, which, in addition to building up muscular power, will teach the horse to move in balance. Thus when called upon to carry his rider and equipment, he will do so with the least amount of friction and have adequate muscular power to perform his task.

It is not contended that any portion of the training of the horse that fitted him to take his place in the ranks should in any way be diminished; on the contrary, all that is urged is that the training should be carried further forward, and that it should have two chief aims:—

1. All movements to be made in balance.
2. The provision of adequate muscular power. Yet since a horse cannot move correctly in balance when carrying a weight, unless

adequately muscled, it follows that balance should be the furthest aim of our training; but so closely allied are balance and muscle that we must seek to obtain the two *pari passu*.

If we examine the anatomy of a horse with regard to balance we see that the horse with its heavy head at the end of a long slim neck is not unlike a heavy-headed stick held at the end, all the weight lies forward, resulting in a distinct downward tendency in front. The result of this uneven distribution of weight is that the centre of balance is further forward than the centre of the horse, its position varying as the horse raises or lowers his head. We know that the majority of troop horses break down in front, and that lack of power to carry the weight is the chief cause of these breakdowns. Hence if the weight on the forehead can be lightened by shifting the centre of balance further back, less strain will be brought to bear on the forelimbs, and the danger of breakdowns will be lessened.

We are now nearer to the answer to our question How can we give the troop horse balance and muscular power, and so ensure increased mobility and rapidity in war? The answer would seem to be easy of explanation, and the means for accomplishing it already provided; for if, by means of the reins, we lift the horse's head, the result will be that the centre of balance of the horse will be shifted further back, therefore less weight will be carried by the weakest part, the forelimbs.

But there are two ways of accomplishing this raising of the head—a right and a wrong way; and if a horse's head is raised by the action of the reins only several evils will inevitably result. The principal ones are, that the horse's mouth will be ruined; that the head will either be carried too high with the nose tilted in the air, which entails loss of control; or that in raising the head by the reins alone, the horse may learn to lean on the rider's hand, tiring the rider, and resulting in worse evils than those we intend to cure. Moreover, it is opposed to all past or present theory and practice for a horseman to ride, so to speak, with his hands in his mouth. Ridicule alone would kill this proposition if it were put forward; and it is recognised that after raising the hands to a certain height, varying with each rider, loss of control over the horse is the only result obtained, and the effort of holding the hands so high becomes fatiguing.

Thus the reins, which at first seemed to be a ready instrument

for our purpose, on examination prove to be almost a snare; yet it will be shown that, if used correctly in conjunction with other aids, their use is essential if we are to secure balance and the muscular power capable of sustaining prolonged rapid movement.

By comparison with the case of the man, we learn that balance should be demanded at the very earliest stages of the training, and must come with the growth of muscular power, and that both are secured only by long and patient work. Here, then, are two facts on which we may build—first, that to obtain our object we must commence our demands at the earliest stages of training; and secondly, that time must be given to the training period.

This brings us a step further, and we must now differentiate between breaking and training. Whether a young horse is to be trained or broken must be largely a question of money and time. Can we afford to go slow with a remount's training when he is young? And, if we do go slow, shall we later on get back value for time and money thus spent? The reply should not be given by those who buy to sell, nor by the small private owner. The English Army authorities by recent regulations show that they consider the policy of going slow highly desirable. But we must also consider the different conditions of the Silladar Cavalry. Will they be able to afford the initial expenditure entailed by this prolongation of training? If the results claimed—viz. increased length of service in the ranks, &c.—are sufficiently clearly demonstrated, the system advocated will no doubt be adopted; but the finances of a Silladar regiment do not admit of costly experiments. The advantages to be derived from prolongation of training require, therefore, very clear demonstration before we can expect to see its universal adoption.

To break a horse the usual system adopted is to get him quiet by tiring him—*i.e.* weakening his muscular energy by some process that is not too drastic; and then, when tired, teaching him. If the horse shows temper, or his muscular energy becomes too apparent, he is either long reined, or, regardless of balance, sacks of earth are placed on his back and he is lunged or otherwise exercised until the cause of unrest is overcome. Under the above conditions the horse will probably, in a short while, do what his trainer requires; and, if this course of treatment be continued, the horse will learn what is required from him. Since this process has produced the required result without

bringing into too high a light its glaring faults, it is looked upon as calling for no comment. It is, moreover, dear to the heart of many of us, as it has the sanctified odour of well-established custom. This gradual elimination of all ambition in the horse, of all confidence in the trainer, may be further added to by a judicious curtailment of the horse's grain ration without the loss of vital energy being too greatly apparent! And, by being careful not to overdo the two processes, a horse that will go in the ranks can be produced in about eight months. But to accomplish this the horse's whole system has been subjected to a very severe strain for a considerable period during his youth—that is to say, at the time when every ounce of muscular energy is required for his education. A gradual and partial recovery is probable when the strains of breaking are over, but the evil effects can never be entirely eradicated from the system, and, though not apparent at this period, the horse is at an early age prematurely worn out. Great damage is also done during breaking by the strain that is brought to bear on the muscular system from being constantly ridden in a manège or closed school. The constant turnings, usually 80 to 100 in a mile, sometimes at a fast pace, are more apt to produce waste of muscular tissue than the gradual building-up of that power which is so necessary for a horse that is being prepared to withstand the trials of war.

Before considering the question of training let us look at the remount that has to be taught. In England a young horse perhaps muscled a little, perhaps grass-fed only; in India probably an Arab or Colonial, or possibly a stud-bred, or country-bred animal, an older horse usually than the remount of England, but (except in the case of stud-bred or remount depot-fed horses) raw and unhandled, often with no muscle at all. Now the very first step in training for war should mark its difference from breaking for the ranks.

The first care of the trainer must be to build up muscle, to bring no strain to bear on the remount until he is fit to withstand it. Also, during this first period of training, the trainer must seek to establish confidence between the horse and himself to such a degree that all fear is removed; and as confidence is gained so must a moral superiority be established, which will ensure prompt and unquestioning obedience from the outset of the training. A horse soon learns from a system of small rewards and punishments combined with firmness that whole-hearted obedience must be given; and this moral

factor once established is of the very greatest assistance to the trainer in the later stages of the training.

Space forbids us to pursue this phase of the subject further, and we must pass on to the other stages of training. It must be clear that 'high head carriage' is an early step towards obtaining the full value from balance, and to obtain this high carriage experience proves that early attention must be paid to the strengthening of the muscles of the neck. Provided certain exercises are wisely followed out, the requisite height of carriage should be assured, but it should be an invariable rule that these exercises are carried out 'on the move,' no matter whether the trainer is mounted or dismounted.

In a short while the muscles of the neck strengthen, the head carriage of the horse becomes automatically improved, and the centre of balance is shifted further back, which is not only a step towards balance, but secures lightness and freedom of movement in front.

All horses do not require training in their head carriage, and some, owing to configuration, can never acquire good head carriage, nor when obtained will perfect head carriage by itself give balance or actually increase the power of endurance of the horse. But it is a step forward, and, as in the man so in the horse, more work will be obtainable at less cost to vital energy if the horse is properly balanced from the commencement of his training, and if, during this period, his constitution is gradually built up with suitable food, and exercises only in proportion to his muscular power are undertaken. Training, to ensure success, must not be hurried and must be continued until the horse moves sub-consciously with his centre of balance so placed as best to withstand the strain of prolonged endurance.

The trainer, when mounted and engaged in the further stage of teaching the remount the exercises which will secure and retain for him the desired high carriage, has at his command two main aids—'the legs and the reins.' In the exercises under consideration the former should be used to push the horse on to the bit; the latter whilst acting in alternating harmony with the former, and taking off the unused energy imparted by the legs, must assist in retaining the horse's head in the high position necessary for balance, the fault of pulling the bit on to the bars of the mouth being most carefully avoided.

Now, so that it may be possible to put a horse in balance once

the horse himself has learnt what balance is, it is necessary that the horse should be 'in hand.' To secure this, the head must be bent correctly at the poll and the lower jaw relaxed to the bit—i.e. direct flexion to the last degree. When these requirements, in addition to balance, have been secured, the trainer will begin to have complete command over his horse and be free to use his weapons to the greatest advantage; and the horse will perform the exercises required of him with suppleness and ease. Of the two chief methods advocated to teach a horse direct flexion, the mounted method where the horse is all the time on the move is now recognised as the more gentle; it possibly takes a little longer, but in the end is more satisfactory; and it is more certain in its effect if the rider will remember that here also the secret of success lies in pushing the horse on to the bit, and not in pulling the bit on to the horse.

At all periods of the horse's training a free and judicious use of the rider's legs, and the employment of the hands so that they take and give with the legs are essential. It is only the combined action of legs and hands acting in alternating harmony 'on the whole mass' which will gain for us what is required—namely, to make the horse yield to the bit in balance.

Let us review what has been sought for in these stages of training for war. We see that a moral superiority has been firmly established, confidence exists between horse and trainer, the centre of balance has been shifted towards the centre of the horse, thus lightening the forelimbs and conferring the other advantages mentioned. The horse has been brought into the rider's hand without spoiling his mouth or temper, and his constitution has for some months during the training period been carefully built up with adequate muscular exercises. Surely a logical sequence of training.

Our object seems to be accomplished, for the strain on the weakest part has been lightened, and the horse is balanced in front and 'in hand' ready to bear the strains of war. But there are still pitfalls, and before complete balance and collectedness of movement can be assured the hindquarters must be brought under the centre of the horse in due proportion as the balance of weight is shifted back by the raising of the head and neck. Also the horse must be taught to move with equilibrium—i.e. lateral balance. The value of horizontal balance has been shown; to obtain true balance the maintenance of

E

balance plus equilibrium is essential, for we know that any untrue movement produces undue fatigue and consequent breakdown.

The acquirement and maintenance of equilibrium is more easy of accomplishment than that of balance, and is acquired and maintained by the use of lateral aids during the time of training; but, inasmuch as the soldier like the polo player has only one hand available for control in the hour of trial, the remount must, towards the completion of his training, learn to maintain equilibrium with the slightest of indications. There remains the final stages of muscling, which are best completed after true balance has been acquired.

To secure these advantages we must inculcate a system of horse training which will procure for the troop horse permanent balance and adequate muscular power to withstand the demands of war. Now we can only expect results proportionate to the skill of the rider, and as these results must necessarily be individual results, the provision of a body of horsemen, skilled enough to bring out the full effects of the methods taught, and so thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the training as to give full value to the system advocated, demands most careful attention. In short, hand in hand with horse-training must be taught and demonstrated a course of recruits training which will go progressively forward, and ensure that the recruit when a trained horseman fully understands the meaning of, and is able to apply correctly, the aids which are mentioned above.

It is thus by a wise and carefully graded course of training for man and horse, that a material strength will be added to our Cavalry squadrons; and that gain will not only make itself apparent on the battlefield by greater numbers and increased cohesion in the ranks, but also in peace by longer service in the ranks.

THE STEEPLECHASE HORSE HIS PREPARATION AND TRAINING

By CAPTAIN HON. R. BRUCE, 11th (P.A.O.) *Hussars*

WHAT a subject to attempt to write an article on !

Volumes might be filled, and then only half the knowledge that it is necessary for a trainer to possess would be found in them. But this is not intended to be more than a chapter in the series of articles which are being published in this JOURNAL on the training of various types of horses.

An attempt will be made merely to sketch the principles on which a man might work if he so wished, to get his own horses fit to run, the carrying of them out being left to his own discretion and common-sense.

Too much stress cannot be laid on the fact that success will depend primarily on regular and punctual stable management, judicious feeding, and the most exacting daily watchfulness for a sign of anything being wrong before giving the horse his work.

Everyone who is asked the question will admit that no horse can be trained for a race until he is first of all brought to a state of 'condition' in which he is fit to be trained. If he is trained (by which is meant galloped) before he is fit for it, he will go back in condition instead of improving. But how often is this fact ignored by the amateur trainer ?

It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that it takes at least six months to get a well-conditioned horse wound up for a race, and a year or more any other horse.

ROUTINE.

The following routine is suggested :—

(1) 6 A.M.—The boys should be at stables; horses tied up; boxes cleaned out; horses dressed over, and given a little water and a small feed.

(2) 8 A.M.—Two to three hours' exercise.

(3) On return from exercise horses must be thoroughly groomed and wisped, after which they will be watered and fed, and given hay about 1 o'clock.

(4) Horses should not be disturbed between now and evening stables.

(5) 4.30 P.M.—Horses should be tied up, groomed and wisped, and comfortably bedded down; watered and fed at 5.30 P.M.

(6) 7 P.M.—Feed and give hay.

The above will probably be found to be the most convenient hours during the winter, but whatever the hours selected are they must be adhered to, as regularity is most important in training horses.

FORAGE AND FEEDING.

It will not be necessary here to describe the characteristics of good forage, as reference to any good veterinary book will supply this. It is only necessary to state here that the very best must be procured and will be found the cheapest in the end.

Oats must be old, and to insure getting this it is advisable to purchase a good supply towards the end of July. They must be thoroughly clean and free from dust and grit, thin-skinned for preference, and weighing certainly not less than 42 lb. the bushel.

Hay.—Good upland meadow hay, one year old and first crop, is best, with a variety of good grasses in it but not too much clover.

Beans or Peas must be hard and dry and taste sweet, and should be one year old. Must always be split before being given.

Bran.—The large flake, whitish-coloured bran containing plenty of flour is preferable to the small, redder-coloured samples.

Other articles of foodstuffs, such as linseed, carrots, oatmeal, &c., should all be at hand to be used when required.

Straw.—Good, clean, long wheat straw is the best for bedding. Horses are apt to eat oat straw if it is new, and if it is old it is very brittle and consequently is very wasteful.

The art of feeding may be said to comprise two-thirds of the difficulties in getting a horse fit. Some horses are dainty feeders and require all sorts of little additions to their staple food—oats—to get them to eat. Some on the other hand are gluttons and seem to get too

fat on nothing. Others will eat plenty of food, but will only eat small feeds at a time. Others bolt their food. Some horses will eat very little during the daytime, but will feed up well at night. And so on *ad infinitum*.

The would-be trainer of a horse must, therefore, study each horse's peculiarities if he is to be successful.

This, then, being the case, it is manifestly impossible to draw out a table showing how many pounds of corn, hay, &c., a horse should be given per diem.

There are two rules that must be observed, however, which govern all feeding of a horse in training. One is 'avoid feeding him in such a way that will fatten him inside'; and the other, 'be careful not to feed him in such a way that will dry him up.' What is wanted is a horse big in muscular condition, but not in belly, with a healthy, glossy, and loose skin, and 'full of himself,' and to arrive at this, besides studying the nature of the horse, a good practical knowledge must be possessed of the different properties contained in the various foodstuffs, the judicious combination of which will give the desired result, but if mixed ignorantly will not; information on this point if required can be found in any good veterinary book.

As has been said before, the horse must, before he is galloped, be brought up to a certain state of 'condition' first.

In some cases this will, of course, take longer than others, but in all cases the greatest patience on the part of the trainer is necessary. The work of a steeplechase horse during this period will simply consist of long spells of walking, trotting, and slow cantering. Very little improvement will be noticed for a long time as a rule, and, especially with only a few horses to train, the temptation will be great to find out 'what they can do' before they are really fit for it.

But if this temptation is given way to, many and various are the bad results.

The horse may go off his feed, he may break down, he may take a dislike to galloping. In fact, everything points to the wisdom of the two proverbs, 'Patience is a virtue' and 'More haste less speed.'

In getting a steeplechase horse into condition the value of a certain proportion of cooked food should not be overlooked, and if the horse is not a very gross one a good feed of cooked food twice a week for the afternoon feed will be found beneficial. A good mash of steamed oats,

bran, linseed, and chopped carrots is suggested. For a greedy horse crushed oats are better than whole oats, but it must not be forgotten that in bulk he will want more, as a measure of crushed oats is not nearly equivalent to a measure of whole oats in the amount of nutriment.

Crushed linseed (not boiled), mixed with the ordinary feed, about a handful, is good for the skin, or a small wineglass of linseed oil.

Rock salt should be in every manger, or placed somewhere in the box so that the horse can lick it.

Other points in stable management, such as plenty of light and fresh air, scrupulous cleanliness, and warm but not heavy clothing, must all be attended to if the best is to be got out of the horse.

A word here might be said about water. If it is possible to make the choice, soft water should be chosen in preference to hard, and if it is possible to maintain a sufficient supply of rain-water it is best of all; but great care must be exercised to keep all tanks and roof gutters clean. If it is not possible to collect a sufficient supply for constant use, then it must not be used at all, as it is infinitely worse for a horse to sometimes have hard water and sometimes soft than to always have hard.

Although, of course, the above is a very meagre description of the way to get a horse into 'condition,' it will perhaps be sufficient to bring out one point clearly, and that is that a great deal of care must be expended on a horse before he can be trained at all.

An attempt will now be made very briefly to describe his training and schooling, with a few remarks on the ordinary casualties and their treatment.

As has been said already about the feeding of the horse in the preliminary stages, so now is it even more important to study the individuality of each horse both with regard to his feeding and work.

There is more than one object to be attained when training a horse. It is not merely a question of bringing him up to the highest possible standard of fitness. This must, of course, be done; but besides this must also be found out, when he is fit, what his best distance is, what nature of 'going,' and what sort of course suits him best. Many disappointments will be the result of not being careful over such things, many horses being put down as useless which are simply being run out of their distance.

With regard to the work, it must be remembered that a steeplechase horse requires a very large proportion of slow, steady work—work that will exert him and harden him, but not distress him, combined with a certain amount of faster work to get his wind right. The proportion of fast and slow work will, of course, vary according to the animal.

As a general rule, it is always best to give a horse a canter half an hour or so before doing any fast work, and it should be an invariable rule that no horse must ever be galloped that is not feeding thoroughly well or that has anything whatever not quite right with him.

It is best that fast work should be done in company with other horses, as a horse will often not take much interest in his work if going alone and it is difficult to estimate the pace if not in company.

It is not possible even to suggest the right amount of fast work that horses should do, as so much depends on soundness, temperament, &c., &c. A hardy constitutioned horse, that is inclined to be lazy and that is sound, will take infinitely more work to get him fit than will a keen horse that is inclined to be nervous. The latter will lose in the actual gallop far more in tissue than the former, besides the chance of his not feeding up as well after it.

To make a general statement, perhaps it is near the mark to say that the average horse will lose during a race or good fast gallop as much tissue as will take him seven days' steady work and good feeding to get back again.

This will serve to show that unless sufficient time is allowed for a horse to recover, after his strength has been fully exerted, not only will he not improve in fitness but he will go back.

Of course during all this time of preparation and training, schooling over fences will form a certain proportion of the horse's work. Too much care cannot be taken over this to make a horse a free, quick, and a safe jumper, and what is most important, one that likes it. The best education to make them safe and fond of it is to have horses ridden with hounds when they are young by a good man. If they have learnt in this way they will very soon learn to take their fences freely and quickly after doing a few schools with older horses.

If this is not possible, then the greatest care must be taken to make them perfect over small stiff fences at a steady pace before they are asked to do any fast schools over regulation fences.

Sticks, shouting, and cracking of whips should be forbidden on

a schooling ground : they not only are the wrong way to get the better of a bad jumper, but they do harm to the good ones by frightening them.

If a horse is a stubborn refuser, then he must be taken out alone in spare time and got the better of, *not* by flogging, but by patience and firmness. If the man is determined long enough the horse will give in.

The majority of horses will jump after a fashion, but there are a great many that are careless in different ways, especially about taking off. A great many, too, get into bad habits at the start of jumping sideways, &c. But nearly all these things can be very easily put right if a little trouble is taken, and it is surely well worth the trouble !

Horses that have been taught to jump should nearly always be schooled two or three together, for the same reasons as have already been given for galloping horses in company. The pace and distance will, of course, depend on the amount of work that it is wanted the horse should do.

There is one thing, however, to be remembered about the pace, and that is that it should be slower between the fences than when the horse is coming to the fence and leaving it. The way to make a horse a good quick jumper is to collect him well between the fences so that he will be pulling and anxious to get on as he approaches the fence.

The amount of schooling that should be done will, like everything else in training, depend on the horse. But care must be taken not to overdo it in any case, as this will have the tendency of making even a real good jumper either sick of it or careless. This is especially the case with old horses. Even though they may be thoroughly good performers in public they will very likely be very bad jumpers on the schooling ground.

Schooling should not be reserved for only fine days and good going. Horses should be schooled on wet days and soft going just as much as any other, as they will very likely have to run on the very worst of going.

As time goes on the horse will gradually be getting fitter. The question is how to know when he is fit. Appearances are so very deceptive. A horse may look the picture of fitness even to an experienced eye, and yet not be so in the least. No one can really judge a horse's fitness who does not see him at his work, and then the mistake must not be made of thinking him fit because he doesn't sweat after a

gallop. A healthy horse in good condition will nearly always sweat after a good gallop, but his sweat will be clean and thin, not greasy and thick. People are apt to sometimes judge that a horse is fit because he 'doesn't turn a hair,' as they say, after a gallop, but this is faulty judgment. What would be a much more accurate estimate would be to use the other common expression, 'he wouldn't blow a candle out.' This is the real sign of fitness. Judge after a gallop how much distressed the horse is, which is easily gauged by looking at his eyes, nostrils, and flanks.

So far everything in this article has been written to try to impress the necessity of taking time and not overdoing the work; but the other mistake of underdoing it must not be fallen into either. Horses must be 'put through the mill' if they are to be got fit to win races among horses of their own class, and if over-training is deterrent to winning races so is under-training, added to which is the risk of horses breaking down.

The work has got to be gradually progressive from the beginning, and must be given with three objects in view: (1) to harden and muscle the horse, (2) to encourage his staying powers, (3) to clear his wind. It must, therefore, be a combination of slow, steady work to arrive at the first object, long distance faster work to obtain the second, and short fast work the third.

The constitution and soundness of the individual horse must govern the work, and if a horse has bad legs the short fast work must be reduced to a minimum, and as much as possible of his other work be done uphill. Of course, continual work uphill is apt to shorten a horse's stride, but it is better to risk this than to break him down altogether.

It would be as well now before closing this article on the training of a steeplechase horse, incomplete as it is, to consider a few of the common mishaps and ailments that are likely to occur. It is not proposed to embark on a treatise of veterinary knowledge, but merely to deal with a few ordinary cases which anyone who is personally interested in his own stable management ought to be able to treat.

In the first place, one of the most ordinary set-backs that is likely to occur is a horse going off his feed. The first thing to do is to try to find out the cause, as on this, as in every other case, the treatment will depend. It may be from overwork, or it may be from a touch of fever and temperature, or it may be the liver is out of order.

With excitable horses it is not uncommon to find them off their feed after going a real good gallop, and, of course, the only way to treat them is to give them quiet work until they get right again and to coax them to eat by means of any device that can be thought of.

If it is fever—which can be soon found out by taking the temperature—then complete rest must be given, warm clothing, legs well hand-rubbed and flannel bandages put on. The horse must be kept warm, but the stable airy. The food that is given must be of the most easily digestible character—warm bran mash, to which may be added a little well-boiled linseed and a few crushed oats. The hay should be damped, and grass and carrots are good.

If the horse will not take this sort of diet, then he should be tried with oatmeal gruel, to which may be added some skim-milk.

Water should be given frequently, with the chill taken off it.

In cases of this kind medicine is not recommended, unless given by a veterinary surgeon.

If the cause of loss of appetite is due to liver, it should be easily detected by examination of gums, or the inner side of the eyelids, which will be a bad yellowish colour. The droppings, too, will be hard, and very likely smell bad.

If these symptoms are visible the horse should be at once prepared for physic, and a veterinary surgeon consulted as to the best medicine to give. It is unsafe to give medicine to a sick horse without a thorough knowledge of the strength and action of the medicine.

Absolute rest is not necessary, in fact it is better that the horse should be walked about, but he must be kept warm. His food should be very much reduced, and only the most digestible given.

Filled legs are another source of trouble.

This may result from either overwork or overfeeding and insufficient work.

If the former, lighter work must be given and plenty of friction applied by means of hand-rubbing, warm woollen bandages being put on afterwards. When the swelling is reduced the legs should be hardened up with cold-water bandages; the cold water might have salt or vinegar added to it.

If the filling is due to overfeeding and sufficient work, then the horse should be given physic.

Sprains may occur in the best regulated stables at any time. Of

course there are sprains and sprains, some infinitely worse than others. But one thing is quite certain, and that is that however slight they are the horse must be given absolute rest and put on light diet. It is quite possible to cure almost any sprain if plenty of time is taken. But if any attempt is made to, so to speak, 'keep the horse on his legs' and work him, knowing that there is a weak spot, a complete breakdown is nearly sure to be the result.

Rest is the chief cure—local treatment, whether blistering, firing, or whatever it may be, is secondary.

If there is much heat, pain, or swelling in the leg, hot fomentations and hot-water bandages, or a good application of Antiphlogistine, will be the best local treatment in the first place, until all soreness is removed. After this it will be a matter for consideration whether a blister shall be applied or not, but in any case it will probably be wise not to attempt any work with the horse for at least six weeks, and then very gradually.

Coughs and colds if they occur must be attended to at once, or they are very likely to turn into something worse. One of the surest ways of letting a horse catch cold is to allow him to loaf about after doing work on a cold day.

A horse with a cough or a cold must be kept warm with extra clothing and bandages, but the more fresh air he gets the better. His food should be warm mash and green food. In the case of cough, if it is an ordinary throat affection, the throat should be rubbed with embrocation, and in the case of colds the head may be steamed over a bucket full of hay and boiling water, to which it is not a bad plan to add a few drops of ordinary eucalyptus oil.

SUMMARY

Finally, then, the man who feels disposed to attempt to get his own horses fit for racing must observe the following if he is to be successful :—

- (1) Punctuality in stable management.
 - (2) Patience in work.
 - (3) Watchfulness for first symptoms of anything wrong.
 - (4) Appreciation of each horse's peculiarities.
- And last, but not least, the best forage that can be obtained.

CAPTAIN W. LEETHAM'S ROMAN OAK,
b.g. by Ascetic, dam by Whistlebinkie.

Roman Oak may be regarded as a pattern soldier's steeplechase horse. He was purchased by the late Captain W. Leetham, 5th Dragoon Guards, when a six-year-old, as a hunter, and was placed into training in 1890, when he won the Hunt Cup at the Sandown Grand Military Meeting. At Punchestown the next month he won the Irish Grand Military, and in June at Auteuil he won the Grand Prix de France, an international steeplechase, value £700, carrying the big weight of 13 st. 5 lb. He ran third for the Grand Sefton at Liverpool, and finished up for the year by running second for the Handicap Steeplechase at Manchester, in all of which races he was ridden by his owner.

In 1891 he ran seven times in big steeplechases. In March he failed for the Grand National, being brought down early in the race, but on the following day won the Champion Steeplechase, ridden by Mr. W. Beasley. Later in the month he ran second in the Lancashire Handicap Steeplechase at Manchester, his owner riding. In April he won the Leopardstown Irish International Handicap Steeplechase, ridden by Captain E. R. Owen, and also the Prince of Wales' Plate at Punchestown, ridden by his owner. In November he ran third for the Grand Sefton, and in December fourth for the Grand Sandown Steeplechase, ridden by Captain E. R. Owen.


In 1892 he became the property of Sir Humphrey de Trafford, and ran five times, winning the Lancashire Handicap Steeplechase, ridden by Captain P. Bewicke, and being placed in two other races.

The illustration facing this page of Roman Oak and his owner is taken from the picture painted by Captain Adrian Jones, M.V.O., in 1890.

J. W. Y.



CAPTAIN W. LEETHAM'S "ROMAN OAK."



ALI WAL.
THE CHARGE OF THE 16th LANCERS.
—
28th January, 1846.

THE 16TH LANCERS AT ALIWAL: A COMPARISON

By PERCY CROSS STANDING

JAMES GRANT.

'Again our horsemen charged through, and by a happy but singular manœuvre changed the lance to the bridle-hand. The Sikhs being unprepared for this, received in their bodies instead of on their bucklers the thrusts of the 16th; but the latter had to ride a third time through these squares before they were utterly broken, mixed up together, and dispersed: yet it was a conflict in which cavalry, by the use of all their weapons in succession, sword, lance, and pistol or carbine, effected wonders against these brave swarthy infantry.'

'BATTLES OF NINETEENTH CENTURY.'

'As the impetus of their charge carried them past the dense mass, the Sikhs flung themselves flat on the ground out of reach of the lances, only to rise directly the squadrons had emerged and pour a deadly volley of bullets after them. Thrice did the gallant 16th repeat this reckless charge, losing a hundred of their number in the effort, or nearly one-fifth of the total casualties on the British side. . . . To this day Aliwal is one of the most cherished memories of the 16th Lancers.'

CAVALRY played an imposing rôle in the hotly contested battles of the Sikh campaign of 1845-46, and in none more than on the bloody day of Aliwal, January 28, 1846. In that memorable mêlée the 16th (Queen's) Lancers, who had only recently been armed with the lance, performed a feat unparalleled in the annals of the Cavalry arm of our Service—they broke and utterly destroyed and 'rode over' a square formation in fair fight. The brave Sikhs had 'come out into the open' a few weeks previously, only to sustain a severe reverse on the sanguinary field of Múdkí, where those gallant veterans, Sir Robert Sale and Sir John McCaskill, had received mortal wounds. But shortly thereafter the Khalsa troops had won a smart engagement at Badhowál and had been able to contain a British force in Ludhiana, which was not relieved until January 23, 1846. Their 20,000 men and fifty-two guns, under Ránjur Singh, opposed to our 10,000 men and thirty-two guns under Sir Harry Smith, then lay entrenched at Aliwal, six miles from Ludhiana. Sir H. Smith had lost his baggage in the affair of Badhowál, and the Sikhs, encouraged by their success on the stricken field of Ferozeshah, awaited the onslaught with the utmost confidence.

The brilliant victory of Aliwal is, however, a familiar because an oft-told story, and we are concerned only with the conspicuous part played by the Cavalry arm. As usual in all battles of this campaign, the Khalsa foe held the advantage of position. But at Aliwal, on that blazing January day, thanks to the exertions of the 16th Lancers (who had until lately been known as the 16th Light Dragoons) and other mounted regiments, the advantage of position availed them not.

'The atmosphere was clear and the sky serene,' we are told, when the 53rd and other Infantry regiments stormed the village of Aliwal—the key to the position—under a withering fusillade from the Sikh guns. Then Major Lawrence galloped to the front with his battery of Light Horse Artillery and fairly raked the Khalsa position. He halted, wheeled round, and unlimbered with such praiseworthy promptitude that in a brief space the enemy's Artillerymen had quitted their pieces and fallen back on the village. And now, as a Napier would have phrased it, was seen with what majesty the British soldier fights.

The Sikh Infantry proceeded to put in practice 'a singular disposition, said to be copied from the French. Instead of forming square they closed up in a sort of triangular formation, the apex to the front, so that when the 16th Lancers, who on this day made history for their famous corps, broke through the head of this novel defence, they were confronted by the base, bristling with bayonets. Yet, nothing daunted, and splendidly led by their officers, our troopers broke through the wedge of flame and steel—a feat seldom accomplished by mounted men, even against Asiatic troops.'

Brigadiers Cureton, Godby, Hick, Wheeler, and Wilson were the officers most distinguished in the series of charges that finally smashed up and utterly dispersed the Khalsa defence. In the ardour of their enthusiasm some of the 16th Lancers even rode their horses into the River Sutlej, and actually in its turbulent waters spiked some of the guns which the beaten enemy were endeavouring to save!

The late James Grant has graphically related how these gallant Sikhs, at the impact of the charge, 'cast aside their muskets and betook them to sword and dagger.' Ever skilled in the *ruse*, they would fling themselves on the ground and let the lancers charge right over them, immediately springing up and rushing in to shoot the riders and hamstring the horses. In this fashion a hundred of the 16th bit the dust ere the foe's plucky and desperate resistance was finally demolished and

done for. But now our decimated Infantry rushed in to finish the job with bullet and bayonet, until finally the stubborn Sikhs were pushed across the ensanguined river, with the loss of every one of the fifty-two guns with which they had entered the action. Close and bloodthirsty as the fighting had been, we had less than 500 casualties, against a loss by the enemy of 3000 killed and wounded, plus the whole of his Artillery.

It is noteworthy that a French officer named Mouton, and a Spanish officer named Huerta, served the Khalsa power during this Sutlej campaign of 1845-6. The former assured his employer, Ránjur Singh, that the lines of Aliwal were impenetrable, whilst the latter, who was an engineer officer, displayed no little skill in designing a *tête-de-pont* to cover the bridge of boats across the Sutlej.

The deciding victory of Sobraon (February 10, 1846) does not belong to this story, albeit the 16th were scarcely less distinguished therein. The British siege train had at last come up, enabling a decisive step to be taken. 'After Aliwal the army was sickening for want of another battle,' wrote Sir Herbert Edwardes, 'and a malignant fever of epidemic horrors must have broken out had it been delayed another week.' To while away the time, General Gilbert and other noted pig-stickers of our army engaged in this fascinating sport, and it was a sight to see so many noted Cavalrymen riding a-tilt—not at the dusky foe, but at the innumerable wild boar with which the jungle abounded.

Sir Joseph Thackwell was in general command of the Cavalry corps, but the 16th Lancers were under the more immediate direction of the dashing Cureton. I have compared three or four different accounts of the proceedings of Cavalry at Aliwal, and all are agreed as to the unbridled impetuosity and supreme heroism which the mounted regiments displayed on that memorable January 28, 1846.

The moral effect of the battle on the native mind was tremendous, and the 'Aliwal Dinner,' in which the 16th unite on each anniversary of the victory, is a notable function. This regiment possesses, indeed, more fighting honours than any other British Cavalry corps of the line, save one. The relatively small cost of Aliwal in human life—not to the Lancers, 'tis true, but to the army generally—is a notable point. In this respect a comparison with the subsequent crowning triumph of Sobraon becomes inevitable. There the losses of the Anglo-Sepoy army totalled up to the great number of nearly 3500, but the outcome was decisive of the fate of the Khalsa power.

THE USE OF MOUNTED INFANTRY IN AMERICA

1778-1780

* By REV. HENRY BELCHER, LL.D., Rector of St. Michael's, Lewes

THE British Army in 1775 was, as it ever is, organised on the basis of policing the Empire, and not for the work of war. There were in Great Britain about 4000 Life Guards and Cavalry, 13,000 Foot Guards and Infantry of the Line. The Irish Establishment stood at 12,000 men. Abroad there were in Gibraltar, Africa, the Minorcas and the West Indies 20,000 men. There were no Auxiliary Establishments organised to maintain in efficiency a striking force, no Army Medical Department, no Transport Service, no Engineer Corps, no organisation of the Regiment of Artillery into Field and Fortress Gunners, the Artilleryman of those days being a good handyman, fit for the rough work of driving the heavy ordnance or acting as a fortress gunner, as circumstances required.

Hence the British Army at the outbreak of hostilities in America in April 1775 was quite unfitted to cope with this most serious and sudden emergency. Lord Dartmouth had again and again pooh-poohed the remonstrances and complaints of Gage. Ministers had again and again declared their total inability to recruit the Army to its requisite strength. North had assured Howe that he might have all the money required, even on the most liberal estimate of expenditure, but that men were not to be had for love nor money. The King in 1775 was fully and keenly conscious of the dangers of the situation. He had frequently drawn attention to the attenuated condition of regiments and battalions. He desired peace almost at any price.

The difficulties of trans-oceanic warfare were vastly increased by the dangers of the sea. Any crazy craft was thought good enough for the transport of men and horses on a military expedition. A regiment of 470 men (at that time the establishment strength of many regiments) exhausted the carrying capacity of four or five vessels. These little ships in themselves were but dens of disease. A kind of plague called

* Author of *The First American Civil War, 1775-1778*. (Macmillan).

ship-fever haunted nearly every transport employed in the King's Service. The transit of horses presented difficulties almost insurmountable. Germain flatly refused to listen to Howe's demand for horses to remount the scanty Cavalry belonging to the American Expeditionary Force. He pointed out that it was throwing away horses and money to make the attempt: and, in fact, even on a coastal voyage on the American side of the Atlantic, the carriage of horses incurred a deadly risk. Howe in 1776 lost all his horses between New York Harbour and the head of the Chesapeake: much of this loss, however, was due to his putting the unhappy beasts on board transports nearly three weeks before sailing; in a year, too, when the summer was, according to records, the hottest of many seasons.

Perhaps this point may be summarily illustrated by Clinton's report to Germain, March 9, 1780, describing his voyage from New York to Charleston.

'I will trouble your lordship with no other particulars of a very tedious voyage in uncommon bad weather, than to mention that in our losses of transports the lives of the crews have been saved, that only one ship is missing, having on board a detachment of Hessians, but I have to regret the total loss of an ordnance ship which foundered at sea, and of much the *greater part of the horses brought for Cavalry.*'

Tarleton, however, reports that all the horses perished. This voyage entailed so much loss of stores, equipment, and beasts as to prove almost destructive to the object of the expedition.

The physical and mechanical difficulties of transporting and maintaining Cavalry or any force of Regular mounted men in connection with the British Army being so great, let alone the fact that the whole Cavalry Establishment at home was only 4000 men, of whom some hundreds had no mounts, it is not surprising that the Regular Cavalry in the service of the King in America was so ineffective.

Whatever the nominal strength of the 16th and 17th Regiments of Dragoons may have been, it is, on a review of the circumstances, reasonable to estimate the total number of sabres in the two regiments at about 300; and after the withdrawal for Home Service of the 16th Dragoons this estimate may be reduced to 150. In the earlier part of the war the most brilliant and exclusive service rendered by the British Cavalry was, according to Mr. Charles Francis Adams,*

* Mr. C. F. Adams is of that family reckoned the foremost in the United States, and himself served as a Cavalry officer on the Federal side in the War of Secession.

the capture of General Charles Lee in his bedgown and slippers while toying with his breakfast : an exploit of which the glory was shared by Banastre Tarleton. In the latter part of the war a contingent of the 17th Dragoons about fifty strong did excellent service under the direction of Tarleton as Brigade Major of Cavalry. Speaking, however, by way of epitome, British Cavalry was too scanty to play anything but a very minor part in this war.

But what about the American use of mounted troops? Good horses abounded in the old Thirteen Colonies : they were freely used for conveyance, for travel, for amusement. Races formed a staple relaxation of the patrons of the tobacco and the rice squares.

Jonathan Turner in 1715 challenged all the Eastern States to a horse match at a hundred pounds a side. The Connecticut folk early became famous for their management of horse stock. The *pacer* was as well known as the *Waler* of our day, and frequent announcements of pacing matches on Little Neck Beach, in Narragansett Bay, attest the popularity of the sport. Southward in Long Island there was good fox hunting, while during the season there were almost as many fixtures for races as from day to day may be heard of in the vicinity of Sydney. The central attractions gathered themselves at Ascot, where might be had also the delightful excitement of coursing.

On a grand occasion in 1750, being the annual Brooklyn racing event, there assembled some thousand gentlemen on horseback, men from New Jersey, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, to say nothing of six hundred coaches, each with its team of six horses, vast equipages occupied by the fair lovers of sport, who came to see and be seen. Barring other game, the boys on Long Island, with their ponies, practised cat coursing, and were, generally speaking, addicted to the pleasures of the chase.

In fact, as in the Thirteen Colonies there were few roads of any stability, travellers followed mere tracks that were a smother of dust in the summer and a series of sloughs and little water holes in the winter. Consequently, horse riding was the chief means of comfortable locomotion. The lawyer, the doctor, the farmer, the commercial man, the schoolboy were all familiar with the saddle : without horseflesh the whole social life of the countryside must have come to a standstill. Except that women have abandoned the pillion for the side saddle, the same conditions prevailed in the American Colonies that may now be

observed in Australia, where a stockman jumps on his nag to fetch his whip from over the way. Hence, everyone could ride, and that not merely in the sense of being able to stick on a horse, but, because of the roadless country, long distances to be traversed, and broken ground, these horsemen had acquired that unconscious balance of rider and horse which helps a man to move rapidly over coarse ground in safety and to ride long distances without over-exhaustion of man or beast.

On the other hand, this ease and custom of riding rendered Colonials impatient of discipline—an impatience which made of them poor material for Cavalry. They would not submit to the drill of the riding school, nor take the word of command from anyone. Their horses, trained to go long distances, were not good weight carriers; they travelled far with light loads, at a good pace—characteristics excellent for the use of mounted Infantry, but inadequate for the requirements of Cavalry.

Mention is made of facts implying a very large supply of horses.

During his disastrous Expedition from Canada, Burgoyne in 1777 nourished expectations of being able to mount de Riedesel's Chasseurs at the expense of the New Hampshire farmers. Having good cause to believe that a thousand horses had been collected at Bennington, he despatched Colonel Baum to fetch them in to the British camp at Skenesborough. Burgoyne issued minute instructions how the horses were to be roped together in droves of ten and so conducted to the British lines. But these horses never arrived, nor did Baum ever return from Bennington. Clinton in 1778 began his march from Philadelphia to New York, with no less than 5000 horses in hand, which had been purchased or commandeered during the British occupation of Philadelphia. Mention has been made of the loss of all his horses in 1780 by Clinton in the course of the voyage from New York to Charleston, yet within a few weeks after arrival Tarleton had collected about 700 horses, and a little later the 63rd Regiment, being directed to equip themselves as a mounted corps and left to their own devices how to procure mounts, achieved the transformation with little difficulty, and fought as mounted Infantry in various small engagements near Charleston (S.C.), besides forming a part of the force commanded by Tarleton at the British victory of Camden.

Obviously, therefore, the supply of serviceable horses was quite adequate to all demands that combatants of either side might make.

General Washington, however, was never keenly alive to the value of mounted Infantry. This most remarkable embodiment of monumental patience under unexampled difficulties—whose place as a commanding officer among the great soldiers of the world has yet to be determined, but whose character as the mainstay of American resistance in a tedious and inglorious war is beyond all cavil—was never a man of military or of any other learning. In the inventory of his library there were only five works on Cavalry, of which three were published after the conclusion of hostilities. Of the remaining two, one in the French language, published in Paris in 1776, did not in all probability come into Washington's possession until the war had ceased. Like Marlborough, Ulysses S. Grant, and many another great soldier, he had little book learning. Yet without reference to Cæsar's well-known description of the Germans' provision of mounted men, he might perchance have heard how on the conclusion of peace at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1749 the French military authorities revised their Army and organised 16 regiments of mounted Infantry, each of 480 men, very much after the style and system adopted by the Germans centuries before, and described by Cæsar in his Commentaries—that is, every man on horseback was doubled by a man on foot, a running companion, trained to replace the mounted man who fell or to fight on foot as required. The French troopers were furnished with the carbine, a weapon of respectable antiquity, but cumbrous and of no great killing power.

In America, however, the rifle was in 1775, among the men on whom Washington could have reasonably relied to furnish first-rate corps of mounted Infantry, a weapon of approved value. The farmers and bushmen of the back country, men like Daniel Boone and Daniel Morgan and James Harrod, were already marksmen of high repute. Marvellous stories of their deadly power at long range still find their way into the self-complacent stories of the Fenimore Cooper school of American romance. No rifle of this period has reached us in a condition good enough to be of value for testing purposes; but such engagements as that of King's Mountain, in 1780, have placed this arm in high esteem for efficiency as a killing implement.

With all this good stuff, material and personal, to his hand Washington evinced no military alertness to profit by his advantages. He had, at least, according to his own and Howe's reports, no mounted

men at the Battle of Brandywine in the third year of this tedious struggle. Mr. John Adams, however, wrote as a spectator in highly eulogistic terms of the four regiments of Light Horse accompanying Washington in his grand march through Philadelphia a short time before the American defeat at Brandywine. Perhaps these invaders, like the First Troop of the Philadelphia City Cavalry, escorted the Commander-in-Chief as far as the City gate in farewell. At any rate, there is no recorded sign of their services in the subsequent part of the campaign of 1777.

Pulaski and Tarleton were each of them engaged in the Battle of Brandywine, of which the circumstances appear to have suggested, certainly to Tarleton, possibly to Washington, the policy of organising at once an efficient force of mounted Infantry. Looking round for a man to do the work, Washington could discover no one of American blood equal to the task. Inveterate jealousies and the cast-iron conservatism of Congress obscured the general estimate of the excellent material lying, as one may say, thick upon the ground, and in consequence the choice of a Master General of American Horse fell upon a Polish adventurer, one Casimir Pulaski, who, being a criminal refugee from Europe, had come to fish in the troubled waters of America. Swarms of such men infested the headquarters of the American General, who found them to be a most intolerable nuisance. But as Washington appears early in his command to have mistrusted his own judgment, so Congress mistrusted or belittled their own people, to the great advantage of these soldiers of fortune, all whiskers and sabre, of whom Washington had the meanest opinion: they were volunteers who, seeking any place in the ranks on Monday, asked for a commission on Tuesday, sought promotion on Wednesday, and demanded substantial privileges on Thursday. A few men among so many rapacious postulants showed capacity, among whom may be named Lafayette, Kosciusko, Steuben, and De Kalbe. To choose Pulaski for the work of organising American Cavalry in the day of its small beginnings was a disastrous choice. He had no English, nor did he understand any terms of English speech. He was a tactless disciplinarian and absolutely without sympathy, both by birth and breeding, for the American temperament. His fiery temper made not incredible a *canard* which went the round of the Loyalist journals that, in disapproval of a Congressman's opinion, he had in Congress itself smitten off with his sabre the unhappy Congress-

man's head : this appeared to be a not unlikely exploit on the part of a man of whom it was commonly reported in America that in his own country he had attempted to assassinate his own King. Pulaski's Polish origin constituted the only ostensible justification of his appointment. It was presumed that being a Pole he ought to know something about horsemanship and Cavalry work : no question was raised as to his actual experience. His attempts ended in swift and complete failure. Six months after the Battle of Brandywine, in despair of making anything of the unruly Americans, he threw up his commission as General of American Cavalry. After this, he formed a small body of guerillos, some horse, some foot, known by the high title of Pulaski's Legion, in command of which little force he perished, in October 1779, during the American attack on Savannah.

Such was the untoward consequence of the first attempt to organise the bold riders and skilled marksmen of Virginia and the backland of the Carolinas into mounted troops. About the time of Pulaski's appointment as General commanding the Cavalry of the United States, a young officer of the illustrious Virginian family of Lee was doing scout work and skirmishing to embarrass the advance of Howe's force along the Delaware towards Philadelphia. This officer's reputation before 1862 stood higher in American opinion as a Cavalry leader than ever that consummate Cavalryman Cromwell has reached in the eyes of the English people. 'Dashing Harry Lee,' 'Light Horse Harry Lee' were the favourite epithets applied to this *Sabreur*. His son, General R. E. Lee, of the War of Secession, and the great Cavalry leaders of that war, Sheridan, Stuart, Forrest, and Morgan, have by their exploits now overshadowed this somewhat inflated older reputation. General Henry Lee commanded a 'Legion,' which, like Tarleton's more famous force, consisted of about 300 men, of whom one half were mounted and the remainder consisted of Infantry and a few Artillery in charge of a three-pounder. No marked exploit lies to his credit except a useful bit of shock work at the Battle of Cowpens, of which engagement a few words occur further on. As to the other small bodies of horse which in insignificant number were organised in 1778, the characteristic Colonial impatience of discipline prevailed to render them of very little use. 'They,' says Mr. C. F. Adams, 'gave Greene almost as much trouble as they rendered him assistance. He was continually making futile attempts to draw them under his personal control for some con-

centrated movement; while they, much older men and natives of the country, acted on their own responsibility, obeying or neglecting his orders much as they saw fit.' Greene was certainly very keen to secure the services of Cavalry, but was very ill served in this as in many other respects. Among other reasons for this belittling of his orders and wishes was the fact that towards him, as a New England man of Quaker family and training, the tobacco and cotton gentry of Virginia and Carolina bore a good amount of steady cold ill-will.

With, therefore, a Commander-in-Chief whose attitude towards Cavalry or mounted men was ever that of a somewhat chilly nature—who, moreover, never directed the operations of mounted men—and with the fine horsemen of the Southern States, impatient of control under all circumstances and filled with a resentful jealousy towards both Gates and Greene, the only Continental officers of repute who had command south of the Delaware, it is not surprising that mounted men played so insignificant a part for America in this seven years' struggle.

On the British side, although in these campaigns Regular Cavalry, or disciplined mounted men, played such a minor rôle, yet it was otherwise with the Irregular Horse, locally raised. Writers on Cavalry have again and again pointed out that in no branch of war service does the leader count for so much as in the command of Cavalry. The efficiency of the man counts for nearly as much as the efficiency of the force he commands. Such born Cavalry leaders as Cromwell, Prince Rupert, Kellerman, Von Seydlitz, Von Bredlow, Murat, Sheridan, Hanno, and Massinissa stand for more at the psychological moments of intense action than do men in similar positions of command in the allied branches of service.

In Banastre Tarleton, Lord Cornwallis found a Cavalryman of this type—a born leader of Horse. To him and practically to no one else, a young man of 24 years of age, is due the initiative under which was formed a mere handful of mounted troops, perhaps for their number among the most efficient, pervasive, and destructive body of men of whose work there is any record. His marches at the head of his little Legion traversed in all directions an area of about 12,000 square miles in Virginia and the two Carolinas, ranging from Savannah, on the Georgian border, to near Fredericksburg, in Virginia. A cornet of the King's Dragoon Guards, he had in 1777 been nominated by Howe to the sinecure office of Brigade Major of Cavalry, serving in that capacity at Brandywine, in which engagement it is probable that the

17th Dragoons did not muster forty mounts. This fragment appears to have served with him subsequently in the southern Colonies until the whole regiment was called together to New York in 1780.

To him, practically, is due the initiative of those somewhat novel features in warfare (as it then certainly was) which the Cavalry of the United States have since made peculiarly their own.

Mr. Charles Francis Adams, President of the Massachusetts Historical Society, published in the Transactions of the Society for 1910 a paper on 'The Failure of Washington to Utilise Cavalry,' in which he frankly says that prior to Germantown 'the idea of a distinctly American mounted service had not yet occurred to anyone. So far as I have been able to ascertain, it first suggested itself to Banastre Tarleton as the result of his experience and observation during the operations in Pennsylvania and New Jersey between November 1776 and June 1778. He was then a Captain in Harcourt's Horse. Tarleton put his conception of this new device in American warfare into form and use in South Carolina in the early months of 1780. He was then in his twenty-sixth year. At first he was almost unopposed, and used his novel contrivance in the most effective way and with excellent results. The patent of discovery belongs in this case neither to Washington nor to any other American, but distinctly to Sir Banastre Tarleton, K.C.B.'

It is one of the ironies of history that this brilliant leader of men sank into comparative oblivion while still quite young; and, although his life extended to 1833, it proved to be of little use to his country or her councils during her struggle for existence between 1793 and 1805. In his later years, as M.P. for Liverpool, he occupied much time and attention in querulous remarks on Lord Wellesley's conduct of his Peninsular Campaign.

Wellington's own opinion of mounted Infantry was, according to Gleig, of the slightest. Speaking of Masséna's tactics before Torres Vedras, Wellington said: 'He made excellent use of his Cavalry too, and once employed a portion of it—the only occasion, by the way, in which I ever saw the Dragoon put to his legitimate use—as Infantry. But the dismounted Dragoons made a poor fight of it. They tried to keep a wooded hill not far from Alcobaça and a few companies of the Rifle Brigade, the old 95th you know, soon drove them away. *I never had much idea of the Dragoon while we had him in our own service*, and after the exhibition which he made of himself at Alcobaça I certainly should not like to see him reintroduced among us.'

Perhaps this opinion adverse to the arm which Tarleton in America had elevated to a higher plane of tactical value some thirty years before may have been common knowledge in military circles, to the annoyance of one who had now become a somewhat blasé middle-aged man of fashion, prodigal only of petulant criticisms of more useful soldiers.

However this may be, it appears certain that Tarleton's spirit was much broken by the result of the engagement at Cowpens. Of that engagement, whether the disaster to the British arms was due to the American General's superior skill or to one of that class of fortuitous events which, as Tolstoy argues, really determines the results of battles, it is perhaps useless now to speculate. Tarleton reported that men of regiments of great repute in our Army were guilty of abject cowardice, and that at the close of the battle he was left with only 40 men to deliver himself from the hands of the enemy. As a result, his Legion was annihilated, and, although he is heard of later, at the somewhat Pyrrhic British victory of Guildford, and that too with his own personal prowess unabated, yet Cowpens appears to have filled him with dejection.* Seven months later, in 1781, the war closed by the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown.

British officers, however, had learned the value of cleaner and more accurate firing; of greater mobility of Infantry by putting men with rifles on horses; and of the superiority of mounted Infantry to Cavalry in countries where wood and swamp and broken ground are so mixed up as they were in those Colonial regions at that time. But the idea with regard to mounted Infantry did not catch on; the time for the consideration of this question had not arrived; and, in fact, the advocacy of some application of the methods of Irregular Horse in America rather hardened the opinions in favour of Cavalry of the orthodox type. It remained for the American people, at the expense of their own kith and kin, to elaborate Tarleton's initiative into a fine system, while among ourselves, as it appears, the question of mounted Infantry is still far from settlement.

* Daniel Morgan, who defeated Tarleton at Cowpens in 1781, is occasionally mixed up with General John H. Morgan, of the Confederate Cavalry, who in 1862 performed many exploits against the Northern and Unionist forces in America. They had much in common, these two Morgans. They were admirable leaders of Irregular Horse; they were both impatient of control; they were both an embarrassment to their commanding officers: the former, Daniel Morgan, to General Greene; the latter, John H. Morgan, to General Bragg. J. H. Morgan was shot dead at Knoxville in 1864; Daniel Morgan lived out his life to a peaceful end in the Shenandoah Valley.

THE 'CAVALRY JOURNAL' COMMITTEE

A MEETING of the above Committee was held at the Royal United Service Institution on Thursday, November 28, 1912. Lieut.-General Sir R. S. S. Baden-Powell, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., presided, the following members being present: Major-General E. H. H. Allenby, C.B., Inspector of Cavalry; Colonel J. Vaughan, D.S.O. (Editor); Colonel F. D. V. Wing, C.B.; Colonel C. W. Trotter; and Lieut.-Colonel A. Leetham (Hon. Managing Editor).

The following letter was read from General Sir J. D. P. French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., Chief of the Imperial Staff:

War Office, Nov. 26, 1912.

MY DEAR LEETHAM,—I very much regret that I am prevented by great pressure of work from attending the CAVALRY JOURNAL Meeting on Thursday next. You know that your work on this subject has my fullest sympathy. The JOURNAL has provided us with a great deal of very interesting reading during the past year; and I believe it fulfils a really important rôle in helping to maintain and increase the efficiency of the Cavalry, and we are very much indebted to you and all concerned.

Yours sincerely,
(Signed) J. D. P. FRENCH.

The Managing Editor submitted the Report on the JOURNAL for the past year, and brought to the notice of the Committee the bound volume for 1912. The Committee expressed the opinion that this was as good, if not better, than any of the six previous ones, and attention was drawn to the excellent way in which the JOURNAL was got up, especially as regards the illustrations, maps, and printing.

The Managing Editor expressed his thanks to Colonel Vaughan

for the way in which he had carried out his editorial duties, also to Colonel Trotter, the Yeomanry Sub-Editor, and to Colonel Yardley, the Sporting Editor. He drew the Committee's attention to the good work done by the South African Sub-Editor, Colonel N. M. Smyth, V.C., and the Sub-Editor for India, Captain R. W. W. Grimshaw, who had helped materially in supplying articles and illustrations, and expressed regret that so little had been received from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Egypt, but hoped that more matter would be forthcoming from these Sub-Editors during the coming year.

A considerable increase is shown in the number of subscribers, but while in some of the British regiments every officer was a subscriber, there was only a small number in others. The Committee desire that this shall be rectified.

The Accounts for the past year were submitted and passed by the Committee as being satisfactory. There is still a considerable sum due from outstanding advertisements.

The Committee drew attention to the advertisements of the JOURNAL and requested the Managing Editor to inform the Advertising Agent that it was expected that a very considerable increase would be forthcoming in the ensuing year.

A letter was read from Colonel Victor Williams, Sub-Editor for Canada, placing his resignation in the hands of the Committee on his appointment as Adjutant-General of the Canadian Forces, at the same time offering to continue to act if the Committee approved. Colonel Williams was unanimously re-appointed Sub-Editor in Canada, and requested to obtain an Assistant Sub-Editor in that Dominion; the name of Captain W. Long, D.S.O., 2nd Dragoons, was suggested.

As Colonel N. M. Smyth, V.C., the Carabiniers, would be shortly leaving South Africa, the Committee expressed a wish that he would, previous to his departure, appoint a successor, if possible an officer from the South African Forces. The Committee passed a resolution inviting Colonel Smyth, on his return to England, to join the Editorial Committee.

Sir Robert Baden-Powell reported the result of his interviews with the various Colonial Sub-Editors during his recent visit to the Colonies.

A vote of thanks was accorded to the Managing and Editorial Staff for their services during the past year.

HORSE BREEDING IN INDIA—MONA DEPÔT

By BRIG.-GENERAL C. T. McM. KAVANAGH, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O.

MONA is a large stud farm of 10,000 acres situated on the west of the N.-W. Railway and on the reclaimed land brought under cultivation by the Jhelum Canal. Its existence is due to Lord Kitchener's desire to make India self-supporting as regards Cavalry remounts, in peace and war, instead of being dependent on over-sea shipments.

All attempts to make the breeding of country-bred remounts for British Cavalry successful have hitherto proved a failure, owing to the expenses of breeding studs being prohibitive.

The present system is for the breeding to be done by the zamindar, or farmer, and the Government to buy likely colts, and run them at Mona until of an issuable age.

Horse and mule breeding are carried on in certain selected districts, under the Army Remount Department—viz., Rawal Pindi, Lahore, Baluchistan, Meerut, and the Jhelum and Chenab Canal Colonies.

Of these districts, Rawal Pindi furnishes a very large number of mules for mountain batteries and transport purposes, also donkeys for breeding mules, and a certain number of likely Cavalry remounts.

Lahore, Baluchistan, and Meerut furnish fair numbers of likely Cavalry remounts, the Chenab Colony large numbers of mules, and the Jhelum Colony by far the largest number of Cavalry remounts.

In the selected districts stallions are stationed in likely centres, equal proportions of Arabs and thoroughbreds being adhered to as far as possible, and every inducement given to the breeder to make use of these sires, no fees of any kind being charged, the only *sine quâ non* being that mares should be branded as suitable by an officer of the Army Remount Department.

It has been said that by far the greatest number of likely Cavalry horses come from the Jhelum Canal Colony, and for this reason in this Colony all the land is held on horse-breeding conditions—that is to

say, that a man's tenure of his land depends entirely on his producing and keeping a mare in all respects, in the opinion of the Army Remount Department officer in charge, fit to breed British Cavalry remounts.

This means that every Colonist must have a mare of suitable stamp, whose stock he is bound, by the terms of the agreement, to sell, if suitable, to Government at the prices mentioned later on. In short, this means that the Colony is one huge stud farm, consisting of some 3000 to 4000 mares, the whole of whose progeny can be bought from Government, if wanted, at fixed prices.

By this means the expense to Government of keeping a large stud of brood mares has been avoided, and, although the scheme is only in its infancy, it appears as if the problem of producing country-bred remounts for British Cavalry has been solved.

Young stock likely to grow into British Cavalry remounts are purchased at all ages, from nine months to five years, and the price allowed is Rs. 12-8-0 per mensem from date of birth or £10 (Rs. 150) for a yearling, £20 for a two-year-old, and so on, up to £40 for a four-year-old, but stock is paid for by purchasing officers according to merit, so long as the average price is not exceeded.

Mules of all classes are bought at the following prices :—Ordnance mules over two years, roughly at £20, under one year £8; transport mules over two years, roughly at £20, over one year £8, under one £5. Transport mules over two years are not bought by the Army Remount Department, but by the S. and T. Corps direct.

At present the yearly purchases of young stock for British Cavalry total about 700 (the majority being about 12 months old), the remainder going to Native Cavalry, Police, etc.

This number should be sufficient to supply remounts to all British Cavalry regiments in India and leave a reserve for emergencies. At present there are about 1500 young stock horses, which will be issued to British Cavalry at four and a-half or five years of age, and 1800 mules—about 900 for mountain batteries and the rest for transport purposes.

There is also at Mona a small experimental stud of 20 mares of pure country-bred blood for the breeding of pure country-bred stallions, but at present it is too early to know if this is going to be a success. There are also 80 donkey mares for breeding donkey jacks, and it is

hoped that in future no jacks will have to be imported from Europe and America.

Of the 10,000 acres, about 3000 are under cultivation—1000 oats, and the remainder fodder; 2000 acres are enclosed as paddocks, and the remainder is at present jungle, whence wood and grass are obtained. At present the prices of horses issued are very high, but this is on account of all the new buildings, etc., on the farm having to be paid for, and once this is done a country-bred remount ought not to cost Government more than £50.

Besides Captain Loch, the superintendent, the dépôt is carried on by a veterinary officer, an assistant superintendent, a farm overseer, an assistant surgeon, and five line overseers with a native establishment of about 1500.

The overseers are all old Cavalry N.C.O.s, and they live in comfortable bungalows on different parts of the farm.



(We are indebted to Mr. Harry Payne for the above illustration, which will also be utilised for the front page of cover of the four numbers of the present volume.)

THE ROYAL MILITARY RIDING ESTABLISHMENT AT HANOVER

OWING to the succession of wars before and up to 1815, Cavalry regiments had to be so rapidly formed and trained that all idea of uniformity in training of man and horse had to be abandoned. Each regimental commander trained his men according to his own ideas. The disadvantage of such a system was obvious, and in 1816, in December, King Frederick William III. decided to form a riding establishment for the Cavalry similar to that which had been established in 1808 in Austria at Neustadt, and in 1771 in France at Saumur.

The object of the school in those days, as it is now, was to procure uniformity in stable management, in training of horse and man for Cavalry work, and the preparation of officers and men as instructors in their regiments of the principles adopted. The course also embraced instruction in packing and adjustment of loads, biting and fitting of saddlery, veterinary work, gymnastics, fencing, and swimming.

On October 1, 1817, the school was opened.

After a year's experience the director of the institute set himself to collate and prepare for the press a book embracing the principles taught at the school. Up to date there had been nothing definitely laid down, and often regimental commanders would not allow officers returning from the *Reitschule* to teach the principles they had learnt there. Without printed regulations approved of by the King the efforts of the school were useless.

On January 21, 1819, the riding establishment was turned into an instructional squadron and attached to the 2nd Guard Cavalry Brigade. The director at once sent in his resignation, which, however, was refused.

In June 1825 the *règlement* for the Cavalry was finished, and the author was at once entrusted with the drawing up of 'Instructions for the Treatment of Remounts,' which was to form an appendix to the 'Règlements für die Kavallerie.'

From 1826 the school became a quasi-independent body in the Army and received its own remounts. At this time, too, a welcome order was made—namely, that each officer besides his own horses should receive a *Dienstpferd* fully trained from a riding-school point of view, on which to acquire an understanding of the terms *Gefühl und Einwirkung*—hands and the proper use of the legs.

In 1849 the instructional squadron was disbanded and a *Reitschule* at Schwedt founded, the object of which was stated to be the formation of good riders and good instructors.

Owing to the good work of the *Reitschule*, the professional riding instructors (*Stallmeister*s) began to decrease, and the interest taken by the Cavalry officers themselves in corresponding manner to increase. The last *Stallmeister* disappeared in 1890.

In 1850 the school was closed, but opened again in 1851. Up to 1861 the school had been under the War Office, but in this year was placed under the Inspector of Cavalry, doubled in numbers, and an instructor in gymnastics and fencing attached.

About this time, too, much importance was placed on school riding, *Reiterei* being considered an especial science and not as a means to an end. Owing to the efforts of Von Witzendorff, who was placed at the head of the school in 1864, all this was changed, and he made it his object to produce lasting, obedient, and ever-fresh horses, merely using *Reiterei* to achieve this end. His aim was to give his pupils a good seat, and thus to take the weight off the forehead. He did not believe in spoiling the paces of his horse by 'over-collectedness.'

In 1866 the school was moved to Hanover on account of the existing riding school and barrack facilities, and the name changed from *Reitschule* to *Reitinstitut*. It was organised into two parts :

1. Riding school for officers.
2. Cavalry under-officers' school.

During the Franco-German War the institute was again closed.

The fact that the student does not obtain fully the necessary knowledge for a riding instructor till his second year at the *Reitinstitut* caused the course to be extended in 1873 to two years.

In 1875 the present building was commenced, the old Royal stables and Artillery barracks being found insufficient for the increased numbers. The new buildings consist of a barrack for the men, a big courtyard for riding, stalls for 400 horses, seven covered schools with cooling

ante-rooms, a casino, dwelling-house for directional staff, forge, veterinary shop, pigeon house, kennels, and cost £143,000.

In 1884 Colonel von Krosigk was appointed commandant of the school, and made riding with the hounds compulsory.

In 1895 the school was increased, a riding school, stables for sixty horses, rooms for forty men, married quarters, workshops, a gymnasium, and fencing-room being added.

For purposes of mobilisation the *Reitinstitut* is under the G.O.C. Xth Corps, the War Office reserving to itself the disposal of horses.

The *Militär Reitinstitut* is under the Inspector-General of Cavalry, and is at present commanded by a major-general.

It is divided into two parts:

1. Cavalry officers' school.
2. Cavalry under-officers' school.

Each school has its own commandant.

The permanent staff of the institute consists of: One major-general, one field-officer in charge of the officers' riding school, one field-officer in charge of the Cavalry under-officers' school, one field-officer of the General Staff as instructor in tactics, fourteen Cavalry captains as instructors, two first lieutenants or captains as adjutants, one doctor, one assistant doctor, one paymaster, one veterinary officer, one assistant veterinary officer, three quartermasters, three assistant quartermasters, eleven sergeants, four under-officers, one *Kapitulant*, seven *Gefreite*, 154 privates, eleven *Okonomie Handwerker*, three *Zahlmeister Aspiranten*, one *Sanitäts-Unteroffizier*.

To the officers' riding school are sent yearly: Sixty-four officer students, one trumpeter, 154 privates.

To the under-officers' school: One trumpeter, eighty-seven *Unteroffiziere* or *Gefreite*, ninety-two privates.

To the officers' school belong 254 horses (*Dienstpferde*), nineteen school horses, fourteen hunt horses, twenty-two horses for the Prussian R.F.A. officers, sixty-seven first-year remounts, sixty-seven second-year remounts, sixty-five *Stammpferde* = 254. Kept up to strength by remounts.

To the under-officers' school belong 181 *Dienstpferde*.

Each Prussian, Saxon, and Württemberg Cavalry regiment sends every year to the officers' riding school one first or second lieutenant;

from each Army Corps (exclusive of Bavarian*) comes one first or second lieutenant, furnished in alternate years by the Field Artillery Regiments. (Stopped 1912 because of the new organisation. The I. and XIV. A.C. had three divisions instead of two.)

Each Prussian, Saxon, and Württemberg Cavalry regiment sends one under-officer or *Gefreite* to the under-officers' school. The candidates must engage to serve at least one year after the expiration of the course.

The normal course for officers is two years. If an officer has to leave within the first four months he is replaced from his corps.

The normal course for under-officers is one year. Eighteen, however, remain for a second or third year.

The course begins on October 1. September is a holiday. There is, as a rule, great competition to be detailed to the school. Officers to be eligible must have three years' service, be capable Cavalry officers, strong, healthy, and not too heavy. They must possess character and be out of debt.

Candidates for the *Unteroffizier* school must have the same qualifications as required from officers. *Gefreiten* must have two years' service. Officers are allowed one groom each, whom they bring from their regiments.

Cavalry and R.H. Artillery officers bring to the school one charger (*Chargenpferd*) and one private horse (*Eigenpferd*).

Prussian R.F. Artillery officers bring to the school one troop horse (*Dienstpferd*). They receive a second horse from the institute.

Officers of Saxon and Württemberg R.F. Artillery bring two *Dienstpferde*.

Officers on arrival are divided into five rides, each ride consisting of approximately twelve officers. As a rule rides are made up of Uhlans, Hussars, Cuirassiers, Dragoons, *Jäger zu Pferde*, and Artillery. They are designated by letters.

The first year is spent in technical and physical training in riding, the second year is used in teaching the pupils how to apply what they have learnt both in school and in the education of the remount.

The course begins with school riding without stirrups and curb. This lasts till the end of December, and during this time only the most

* Bavaria has its own riding establishment at Munich. There is a riding school for very young Cavalry subalterns at Paderborn.

simple movements are attempted. The object is to give the students a good seat, equilibrium, and to strengthen their muscles. In addition to the school riding the officers have instruction in fencing, gymnastics, and revolver shooting. They are lectured on veterinary work and shoeing, ride twice a week with the hounds, and carry out a few long-distance rides and reconnaissances.

They give in turn, commencing from the most junior, a lecture lasting about twenty minutes on any subject they may choose, such as the battle of Tsushima, India, etc. These lectures are for the most part culled direct from books, and are with a few exceptions very unpopular with both givers and hearers.

Each student gives one lecture every year.

After a few days' leave at Christmas the course is resumed, and the students are promoted to bits and stirrups. The riding is still confined to the school and is still of a simple character, such as 'Shoulder in,' 'Passaging,' the manipulation of the reins and a few low jumps. The greatest attention is, however, paid by the instructor to the maintenance of a good seat, and the correct pace at 'Middle trot,' 'Full trot,' 'Slow,' 'Middle,' 'Full gallop.'

Officers ride during their first year one *Chargenpferd*, one *Eigenpferd*, and one *Dienstpferd* daily. The majority have also a private horse which they hack out of doors for their own amusement, or hunt with the drag.

At Easter takes place the yearly competition, and after each ride has been inspected by the commandant of the institute, the officers go on ten days' leave.

From the middle of April till end of August the course goes on in much the same way: riding takes place in the open yards more than in the schools, and the movements become rather more difficult, such as changing feet, passaging at a canter, contra gallop, etc. Reconnaissances and distance riding are more frequent.

After returning from leave on October 1 each officer receives a first-year remount (*i.e.* probably unbacked) and a second-year remount. For the first four weeks of the second year the five best riders each 'ride' are mounted on *Schulpferde*, and work for one hour every day under the chief of the *Schulstall*.

The horses for this school *Abteilung* are mostly picked remounts, and a few are specially bought. They are first of all thoroughly trained

according to the principles of the *Reitinstruktion*. When perfect at this they are put on the 'pillars' and taught the *piaffe*. This is followed by *piaffe* when mounted, and next the passage, Spanish trot, and occasionally the *pesade*. In this school special stress is laid on the changes at the canter, and turnings at the trot and canter. They say it takes three to four years to teach the horse to do the above perfectly, and during this time they are only ridden by the chief of the *Schulstaff* himself, or his assistants. After this they are put into the school, and used as a means of teaching the selected twelve.

The rest of the students in the second year and the *Schulabteilung*, when not specially employed, go on with the breaking of remounts and the more complicated movements in the school. By this time the jumps are heightened. They are taught to lunge horses.

Thirteen officers who are undergoing their second year at the school are detailed as instructors to the under-officers' school. This does not absolve them from riding in the officers' school.

Officers in their first year ride one horse from the school, one charger, one private horse (*Eigenpferd*).

Officers in their second year ride: 1st, one young remount; 2nd, one old remount; 3rd, one charger; 4th, one *Eigenpferd*; 5th, one school horse.

From June 25 to July 25 is held the refreshers' course for Cavalry field-officers. Twenty-five Cavalry field-officers below the rank of regimental commander come to the school.

The object of the course is to show future C.O.s what horse and man can do, and to allow them to form their own ideas on the subject from what they have seen. They watch the school riding and are expected themselves to ride with the hounds. At first this refreshers' course was exceedingly unpopular, but its advantages are now recognised.

The commandant of the school can draw on the Pioneers of the Xth Army Corps for instructors in demolitions, etc.

There is a pigeon loft attached to the school, and officers are taught the use of the carrier pigeon as a means of transmitting messages.

The Königs (13th) Uhlans started as a pack in 1866; in 1868 the King granted 20,000 marks for the upkeep of the pack, and handed it over to the *Reitinstitut*. In 1884 riding with the hounds was made compulsory. The pack now consists of forty couples of hounds, and

an officer is selected to look after them. He receives a certain sum from the Government for their upkeep. To aid him in his duties are struck off an under-officer as huntsman and two privates as whips.

He is allowed fourteen *Dienstpferde*.

A drag is hunted from June till manœuvres. In October after the manœuvres till the end of January carted wild boar is hunted. The authorities set great store on this hunting. The drag hunts are arranged so that they gradually become longer. Officers learn how to condition their horses and to judge of what they are capable. 'Plucky men delighted in the rise of cross-country riding, and the next war will show the fruits of this cross-country work.'

Polo is much encouraged by the authorities, but most of the officers find it too expensive. There are some thirty members of the club.

About Easter takes place the annual competition. None of the fences have wings, and I saw no refusals in two days. It will be observed that in framing the competitions the aim is always to make them of military value; in judging the riding the seat of the rider is judged, as well as the performance of his horse.



*FIELD-MARSHAL THE MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY,
K.G., G.C.B.*

BY COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B.

HENRY LORD PAGET, Earl of Uxbridge and first Marquis of Anglesey, was born in 1768, in a year which may with some truth be said to have witnessed the passing of the events which immediately led to the rebellion of our American colonies. Lord Uxbridge, to give him the name by which British soldiers know him best, lived to see the loss of those possessions in the western world made good by the extraordinarily rapid growth of our Empire in India; he fought in the wars of the Revolution and of Imperial France; and he died, full of years and of honour, in April 1854, at a moment when England, having once again drawn the sword after nearly forty years of peace, was engaged in despatching an expeditionary force to Turkey and to the Crimea.

Educated at Westminster School, Lord Paget proceeded thence to Christ Church, Oxford, and entered Parliament in 1790. The records of the 1st King's Own Stafford Militia show that in 1793 he held a captain's commission in this corps, of which his father, the Earl of Uxbridge, was then the colonel; in February of that year the Convention declared war upon England, and it became necessary to take measures for the augmentation of the British Army. In this year, then, one new regiment of Cavalry and seventeen new battalions of Infantry were raised, and among these latter, third in order of formation, was the 'Staffordshire Volunteers,' to be numbered later as the 80th, and raised by Lord Paget chiefly from among his father's tenantry. The regiment was completed in September. Lord Paget was given the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and proceeded with it to Guernsey in December. In the summer of 1794 he embarked with his regiment to join the army under the Duke of York in Flanders, but only actually reached Flushing at the end of September, it having been intended that the 80th should take the place of one of the more senior regiments which it was proposed to withdraw for service in the West Indies. By the date when Lord Paget arrived in the theatre of war the situation was already a hopeless one; but he received his baptism of fire, and served in a retreat



THE MARQUIS OF ANGLESEY.
In the uniform of the 7th Queen's Own Light Dragoons (Hussars.)



WATERLOO.

1815

—that from the Waal to the Weser—almost as trying as that from Sahagun to Corunna, in which he so greatly distinguished himself some thirteen years later.

On his return to England late in the spring of 1795 he exchanged as a lieutenant to the 7th Foot, and thus did not share in that most unfortunate and ill-planned expedition to the Isle d'Yeu, in which the 80th took part during the autumn under General Doyle. Lord Paget's promotion was rapid; he became a captain in the 23rd in March; major in the 65th in May; lieutenant-colonel of the 16th Light Dragoons in June; and, finally, on April 6, 1797, he was appointed lieutenant-colonel in the 7th Light Dragoons, a regiment with which for nearly half a century he was to be closely associated.

By the year 1799 Holland had been for nearly five years under the heel of revolutionary France, and in this year England, which had hitherto only subsidised the Coalitions, was so encouraged by French defeats that she at last herself put troops in the field. A treaty was therefore signed with the Czar Paul, whereby England engaged herself to provide 30,000 men, and to pay for the services of 18,000 Russians, the object of the joint expedition being the re-conquest of Holland north of the Waal, and the restoration of its independence under the House of Orange. The first contingent of the British force sailed for the Helder late in August, under Abercromby, but the remainder, under the commander, the Duke of York, did not disembark near Bergen until the middle of September. With these reinforcements went the 7th Light Dragoons, under its colonel, Lord Paget, who had been appointed to command the Cavalry Brigade, composed of his own regiment, the 11th, 15th, and part of the 18th Light Dragoons, with one troop of Horse Artillery. The expedition ended a month later in a capitulation and the return to England of the survivors, but Lord Paget found ample time and opportunity for adding to his growing reputation. When the army advanced on September 19, the 7th Light Dragoons were attached to the column under General Hermann, and participated in its initial success and ultimate failure. In the attack on the enemy's position at Bergen on October 2 Lord Paget was in command of nine squadrons of the 7th, 11th, and 15th Light Dragoons, attached to the right column, under Abercromby, and helped to gain the somewhat dubious victory of Egmont-op-Zee. Of Lord Paget's behaviour in this action Sir Henry Bunbury records as follows: 'Just as the day closed, the action apparently at an end, our column of Light Dragoons on the beach were

dismounted to rest the horses, when suddenly down came two squadrons of *Chasseurs à cheval* at full speed, and were upon and among the Horse Artillery, who were in front of the column, before they were discovered. They hoped by this act of dashing gallantry to have carried off some of the guns; but luckily there was a group of ten or twelve officers chatting together close by (amongst them were Lord Paget, Colonel Erskine, and Sir Robert Wilson), and these, followed by half a dozen sergeants and others who happened to be still on horseback, plunged at once into the midst of the French and fought so furiously that the Dragoons gained time to run together and mount, and then the thing was over.'

Again, on the 6th the French general, Brune, had fallen upon the Russians, captured their guns and driven them back. Fortescue states that 'the French Cavalry followed up keenly . . . until a small party of the British Horse, apparently of the 7th Light Dragoons, under Lord Paget, crashed in upon their left flank from an ambush in the dunes and sent them galloping back in wild confusion upon the French Infantry. The effect of this unexpected charge of a few score of resolute men was astonishing. The panic of the French horsemen communicated itself to the French foot, and the whole, some two or three thousand strong, gave way and ran back to Kastrikum. . . . The attack of the Dragoons gave them' (the Russians) 'breathing time and recovered for them their guns,' while the records of the 7th Hussars state that they captured also 'several pieces of the enemy's cannon.' The force, or so much as was left of it, embarked for England in October.

In May 1801 Lord Paget was advanced to the colonelcy of the 7th Light Dragoons, 'as a special mark of royal favour and approbation for personal merit and for the excellent state of discipline and efficiency of the corps under his command.' He was promoted major-general on April 29, 1802, and became a lieutenant-general on April 25, 1808; in this year he proceeded to Portugal, and was probably one of the lieutenant-generals of 'powerful connections who were eager for foreign service' to whom Professor Oman makes allusion, when discussing the question of the command of the British force sent to the Peninsula in that year. Lord Paget was one of the five lieutenant-generals—Moore, Hope, Fraser, and Wellesley being the others—who were intended to command the five divisions in which Sir Hew Dalrymple's force was to have been organised.

Late in 1808, however, Lord Paget got the opportunity which was to enable him to establish his fame as a Cavalry leader of unusual powers..

Already in July 1807 he had assembled and commanded in England a Cavalry brigade composed of the 7th, 10th, and 15th Hussars, as these regiments were now styled, and this brigade was detailed to form, under Lord Paget, part of the force now ordered to Spain to provide, under the command of Sir David Baird, a reinforcement to the British Army then in the Peninsula under Sir John Moore. Owing to the dearth of horse transports, the mounted portion of Baird's force was embarked the last of all, and consequently did not land at Corunna until the middle of November—three weeks after the remainder had disembarked; but, marching rapidly, the Cavalry overtook the rest of Baird's troops in camp in front of Astorga. There were only two other Cavalry regiments with the British Army under Moore—the 18th Hussars and the 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion; these formed a brigade under Brigadier the Hon. Charles Stewart, but on the junction being at last effected at Mayorga between the forces under Moore, Baird, and Hope, the command of the all-British Hussar Brigade was handed over to Major-General Slade, and the Cavalry, now formed as a division of two brigades under Lord Paget, was pushed forward to within three leagues of Sahagun. Finding himself now within striking distance of the headquarters of Debelle's Brigade of Light Cavalry, which covered the front of Soult's Divisions, Lord Paget determined to attempt a surprise. Taking with him the 10th and 15th Hussars and a few men of the 7th, he started for Sahagun at midnight on December 20.* 'A more dreadful night,' wrote General Slade in his diary, 'the troops could not be exposed to, as it was particularly dark, a severe frost, with sleet falling, and many snow drifts to the depth of four feet. Many horses fell and one man had his leg broken.'

Between five and six in the morning the 15th came upon Debelle's main picquet on the high road, and took five prisoners, but the rest escaping gave the alarm. Paget now sent Slade with the 10th by the direct road into Sahagun, while he galloped round with the 15th to cut off the retreat. 'As he reached the suburb he found Debelle forming up his two regiments . . . among the snow-covered stumps of a vineyard. Nothing could be seen of the 10th, which was scouring the town, but Paget formed up the 15th for a charge. His first movement was checked by an unexpected ditch; but moving rapidly down it he crossed at a place where it was practicable, and found Debelle changing front

* A few days previously Paget had attached the 7th to Stewart's Brigade.

to meet him. Catching the French before they had begun to move . . . Paget charged into them without hesitation, though they outnumbered him by nearly two to one. He completely rode down the front regiment and flung it back on the Dragoons, who broke and fled.' Of the French, twenty were killed, many were wounded, and 170 were taken prisoners, while the British lost only two killed and twenty wounded.

On the 24th, Moore's Divisions commenced their retreat to Corunna, while the Cavalry, pushing forward with great confidence and audacity, made demonstrations towards Saldanha and Carrion, driving in the French outposts. The Infantry, including the rearguard, were all across the Esla by the 27th; but the Cavalry had an exciting time of it, holding their own, admirably handled by Paget, against thirteen regiments of French Cavalry on a front of thirty miles. 'Moore,' writes Oman, 'was not exaggerating when he wrote on the 28th that "they have obtained by their spirit and enterprise an ascendancy over the French which nothing but great superiority of numbers on their part can get the better of." . . . Every one of Paget's five regiments had its full share of fighting on the 26th and 27th. . . . Since the start from Salamanca they had in twelve days taken no less than 500 prisoners, besides inflicting considerable losses in killed and wounded on the French.' Again, on the 29th, at Benevente, the Cavalry had one last chance; our picquets appear in a measure to have been surprised, and the 3rd Hussars of the German Legion lost heavily. But Paget brought up the 10th Hussars in the nick of time, and used his Horse Artillery guns to great effect; the French horsemen were driven back across the Esla, one of Napoleon's favourite regiments suffered heavy casualties, and General Levebvre-Desnouettes was taken prisoner.

At the beginning of the year, the route of the retreating Army now lying through the mountains, where Infantry could act more effectively than mounted men, the duty of covering the rear of the Army was transferred to Lord Paget's younger brother, Major-General the Hon. Edward Paget, and the Reserve Division. The 15th Hussars was left with this rearguard, while the remaining four regiments pushed on to Corunna. Of Paget's Cavalry Division no regiments took part in the battle, a small body of forty men only of the 15th Hussars being detailed as escort to Sir John Moore. But the title to fame of the horsemen whom Lord Paget commanded rests upon their conduct prior to and during the earlier stage of the retreat to the coast.

'The part taken by the Cavalry under Paget,' writes Dr. Fitchett, 'was very gallant. They faced with courage and hardihood the vastly superior French Cavalry, which pressed on the British rear, and never failed to overthrow them in the actual shock of the charge.'

The author of 'Wellington's Operations in the Peninsula' speaks of 'the Cavalry Division, beautifully handled by Lord Paget, which in a succession of brilliantly successful actions gained for its commander the opportunity of displaying his consummate skill as a leader of Cavalry. The occasion lasted hardly longer than a fortnight, but those few golden days were worth almost a lifetime, and bitterly must Paget have lamented the cruel fate which, through family interest, gave him seniority to Lord Wellington and deprived him of the command of the Cavalry during the subsequent years of the Peninsula War.' But there were other reasons, of a personal character, which made it impossible that, for some time at least, Paget could serve *with* Wellesley—that he would not have objected to serving *under* him seems proved by the fact, as stated by Fortescue, that he had already offered to do something of the same kind once before, when he and his brother lieutenant-generals proposed to Sir Hew Dalrymple that they should stand aside in order that Wellesley might retain command of his Division.

In 1809 Napoleon was making every effort to establish at Antwerp a commercial rival to London, and to avail himself of the naval resources of Holland to hold a threat over England. The British Government came to the conclusion that, by striking a blow in the Scheldt, Napoleon's hopes of maritime rivalry might be frustrated, while a large portion of the forces he was then setting in motion against Austria would be detained in Holland. In July of this year an expeditionary force, numbering nearly forty thousand of all ranks, under the Earl of Chatham, was sent to the island of Walcheren, and of the seven divisions into which the force was divided, the 5th was commanded by Lieut.-General Lord Paget.

As we all know, the expedition was worse than a failure, owing to the supineness of the commander. Antwerp was at his mercy, but he wasted time in the siege of Flushing, which surrendered on August 15, and this solitary success was all that resulted. The Force returned to England in November with more than 11,500 men in hospital and having buried 4000 men in Walcheren, of whom only just over 100 fell in battle.

On March 13, 1812, Lord Paget became Earl of Uxbridge, and early in January, 1815, he was advanced to the Grand Cross of the Bath. In the spring of this year all Europe was startled by the news that Napoleon had broken out of Elba, and when the Armies of the Allies were mustering for the fray, the Earl of Uxbridge was called to the command of the Cavalry in the Low Countries, where so many of the great battles of the centuries have been decided. It was a fine command to which he was appointed; there were seven brigades composed of British and German Legion Cavalry, one brigade of Hanoverian and three of Dutch-Belgian Cavalry—eleven brigades in all, with five squadrons of Brunswick Cavalry; the total strength was just under 14,500, and there were seven batteries of Horse Artillery attached to the force. When the Earl of Uxbridge first arrived in Brussels, the Duke of Wellington said to him: 'I place the *whole* of the Cavalry and Light Artillery of the United Army under your command,' but a few days later the Duke, in consequence of representations by the Prince of Orange, withdrew the regiments of H.R.H.'s nation from the command of Uxbridge. Finally, however, just as the battle of Waterloo commenced, Lord Uxbridge was again asked to take charge of the whole of the Cavalry of the Prince of Orange.

Throughout the short campaign the Earl of Uxbridge was left entirely unfettered by the Duke in regard to the employment of the Cavalry, but it is difficult to gather why the brigades were never formed into divisions. With the fighting on June 16 at Quatre Bras the Cavalry had no concern; Uxbridge himself only reached the field in the afternoon, and the six brigades which were called up did not arrive at Quatre Bras until close upon and after nightfall. When on the following morning Wellington decided upon withdrawing to the Waterloo position, Uxbridge covered the retreat from Quatre Bras with the Cavalry, the enemy's mounted troops following up and being checked at Genappe by charges by the 7th Hussars and the 1st Life Guards. Lord Uxbridge described the operations as 'the prettiest field-day of Cavalry and Horse Artillery that I ever witnessed.'

In arranging the distribution and employment of the Cavalry on the 18th, Lord Uxbridge appears to have accorded to his subordinate commanders an independence of action unusual in those days, and rarely permitted to divisional generals, and still less to brigadiers, who had served under the Duke of Wellington. Both Generals

Vandeleur and Vivian state that they received instructions to 'engage the enemy whenever they could do so with advantage without waiting for orders.' There is no need, neither is there here space, to describe in detail the work of the Cavalry at Waterloo, or even to do more than allude to that extraordinary charge by two brigades, which completely wrecked an Infantry Corps with much of its Artillery; but none who read Lord Wellington's despatch would imagine therefrom how much of his success he owed to Lord Uxbridge and his squadrons. 'Lord Uxbridge,' writes a field-marshal of the present day, 'made but one mistake, and that was undertaking a brigadier-general's, and even a squadron leader's duties in the first charge. . . . He himself, writing in 1839, points out his "great mistake in having led the attack of the Household Brigade." . . . This was, however, his Lordship's only fault throughout the day, in which he showed great skill, initiative, and the most daring courage. He by no means contented himself with leading Cavalry brigades. Several times in the afternoon he rallied Infantry of the Allies which had been crushed by Artillery fire—and at a critical moment he led a single squadron against a massive column, and, though the men did not follow up, he reached and struck the enemy's bayonets with his sword ere he turned.'

The forty years of peace which followed would of themselves have put an end to the further leading by Lord Uxbridge of Cavalry in the field, even had he not at the close of the action been struck by a bullet on the right knee, necessitating amputation; but he did not leave the Service, becoming a general in 1819 and a field-marshal in 1846, being also raised a step in the peerage for his services at Waterloo. During the many years of life that remained to him he filled several public appointments; he was twice Master-General of the Ordnance—under Canning and Lord John Russell—and was twice Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. He has been described as 'of a noble presence, he was the beau ideal of a dashing Hussar; of courteous bearing, impetuous, but not wanting in shrewdness and judgment, and with great kindness of heart.' He lived to so great an age that when he died all his contemporaries and many of his juniors had preceded him; but it was a goodly company which awaited him beyond the Barrier, and there must have been 'feasting and high revelry in the courts of Valhalla' when the great Cavalry leader joined those who had served with him during twenty years of war.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Revue de Cavalerie, August-September.—In a paper 'on the employment of Cavalry,' General Cherfils begins by enumerating the methods of Cavalry action against Cavalry and against the other two arms, and then proceeds to a discussion as to its general employment in the field. He finds increased opportunities for the use of Cavalry in modern battle by reason of the wide extensions of the field and owing to the fact that battles, on the enormous scale of the present day, are virtually no more than a collection of smaller actions, each separate and distinct from those going on upon either side of it, and carried out often at wide intervals apart. General Cherfils is of opinion that herein lies the need for the attachment to every unit, varying in size, of a larger proportion of the mounted arm than has hitherto been held to be desirable—according to him each Infantry division should have a complete regiment of Cavalry, there should be a Cavalry brigade told off to each Army corps, and a strong Cavalry division to each Army, with a Cavalry corps at the disposal of the general in chief command. The divisional Cavalry will suffice to ensure the *sûreté rapprochée*, while the advanced guards of each Army corps, with the Cavalry brigades he proposes giving them, will be responsible for the *sûreté éloignée*. The general commanding the Army requires, however, something beyond this—he requires to be informed of the enemy's movements at such a distance as will afford him time to make his own dispositions, and the instrument to affect this is the Cavalry division well provided with Horse Artillery and several companies of cyclists. For the Cavalry corps he does not seem to find much work, except in the actual battle: if the interval between the Cavalry brigades and the Cavalry division is narrow, then there will be no opportunity for the action of Cavalry masses in the front. These may be given special missions, but their old rôle of exploration has, General Cherfils considers, been appropriated by the aviator. 'Deux Légers' have collaborated in a criticism of the *Nouveau règlement de cavalerie*, and express their unbounded admiration for the *doctrine de combat* propounded in a previous number of this *Revue* by General Durand. The authors decry the controversies on the employment of Cavalry which have raged during late years, and the difficulty in plucking from them anything resembling a *doctrine*. They are rather hard on the dismounted-action school, declaring that such is only *pour les cavaliers timides, âgés ou fatigués qui ne galopent plus!* They are altogether against the converging and enveloping attack favoured by the latest regulations, and they declare for the *doctrine* laid down by General Durand, of which a very brief and necessarily incomplete review was given in

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL for April 1912. The account of the action of the German Cavalry in the Imperial manœuvres of 1911 is concluded in this number; the translator of this paper, chiefly taken from an appreciation by Colonel von Unger, of the Great General Staff, winds up with some general remarks of his own: he finds that while the *découverte* was well organised, its execution left much to be desired; that the divisional Cavalry scouted badly and was very slow in sending back information. In regard to the tactical employment of the Cavalry, it is pointed out how infinitely better the Guard Cavalry division worked than did any of the others, and the reason for this is found in the fact that it is the only permanently organised division. Stress is also laid on the need for the chief command precisely to lay down the successive missions required of the *cavalerie d'armée*. The Vicomte de Noailles has written much on the 'History of the Thirty Years' War,' and in this number a short extract is given from a volume about to appear on 'The Count de Guébriant at the Siege of Brisach in 1638.' In *Au Maroc* Colonel Sainte-Chapelle gives an account of the happenings in that country from the date of the abdication of Muley Hafid—the operations conducted by Colonel Gourand and those to the south of Fez. There is nothing of special Cavalry interest in the account of these operations during August and September of this year; indeed the columns seem to have been mainly composed of Infantry, but it is very evident that the French had not enough troops available in the country for the work required of them; the columns never failed to overcome and disperse the bodies opposed to them, but they were rarely able thoroughly to destroy them, and effectually to protect such of the population as desired to be afforded the necessary security in order to live at peace.

October.—This number contains an account of the ceremonies connected with and the speeches made at the centenary of the Battle of Borodino, near Moscow, last year, when the French erected a memorial in honour of those of the *Grande Armée* who fell during the Russian campaign of 1812. The French were rather unlucky, for their monument could not be got ready in time, and had to be represented by a model, while the granite block upon which it was to have been erected was lost in the North Sea *en route* to Russia. General Aubier contributes some remarks on the *Loi des Cadres*, and enumerates what he considers to be the main requirements of the French Cavalry in order that, while inferior in numbers to the German squadrons, it may at least be equal, if not superior, in quality. An ex-Chasseur d'Afrique has a short account of his experiences during the Franco-German war of 1870, when France recalled her old soldiers to the Colours, and the writer rejoined the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique for the duration of the war. In December 1870 a provisional regiment was formed for service in France from two squadrons each of the 2nd and 4th Chasseurs, and this regiment was attached to the Army of the East and saw a good deal of service, while it was so fortunate as to escape the fate which overtook the majority of those who served under Bourbaki. This is followed by a *résumé* of the work of the three Cavalry divisions and three Cavalry brigades—raising thus each division to the strength of six regiments, now to be the permanent establishment—which were exercised between August 24 and

September 2 last, under General Marion, between Dijon, Gray, and Chalindrey—a splendid manœuvre ground for Cavalry, but marred this year by the bad weather during the concentration period; this account is illustrated by an excellent map. 'Dressages et Dresseurs' is a plaint, and apparently a well-founded one, by a squadron officer, on the subject of the extraordinary difficulty experienced in French Cavalry regiments in training their remounts, owing to short service and the paucity of re-engaged and more experienced men. There was at one time a hope expressed by French Cavalry officers that these acknowledged difficulties would receive official recognition by an increase in the period of service in the Cavalry. M. Millerand was, however, opposed to this and decided against it, while admitting the disadvantages under which the mounted arm works in France. The writer—*un Dragon*—makes out a very strong case for remedial measures; he urges that the French Cavalryman of only two years' service requires an even better-broken charger than does the German, who serves for three years, and he proposes the enlistment or re-engagement of *dresseurs de profession*.

November.—General de Lacroix, formerly Vice-President of the *Conseil supérieur de la guerre*, opens this number with an article wherein he discusses the proposed divisional formation of the French Cavalry. For the principle he has nothing but praise, while he has small fault to find either with the manner of its application. The scheme, outlined in the report by M. Benazet on the *loi des cadres*, recommends that each Cavalry division should contain six regiments, that there should be ten such divisions, and that these divisions should be of three types—the Heavy (two regiments of cuirassiers and four of dragoons), the Mixed (two of cuirassiers, two of dragoons, and two of light Cavalry), and the Light (four of dragoons and two of light Cavalry). General de Lacroix considers the first of these—the number of regiments per division—and rejects absolutely the present arrangement of four per division. He admits its superior mobility and manœuvring power, but dislikes its partition into two brigades, while affirming that its inferiority in numbers to the German Cavalry division makes its increase in size obligatory. He then discusses, but only to set aside, a proposal which has found some supporters—i.e. that the division should contain five regiments; the only advantage he finds in this suggestion is that it would permit of increasing the actual number of divisions, and he finally comes to the conclusion that the six-regiment division of Cavalry adopted by the War Ministry and the *Commission de l'armée* is better than any other organisation. The actual number of Cavalry divisions follows more or less naturally, he says, once the number of regiments per division is agreed to and sufficient Cavalry is left over for the needs of the Army corps. There are seventy-nine regiments, and, deducting twenty-one for the Army corps, there remain fifty-eight. The sixty regiments required for the ten Cavalry divisions are made up by bringing over to France two regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, replacing these in Algeria by two regiments of Spahis still to be raised. As regards the composition of the divisions, General de Lacroix seems to express the opinion that the types selected are due not wholly to military reasons, but also to the equine resources of the country, and consequently one gathers

that criticism is in a measure disarmed. In any case the General appears to be satisfied both with the principle proposed and the manner of its application. General Aubier contributes some practical lessons *à propos d'une journée de manœuvre*; they appear to be drawn from the actual operations of the 20th Cavalry Brigade on September 18 last. He makes some significant remarks on Cavalry employment, emphasising the need for sparing the horses at the outset of the manœuvres, especially in view of the decisive work which will later fall to them; but he is equally outspoken in regard to what he calls *une fâcheuse tendance* of constantly pleading the 'fatigue and overwork of the horses.' It is too often, he says, overlooked that at manœuvres even the youngest troop-horses are seven years old, and that, if properly trained, there should be no occasion to be always trying to spare them from anything of the nature of serious effort. Colonel Sainte-Chapelle continues his account of the late operations in Morocco, bringing these up to October 23 and the conclusion of the Franco-Spanish agreement. Then follows an account of the Cavalry manœuvres of this year, and two smaller articles, the one dealing with the various suggestions for increasing the numbers eligible for service, the other with field signals.

Spectateur Militaire, October 1.—This number contains some interesting considerations on the employment of Cavalry in the *guerre de demain*. The writer, whose name does not transpire, does not consider that any fruitful results will be obtained by use of large bodies of Cavalry on the narrow eastern frontiers of France during the opening days of a campaign. He holds, however, that during the moment immediately antecedent to the establishment of contact, Cavalry will have a *rôle* of almost supreme importance in the *sûreté de première ligne*, acting in combination with the heads of the Infantry columns behind it. This combination again will assume an even greater importance from the moment when contact is actually established, before, during, and after the battle. Co-operation of this kind—combination in the true sense of the word—is not, the author thinks, sufficiently understood or practised; each arm endeavours to *specialise*, with the result that of this combination *l'on fait du travail parallèle*. Full credit is given to the work and writings of General Percin for having done much, under considerable opposition from Artillerymen, to draw closer the *liaison* so necessary between the Infantry and the Artillery; but there are signs, apparently, that the former particularist spirit is again becoming stronger. The Cavalry, complains the author, has done less than the other arms towards the establishment of the necessary *liaison*, and all the ideas as to its method of employment tend towards its increased isolation. The *rôle* usually, indeed chiefly, allotted to it to play is on the flank of the Army or Armies; there is hardly ever a suggestion of the mounted arm being used in the immediate front at the moment of need, and if its place is to be invariably on a flank, it seems tolerably certain that it can scarcely be expected that it can thence reach the front in time to *frapper le coup décisif*. Operations on the flank will too often, urges the writer, be sterile in result; they will be neutralised by the enemy's superiority in mere numbers. To

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employ Cavalry only on the flanks, or at the close of a battle, is an idea resulting from a wholly false conception of the form and progress of an action on the huge, modern scale. We usually imagine a battle, says the French author, as a set scene which will reveal itself before our eyes on an immense front, act soberly succeeding act, up to the final moment when, superiority in rifles and guns having been accumulated against the chosen point, the Cavalry will ride in to pursue if the enemy retires, and to sacrifice itself if he be the stronger. The author quotes from Cantal's *Etudes sur la cavalerie* that war is really a succession of small and violent dramas, each requiring its own special and personal decision, and that throughout there will be phases wherein the employment of Cavalry will be as effectual as at the moment of the supreme crisis. The increased length of front of the modern battle provides increased opportunities for the mounted arm, and the author contends that modern weapons have not *amoindri* the Cavalry rôle, but have only made it more difficult, while the moral effect of a Cavalry success will be greater than ever before.

The writer then proceeds to criticise the modern French tendency to *endivisionner* their Cavalry; those who favour it and who would *endivisionner* the army corps Cavalry, argue that the army corps nowadays is no more than a purely secondary unit, that the real *échelon* is the Army which ought to be given a Cavalry division, the army corps contenting itself with a single regiment of light Cavalry. The writer urges that an army corps may well in the modern battle have a very extended front, may have a special combat to carry on, and for that purpose will require the three arms, and that a single regiment of Cavalry will not then be enough to *jouer aucun rôle tactique*. He considers that the German military authorities are the more correct in refusing to form Cavalry divisions in peace time, approving though they do of the employment of Cavalry masses. They prefer to group their Cavalry according as the conditions of the war may dictate, believing that in peace time the brigade is a sufficiently large unit, provided that its commander is experienced and conducts his command according to the general principles handed down to him by his superiors.

October 15.—This number has a description of an invention recently introduced and experimented with in Germany, but not yet in use either in France or in this country. It is called a *Leuchtpistole*, and is a pistol throwing a small shell which lights up the ground upon which it falls. It is fired at an angle of 45° , and has a range of about 200 metres; the shell burns for from eight to ten seconds and lights up brilliantly a circle with a diameter of about 100 metres. Its employment with Cavalry seems rather obscure, but it appears to be suggested that it might be useful to small Cavalry posts watching a natural obstacle, such as the line of a river, when its employment would reveal any attempt at crossing by an enemy, which might be suspected, though possibly not heard, on a boisterous or stormy night.

There is nothing of special interest for Cavalry in the two numbers for November, except for a tactical review, now somewhat belated, of the German Imperial manœuvres of 1909.

Kavalleristische Monatshefte. September.—There is rather a dearth in this number—not of interesting matter so much as of subjects which have not been already dealt with, at more or less length, in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL. Thus Rittmeister Lauffer has a paper on the new 'Riding Instructions' issued last June, and Lieut.-Colonel Count Spannochi continues and concludes his *précis* of the Russian 'Cavalry Training,' published this year. There are quite a number of papers on distance riding, *concours hippiques*, and similar competitions, with which Continental Cavalrymen concern and interest themselves far more than do we. Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt contributes an article, which appears to be a reply to another which has appeared in the *Militär-Wochenblatt*, on the many-sided character of the present-day training of a Cavalry regiment. This tendency Colonel Kranefeldt seems to deplore, as he contends that, with the object of making the Cavalryman a Jack-of-all-trades, his riding instruction, the most important of all, is liable to be neglected, for the simple reason that time cannot now be found for it. He states that during his thirty years' service, not only has the attention given to musketry enormously increased, but he enumerates no fewer than fourteen entirely new subjects in which the Cavalry soldier has now to be instructed, and which were quite unheard of when he joined the service. With this the period of service remains at three years and the day at no more than twenty-four hours; further, the number of regimental instructors does not appear to have been added to. According to the writer, the riding-school accommodation per German Cavalry regiment would appear to be rather limited. He closes with an expression of the wish that Cavalry should become again rather a special arm than one which is expected to do something of everything. Major-General von Gersdorff has a short paper urging the attachment of cyclist companies to larger Cavalry bodies: he points out that in France the value of this additional rifle power is recognised, while in Germany the wheelman is regarded as a fine-weather soldier only, his efficiency being, it is held, too much dependent upon weather and condition of road surface. Major-General von Gersdorff is a staunch believer in the value of cyclists as a support to Cavalry—he even suggests their inclusion in the mounted fight, but in what manner he does not disclose. Major-General Baron von Maltzahn makes mention in this number of a remarkable long-distance ride, the start of which was effected on June 16 last, and which is expected to extend over eighteen or twenty months. It seems likely to throw all previous records for these competitions into the shade. On the date mentioned two Germans, the one a lieutenant of the Reserve of the Baden Artillery, the other a farmer, left Omaruru, in German South-West Africa, for Berlin, *via* Windhuk, Bulawayo, Salisbury, Tabora, Fashoda, Khartoum, Cairo, Jerusalem, Damascus, Constantinople, Sofia, Buda Pesth, and Vienna. They take with them six country-bred horses, which General von Maltzahn declares to be far better than our South African horse, and two of these are ridden by natives and two carry packs. The distance to be covered is estimated at something like 12,500 miles, and these are, of course, contained within long stretches of desert, fever belts, and also of the fly-country.

October.—In the opening article of this number Field-Marshal-Lieutenant Baron von Gemmingen writes on 'the employment of Cavalry in varying

terrain,' and illustrates his paper with a number of examples, drawn apparently from his own experience when in command : this is to be continued. Major-General von Unger describes the battle action of the Prussian Cavalry in sixteen of the great actions of the war of the Austrian Succession and of the Seven Years' War; his object, apparently, is to prove that, great as were the results achieved by the mounted arm, they might well have been more important than they were had the Prussian Cavalry not been, on the majority of occasions, in a state of considerable numerical inferiority to the opposing Cavalry. In *l'instrument de la vitesse* Captain von Möller, of the General Staff, reviews the work of the Cavalry, on either side, in the Sedan campaign, and pleads for the careful study by Cavalry soldiers of every day of its happenings; he shows that while the French Cavalry was weak in numbers, and indifferently supplied with Horse Artillery, it had in peace time been badly trained, and the troop-horses were overburdened. Rittmeister Laufer continues his criticism of the new 'Riding Instructions,' and then follows a careful paper, with three sketches in the text, on 'impressions of the Cavalry part of the great manœuvres of 1912 in Hungary'; this is very brief, but will repay perusal. The writer, who withholds his name, is of opinion that the various missions entrusted to the Cavalry were always difficult of attainment, while particularly those set to the northern force on the three days the manœuvres lasted were, from the very commencement, practically doomed to failure. Considering the nature of the country, a firm enough contact was not established with the larger Infantry bodies, and while the action of the Cavalry was always very bold, and the attacks well planned and carried through, it seems open to doubt whether the energy expended was always commensurate with the problematical result. The critic, however, hastens to remark that he regards this blemish, if so it be, as a sign of the possession of energy, determination, and initiative in the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry, the value of which can hardly be over-rated. Dr. Kraemer, Professor at the Agricultural College at Stuttgart, has a curious paper on the 'psychology of the horse,' and the number concludes with several quite short articles, some of unusual interest. Among these is a brief account of the action of the Spanish Cavalry at Tzenain, in Morocco, on February 20 of last year. This has attracted but meagre attention, the operations of the Spanish forces in the Riff country being, naturally, overshadowed by the work of the Italians in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. During the short period from September 7, 1911, to February 20, 1912, the Spanish had some 900 Cavalry in the field, and lost 91 officers and men and 105 horses killed and wounded—more than 10 per cent. At Tzenain 250 Cavalry, consisting of part of a squadron of the Alcantara Regiment and two squadrons of a locally raised Cavalry, were drawn up some 200 yards in rear of the right wing of their own Infantry, occupying an awkward position some 150 yards in rear of a piece of wooded ground. The Cavalry commander had noticed that individuals of the enemy were by degrees occupying this wood, and ordered his three squadrons to mount in readiness for an attack which he expected, but which the Infantry had not apparently foreseen. Presently some 400 Arabs made a rush from cover upon the right of the Infantry, when the Spanish Cavalry at once charged into them. The Arabs stood, and the fight, which

terminated in favour of the Spaniards, was a very bloody one while it lasted; the Arabs left 68 men on the ground, while the Spanish Cavalry had 50 men and 65 horses killed and wounded. The composition of the French Cavalry Divisions in last year's manœuvres, and the new permanent attachment to them of a body of 350 cyclists, leads General von Gersdorff to plead for some such permanent increase to the rifle power of the German Cavalry Division. He admits that the Red Cavalry during the last Imperial manœuvres obtained the upper hand in the action of September 10, because it was supported by two Jäger battalions accompanying it on motor-lorries. He points out, however, that in the absence of any *permanent* arrangement of this kind, neither Jägers nor lorries might be forthcoming when wanted, and that, therefore, it is better that each Cavalry division should have, as in France, a cyclist detachment permanently attached to it. There are some remarks on the 'conduct of a number of Cavalry divisions' forming a Cavalry corps—a formation which was experimented with during the German manœuvres of 1912. The writer considers that to bring two divisions under one command, and thus make a Cavalry Corps of them, is justified where a strong army Cavalry is covering a weak *Armeeabtheilung*; but that, in the case of the reconnaissance and security of an army, composed of four or five corps, no useful purpose is served by uniting the whole of the Army Cavalry into one corps. The writer submits that it would be better to postpone such union until the Cavalry divisions come together on the actual battle-field, when the senior of the Cavalry divisional commanders would automatically take charge of the whole, and the advantages of undivided command would be at once apparent. During the movements, however, leading up to the battle, it is suggested that the machinery of the issue of orders, conveyance of intelligence, &c., would suffer, and be likely to be thrown out of gear by the creation of the Cavalry corps.

November.—'A German General' contributes to this number a very short opening paper on the training of Cavalry divisions and on the education of leaders. He appears to deprecate the system at present pursued in Germany of bringing together annually a number of widely separated units, forming them into so-called Cavalry divisions, and training them for a limited number of days upon the same old piece of ground. He compares the French system of training Cavalry divisions with the German—to the disadvantage of the latter—and if his complaints generally are justified, it would seem that there has been something of a falling off in the standard of such training since the days of Wright, Haeseler, and Rosenberg. Baron von Gemmingen continues his article on 'the employment of Cavalry in varying *terrain*,' and Rittmeister Lauffer concludes in this number his remarks on the recently introduced 'Riding Instructions.' The last number of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL contained a very brief review of the new Russian 'Cavalry Training,' wherein it was mentioned that the *Lava* attack formation was no longer to be confined only to the Cossacks, but was, for the future, to be employed by the whole of the Russian Cavalry. This number of the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte* contains an anonymous article on this attack formation, with suggestions as to how it can best be met. It is stated that the word '*lava*' is of Arab derivation, was introduced by the Turks to the Mongols, and from them was

adopted by the Cossacks, and has a rather comprehensive meaning, signifying an attack which shall deceive the enemy and induce him to break up his solid formation. The writer describes the main features of the 'lava' attack—the rapid advance of the over-lapping lines of horsemen, ever threatening to attack, and retiring when pursued, the intention being to draw forward an enemy in pursuit and to beguile him towards the bodies of solid Cavalry following the dispersed lines. The 'lava' is really, therefore, no actual attack formation, but rather a screen covering the tactical blow by the formed body. Its employment calls for very high individual training of man and horse, easy enough of attainment by the old-time *Cossacks*, who were professional soldiers, but more difficult of practice by the slow-thinking, somewhat lethargic *Russian* Cavalryman, who serves for four years only. It must be combated, says the writer, by keeping cool, by avoiding all temptation to pursue, and especially to open out too much in the pursuit; finally, it is suggested that, however terrible a form of attack the lava may have been, it remains to be seen whether its employment will answer in modern war. Lieutenant Corsepius has an article on the 'Raids in the War of Secession,' and Dr. von Madag asks the question, which he replies to in the negative—'Can horses think?' This number contains a description, with plates, of a new Service bridle, with halter attachment, which has been invented by Rittmeister Zingler, and has apparently received official approval.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—In No. 121 of this journal Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt drew attention, without any special comment, to a paper by Lieut.-Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson, of the Royal Scots Greys, which appeared in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL for July of last year, 'On Shoeing,' and the burden of which was that any foot, with the exception of abnormal feet from birth, can, with knowledge and patience, be made into and kept in a more or less perfect shape. In No. 127 Major-General Dreyer takes Colonel Kranefeldt to task for a tendency which he says he has noticed among his fellow-countrymen, and which the General appears to deplore, to attach undue importance to anything about horses and horsemastership which comes from the United Kingdom. He then controverts most of Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson's statements, and opines that this officer seems to have met only with horses possessing normal limbs and hoofs, and that the recital of his experiences possesses no value for German officers who have to deal with horses which, according to General Dreyer, are more generally decorated with abnormal extremities. He seems to ridicule the idea that a horse's foot can be made by treatment into a more or less perfect shape, or that Colonel Bulkeley-Johnson can alter the designs of nature. But if we understand the paper 'On Shoeing' by that officer aright, he especially disclaims the idea that feet *abnormal from birth* can derive any real benefit from the treatment he advocates. Incidentally General Dreyer permits himself the expression of the comfortable reflection that shoeing in England is not of anything like the same efficiency as in Germany, though he admits, with regret, that his fellow-countrymen seem to think the opposite.

No. 134 contains a review by the Commandant of the Potsdam *Kriegsschule*, Lieut.-Colonel von Geyso, of the portion of the new Russian Cavalry

'Training,' which deals with dismounted duties. He calls attention to the very high standard required for this work of the Russian Cavalry soldier—that he is to be so trained as to be in no respect inferior to the Infantryman, and that to further this the foot drill and exercises for both have been now brought into line. The dismounted or fight line is divided into two classes—'ordinary' and 'special'; in the first case two-thirds of the men are dismounted, in the latter five-sixths of the men of a squadron. The horse-holders usually remain mounted; tethering is never resorted to; in 'special' cases the Cossacks make their horses lie down. The led-horses are usually brought up in groups in rear of, and as close as possible to, the dismounted men, covered, however, from view and fire. In the assault the Cossacks sling the rifle over the back and 'go in' with the sword, the other Cavalry appear to fix the bayonet on dismounting, but the lance, usually grounded on dismounting, can also be employed in the assault. When Cavalry is working in large bodies, the combined dismounted and mounted action should be employed. Stress is laid upon the need for remaining mounted as long as possible—not only in the hope of seizing such opportunities for mounted action as may offer, but in order that, when the men *must* dismount for the fire-fight, they may enter upon it as fresh as possible. Owing to the small number of rifles available and the difficulties attending replenishment of ammunition, the attacks should be carried through as quickly as possible, firing commencing at short ranges, and being very rapid. The assault must be carried to push of bayonet, the enemy being pursued with fire and also with cold steel. The employment of fire on the defensive is regulated for, positions are to be artificially strengthened, for which purpose forty picks and shovels are carried among the men of each squadron, attached to the saddle, while every regiment has, in addition, a tool-cart. The closest combination of mounted action and dismounted fire is insisted on, and Cavalry are by no means to regard dismounted attack, even by night, as outside their *métier*.

In No. 148 Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt has a very short but illuminating paper on 'Stuart's Cavalry in the War of Secession'; he describes the material of which this Cavalry was composed, its uniform, armament, and mounts, but points out that it was chiefly employed on independent missions, less frequently took part in a set battle. He has the greatest respect for all that they did by means of the raids they carried out in rear of the Federal armies, and describes the methods of using their arms. He appears, probably with some reason, to attribute the frequent employment of the revolver in the mounted attack to the idea, still rather over-prevalent, that the ordinary American habitually carries a revolver on his person and uses it on trifling encouragement. He seems to consider that much of the success of the Southern Cavalry was due to their excellently organised despatch riders, scouts, and signal corps. Of the first he reminds us that they were usually all young men, light-weights, and admirably mounted, and that the commander had 60 attached to his staff, every corps commander 12, each divisional general 6, and every brigadier 3. Each body had a party of scouts attached, mostly men from the western states, who looked after themselves, lived often within the hostile lines, travelled only by night, and remained out for days and nights at a time. But for the fact

that they always wore uniform, they were practically spies. Moltke used to declare that the operations of the War of Secession were merely those of 'armed mobs,' and that nothing of military value was to be learnt from them. More recently their importance seems to be recognised by German officers, among them General von Bernhardt, and Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt concludes his paper with the remark that there is very much to be learnt from Stuart's employment of his Cavalry, and especially from the manner in which he practically created his arm during the campaign, for which, however, he was fortunate enough to find magnificent material to hand.

'History of the 30th Lancers (Gordon's Horse).' By Major E. A. W. Stotherd. (Gale & Polden, Ltd.)

This volume, albeit one of slender proportions, is a welcome addition to the military histories. The author writes concisely, evidently with great accuracy, and his descriptions of the events when his regiment has been engaged on active service are graphically told.

After tracing the origin and evolution of the Hyderabad Contingent Cavalry, from which the distinguished regiment under consideration sprang, he narrates how it successively was known as the 4th Nizam's Cavalry, the 4th Cavalry (Hyderabad Contingent), the 4th Lancers (Hyderabad Contingent), and lastly as the 30th Lancers (Gordon's Horse). And here we may remark that the family of the Gordons of Park have between the years 1759 and 1857 raised no less than seven regiments; of these the 30th Lancers was the fifth, and was raised in 1826 by Captain Sir John Bury Gordon, 13th Light Dragoons. The opening chapter already mentioned gives with great clearness many details of the establishment, pay, horses, and composition as to native soldiers in the force which hardly more than a decade ago we knew familiarly as the Hyderabad Contingent.

Following on this, we are told the military record of the regiment, and a stirring one it is; how, quite as a young regiment, it was almost immediately employed on active service against the Naiks, Pindarees, Rohillas, Bhils, and other lawless, marauding tribes; and indeed fighting or endeavouring to force their opponents to come to hand grips was the normal condition of the corps.

A curious regimental custom is noted, and is worth quoting: 'No men wounded in the back need ever expect promotion.'

In a case which occurred when a detachment was sent out on duty and failed, a *panchayat*, or native court of the risaldar and jemadars, tried the delinquents. The decision being that all but nine were blameworthy, all the rest were immediately paid off and dismissed. Byam's great march of 588 miles in thirty-one days through dense jungle and over wild hills in 1831 was an achievement of which any regiment would be justly proud.

Later, in the dark days of the Mutiny, the regiment added much to its fame; and be it remembered the Hyderabad Contingent remained not only loyal to the Raj, but the effect of its loyalty was indeed far-reaching on the disaffected in Southern India. Major Stotherd tells, and tells well, of the

Siege of Dhar and of other combats which preceded the coming of Sir Hugh Rose.

Later, on the formation of the Central India Field Force, we read of the operations around Jhansi, the siege, storming, and capture of that stronghold, the flight, the misdirected attempts at a rally made by the Rani, and of her death. Then follows the recapture of Gwalior, which almost closed the campaign as far as the regiment was concerned.

We next find the regiment engaged in the third Burmese war, as they were ordered to that country early in 1888; and here again good service was performed. A most useful and apparently very complete chapter follows on the uniforms of the regiment at various times. A biographical notice of each of the Gordons concludes the historical portion of the book.

Three appendices follow, in which are recorded chronologically the register of the commandants, the officers of the regiment, and, lastly, the personal list for 1911.

A clear sketch-map of the campaign during the Mutiny is given, and a dozen or more illustrations, some those of British officers, others of native officers and men, are scattered through the pages.

The military history is so clear that one would fain have had from the same pen a chapter on regimental sport. That the regiment has produced not a few mighty hunters we know—notably Hastings Fraser. His trophies of heads, horns, and hides were, to say the least of them, extensive. We must heartily congratulate Major Stotherd in conclusion on his excellent work.

‘From the Black Mountain to Waziristan.’ By Colonel H. C. Wyly, C.B. Published by Macmillan & Co., St. Martin’s Street, London.

All officers who are ever likely to serve in India should have this book in their possession. The author has grouped the various warlike tribes of our North-Western Borderland geographically and ethnically, and deals with each tribe historically. The reader can thus easily make himself acquainted with the history of any portion of the frontier in which he happens to be interested. The work includes our most recent frontier operations against the Mohmands in 1908. Not the least interesting reading in the book is the appendix dealing with the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, narrating the extent to which it had attained, and the means employed for its suppression by land and sea. This trade was carried on on a very large scale, and probably few of our readers are aware that the tribesmen are estimated to have in their possession to-day from 80,000 to 150,000 modern rifles. This fact alone should make all officers keen to read Colonel Wyly’s valuable work.

‘Military Law made Easy.’ By Lieut.-Colonel S. T. Banning. Sixth Edition. (Gale and Polden.) Price 4s. 6d.

This is especially designed for officers going up for promotion examinations.

‘Cavalry Training, 1912.’

The Cavalry manual which has lately been issued to the troops differs considerably from that of 1907 in the form in which it is written. In the old book there was some danger of instructions for training being mistaken for instructions to be carried out in war—for instance, the sentence ‘whenever possible the attack should be practised over a space of 1,200 to 1,800 yards . . .’ was often taken to imply that in war it was desirable to attack over this distance. To avoid misconceptions of this nature, the new manual has been divided into two parts, the first dealing with training and the second with war. Another alteration in the form is the relegation of instructions for ‘ceremonial’ to a manual devoted entirely to this subject and called ‘Ceremonial.’ This change, made in pursuance of a policy adopted for all training manuals, may hasten the end of the fast-dying belief that steadiness in ‘marching past’ and efficiency for war are always synonymous.

The general principles of training have not been materially altered, but more emphasis is laid on the development of the soldierly spirit, and to the careful and uninterrupted training of the machine-gun detachment.

In the instruction of the man on foot, the method of using the new sword is given. Cuts are no longer taught, and the importance of the point is insisted upon.

The chapter on equitation has been rearranged. The instruction has been simplified as far as possible, and notes on driving have been added. In training the man the chief points aimed at are confidence, a firm and easy seat, and good hands; in training the horse, the necessity for devoting plenty of time to his education and for making the amount of work he does depend on his physical development are the points on which particular stress is laid.

The first chapter of Part II.—‘War’ is devoted to an explanation of the principles governing the employment of Cavalry. The 1907 manual appears to have been misunderstood in regard to the sub-division of Cavalry. It seems to have been assumed that the mounted brigades should always be allotted a protective rôle, while the Cavalry division should always act as independent Cavalry. The new manual clears up this point. It says: ‘The commander-in-chief, in order to gain full value from his Cavalry, must clearly determine what he requires from it, and group his units accordingly in a suitable manner and in sufficient strength.’ Again: ‘It will depend mainly upon the general situation and upon the strategical object in view whether the greater part of the Cavalry is employed, in the first instance, upon protective or other duties’; and again: ‘At any time circumstances may arise which make it necessary for the Cavalry to be regrouped; for the Cavalry which has been acting independently to assume a protective rôle, and *vice versa*, or for either body to reinforce or merge into the other.’

Separate chapters are devoted to movements and information, more attention being paid than formerly to the necessity for strict march discipline.

Considerably more space is allotted to the principles of dismounted fighting. In the 1907 manual this subject was treated in a slightly superficial manner, and it was probably as a result of this treatment that many officers of other branches of the service concluded incorrectly that Cavalry officers attach little or no importance to rifle fire. The principles of the employment

of machine guns has also received more attention, and machine-gun officers, provided they receive a proper amount of encouragement from their commanding officers, will now have little cause to complain that they suffer from any neglect to appreciate the value of the weapon of which they are in control.

No instruction for the mounted drill of the machine gun is included in the new manual for two reasons: firstly, because the drill has not been settled, reports on the provisional drill issued in a special pamphlet not having been fully considered; and, secondly, because an alteration in the provisional drill may be necessitated by the adoption of the new gun-carriage which was under experiment during the recent manoeuvres.

In the appendix at the end of the book a syllabus of recruit training is given as a guide to officers charged with the training of recruits.

'Animal Life in Africa,' by Major J. Stevenson-Hamilton, late 6th Dragoons (W. Heinemann), is a book that all interested in big game should read. It breathes the true spirit of the sportsman, and is a standard work for the naturalist.

'The Arabs in Tripoli.' By Alan Ostler. (London: John Murray & Co., 50 Albemarle Street.) Price 10s. 6d.

Mr. Ostler has written a very interesting book showing accurately the condition of affairs in Tripoli.

From an instructional point of view it is marred by the want of a map.

Mr. Ostler has faithfully reproduced the mode of thought, life, and surroundings of the desert Arabs of that country.

'A Manual of Field Cookery.' By Lieut.-Colonel H. E. R. James, C.B., R.A.M.C. R. Published by Forster, Groom & Co., Ltd., 15 Charing Cross Road. Price 6d.

This is a translation from the French, and French soldiers are well known as the cleverest cooks in Europe in the field. All recipes, which number thirty, are made out for parties of four men. The book should therefore be very valuable for regimental scouts and other Cavalry soldiers on detached duties.

'The Stableman's Course.' By Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.

This is an excellent little book full of short, pithy, practical information.

It is written in the simplest language. The two lessons have been arranged as a guide to instructors when teaching young soldiers their stable duties. They contain nothing which a Private in a Cavalry Regiment ought not to know if he is to look after his horse properly.

Price 1s. 6d., which, let us hope, will soon be reduced to 6d.

'The Boxing Rules and Guide to Refereeing, Judging, &c.,' issued by the authority of the Royal Navy and Army Boxing Association, published at the offices of *Boxing*, 22 Burleigh Street, Strand, W.C. (price 6d.), is a good reference book, and contains many useful articles.

NOTES

EDITORIAL

The series of articles on horse-training, written by officers at the Cavalry School, Netheravon, concludes with Captain Bruce's article on steeplechasers in the present issue.

The Editor has received several letters from officers at home and abroad expressing appreciation of these articles.

It is therefore proposed to extend this system of publishing series of articles on subjects interesting to our readers from a sporting, as well as from a strictly military, point of view.

We have in hand two articles on horse-breeding, and will be very thankful to officers or others who have had experience of horse-breeding in any country if they will send accounts of their experiences and their views on this all-important subject.

Subsequently it is hoped to publish a series on sports open to Cavalrymen in various parts of the world. We therefore exhort our numerous readers who have had special opportunities or experiences to let loose their facile pens for the benefit of their less experienced but equally ardent comrades.

APPOINTMENTS AND COMMANDS

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to appoint Mr. Frederick Hobday, F.R.C.V.S., to be Honorary Veterinary Surgeon.

Major-General Hugh Richard Viscount Downe, K.C.V.O., C.B., C.I.E., has been gazetted Colonel of the 10th (P.W.O.R.) Hussars, vice Major-General Lord R. D. Kerr, K.C.B., resigned.

Major-General Frederick W. P. Angelo has been gazetted Colonel of the 9th Hodson's Horse.

Colonel his Highness Asaf Jah Muzaffar-ul-Mamalik Nizam-ul-Mulk Nizam-ud-Daula Nawab Mir Sir Usman Ali Khan Bahadur Fath Jang, of Hyderabad, G.C.S.I., has been appointed Honorary Colonel of the 20th Deccan Horse.

Brigadier-General W. A. Watson, C.I.E., has now taken up the command of the Cavalry School, Saugor, India.

The undermentioned officers have been appointed to the following Territorial mounted brigades respectively :—

South Wales : Colonel F. A. B. Fryer, late Inniskilling Dragoons.

1st South-Western : Colonel the Earl of Shaftesbury, K.P., K.C.V.O., late North Irish Horse.

THE CAVALRY DIVISIONAL TRAINING, 1912

NOTES ON ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

BY MAJOR I. G. HOGG, D.S.O., 4th (Q.O.) Hussars

THE Cavalry Division only exists as a division for a few weeks in each year, and does not enjoy a permanent commander and nucleus staff as is the case with an Infantry Division. It has therefore been customary to attach a Cavalry officer to the general staff at the War Office to act as D.A.A. and Q.M.G. of the Cavalry Division during the training season, and to deal with the preliminary arrangements for Cavalry Divisional Training. During the past training season the divisional training of the Cavalry has consisted of:—

- (a) A divisional staff tour held in April.
- (b) A reconnaissance scheme from September 2 to September 6.
- (c) A week's divisional training in the manœuvre area.
- (d) Participation in Army manœuvres.

For reasons of expense it is only possible for 3rd Cavalry Brigade to participate in the divisional training every third year, though sometimes, as was the case this year, an improvised mounted brigade is formed to take part in it. I propose to describe the various phases of the training very briefly from an administrative point of view.

(a) As regards the staff tour nothing need be said here, a report being issued from the War Office to all Cavalry units.

(b) The reconnaissance scheme was devised to utilise the march of the units from their brigade training areas to the manœuvre area for instructional purposes. A system of billeting for shelter was made use of instead of camps or bivouacs. The price to be paid for the billets was fixed at 6d. per horse and 6d. per man per night, which was to include use of water, 2 lb. wood fuel per man, provision of straw for the man and litter for the horse, in addition to overhead shelter.

Units had sufficient train transport to carry one day's supplies and one day's corn, and supplies were drawn at each halting place. The provision of billets was, of course, entirely voluntary on the part of the owners, and necessitated careful preliminary reconnaissance. Brigades were therefore informed of the areas in which they would halt during each night of the reconnaissance, and were instructed to detail officers to make the preliminary reconnaissance. This work would normally be done by the staff captains, but the officers who fill these appointments are rarely available for preliminary work, and therefore other officers have to be employed. In any future billeting scheme it would probably be desirable to include the provision of hay in the price of the billets, as units find a difficulty in fetching hay from some central dépôt at the conclusion of a long march; the other alternative would be to reduce the length of the marches. On the average they were, no doubt, longer than desirable this year, but it is not always possible to find a line of suitable billets at the desired distances quite apart from other limitations such as the time available, the expense involved, &c. So far as

I am aware, no difficulty was experienced in obtaining the required accommodation, and the experience of 1910 and 1912 seems to prove that the billeting of troops is the reverse of unpopular.

As regards cost, billets are more expensive than camps or bivouacs. Taking a brigade as consisting of 1,500 men and horses, billets on this year's scale would cost £75 per brigade per night, bivouacs would cost £15 to £30 per night, according to site and engineer services, and camps would cost £15 to £20 a night more than bivouacs for the transport of tents.

Under a system of voluntary billeting a reconnaissance scheme becomes of necessity a somewhat cut and dried exercise, owing to the amount of preliminary reconnaissance required, and to the fact that most of the march takes place outside the manœuvre area, and the movements of troops are confined to the public roads. In such a scheme value must, therefore, be sought from practice in billeting, the collection and transmission of information, inter-communication, the conduct of patrols and kindred subjects, rather than from strategical or tactical problems. The general and special ideas were compiled by the directing staff in conformity with the march table. The 1st Mounted Brigade represented the enemy, and in addition information to be collected by patrols was deposited at 165 post offices in the area traversed by the troops. This information was collected from sixty-five post offices, but it was sometimes left at post offices in the actual billeting areas of the troops. The attached table shows the areas occupied by the troops each night.

(c) *Divisional Training*.—When the divisional training takes place in the manœuvre area, as was the case this year, the sites for the camps are selected several months in advance. The contracts and the necessary Engineer services are then made under the direction of the command in which the area is situated. This year the 1st, 3rd, and 5th Field Troops R.E. were assembled in the area about a month before divisional training commenced for their own collective training and for the preparation of the Cavalry camps under the orders of the officer commanding Cavalry Divisional Engineers. The chief difficulty lay in finding the necessary combination of dry meadow land and good water supply in convenient proximity to the centre of the area in which it was desired to exercise the division. Most owners are only too willing to receive the troops; a few, with an excess of modesty, emphasise the advantages of their neighbour's property over their own for such purposes, and some have very hazy notions as to the composition of a Cavalry brigade. One lady whose permission was sought to camp a Cavalry brigade in her meadows replied that she was accustomed to grant permission to the Cambridge Boy Scouts to pitch a tent under an oak in the park, and would be pleased to allow the Cavalry brigade to put their tent under the same tree.

(d) *Army Manœuvres*.—It is proposed under this heading to give a short description of the supply and transport arrangements for the Red Cavalry Division during Army manœuvres. A few comments and deductions will be put forward for consideration at the end.

The units forming the Red Cavalry Division assembled at Euston Park

on September 15. Hostilities commenced at 6 A.M. on September 16, at which hour the supply situation was as follows :—


Bread, meat, groceries, and corn for consumption on September 16 were with units—i.e. on the man and horse or in the cook's vehicle with first-line transport. Similar supplies for September 17 were carried in the supply sections of the Cavalry divisional train. The Cavalry divisional supply column (mechanical transport) was at the rail head at East Dereham.

At 6 A.M. on September 16 the Cavalry division moved *viâ* Mildenhall and Ashley to the neighbourhood of Brinkley, followed by its first-line transport, under an officer specially detailed in divisional orders, about four miles in rear. The Cavalry divisional train moved under the orders of Colonel Ludlow, A.A. and Q.M.G. of the division, *viâ* Honington to Little Saxham, where it was parked at 11.15 A.M. A wireless station, a visual signalling detachment, and a motor cyclist accompanied the train for communication services, and about 200 cyclists from various units of the division were available as escort. When closed up the train occupied about $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile of the road. The D.A.A. and Q.M.G. accompanied divisional headquarters. At Little Saxham the train received orders, despatched from Ashley, directing it to move *viâ* Barrow to Dalham, which it reached at 4.30 P.M., being met by a motor cyclist with further orders to move *viâ* Cowlinge to Great Bradley. This message also contained a warning that Blue cyclist patrols were moving towards the left flank of the train, and stated that a company of Red cyclists had been sent to occupy Cowlinge. Meanwhile the Cavalry division had reached a point just south of Brinkley, where orders were issued about 5 P.M. for the division to bivouac about Brinkley, Weston Colville, and Carlton. This information reached the train about 5.40 P.M., and on its receipt Colonel Ludlow wired to Red Army Headquarters fixing the refilling points for that night at Great Bradley and Dullingham. The train reached Great Bradley at 6.30 P.M., where it was met by D.A.A. and Q.M.G., and the baggage and supply sections were directed to the bivouacs of their units. After issuing to units (for 17th), supply sections were ordered to return to the refilling points to load up for 18th. The refilling points were reached about 10.30 P.M., the train having covered some thirty-five miles during the day. Now to turn for a moment to the mechanical supply column. The rendezvous had been fixed at Elveden at 6 P.M., and the supply column left East Dereham with the supplies for 18th at 1.45 P.M., reaching Elveden at 5.58 P.M. Here it was met by the senior supply officer of the Cavalry train, who had gone back in a motor for that purpose. He conducted the column to Gazeley, where it was split into two sections, one section taking the supplies (for 18th) for the divisional Artillery, Engineers, and 4th Cavalry Brigade to Great Bradley; the other section taking those for divisional headquarters, 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades, and divisional cyclists to Dullingham. The supplies were off loaded at the refilling points, and the supply column started back at 10.30 P.M., reaching the new rail head at Thetford at 2.15 A.M. Supplies for September 19 were loaded from the railway and completed at 4.15 A.M., when the drivers turned in until it was time to start for the rendezvous on September 17, which was fixed for Bury St. Edmunds at 12 noon.

The supplies off loaded at Great Bradley and Dullingham were picked up by the supply sections of the train, which finished loading at 1 A.M., September 17.

Hay and wood were brought by tractors from Higham, but in some instances did not reach the bivouacs till too late to be of use.

Colonel Ludlow is of the opinion that Cavalry trains should refill in the early morning, and not during the night, and I think the consensus of



opinion will be with him. Cavalry trains nearly always reach the billets or bivouacs late in the evening, and refilling at night tires out the men and horses, and is apt to delay the return of the supply column to the rail head.

I have detailed the movements of the various component parts of the supply mechanism rather fully for this day, as owing to the distance covered

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BILLETING AREAS DURING RECONNAISSANCE.

Unit.	Sunday, Sept. 1. Barracks and Standing Camps.	Monday, Sept. 2.	Tuesday, Sept. 3.	Wednesday, Sept. 4.	Thursday, Sept. 5.	Friday, Sept. 6. Reach Standing Camps.	Remarks.
Divisional Headquarters. 1st Signal Squadron.	Aldershot	Stand Fast	Windsor*	Tring	Hitchin	Royston	*Use camp vacated by Mounted Bri- gade.
1st Cavalry Brigade. VII H.A. Brigade.	Aldershot	Stand Fast	Windsor*	Hemel Hempstead	Stevenage	Royston †	† Less 4 squad- rons proceeding to join 1st and 2nd Divisions.
2nd Cavalry Brigade.	Salisbury Plain	Newbury	Henley	Berkhamsted	Hitchin	Little Linton	
4th Cavalry Brigade.	Salisbury Plain	Hungerford	Wallingford	Tring	Shefford	Newton (near Harston)	
1st Mounted Brigade (As enemy).	Windsor	Stand Fast	Chesham	Luton	Baldock		
Headquarters. Composite Regiment. Household Cavalry. J Battery R.H.A.							
Royal Scots Greys.	Windsor	Stand Fast	Great Missenden	Dunstable	Biggleswade	Wimpole Park	
Mounted Infantry.	Windsor	Stand Fast	Amersham	Harpden	Buntingford		

THE CAVALRY DIVISIONAL TRAINING.

I

by the Cavalry division it was the hardest day for the train and supply column. In fact from a small parlour of the inn at Brinkley which constituted divisional headquarters, I could overhear some of the civilian drivers in the public bar discussing their experiences, estimating the distance covered as fifty miles, forecasting their absence from manœuvres in 1913, and hopefully predicting a violent death for the whole of the staff! Happily no great exertions had to be demanded of the train during 17th and 18th.

On September 17 the first-line transport and the train was concentrated and parked at Wood Ditton at 8.30 A.M., a wireless station and two motor cyclists being sent to it for communication services. The train remained parked till 3 P.M., when orders reached it from divisional headquarters that the division would bivouac at Great Bradley and Little Thurlow, with the cyclists at Carlton. These areas were reached about 6 P.M. Colonel Ludlow fixed the refilling points at Great Bradley and Little Thurlow, so as to avoid the supply section of the train having to move back to refill from the supply column. The supply column reached the refilling points with supplies (for 19th) about 7 P.M., off-loaded and restarted for Bury St. Edmunds at 9.45 P.M., arriving there at 11.30 P.M.

Hay and wood were brought by tractors about 8 P.M.

On September 18 the train was ordered to remain in bivouacs, but to be ready to move at 7 A.M., a portion of the first-line transport being left with it. At 9 A.M. a message was received from divisional headquarters directing the train to move, if possible, towards Steeple Bumpstead, so as to clear the front of Red Infantry, but to obtain permission from Red Army Headquarters. The latter were established at Little Thurlow at that hour, but considered the proposed move too dangerous, in view of the proximity of the Blue Cavalry and cyclists. At 4.50 P.M. a message was received stating that the division was at Redwinter, and about 6 P.M. information was received that the division was returning to the same bivouacs. These were reached between 8 and 9 P.M.

Hay and wood were brought during the day by the supply lorries from Bury St. Edmunds. Lorries appear much better than steam tractors for this purpose, the latter being too slow.

At the conclusion of the manœuvres on 18th, therefore, units were in possession of bread, meat, groceries, and corn for 19th, and the supply sections of the train were empty.

So much for the narrative. Attention may now be directed to one or two points in connection with it. The first is the necessity of good communication between the divisional headquarters and the train. Occasions will arise both in manœuvres and in war when no amount of forethought will enable the train to reach the troops, but it is the duty of the administrative staff to reduce these occasions to a minimum, and the chief aid is good means of communication. As will be seen from the above narrative, both wireless and motor cyclists were attached to the train, which was accompanied by the chief administrative staff officer of the division, who dealt with all matters of supply and transport. His deputy dealt with all matters connected with camps, billets or bivouacs, and accompanied divisional headquarters. Thus as soon as the area in which the division

was to halt for the night was decided by the general staff, the administrative staff officer with headquarters could communicate it to the train and then, in company with the staff captains of brigades, make a rapid reconnaissance of the area, allot each brigade its area, and be ready to meet the train and direct it to the brigade areas on its arrival. For this purpose the administrative staff officer with headquarters should be able to lay his hands on a motor-car when required, and some of the headquarter motors should either accompany first-line transport or, in a friendly country, be directed to convenient telegraph offices where they can be got hold of at short notice.

The second point is the question of protection. A horsed train will always be a source of anxiety to a Cavalry commander. If it is kept too far back it will never reach the troops at night, whereas if it is too close up it is liable to capture, although, in peace manœuvres, the danger of capture can be viewed with a good deal of philosophic calm. When on the move the train is clearly very vulnerable, but when parked in a suitable position it can generally defend itself from any reconnoitring detachments which may work round the flanks of the division. There are always a large number of mounted men and cyclists with the train from various units of the division, in addition to the armed and trained A.S.C. *personnel*, which at war establishment numbers some 500 men. During manœuvres the divisional train found no difficulty in resisting the attentions of Blue patrols, and in capturing a good many of its tormentors.

The third point is, how are the men and horses of the fighting troops to be fed on those occasions when, from whatever cause, the train cannot reach the troops? In war the men carry an iron ration for use on such occasions, but no iron ration has been, or is likely to be, devised for the horses, and reliance has to be placed on requisitions from the country. I think that each man should carry an iron ration in peace manœuvres; if not used before, it would have to be consumed on the last day of manœuvres, as it could not be returned to store, but I think most people would prefer to carry it with that proviso rather than be without it.

The fourth point is a suggestion for consideration and discussion regarding the organisation of the Cavalry train for service in a country where good roads abound. Personally I incline to the opinion that a horsed train is not sufficiently mobile to supply a Cavalry division, and that there should be no horsed transport behind the first line. At the same time some link under the command of the Cavalry commander appears necessary between first line and the mechanical supply column on the lines of communication, and I think this link should be supplied by the substitution of a light motor train for the present horse train. With a motor wireless station and a few motor cyclists for requisition and communication duties such a train could be left parked, well in rear of the Cavalry, and could rapidly move up to the billets or bivouacs in the evening. The present horsed train has far too many dismounted men with it, and lacks the requisite mobility.

This is a very inadequate sketch of some of the problems connected with the supply of a Cavalry division in the field. It may appear a somewhat dry topic, but every Cavalry commander should have a good knowledge of the subject if only with the object of ensuring that failure in supplies

reaching his troops is due to unavoidable causes, and not to want of forethought or bad staff work on the part of his administrative staff. It is a subject in which familiarity does not breed contempt.

I am indebted to the notes of Colonel Ludlow, A.A. and Q.M.G. of the Cavalry division, and Captain Inglefield, commanding the supply column, for the data regarding the movements of the train and supply column respectively.

'THE STABLE FLY NUISANCE'

The following has been found a most efficacious expedient for reducing that pest of Indian stables, the common house-fly. Its use has been attended with the most satisfactory results at two important Remount Depôts in India.

Its efficiency depends on the fact that the ordinary fly only survives a few hours, and, consequently, if one can destroy the eggs before they can hatch out, the pest will soon be materially reduced.

It has been found by experiment that one of the substances the common fly particularly favours for depositing its eggs in is fresh horse dung.

Construct a series of pits about two feet square and two feet deep at suitable intervals in close proximity to the stable. In the morning place a layer of freshly gathered horse dung, about three inches deep, over the floor of these pits. Early the next morning have the dung removed and burnt. During the day the fly lays its eggs in the pit, and before the eggs have time to hatch out, all are burnt.

Needless to say, it is of little avail if one's next-door neighbour does not share one's views on fly destruction.

THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA DEFENCE FORCE

In November 1912 the *Gazette* published the regulation of the Defence Act recently ratified by the Council of Defence. The following are the principal features :—

The Union is divided into thirteen military districts for the purposes of the Act. Any citizen who, during 1913, will attain the age between seventeen and twenty-one years, both inclusive, must appear personally between January 2 and 15, 1913, at the Magistrate's Office, Police Station, Police Post, or before a Field Cornet, to fill in a registration form. The procedure is outlined for cases of illness, or invalidity by absence from the Union.

Following are the rates of pay and allowances for the active citizen force, when engaged on continuous training, per day :—

Lieut.-Colonel, 20s.	Sergeants, 4s. 6d.
Major, 15s.	Corporals, 3s. 6d.
Captain, 12s. 6d.	Bombardiers and Lance-Corporals, 3s. 3d.
Lieutenant, 10s.	Gunners, Privates, Trumpeters and Buglers, 3s.
Warrant Officers, 6s.	
Staff Sergeants, 5s.	

A citizen, who, having completed four years' peace training in the above force, or having been transferred to that force from a Militia or Volunteer

corps, with not less than five years' efficient service in the corps, is engaged to continue his service in that force as a non-commissioned officer in or above the rank of sergeant, may receive an allowance at the following rates during continuous training :—

A shilling a day for every day's attendance at non-continuous training ; 3s. for every attendance for training for a period of four hours, and for a period of an hour and a half, 1s.

During days of continuous training, all ranks of the active citizen force receive rations at the public expense, or allowance in lieu thereof, not exceeding 1s. 6d. per day. For a period of one day's training, lasting eight hours, all ranks may receive rations, or an allowance in lieu thereof, not exceeding one shilling. Forage allowances for similar periods at similar rates may be allowed.

Provision is made for free rail transport for members of the force to and from places appointed for training and exercise. Allowances are made to qualified signallers on the establishment unit of 2s. per day, and to machine gunners of 1s. per day for every day's continuous training, and for each attendance period of not less than eight hours.

On certain conditions the following allowance shall be paid to members of the active citizen force in respect of attendance on occasions indicated. Attachment to the Regular Forces, Imperial or South African, or attendance at special courses in the schools of instruction :—Officers, 12s. 6d. per day ; other ranks, 7s. 6d. per day.

The uniform is brown with green facings.

A field service outfit shall be issued at the public expense to all ranks other than commissioned on the scale as set forth in the regulations. Every article should be maintained at the expense of the citizen to whom it is issued for four training years. Afterwards it reverts to the Government. On appointment to commissioned rank, a citizen should supply himself with a uniform on Scale B, and may be granted an allowance not exceeding £15. In the case of Militia and Volunteer corps the Minister may authorise a grant in lieu of outfit to enable the corps to provide the members with special articles of field service outfit of the authorised pattern. The Minister may authorise patterns of uniform and personal equipment to such.

The regulations further prescribe the arms to be supplied, and conditions with the same.

The following are among the regulations for peace training. The first year recruit's training is to be continuous, the maximum of which is 22 days, and the total maximum 30 days ; Field Artillery, 15 continuous and 8 non-continuous ; Engineers, 12 and 10 ; mounted, 22 and 3 ; Infantry, 12 and 10 ; departmental services, 12 and 10. In all cases the non-continuous training includes musketry. The annual training for other than recruits is continuous, with a maximum of 15 days, and a total maximum of 21 days ; Field Artillery, 15 continuous and 5 non-continuous training and of musketry ; Engineers, 10, 5, and 3 ; mounted, 15 and 3 musketry ; Infantry, 10, 5, and 3 ; departmental, 10, 5, and 1.

Members of the Militia and Volunteer corps who have been transferred to the Active Citizen Force under the Act, and who have been returned as

efficient for not less than two years during Militia or Volunteer service, may be granted leave of absence from continuous training by their commanding officer. The maximum days are to be fixed by the Commandant-General in the case of each unit.

A number of regulations deal with horse regulation allowance, insurance, and compensation. A horse must be passed by the Board, and be not less than three years of age, and $13\frac{1}{2}$ hands, not less than £18 in value, and be properly broken in, and fit for field service. An allowance will be paid at the rate of £3 a year. Provision is made for insurance at the public expense against injury and disease. The insurance in such cases should not exceed £150. Compensation not exceeding £22 10s. may be paid to the owner for a horse registered under the conditions, which dies from disease or injury occasioned by reason of military service. July 1, 1913, is the date fixed when the Militia and Volunteer corps become embodied and trained as part of the Active Citizen Force, on condition that the due proportion of each unit shall not be less than the number shown on the schedule as the minimum quotas to be furnished by the corps under the Act. These appear to be based on half the strength of the establishment of the corps, and the minimum quota of the new annual contingent rests on a 15 per cent. basis of the present establishment.

Certain changes in titles are noted. The Cape Field Artillery, the Natal Field Artillery, and the Transvaal Horse Artillery, are to be known as the 7th and 8th Citizen Batteries, the old regimental titles to be bracketed after the designation. The four mounted rifle corps in Natal become squadrons or units of a regiment to be styled the Natal Mounted Rifles. The B. C. and D. Squadrons to retain their old regimental titles placed in brackets after the alphabet letter of the squadron. The Transvaal Cycle and Motor Corps are to be allotted different designations on embodiment in the Active Citizen Force to be determined later.

The Natal Carbineers and Imperial Light Horse keep their present designations and uniforms.

OBITUARY

We much regret to announce the death of Major-General Richard Temple Godman, which took place last month at his residence, Highden, near Pulborough.

Major-General Godman, who was in the 5th Dragoon Guards, served throughout the Crimean War, and took part in the Charge of the Heavy Brigade at the Battle of Balaklava.

By a sad coincidence, only the day before his death he was gazetted Colonel-in-Chief of his old regiment, the 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards.

IMPORTANT

The staff of the JOURNAL is limited, and it is therefore necessary for all officers who obtain the JOURNAL direct from the Managing Editor to report any alteration of rank or address immediately, as it is quite impossible to follow up the stations of individual officers; every effort will, however, be made to trace the movements of regiments.

THE DAILY ROUND

To the Editor of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

SIR,—I am a subaltern of four years' service in what I consider is the best Cavalry regiment in the Service, and now stationed at Aldworth. I must own to having sporting tastes, which I indulge as far as the £500 a year that I have, in addition to my pay, allows; but I also am fond of my work, and honestly do my best at it.

I was therefore rather disgusted the other day when I heard two well-dressed, sleek-looking men who were travelling in the same railway carriage with me to London from the Eastern Counties, and who looked as if they were on their way to the City, talking about officers in the Army generally, and young officers in particular, and I must confess I could not help listening to what they said. Their opinion seemed to be that the latter, though they owned their pay was not high, really did very little to earn it, and beyond attending stables for an hour in the morning, and occasional drills in the summer, did little else beyond trying to find amusement for themselves.

I hope I am not a prig, but I must confess that I have for the past two years kept a diary, and I think I get considerable amusement and a certain amount of benefit by looking at its back pages occasionally. When I was making my daily entry in it that evening, I could not help thinking how surprised these two sleek gentlemen would have been if they could have read through an account of a week's work and play of an average Cavalry subaltern.

It has since struck me, Sir, that if you could publish an account of six days' work and play of a subaltern in a Cavalry regiment, perhaps it might reach the eyes of these two gentlemen or their like, and make them realise that the Cavalry subaltern of this date is not the idle dog they give him the credit of being.

I am therefore sending you, Sir, the account of six days of my life with my regiment taken straight out of my diary of last February, when individual and troop training were going on, which month, I may draw attention to, is in the leave season, and therefore not the most strenuous part of the year.

In order to explain the entries in the diary, the following are the *Dramatis Personæ* referred to:—

B. The Brigadier.

The Colonel (of my regiment).

F. My squadron-leader.

H. My troop-sergeant.

E. The present object of my affections.

The 'Rs.' Her people.

Slippery Anne. b.m. by Anah—Slipnot. The apple of my eye, and in my opinion the certain future winner of many important races!

Blarney and Bridget. Two nice-quality young ponies bought in Ireland the previous autumn, and in process of being made into first-class polo ponies.

Rupert. My first charger; a well-trained quality horse.

Rebecca. My second charger; a good jumper, but plain and slow.

47, 32, 94, &c., &c. Troop horses in my troop.

Diary

Monday, February 6, 1912.—Orderly officer. 6.30 A.M.-7.30 A.M. : Stables. Rain and very cold.

8.30 A.M.-10.30 A.M. : Troop training. Twenty-five men out. Rode Blarney, as Colonel says B. likes to see young officers training their own young ponies and combining it with work. Section leaders had their sections at equitation for an hour. Horses really beginning to get better balanced, but some of the men still cannot use their legs. Rode 47 myself for a bit; though undoubtedly improving, centre of gravity still too forward. Did half-hour's dummy-thrusting before going home. Men still do not put weight of their horse behind their points.

11 A.M.-1 P.M. : Stables, dinners, &c.

2 P.M.-3 P.M. : Instruction to troop in swordsmanship in Barrack-room; lunging at dummies. Men are keeping sword and forearm better in line with one another.

3 P.M.-3.45 P.M. : Gave short lecture on reconnaissance, and especially the movements of a reconnoitring patrol.

5 P.M.-6 P.M. : Evening stables.

11 P.M. : Went round guards and sentries. Fine night.

Tuesday, February 7.—8.30 A.M.-10.30 A.M. : Brought corporals out about five miles working as a reconnoitring patrol. On way back rode on twice about a mile, and made Corporal K. bring patrol up to me under cover. Corporal D., who was one of the advanced scouts, is very stupid. H. had bad riders and horses out.

11 A.M.-11.45 A.M. : Rode Bridget in school; she is improving, but still rather too keen.

12-1 P.M. : Stables. My horses on the whole looking well, but 54 and 73 must have more corn. 102 looking much better; teeth right now, and therefore digestion right.

2 P.M.-3 P.M. : Had sections on Barrack Square, and passed messages through each of them. Described to section leaders what they were supposed to see, and made them frame message and pass through their men; some very funny results, and section leaders especially want more practice.

5.30 P.M. : Tried to work after tea for my 'D' exam., but must confess went to sleep in my chair.

Wednesday, February 8.—7 A.M. : Rode Slippery Anne nice two-mile gallop on racecourse, last mile over fences; jumped beautifully.

8.30 A.M.-10.30 A.M. : Troop training. Twenty-six out. Rode Bridget. Sections at equitation under leaders for an hour. Nearly all horses now go temperately at all paces with loose reins, as well as when collected. Later jumping and walking up and down steep slopes. Corporal D. nearly had bad accident owing to hanging on to 106's head.

11 A.M.-12 noon : Rode Blarney in school. He does not answer leg well enough yet.

12-1 P.M. : Stables. Three last-joined recruits from Depot require further instruction in grooming. Think recruits should be instructed and passed in this just the same as in riding and foot drill, &c.

1.30 P.M. : Rode Rebecca with Drag. She jumped well, but as usual

wanted a lot of driving between the fences. Gave me a fall in second line. Jumped short over wide ditch on off-side of fence. Had to ride her rather fast back seven miles to catch train to the 'Rs.'

H. had troop at miniature range from 2.30 P.M. to 3.30 P.M.

6 P.M. : Went by train to —. Dined with 'Rs' and went on to ball at —. Danced mostly with E. Wish she had some money, but as neither of us have it can't be helped, and anyhow I could not marry until I get my troop. F. motored me back. Bed at 4 A.M.

Thursday, February 9.—8.30 A.M.-11 A.M. : Had bad horses and men out. Rode No. 47 myself. Later rode out with N.C.O.s and did short scheme.

11.15 A.M.-12 noon.—Rode Bridget for short time in school.

12-1 P.M. : Stables. Asked F. to look at shoeing of some horses in my troop. Think Farrier has been lowering bars with knife and also shoeing some too short, and F. agrees with me. Hay great improvement on last week.

2 P.M.-3 P.M. : Troop at aiming drill on Barrack Square.

3 P.M.-3.30 P.M. : Gave short lecture on dismounted action; fire discipline and control.

5.30 P.M. : Worked at 'D' exam. after tea.

Friday, February 10.—Orderly Officer.

6.30 A.M.-7.30 A.M. : Stables.

8.30 A.M.-10.30 A.M. : Troop training. Twenty-five men out.

Equitation under section leaders one hour. Stayed most of time with Corporal D.'s section. Some of his horses still behind their bridles; men do not use their legs. Practised troop in taking up dismounted position and moving lead horses, and then half-hour dummy-thrusting. Rode Rupert so as to show how I think latter should be done. Tried using only one dummy and making men ride at it from different directions, and it worked well.

11 A.M.-1 P.M. : Stables. B. came round with Colonel to see horses of regiment. I think he thought ours looking best, and I agree. He spotted some saddlery in 'A' Squadron that he said was not serviceable. Must look carefully at mine to-morrow.

2 P.M. : Troop at swordsmanship in Barrack-room.

3 P.M. : Gave them short lecture on horsemanship and march discipline.

5 P.M.-6 P.M. : Evening stables.

11 P.M. : Went round guards and sentries. Wet night. My troop stable rather stuffy, so opened another window.

Saturday, February 11.—8 A.M.-9.30 A.M. : Rode Bridget out with bad horses and riders.

At 10.15 A.M. cantered Rupert on to meet of — Hounds at —. Rode Slippery Anne, whom I had sent on to meet. Quite nice hunt in afternoon in country not good enough for mare. H. and Corporals P. and L. were out on 47, 32, and 94. H. rode 47 very well, and it will do the horse good.

They all seemed to enjoy themselves, and I have told them to write out a description of their day and give it me. Makes them take notice of country.

Got back 5 P.M.

The above, Sir, is an account of a complete week's work during February

this year, and I hope you will agree, Sir, that at any rate it was not an idle week which was spent by your obedient servant,

LIGHT DRAGOON.

Cavalry Barracks, Aldworth. November 27, 1912.

WATERLOO

On Wednesday, December 11, Captain Sir Morgan G. Crofton, 2nd Life Guards, gave a brief but most valuable lecture on Waterloo at the Royal United Service Institution to a party of N.C.O.s from the 2nd Life Guards and Royal Horse Guards. Sir Morgan Crofton's lectures in barracks have been important regimental occasions during the last two winters, and have been given in consequence of requests for information on various military and political subjects from the N.C.O.s and men of his regiment. He has recently written a little book entitled 'The Household Cavalry Brigade in the Waterloo Campaign.' This volume contains a foreword by Sir Herbert Maxwell, author of the 'Life of the Duke of Wellington,' who remarks: 'It is not for me—an old militia-man—to criticise or emphasise Sir Morgan Crofton's narrative, but I must be allowed to acknowledge that he has succeeded in giving a more vivid impression than I have ever received from other sources (1) of the forced march of the Household Cavalry to Quatre Bras; (2) of the engagements of the Light Cavalry Brigade with the French Cavalry during the critical retreat on Mont S. Jean; (3) of the gravity of Lord Uxbridge's mistake in leading, instead of directing, the charge on D'Erlon's column, whereby he was not in a position to send the Brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur to support the Heavy Cavalry.'

The lecture the other day was, of course, with special reference to the rôle played by the Household Cavalry in the Waterloo campaign; the first portion was given in the theatre, after which an adjournment was made to the model in the museum, where the different points and phases of the great battle were lucidly explained, and a large number of questions replied to with expert skill. The lecturer explained briefly how Napoleon, taking advantage of Sir Neil Campbell's absence in Naples, slipped away from Elba and landed near Cannes with 1,219 men. He spoke of the wonderful march on Paris, which lasted three weeks, during which not a shot was fired nor a life lost. He emphasised Napoleon's wonderful feat in totally reorganising from scattered details an army of 200,000 men, capable of expansion to one million within six months. Allusion was briefly made to the plan of campaign ultimately selected by the Emperor, and the reasons for his adopting an offensive campaign instead of a defensive one, to his departure from Paris, and his concentration of the Imperial Guard and five army corps at Beaumont. He described briefly, but graphically, Napoleon's advance in the early morning of the 15th, the battle of Gilly, the arrival of Ney, and the division of his troops into two columns, one to be directed on Quatre Bras and the other on Fleurus, and the faulty execution of these orders. The battle of Ligny and its failure, the episode of the appearance of D'Erlon's corps in the wrong place, Ney's withdrawal, the fight of Quatre Bras, the effect of d'Erlon's disappearance, the dispositions of both armies on the night of the 16th, the inactivity of the French on the morning of the 17th, the aimless movements

of Grouchy, the sudden inspiration of Napoleon to overwhelm Wellington at Quatre Bras, the withdrawal of Wellington from Quatre Bras, the running Cavalry fight at Genappe, and the disposition of the English, French, and Prussians on the night of the 17th—these and other incidents on which much new light was thrown led up to the narrative of the battle of Waterloo itself.

At the conclusion of the lecture Sir Morgan Crofton was earnestly thanked by his hearers, and urged to repeat his kindness for the benefit of other Household Cavalry students of the strategy of Napoleon and Wellington.

G. A.

PLEASE NOTE !

Owing to doubt having been expressed as to the extent to which officers may contribute articles to *THE CAVALRY JOURNAL*, in view of the recent amendment to paragraph 423 of the King's Regulations, it is notified for general information that *THE CAVALRY JOURNAL* is issued with the sanction of the Army Council. Officers are, consequently, encouraged to submit papers for publication, on the understanding that should their articles pre-judge questions under consideration by superior authority, or criticise existing orders or regulations, the Editor will make such amendments in the text as he may deem advisable.

SUBSCRIPTIONS.

Subscribers are reminded that subscriptions for Vol. VIII. are now due, and should be forwarded to :—

The Managing Editor,
THE CAVALRY JOURNAL,
Royal United Service Institution,
Whitehall, S.W.


PROBLEM NO. XII

Non-Commissioned-Officers of the mounted branches of the Regular, Territorial, and Colonial Forces, at home and abroad, are reminded that the last day on which solutions of the above can be received by the Editor is February 28, 1913.

The result will be announced in the April number.

BATTLE HONOUR

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased, in recognition of their valuable services, to approve of the 19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars being permitted to bear upon their appointments the distinction "Seringapatam."



WHITEHALL — THE HORSE GUARDS. — LONDON

RANGE-FINDERS FOR CAVALRY

At page 464 of the October number of the JOURNAL, Colonel F. St. D. Skinner, in his interesting article on the essentials and possibilities of Cavalry fire action, expresses the view that every squadron should have a one-man range-finder. With this view most Cavalry officers will be in accord, provided the range-finder is light enough, because most practical soldiers are agreed that the mekometer type of instrument has been found to be too slow, too liable to attract attention during its manipulation, too cumbersome, and too liable to deterioration and inaccuracy for use by Cavalry on service. It may even be doubted whether it has ever been used by mounted troops with valuable results which might not equally well have been attained by other means.

The Marindin range-finder, it appears, is found to be unsuitable for Cavalry work owing to considerations of portability. There are, however, a number of accurate and portable one-man range-finders on the market, among them the Steward Telemeter and the Verner, which, at one time carried by every keen officer, appear to have gone out of fashion with the discouragement of military sketching and the prospect of flatter trajectories.

Is a range-finder of any use to Cavalry? Before answering this question let us stand to the flank of a target which is under fire at something between 1,500 and 2,500 yards, the range having to be found by the riflemen by observation of strike. We may then appreciate what waste of time and ammunition is entailed before the target is struck.

But Cavalry wish to be effective on the main battle-field, especially at these long ranges, with surprise, enfilade, or reverse fire! Horses cannot carry ammunition to be fired away without results. The general result of missing is to encourage the enemy to regard being under our fire with equanimity or amusement. Our bursts of fire must be like destructive 'bolts from the blue.' We cannot afford to disclose our position to hostile Artillery before we have done any damage. In shooting from a position which we may have occupied by stealth, to begin by missing is to discount our advantage. In order to succeed in opening effective fire on a target at long or distant range some form of telemeter is invaluable, because the firing lines cannot always ascertain their own range to a target from the Artillery or our own machine-guns. By all means let us, then, consider the advantages that may accrue from the use of range-finders with squadrons. In practice they enable us to educate the eye to judge long ranges; they are of great convenience for measuring a base line for a sketch across rough ground; they may be of use in the outpost line and for the rear echelons in a rear-guard action; they ensure correct ranges for opening fire by surprise or in ambushes. But for Cavalry work it is essential that they should comply with the following conditions:—

1. Quickly operated by one man.
2. Weight not over, say, three pounds.
3. Accurate at the extreme range of the rifle, say 4000 yards down-hill.
4. Portable on horseback without diminution of accuracy.

N. M. S.

SPORTING NOTES

POLO

Capt. C. McG. Dunbar (late 20th Hussars) has been appointed joint polo manager at Ranelagh with Mr. F. A. Gill, in place of Capt. L. C. D. Jenner, who has retired.

The American Polo Association announces that the Hurlingham Polo Club has challenged again for the America Cup, and that the matches will probably be played at Meadowbrook early in June.

Polo at the Cavalry School has made very great strides in the last year; a second ground has been made, and two tournaments—the Spring and Autumn—instituted.

Polo started on March 15, and, in spite of the bad weather, was carried on almost without intermission till October 10; there were about twenty regular players.

Besides these two tournaments, many minor tournaments took place, and altogether the season was very successful, the standard of play being high, as might be expected with coaches such as Colonel Vaughan and Major Lannowe.

ABROAD

The Poona Open Tournament final was between the 26th and 33rd Cavalry, the latter winning by seven to four. At the fourth period the game was level, when Lieut. H. A. B. Johnson was unfortunately injured, and Resildar Mul took his place. Lady Clarke presented the cup to the winners.

There were thirteen entries for the Poona Junior Tournament. In the final on October 2 the 26th Cavalry beat the Bangalore Gymkhana by five to three, and Lady Clarke presented Sir George Richardson's challenge cup to them.

The final of the Barton Cup Tournament, played at Jubbulpore on October 26, was between the 12th Cavalry and 22nd Punjabis. Time was called with the score three goals each, and it was not until the third extra chukker that the Punjabis scored the winning goal.

The Country Life Cup, competed for by regimental polo teams in the Southern Army in India, was won by the 26th Light Cavalry.

Ten teams were entered for the Meerut Autumn Tournament, the final of which rested between the King's Dragoon Guards and the 13th Hussars. The latter won by six to five, and Major-General T. D. Pilcher, C.B., presented the cup to them.

RACING

The Aldershot races on November 12 and 13 brought out good fields and good racing, but the attendance was poor owing to the bad weather on both days. There were not many soldiers riding. The Past and Present Handicap, a steeplechase of two and a half miles, was won by Capt. Wallace Wright's *Sterling Lady*, Mr. W. Roughton riding, with Capt. Grenfell's *Schwärmer* (Mr. Crossley) second, and Mr. W. McNeil's *Cannock Lad* third.

At the Gatwick meeting on December 4 Mr. E. Wyndham won the Amateur Riders' Handicap Steeplechase of two miles, riding his own horse, *Another Delight*, the winner of last year's Grand Military Gold Cup.

POINT-TO-POINT

The season of so-called point-to-point races commenced on November 21 with the Cavalry School races over a three-mile course near Andover. The race for the challenge cup presented by Lieut.-General Sir R. S. S. Baden-Powell was won by Lieut. G. F. Reynold's (9th Lancers) *Security*, with Lieut. E. H. Wyndham's (1st Life Guards) *Red Knight* second, and Lieut. W. Joynson's (18th Hussars) *Tara Hall* third. This was a fine race, won by a short head, with a good third.

The Light-weight Chargers' Race was won by Lieut. G. F. H. Brooke's (16th Lancers) horse, ridden by Capt. R. Bruce, and the Heavy-weight Race by Lieut. C. F. Clarke's (3rd Hussars) *Capt. Ginger*.

The Staff College held their annual races at Arborfield. Lord Roberts was in the judges' box with Major-General W. Robertson and Colonel C. G. Stewart. Results:—

Light-weight Race: Major G. A. Weir's (3rd Dragoon Guards) *Bailey*. Twenty ran.

Past and Present Race: Capt. R. Grant's (Rifle Brigade) *Castle Bagot*. Seven ran.

Heavy-weight Race: Capt. G. H. Walford's (Suffolk Regiment) *Wildfire*. Thirteen ran.

The Army Point-to-Point Races in Ireland will be run on March 14. His Excellency the Lord Lieutenant and General Sir Arthur Paget, commanding the Forces, are presenting cups.

THE NEW RULES

The Duke of Westminster kindly lent a room at Grosvenor House, Park Lane, on December 20 for a meeting of point-to-point secretaries, representatives of regiments, and others called to discuss the new rules governing point-to-point racing lately passed by the National Hunt Committee. The Hon. Ulric O. Thynne convened the meeting, and associated with him were Brigadier-General T. L. N. Morland (Aldershot), Brigadier-General H. de La P. Gough (the Curragh), Colonel S. T. Lawford (Long-

moor), Colonel John Vaughan (Netheravon), Lieut.-Colonel G. K. Ansell (5th Dragoon Guards), Major E. H. Trotter (Grenadier Guards), Mr. F. Lawson, Mr. F. Stern, Mr. A. Y. Scott (the Universities), and the secretaries of about thirty Hunts.

It was agreed that considerable discontent existed, and that the rules would almost certainly prevent many annual regimental, Yeomanry, and University steeplechases (some of very old standing) from being held this year, mainly because few Hunt meetings would be able to spare them one of the four races to which they are now limited. Yesterday's meeting, therefore, had been called with a view to making a joint appeal to the Masters of Foxhounds' Association to use their good offices in approaching the National Hunt Committee on the subject once more. It was decided to ask the committee to postpone the operations of the regulations over the present season and to receive a deputation.

HORSE SHOW

At the New York Horse Show the International Jumping was won by Lieut. Labouchere (Dutch), with Capt. Lear (American) second, and Lieut. Richardson (British) third.

RESULTS OF COMPETITIONS AT THE CAVALRY SCHOOL, NETHERAVON

FINAL COMPETITIONS—OFFICERS

The honours of the day fell to the 20th Hussars, Lieut. S. Barne winning no less than four events out of a total of eight. These were :—

- (1) Sword v. Sword.
- (2) Best-trained remount.
- (3) Jumping second-year remount over the hunters' course.
- (4) Jumping second-year remount over the steeplechase course.

Lieut. Wyndham (1st Life Guards) won the Olympic Jumping.

Lieut. Hall (Queen's Bays), Pistol v. Pistol and Revolver Competition.

Lieut. Reynolds (9th Lancers) won the competition for the best-trained second-year remount.

FINAL COMPETITIONS—N.C.O.s

Sergeant Barron (5th Lancers) won the Sword v. Lance and the best-trained second-year remount.

Corporal of Horse Anstice (2nd Life Guards) won the Olympic Jumping and the jumping of the steeplechase course for second-year remounts.

Sergeant Nash (20th Hussars) won the Sword v. Sword.

Sergeant Phillips (3rd Hussars), the best-trained remount.

Corporal Spencer (3rd Dragoon Guards), the Dummy Thrusting.

Sergeant Wyborn (20th Hussars), jumping over the hunters' course for second-year remounts.

FOOTBALL

RUGBY

A fine match took place at Portsmouth between the officers of the Navy and Army and the South Africans, which resulted in the South Africans winning by three goals and a try to two goals and two tries—18 points to 16.

The Services were pressing at the finish, and were rather unlucky not to win. The issue was determined by the ability of the South African forwards to get the ball in the scrummages and the fact that Lieut. Lyon, R.N., was out of practice and only played at the last moment as a substitute.

The headquarters of the Army Football Association will in future be at the Union Jack Club, Waterloo Road, London, S.E., and correspondence should be sent to the secretary at that address.

At Blackheath Kent beat the Army by two goals and two tries (13 points) to two tries (6 points) after a lively game.

ASSOCIATION

Eighty-eight clubs entered for the Army Association Cup—four more than last year. The ties are now being played off.

THE CAVALRY CUP

The 19th Hussars beat the Royal Horse Guards by seven goals to one.

The Queen's Bays beat the 11th Hussars at Aldershot by four goals to nil.

The 1st Life Guards beat the 2nd Life Guards by two goals to nil.

The 18th Hussars beat the 20th Hussars at Fulham by one goal to nil after a strenuous game.

ABROAD

The final of the Walter Locke Tournament between the 1st Border Regiment and the Rangoon College was won by the former by three goals to nil. On presenting the shield to the winners, Lieut.-Colonel A. E. O. Congdon said that the shield represented what might be called the 'blue ribbon' of Association football in Burma, that it had been played for upwards of twenty years, and in the majority of cases been won by military teams.

A fine match was witnessed for the final of the Bombay Tournament between Madras and the 1st West Riding Regiment, the former winning by two goals to a try. The West Ridings have won the tournament ever since 1907, so it was a fine performance for Madras to wrest it from them.

GOLF

The idea of forming an Army Golfing Society will be considered at next year's Army Golf meeting. This event has been fixed to take place on the links of the Royal Cinque Ports Club at Deal in the first week of April, when the Army Championship and the Inter-Regimental Cup Tournament will be decided.

BOXING

The Navy and Army Championships were decided at Aldershot this year. The entries for the men's and the officers' competitions totalled 297, or thirty-nine below the total of last year, when the meeting took place at Portsmouth. The feature of the contests was Lieut. A. M. Read, 1st Northamptonshire Regiment. His title of heavy-weight champion was not even challenged, and he showed his superiority in the light-heavy-weights. Final results were as follows :—

OFFICERS' COMPETITIONS

Feather-weights : Lieut. A. B. Butterworth (A.S.C.) beat Lieut. N. W. Thistle (R.G.A.).

Welter-weights : Lieut. G. Le Q. Martel (R.E.) beat Sub-Lieut. J. H. R. Homfray (R.N.).

Middle-weights : Lieut. H. F. S. Huntington (2nd Welsh Regiment) beat Lieut. H. J. Shields (R.A.M.C.).

Light-Heavy-weights : Lieut. A. M. Read beat Lieut. C. O. Lilley (1st Dorsetshire Regiment).

MEN'S COMPETITIONS

Heavy-weights : Private Voyles (1st Irish Guards) beat Private Powell (2nd Coldstream Guards).

Light-Heavy-weights : Private Doyle (4th Hussars) beat Lance-Corporal J. Delaney (Leinster Regiment).

Welter-weights : Lance-Corporal Redrup (1st East Surrey Regiment) beat Lance-Sergeant A. Baker (1st Royal West Kent Regiment).

Light-weights : Corporal W. Rice (2nd South Lancashire Regiment) beat Private J. Carey (3rd Hussars).

Feather-weights : Lance-Corporal Miller (1st Loyal North Lancashire Regiment) beat Corporal T. Evans (2nd Royal Scots).

Middle-weights : Lance-Corporal P. McEnroy (1st Irish Guards) beat Corporal H. Spalding (1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers).

At the conclusion Lieut.-General Sir Douglas Haig, G.O.C.-in-Chief, Aldershot Command, presented the prizes.

The 2nd Dragoon Guards held a capital boxing tournament at Aldershot in December under the patronage of Brigadier-General C. T. McM. Kavanagh, C.B., commanding the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

HOCKEY

The Murree Hockey Tournament had sixteen entries. The final between the 'A' teams of the 1st Royal Sussex Regiment and 2nd Rifle Brigade ended in a tie after extra time, and had to be played again, when the Royal Sussex won by two goals.

Lieut.-General Sir J. Willcocks made a congratulatory speech, and Lady Willcocks presented the cup.

PIG-STICKING

The following pig-sticking songs have been kindly sent us by an old sporting Indian Cavalry General, who says they used to be sung after mess and at pig-sticking meets in his younger days in the early 'sixties, and it is a pity that they should be lost to the present generation.

A version of the song of 'The Mighty Boar' has recently been printed in the appendix of Colonel St. Quentin's excellent reminiscences, mentioning the author as unknown.

The author was Colonel Tom Morris, head of the Khandish Bhil Corps of the Bombay Army, a celebrity in the sporting world in his day. He flourished in the early half of the last century, and was quite the 'beau ideal' of the old Indian sportsman as well as soldier, a fine shot, a bold horseman, and first-rate pig-sticker, which was the sport he most loved. Amongst other horses he owned was one called 'Goblin Grey,' which won many big races, and was generally admitted to be the best of his day.

Another noted rider of those days who used to pig-stick with Tom Morris was Nightingale, of the Hyderabad Cavalry, and he also wrote some good pig-sticking songs which we fear have been lost.

[These songs will be continued throughout our present volume.—ED.]

'THE MIGHTY BOAR'

The boar, the mighty boar's my theme,
 Whate'er the wise may say—
 My morning thought, my midnight dream,
 My hope throughout the day.
 Youth's daring spirit, manhood's fire,
 Firm hand and eagle eye,
 Must they acquire who dare aspire
 To see the grey boar die.

CHORUS—Then pledge the boar, the mighty boar :
 Fill high the cup with me.
 Here's health to all who fear no fall—
 And the next grey boar we see.

When age hath weakened manhood's powers
 And every nerve unbraced,
 These scenes of joy shall still be ours
 On mem'ry's tablets traced.
 Then with those friends, whom death hath spared
 When youth's due course is run,
 We'll sing of the dangers we have shared,
 And the tusks that we have won.

CHORUS—Then pledge the boar, the mighty boar :
 Fill high the cup with me.
 Here's health to all who fear no fall—
 And the next grey boar we see.

T. MORRIS.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

' 'TIS THE BOAR '

(Tune: ' C'est l'amour ')

What leads the throng of the chase along
 With their spurs all dash'd with gore,
 And tries the speed of the fleetest steed
 As it ne'er was tried before?
 And it's hey ! over the jungle plain,
 With the tall spears glancing bright.
 And it's hey ! over the mountain top
 Morning, noon, or night.

CHORUS—'Tis the boar, the grim grey boar,
 The boar with the foaming tusk,
 That goes o'er the hills at the pace that kills
 From dewy dawn till dusk.

And what can make the spouse forsake
 The blush of his blooming bride,
 And leave the bliss of the smile and kiss
 For the joys of the jungle side?
 And oh ! what lures the wise and grave
 From their homes of learned lore,
 The toils and care of the chase to dare
 As bold ones dared of old?

CHORUS—'Tis the boar, &c., &c.

And what in sooth can tempt each youth
 To forget his failing purse,
 To laugh at his debts and the bailiff's threats
 While his pay grows worse and worse?
 For tentage and full batta too
 No longer more to care,
 But dash aside the tear of pride,
 Man's tribute to despair?

CHORUS—'Tis the boar, &c., &c.

Since nerve and health win love and wealth,
 The hopes we chiefly prize,
 Let's seek the field and the bright spear wield,
 For there the elixir lies.
 While it's hey ! over the jungle green,
 When the game is once in sight ;
 And it's hey ! over the deep ravine,
 Morning, noon, or night.

CHORUS—'Tis the boar, &c., &c.



BALAKLAVA.

25th OCTOBER, 1854.

*Sergeant J. Malone, 13th Light Dragoons,
Troop Sergeant-Major Berryman and Sergeant Farrell, 17th Lancers,
gaining the Victoria Cross.*

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

APRIL 1913

WITH THE FRENCH CAVALRY

1912

By COLONEL J. VAUGHAN, D.S.O., *Commandant, Cavalry School,
Netheravon*

THE French Cavalry is organised into eight Cavalry divisions, of which six contain two brigades and two contain three brigades. Each brigade comprises two regiments, and each regiment comprises five squadrons, of which four squadrons mobilise and attend manœuvres; the fifth squadron in each regiment becomes a *dépôt* squadron.

The remaining regiments are detailed as corps Cavalry brigades or as divisional regiments.

On initial mobilisation France has approximately one sabre per nine rifles; England has one sabre per twelve rifles in the Expeditionary Force.

Three Cavalry divisions were assembled in the district north-west of Dijon for manœuvres in August 1912.

These were the 2nd Cavalry Division (General de Mas-Latrie), the 6th Cavalry Division (General Charlery de la Masselière), and the 8th Cavalry Division (General Durand de Villers).

Each division had two batteries of Horse Artillery and six machine guns—that is two machine guns per brigade. There were a company of cyclists with each division. The total was seventy-two squadrons, eighteen guns, eighteen machine guns, and three companies of cyclists.

The manœuvres took place in the department of Haute Marne and Côte-d'Or, on the watershed of France, which has an average height of about 700 feet above sea-level.

L

This country was very favourable for Cavalry work; the hills, villages, and woods afforded tactical points, while the movements of masses could be concealed by the undulations in the ground.

The roads are straight and good, though few in number according to English ideas. They are unfenced save in the neighbourhood of some of the villages.

Excepting for the last two days, when manœuvres were continuous, the training was in the form of daily schemes. The billeting areas were arranged in three groups, one for each division, about twelve to fifteen miles apart.

In this neighbourhood, as throughout most of the Continent, the farms are generally located in the villages, and this facilitates billeting.

The 'Ideas' were based on a general situation with imaginary Infantry columns, the duties of whose Cavalries were either to explore in advance, or to cover a flank movement or retreat. Whatever the duties assigned to the Cavalry, it was always insisted that, should the hostile Cavalry be encountered, it was to be attacked and broken up or thrown back.

The same methods were almost always used.

(a) 'Decouverte' or 'exploration' by officers' patrols, supported by contact troops or squadrons to hold open passages for them to get back by, 'troops' detailed from other units being sent forward to furnish relays.

(b) 'Couverture' or 'protective reconnaissance' by squadrons covering the assembly points and successive bounds of the main bodies.

(c) The rapid occupation of advanced points of tactical importance by units with great fire power—*i.e.* cyclists and machine guns.

(d) Movements by bounds of the main bodies covered by advanced guards.

(e) When the enemy's line of advance was ascertained, the quick issue by divisional generals of verbal orders to brigadiers and Artillery commanders.

(f) The consequent rapid and sudden development of combined fire and shock action—the fire being supplied by the Artillery—cyclists, and machine guns.

(g) Deployments delayed till the last moment. Great solidity, but no increase of pace (in peace time) in the charge.

(h) After the attack troops stood fast and officers fell out to attend the conference. Troops then marched to billets under peace conditions.

For the mass the exercises would last about eight or nine hours from the time of leaving billets in the morning to the time of return to billets in the afternoon.

There was one rest day per week.

Staff.—The staff of a division is usually divided into three sections:—Operations; Information; Administrative. But great latitude is given to the chief of the staff in allotting the duties.

Operation orders are longer than ours, as the missions of the detachments detailed for exploration and the positions of relay posts are published in orders. For mutual co-operation and smooth working this seems better than our plan of confiding the mission personally to the officer in charge of the patrol.

The staff is expanded from peace strength for manoeuvres by the inclusion of Reserve officers for the work of information and administration. These officers seem quite up to the mark in every way. They perform the same duties each year.

Staff officers of the general staff of the division have arm bands, about three inches wide, of red silk, with a star and the number of the division marked on it in gold.

The *brigade* staff (brigade-major) wear blue bands, the numbers being in gold.

The staff of a brigade consists of the brigade-major and a captain from the Reserve who performs the work of our brigade staff captains.

Time.—The method of expressing the time is the same as that used in India. The hours are numbered from one to twenty-four; thus 7 P.M. is called nineteen hours.

Engineers.—In each division there is a troop of one officer, two non-commissioned officers, and thirty men on bicycles (*sapeurs cyclistes*) for demolition work; this troop had one wagon with explosives. Three hundred kilos. of melinite are carried in the ammunition column.

In each brigade a party of one non-commissioned officer and eight men, with sixteen miles of cable in a two-wheeled cart.

Aeroplanes.—There were three aeroplanes, one of which was retained for use by the director; the other two were given to the rival commanders. They were all three single-seater Blériot monoplanes,

50-h.p., carried in special motor-wagons. Six aviators were present to use the three machines.

The aeroplanes usually come to ground to deliver their messages, but in order that immediate information might reach the commander, each aeroplane, on finding the mass of the enemy's Cavalry, circled round above it.

Transport.—The French Cavalry are not more mobile than ours as regards squadrons and regiments. But they have fewer wheels in their brigades and divisions than we have.

The transport of a brigade comprises :—

4-wheeled, 2-horsed.

Fourgons for baggage, <i>i.e.</i> officers' kits, field forge, marmites, squadron books, &c.	10
6 wagons per regiment for 'alimentation' (forage and rations)	12
1 wagon per brigade headquarters	1

2-wheeled.

1 telegraph cart	1
2 ambulance carts	2
Total	26 vehicles

Add two machine guns per brigade, the total of vehicles becomes *twenty-eight*.

Personnel and Horses.—The majority are thoroughbred English or Anglo-Arabs. The Divisional General de Mas-Latrie has three thoroughbred English chargers. General of Brigade, Varin, has the same. One of these ran six times into second place on the flat in England, and has won the French Grand Military Steeplechase at Auteuil. The horses looked well in their coats, but were rather light in condition, though hard. The French Cavalry officers are better mounted than our own. Their chargers show more quality, have better paces, and are better trained.

Troop Horses.—The 31st Dragoons is considered one of the best-mounted regiments in France. Their horses show plenty of quality, and have better shoulders than the English troop horses. Some are, however, rather long in the back and too much 'on the leg' for troopers. They do not look as if they were up to as much weight as our own troop horses, but the French officers state that they carry the weight without difficulty. They further maintain that with underbred

horses with round action *chevaux manquant d' espèce et ayant des actions moins étendues*, the same smoothness of movement in squadrons cannot be obtained, nor can the gallop be continued for so great a length.

There is no doubt that their horses, especially the small horses of the chasseurs, are well suited for operations in a light country.

Officers.—The French Cavalry possess a fine corps of officers. They ride well and understand more about horses' paces and balance than our own officers do. They appear hard and fit, though they are much older according to rank than our own officers.

Men.—The men are of good physique and ride well. They seem to have sympathy with their horses. Their discipline appears good, and they are cheery and willing. There are a large number of re-engaged men in the ranks.

Equipment, Saddlery, &c., on Man.—Carbine slung; ammunition in pouches; water bottles.

Equipment on Horse.—One pair wallets, containing 1 suit of slacks, a pair of slippers, and any remaining rations; overcoat rolled long and thin behind saddle and steadied by tab to girth; head rope; corn-sack over the wallets; forage cord on off wallet; blanket under saddle; sword, near side; lance, slung.

No picketing pegs are carried or used in the French Cavalry. A double shackle above the hocks is used for kickers.

Both the man and the horse have less hanging about them than the British cavalryman and horse have.

One marmite (or cauldron) per troop is carried on the squadron fourgon. These are often not used, as inhabitants lend cooking-pots.

The French do not in peace time carry forage or rations to billets where they exist; *e.g.* at Selongey everything was bought locally for the troops excepting meat, which was driven from Dijon on the hoof.

Each regiment has its own butcher's implements complete.

Forage ropes and canvas buckets are excellent articles of equipment. Nose-bags have ventilation holes. The men carry a light working dress and a pair of light slippers in their wallets; they don this on arrival in bivouac. In the evening they again put on their uniform, which they clean as soon as they have finished their horses and saddles.

In regiments each squadron has a colour. The squadron colours are painted on lances, saddles, wagons, &c. In addition each saddle has its horse's name painted on the back arch.

The bits are light double bridles of various patterns.

Some of the snaffles are made in two pieces, like our own bridloons, some in three pieces. Some of the bits have half-moon ports, some have low ports or other variations. The bits are lighter than ours and fit the horses much better, as squadron and troop leaders have a certain variety to choose from; consequently the horses carry their heads much steadier, and, generally speaking, their paces are smoother than is the case in English regiments.

Lance.—We were informed that in future all Cavalry will be armed with the lance; the arming of hussars and chasseurs has already been begun.

Unity of Thought.—The French Cavalry is animated by a thoroughly patriotic spirit. All officers understand and subscribe to their doctrine and theory, which is clear and simple both in tactics and training. Any half-dozen French Cavalry officers would solve a tactical problem in the same manner.

This uniformity of thought is probably due to the system of corps promotion and to the training at the Cavalry school at Saumur.

Inter-communication.—There is no wireless and there are no visual signallers in the French Cavalry, but in each brigade there is a cable detachment of one non-commissioned officer and eight men with sixteen miles of cable in a two-wheeled cart. The duty of this detachment is to keep brigades in touch with the divisional commander and with other brigade headquarters in billets.

In the field messages are transmitted by officers and orderlies, or use is made of the existing telegraph and telephone lines.

The French consider that cyclists and motor-cyclists are so easily captured that they are too unreliable for inter-communication.

The officers are very well mounted and ride well. The orderlies are also well trained; they are generally long-service re-engaged men. The country was an easy one to cross; the orderlies moved quickly, and without distressing their horses made their points accurately, and gave their messages to the right officers.

March Discipline.—The march discipline seemed to be better than our own. The columns kept well to the side of the road and there were

no lost distances. The head of the column always moved at an even pace and never more than eight miles an hour; there was therefore no necessity for the troops in rear to gallop to keep up with those in front. Checks did not occur frequently, but when they did come they were signalled back along the column by all those seeing what was happening; those in rear were consequently prepared for what was to happen and ready to minimise the effect of the shock. There was practically no falling out.

No equipment was ever found on a road along which the troops had marched.

Billeting and Bilets.—During the training the three divisions were billeted in different parts of the training area. The law forbids the billeting of troops in one place for more than three nights, so after three days in one place all the divisions moved on to fresh billeting areas. The second division after two days' absence from the place where it was first located returned to its old quarters.

The distribution of troops in bilets seemed to present no difficulties. No elaborate preliminary arrangements were made. On the morning of the change of quarters billeting officers went on straight to the new area, and in consultation with the mayors arranged for the distribution of the troops. An hour or two before the troops finished their work regimental billeting parties were sent ahead to divide up the regimental area, so that when the troops themselves arrived they found all the doors marked in chalk with the designation of the smaller unit and the number of men each building was to hold, viz.:—

31 D
2 E
3 P
5 C

to mean:—

31st Dragoons
2nd Squadron
3rd Peloton
5 Horses.

Two methods of avoiding kick-injuries were noticed. To each troop were given four kicking hobbles, which consisted of two pieces of numnah about 9 inches deep, one to be fastened round each hind-

leg above the hock and a rope or strap made to fasten at any length, but usually about 18 inches long, to join the two numnah leg-shackles. These were for the worst kickers.

The other method was to attach an ordinary stirrup-iron to one hind-leg of the horse just above the fetlock. As there were usually no rings in the walls to which to fasten the horses' head-ropes the forage-ropes or chains obtained locally were run along the wall at a height of about 3 feet from the ground. There were no heel-pegs or other methods of tying up the horses' hind-legs except the shackle mentioned above.

The men sleep in out-houses close to their horses or in hay-lofts above them. They appear to be well fed, getting two meals a day of soup, meat, and bread. The inhabitants welcome the soldiers so long as their visits to the same village are not too frequent.

Machine Guns.—There are two machine guns in each brigade. The detachment, which is usually attached to one of the regiments for rations, billets, &c., consists of one officer, one non-commissioned officer and thirty men, all of whom carry revolvers and no rifles. The guns are made on a system which is an evolution of the Puteaux and Maxim systems. They are clip loaders, each clip holding twenty-five cartridges. Blank cartridges have hollow wooden bullets which give the necessary recoil; consequently the action for firing blank is the same as for firing ball.

Each gun is mounted on a steel carriage which is *two-wheeled* and *four-horsed*. This carriage, which is light and mobile, carries fourteen ammunition boxes containing 3500 rounds, two spare barrels for the gun, one pick, one felling axe, and one shovel. In the divisional ammunition column there are 18,500 for the machine guns of each brigade.

The gun can be fired either from the carriage or from the tripod on the ground, but the latter is the normal method. The gun is permanently fixed to the tripod so that there is little waste time (thirty seconds) in coming into action on the ground.

The gun has a traverse of 180 degrees and has no shield.

The gun and carriage seemed to be more handy and suitable than the vehicle that was issued for trial during our recent Cavalry divisional training and manœuvres.

The machine-gun commanders generally received special instructions from the divisional commander or from the commander of the

detachment of which they formed part. When the time for deployment arrived it sometimes happened that the machine-gun commanders received no orders as to the disposal of their guns, and they had then to act on their own initiative.

The machine-gun sections which are massed or employed by sections according to the tactical requirements were handled with considerable boldness. They usually formed part of the advanced guard, and together with the cyclists, and occasionally the Artillery, were frequently pushed forward to act as a pivot around which the main body manœuvred. But they were not always employed on the same flank or near the guns. There seemed to be no strong desire to keep only one line of fire, for on one occasion the whole of the machine guns of a division were massed on one flank while the Artillery and cyclists were on the other, and on another occasion the sections galloped forward with the advancing Cavalry.

Cyclists.—The cyclists of the 8th Cavalry division were provided by the 4th battalion of the Chasseurs à pied, and were attached to the division for manœuvres only.

Peace.—A company consists of :—

1 captain in command, mounted sometimes on a horse, sometimes on a cycle.

3 or 4 lieutenants—on this occasion there were 4 lieutenants, usually only 3.

1 under-officer.

125 non-commissioned officers and men.

The company is divided into 4 sections of about 30 men, each commanded by a lieutenant.

In each section of 30 men were 2 non-commissioned officers.

War.—The proposed organisation for war is a unit of 3 companies each of 125 men.

Cyclists are not yet integral parts of the Cavalry divisions.

They are attached to divisions during annual manœuvres, usually about 14 days.

The men are trained Infantry soldiers and are second-year men.

During the second year they are trained as cyclists. Before joining the cyclists the men have to pass a medical examination as to the condition of their hearts. They are picked men.

Transport.—Each company is provided with a 2-ton covered motor-wagon, which has solid rubber tyres and a 40-h.p. engine. This wagon which can *average* about 24 kilometres per hour carried great-coats for the men, rations, spare parts for cycles, and officers' baggage.

Armament.—Officers carry revolvers only. The men are armed with the ordinary infantry rifle and bayonet.

The rifle is carried slung over the right shoulder, across the back, the barrel being carried fairly high in the air.

The bayonet is carried on the left side attached to the belt that carries the cartridge pouches.

Ammunition.—On mobilisation the men carry 12 packets, each of 8 cartridges in clips, in three pouches attached to the waist-belt. There is no reserve of ammunition other than the divisional ammunition reserve of 30,000 rounds.

Equipment.—The men are clothed in blue serge jacket, trousers, and putties. They carry a light serge cape (blue) and a day's rations on the handle-bar of the cycle.

About four men per section carry wire cutters and a few men carry a light cutting-tool. Nothing is carried in rear of the saddle except cycle tools and spare tubes.

The Cycle.—The folding type of bicycle has been adopted.

The old cycle (machine Gerard) is still in use, but it is rather heavy—it weighs 16 kilograms (35 lb.) alone, and 18½ kilograms (40 lb.) in marching order.

A new folding cycle (mark Peugeot) is being tried and is very much liked; it weighs about 12½ kilograms (27½ lb.) alone, and 15 kilograms (35 lb.) in marching order.

It is thought that this new cycle will be adopted this year as the Army cycle.

The cycle is low set, the wheels being about 4 inches less in diameter than an ordinary cycle. The cyclist when astride his machine can touch the ground with his feet.

The cycle is not a free-wheel and has one break. When folded it can be carried on the back.

The men can carry the cycle during a 2-hour march without feeling undue fatigue.

The inner tubes are of a special pattern. They are not endless. One end fits inside the other and an air-tight joint is formed under

air pressure. As a rule punctures are not repaired on the road-side, but a fresh tube is substituted for a punctured one, the repair taking place at the end of the day. Each man carries two spare tubes. When the cycle is folded the handle-bar is carried fixed to one of the forks of the front wheel.

Method of Moving with Bicycle.—When working with an advanced guard, as soon as the cyclists have to deploy, they fold the cycle and carry it on their backs. If, however, they have to hold a certain place, such as a wood or village, they leave their cycles some little way behind them, not more than 100 yards. They prefer to have the cycles with them, and this is the normal method. They often carry them to the firing line, drop them for a short time, and then when they advance or retire pick them up again.

On fairly dry ground they ride across country easily. Men were seen riding on wet ground, along the drills of a turnip field, and across stubble fields.

Normal Rate of March.—The normal rate of march is about 12 kilometres (7 miles) an hour, but in wet weather this rate often drops to 8 kilometres (5 miles) an hour.

The officers say that according to the roads and weather they can march from 8 to 16 kilometres (5 to 10 miles) an hour; they aim at keeping a normal pace of 12 kilometres (7 miles).

Method of March.—From tactical point to tactical point. That is from wood to wood or village to village rather than from ridge to ridge. They are always accompanied by sufficient Cavalry to scout for their protection.

Road Spaces.—They normally ride 3 abreast, and like this much better than 4 abreast. They keep about 1 yard interval and about 1½ yard distance. When passing other troops and on narrow roads they move in pairs or single file according to the space available. When halted, they always keep clear of the road and form up in double rank.

Tactics.—During the Cavalry manœuvres the cyclists were mainly used in two rôles.

(a) *With the Advanced Guard.*—In this rôle they moved with the main guard; when the enemy's advanced troops were met with they were used to occupy woods, villages, and other tactical points on either side of the road along which the main body was advancing.

They did not deploy far on either side of this road—about a quarter of a mile.

During advanced-guard fighting they continually pushed forward, sometimes on foot, sometimes mounted, attacking parties of the enemy. They are accustomed to rely on the Cavalry for protection from surprise. Their use of obstacles behind which they would be safe from Cavalry shock action was good.

(b) *As a Covering Force.*—At times they were ordered to move forward with one or two squadrons of Cavalry to cover a rendezvous where the Cavalry division, moving by several routes, was going to assemble.

Here, again, the cyclists employed similar tactics, occupying villages, the line of a road, or the edges of woods. For this duty they were usually placed under the orders of an officer commanding a Cavalry brigade.

When the opposing Cavalries came into contact the officer commanding the cyclists was usually ordered to co-operate on a flank. In nearly every case which came under notice the officer commanding cyclists practically acted on his own initiative. He was given a free hand.

At night the cyclists found their own protection and were not called upon to protect other units.

During manœuvres cyclists were not employed, unassisted by Cavalry, on reconnaissance work.

SUMMARY

The strong points of the French Cavalry appear to lie in (a) staff work; (b) unity of doctrine both as to training and tactics; (c) mobility owing to the small amount of transport and to common-sense utilisation of the resources of the country; (d) march discipline; (e) fire power produced by very efficient Horse Artillery, machine guns, and cyclists; (f) solidity in the mounted attack.



The . . . French Cavalry



'A very gallant gentleman.'



THE LATE
CAPTAIN L. E. G. OATES.

6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons.

'While, on his return from the South Pole, in March 1912, willingly walked to death in a blizzard to try and save his comrades beset by hardship.'

AN OPEN LETTER TO BRIGADE-MAJORS

By B. M.

It is as well to remember that you do not command the Brigade—that is the privilege of the Brigadier. It is your duty to see that his orders are conscientiously carried out by the units of the Brigade. Adhere to Cavalry training; avoid innovations, they create distrust. It is your duty to your Brigadier to feel the pulse of the Brigade. You are in close touch with all ranks, or should be, and it is easy to discover where the shoe pinches, not always so simple to ease the pressure. You will find that a certain order will cause quite a different feeling in one regiment from another; why, it is difficult to say, unless the recipient of the order in the one case has chosen to cavil at it in the presence of subordinates. Again, after various regiments have been in the Brigade and you have become more or less intimately connected with their *régime* and system of interior economy you will find that certain legacies for good or evil appear to be handed on, for some peculiar reason, in spite of the innate knowledge that the evil is still there. For example, a regiment has good stable management, shoots well, yet has poor tactical ability. Another is excellent and reliable in the field, but is handicapped by badly-conditioned horses. Another is a bad shooting regiment, but excels in the school and for general smartness. How to level them up, that is the business of the Brigadier and yourself. Always suggest that your Brigadier should praise what he has seen that is good, but it answers no useful purpose to allow him to slur over what is not up to standard. On the other hand well-deserved praise is a stimulant for further effort. Restrain the Brigadier from becoming impatient if you know that officers are really working hard to reach the desired result. If slackness prevails it is your business to see that he is informed. Always try and work for the good of the Brigade as a whole; if you are in doubt consult commanding officers, adjutants, and quartermasters; you will then

get a fairly well-tempered opinion of what is best. Finally remember that an important duty of a staff officer lies in considering the welfare and well-being of man and horse. It is with these you have to fight.

Office Work.—Endeavour to keep this down to a minimum. During the last year it has increased to an abnormal extent. The Brigadier likes to have a list of all letters that come through the office. This list is placed on his table every morning. Letters merely requiring your signature in the ordinary course of events go to the clerks and are thence dispatched to their destinations. Should the Brigadier wish to see any of these he puts a mark against them on the list. All papers going direct to headquarters should bear the Brigadier's signature. A weekly programme of training sent into headquarters entails much labour, and is often difficult for C.O.s to make out owing to their not receiving in time the range allotments for the week.

Courts Martial.—These are rather the bugbear of every office. There are some who sit in the judge-advocate-general's office who make technicalities of law their speciality, and continually return C.M.s for minor corrections. If in doubt always send the case to them before convening the court with 'for favour of opinion.'

Staff Rides.—As a rule two a year are held, one in November and one in February or March. Personally, I think it rather better to hold a staff ride after the Cavalry divisional staff ride (generally held in March). Base your Brigade ride on it and bring out such points as you consider necessary. In arranging a staff ride there is a good deal to do. After you have settled your general and special idea make all officers write an appreciation; never deal with anything larger than a Brigade; make junior officers issue orders on the appreciations of their senior officers. If R.H.A. and R.E. officers or Yeomen form part of the ride, put them in a section with a Cavalry officer. The only chance you have of discovering if your officers know anything about the organisation of their own arm is during a staff ride; therefore insist on giving them questions to work out in detail which entail at least a reference knowledge to *Field Service Manual for a Cavalry Regiment: Mobilising Regulations*, or some such work. Bring out the importance of inter-communication. How is this carried out—by cyclists, despatch riders, visual or aerial signalling, motor cyclists? If so, are these thoroughly trained? When you have your Brigade scouts out test them well: with a little patience

dispatch riders become really good in delivering verbal messages. See that all officers can write an intelligent message in the correct form; they usually cannot. Give your officers short 'allez allez' schemes, five to ten minutes. Have all your schemes typed out on foolscap and make officers write their solutions down below, sign it, and hand it in. In correcting schemes be sure to bring out the object of the scheme, point out faults, and suggest alternatives. Usually get the Brigadier to give you his views on the scheme beforehand so that you may have likely references ready should he wish to quote text-books. Keep up to time. Correct and hand out all schemes at each evening conference if possible; to this end give officers a scheme entailing calculations on return, it keeps them busy; each scheme should be different, otherwise only one studious fellow does it *pro bono publico*. Arrange accommodation at hotels weeks before; stipulate for 10s. a day to include everything, 'bus to and from station, baths, early tea, &c. Arrange with police for billets for men and horses. Take the Brigadier, one directing staff officer, and yourself in a motor-car, either obtainable locally or on application to motor reserve (a fortnight before). The cost of a staff ride using horses, for a dozen, works out about £60; if in uniform servants may be taken, one to two officers. Be sure that all horses, servants, and men employed in a staff ride are struck off rations. Three working days is quite sufficient. Settle all claims before leaving.

Inspections.—There are far too many of these and training is rather sacrificed on the altar of inspection. This however is the fault of the system and not of the subordinates, but it should be represented. The Brigadier has to inspect books, barracks, &c., troops during individual training, squadrons during squadron training, regiments during regimental training. He has generally to be present when the Inspector of Cavalry comes along or the C. in C., the Command, or the I.G. of Home Forces. All these require their say, with the result that units are continually being inspected. It is most necessary to have a full-dress parade now and again. Some regiments seem to consider that efficiency in the field cannot combine with smartness at ceremonial, or that it is not worth the trouble. This is most fallacious; a good and smart regiment should be able to set an example anywhere, and in no case should an officer have to acknowledge that another regiment is better than his own. At an inspection ascertain

that all men and horses of a squadron are present. Usually some 'stiff uns' of both species are absent for some reason or another. Ask the Brigadier if there is anything he particularly wishes to see, write and let the commanding officer know, and get him to submit a programme for the inspection to include what the Brigadier has asked for, and the remainder can be filled up with what the C.O. wishes to show, which is usually something he expects doing well. It is rather instructive since by this somewhat simple means it is possible to ascertain what C.O.s themselves consider a good standard; the degree of efficiency in different regiments is very marked. At inspection make it your business to become acquainted with junior officers and senior N.C.O.s.

Brigade Training.—Get your programme fully prepared beforehand, you have not time to do it during training. Issue this programme weekly; in all schemes state what is the object of the scheme and what particular points of training you desire to demonstrate. At Brigade drill you will find the foundation of good drill is a strict observance of pace, especially the trot, which I think is now pretty well judged. In giving directions with a flag you should be well in front so that you may be observed by all. When the Brigadier is drilling by signal see that the Brigade headquarters (which should be reduced to a minimum) does not place itself between the Brigadier and the Brigade and so obscure signals. When drilling by means of gallopers the latter should be instructed to give their orders simultaneously. It generally happens that the nearest regiment receives the new change of direction or formation first, and the regiment farthest away appears slow in conforming or ragged in drill, but if orders are received simultaneously this will, or should be, obviated. These are small points, but all tend to get smooth machine-like drill. Arrange a Brigade parade ground and Brigade formation, usually senior regiment on the right, next senior on the left, junior in the centre. Brigade machine guns in rear of centre of regiment. There is usually some difficulty in obtaining the required amount of canvas for headquarters. Avoid this by assuming you will be a mess of twelve. Medical arrangements are generally for some reason indifferent, they are not officially made until the eleventh hour and then arrive deficient of such things as watercarts, Maltese carts, &c. As regards the cleanliness of the camp, clearing

away of night soil, supply of dry earth, &c., appoint a camp quartermaster (senior quartermaster). Make him keep a book which goes round to every unit in the Brigade and contains a daily report signed by each quartermaster, stating if the contractor has satisfactorily performed his duties or not. If he has not, you report to A.S.C., whose business it is to see that measures are taken to put things right. This book should be on your office table every day at mid-day. Once the contractor realises he can play no tricks he won't try. As regards forage boards, only order them in the event of any complaint. Insist on the Brigade transport and Brigade supply officers being with you at least a week before manœuvres. There are many vexatious questions to settle, and usually the A.S.C. officers do not arrive until a few hours before the actual move-off. This is very wrong and entails a great deal of unnecessary trouble afterwards. All sorts of excuses will be put forward, but insist on their reporting at least a week beforehand. The Brigadier will, I am sure, back you up. It is useful to get some good, keen Yeomen to come and help on Brigade training, since for some reason the staff captain allowed in war establishments is not included in Brigade headquarters during Brigade training. This is a pity, since it is all-important that the staff captain should become acquainted with adjutants and quartermasters with whom his work largely lies prior to the beginning of manœuvres.

Manœuvres.—Allot various duties as indicated in the Staff Manual to the members of your own staff, and having done so, let them carry *them* out. You have not time to concern yourself with it and must trust them implicitly to do their own job; they will work much better in consequence. If they want to know anything they will ask soon enough. I think the running of the mess is the most difficult and thankless duty. Whenever you have an opportunity jot down in your notebook positions of the Brigade in any sort of attack, time verbal orders are received, &c. It is most useful after for the War Diary. When the Brigadier gets into camp leave him alone unless absolutely necessary to do otherwise. Always give out preliminary orders; it may be necessary to change, but it assists troops to settle down. Remember that both your transport and supply officers have the hardest time of any on manœuvres, and I have always found them triers, so don't allow them to get discouraged if things don't turn out right.

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Supplies this year were not a strong point, but no one worked harder than the supply officer; the fault lay either in the system or the higher commander, but not the goodwill or lack of energy on the part of the subordinate. Start manœuvres, or rather before manœuvres, with the idea (which is correct) that most regiments have no conscience where transport is concerned, and no doubt it will be necessary to make yourself peculiarly unpleasant, but you will save both yourself and units a lot of trouble after. Regulations are laid down but are often most confusing, since there are command orders, W.O. orders, and Cavalry divisional orders. Inter-communication is a great difficulty, and I believe the reason is that on 'manœuvres' everything moves far too quickly and not enough attention is paid to it there. Arrangements for security leave much to be desired both by day and night. Regiments and Brigades move in a manner they would not dare to do in war. This again I think largely comes from too much work on 'terrain,' where everyone knows the ground like the palm of his hand. Get the Brigadier to drop on it at every opportunity. It spells disaster, one of which we experienced last year at Cavalry divisional training. When officers go out on special patrol, give them definite questions to answer and get them to send in reports frequently. This at least permits the G.O.C. to know if they are existent or non-existent, which is something. If you do not already know those who work your branch at the War Office it is as well to do so, because you can save yourself and your Brigadier a considerable amount of unnecessary work at times. If the Cavalry Division ask for a report from you be sure it is accurate, because the same report is probably called for from each of the other Brigades. It often happens that someone sends in a wrong report; this is more or less at once detected and the Brigade in question is not trusted for much. This will be the case in regiments, but jump on it at once and ask the why and wherefore, and you won't get it wrong a second time. The modern Cavalry Brigadier is very good about leave and sport. He will do anything for those that play up, and all can be sure that he means fighting, which is everything.

NATIVE WARFARE IN SOUTH AFRICA

By BRIG.-GENERAL SIR DUNCAN MCKENZIE, K.C.M.G., C.B.,
*Member of the South African Union Defence Committee, late
Commandant-General, Natal Forces.*

THOSE who live in Africa cannot with impunity neglect what Lord Bacon called 'the most certain oracle of time,' and allow themselves to be lulled by fancied security into a condition of impotent unreadiness to defend the prerogatives of our race.

In dealing with native risings hesitation or irresolution on the part of the white man is disastrous, and in no other kind of warfare is it so essential to take the strategical offensive. This may entail facing apparently disproportionate odds, but a properly led and organised force of mounted riflemen can do so with safety, and its mobility enables it to achieve great results.

A tendency to carry too many impedimenta has been observable of late years, both among regular and irregular corps, and I cannot too strongly emphasise the importance of a light scale of equipment according to the work in hand. Thus a force mobilising in South Africa must have different transport and equipment, respectively, for operations in the Kalahari desert, on the high veld, or in bush and forests, where horse-sickness and the tsetse fly may be encountered. Again, to burden the transport of a flying column with field-forges and spare saddlery would be as unpractical as to send water-tanks with a force in a well-watered country in the rainy season.

Under all circumstances I am strongly in favour of pack-mules for the first-line transport, and in many cases for the second-line transport also—*e.g.*, to carry victuals for a few days, to admit of quick movements without the delay of foraging, for it must be remembered that, the longer operations last, the less salutary is their moral effect and the more the strength of our force will be impaired in unhealthy districts by diseases of man and horse.

Thus we know that in a horse-sickness district many horses will succumb within fourteen days, and in a 'fly country' our oxen will

only last for a month or so, and after the first rains they die off at once.

A tactical principle which should be observed by mounted riflemen in fighting African natives armed with the assegai is to *never let them among you*. It is better to gallop a certain distance to the rear than to throw away the advantages of discipline and good shooting by engaging in a mêlée at close quarters with such skilful and determined spearmen as, for instance, the Zulus.

Where high grass or other cover exists, scouting cannot be left to single horsemen or small groups, but must be undertaken by complete detachments, not under the strength of a troop, capable of dealing with any small parties of the enemy that may be lying, like snakes in the grass, to ambush stragglers or small parties.

In the same way in a 'bush drive,' or sweeping operations in thick forests, the firing line should be at as close intervals as the physical obstructions will allow, closely followed by the supports at intervals of 200 yards, or when possible of 100 yards, the first essential being that the line should be kept thick enough to resist a rush.

The general opinion would be that there is less excuse for being surprised in savage than in civilised war, because the native is not formidable until he gets to close quarters, being a bad shot at medium or longer ranges, and it might be considered that the approach of an attack should easily be detected before it becomes dangerous; but it must be remembered that often owing to the nature of the country or thick bush, which is impenetrable to mounted scouts, and owing to the efficiency of the natives in lying hidden in rough ground, we must always be ready to meet sudden attacks from unexpected directions.

The Zulu formation is well known, in which the 'horns' are pushed forward to make an enveloping attack.

It has been suggested that all small bodies of troops engaged in this kind of warfare should make a practice of moving with certain angles of defence told off to different units of the force. For instance, acting on the assumption that attack may come from several directions (see fig. 1), the leading squadron is made responsible for the defence of the front, to an angle of 45 degrees to right and left; the second, third, and fourth squadrons deal with all attacks on the right, left, and rear respectively.

The advantages of such a plan are evident for a small, compact, immobile force; it inspires confidence, especially in thick bush, and it is quickly put into operation.

The disadvantages are that it implies ceding initiative to the enemy; it presupposes inferior scouting on our part; a proportion of our strength is likely to be kept unemployed where no attack is imminent; and the position of the firing unit may be such that they do not effectively command the area which they are responsible for.




FIG. 1.—IMMOBILE DEFENCE.

Speaking generally, I am not in favour of any form of immobilised defence, but would under most circumstances be for the tactical offensive (see fig. 2), though all moves must be according to the lie of the country.

I have noticed that after warfare in open country with a civilised enemy, armed with guns and long-range weapons, there is a tendency when engaged against natives to place the advanced guard and protective detachments too far out. This should be guarded against and the distances reduced, because, as has been already pointed out, the natives' shooting is inferior.

In continuance of the principle of taking the initiative, we cannot forgo the advantages of night-marches, in spite of their undoubted attendant risks.

In defence of the camp, searchlights are of the greatest use, particularly in view of their moral effect.

In the native rebellion in Natal in 1906, on the night preceding the Mome Gorge fight, I had occasion to leave a position weakly held,




FIG. 2.—MOBILITY AND GOOD SCOUTING ENABLE A FORCE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE.

while I made the night-march, and I ordered the searchlight to be kept working the whole night, with the result that no kind of attack was made on the camp because the enemy believed the troops were all still occupying it.

I am strongly opposed to the use of one searchlight only (see fig. 3), because attacks are most probable from different directions




FIG. 3.—A METHOD OF PLACING SEARCHLIGHTS.

simultaneously. Moreover, if the searchlight is projected on to an area of ground and has then to be turned in another direction, it leaves the defenders dazzled by the illumination and unable for a consider-

able time to distinguish objects until their eyes have again become accustomed to the darkness.




FIG. 4.—USES OF MOBILITY.

Situation.—Black holding line of hills. White simulates intention to run into the defile by continuing to march towards it. Black flanks gravitate towards expected point of collision, but White at last possible moment gallops to the flank and crowns the heights.

At night most of the men should sleep lining the perimeter of the camp ready to shoot, and supports within should be ready to strengthen the firing line at the shortest notice.




FIG. 5.

Situation.—White scouts have been allowed to pass by Black in ambush. The watercourse is suitable for giving cover to men and horses. Head of White column is fired on at decisive range by Black in strength on the hill. What should White do?

This problem is best considered by placing oneself in the position of Black commander. He has probably placed an ambush in the watercourse and hopes to drive White into the trap by firing from the hill.

BREEDING HORSES**SUITABLE FOR STEEPLECHASING, HUNTING,
CAVALRY SERVICE AND POLO**

By CAPTAIN A. B. POLLOK, 7th (Q.O.) Hussars.

AMATEURS sometimes start horse breeding in a haphazard manner, which leads to disappointment and failure. These notes, chiefly the result of personal experience, are published with a view to assisting those who may wish to take up this interesting and patriotic business on a small scale.

Many authorities maintain that the Government should start breeding farms at various suitable centres throughout the country, and that these studs should be run on similar lines to those on the Continent or in India.

Undoubtedly certain advantages might be derived from this system.

(1) Continuous reliable records which would be of the utmost value to breeders could be compiled.

(2) These records assist in selecting sound, hardy strains to breed from.

(3) A more suitable type of horse is eventually evolved.

(4) Horses of suitable placid but courageous temperament are bred.

Example.—‘The best Arabian horses* are undoubtedly the outcome of centuries of breeding to a type suitable to carry a light man

* Excellent as the Arab horse is, few practical breeders would think of using him as a sire in this country now that we have such a selection of really hardy, sound, thoroughbred horses to choose from. The Board of Agriculture insist on these horses being sound. What better horse is there in the world than the best of our racing stock, and only the best are now kept as sires. The thoroughbred of to-day is reared in a rational way, with plenty of air and freedom to render him hardy and sound. Our thoroughbreds have proved that they can thrive in any climate—from Russia to Africa; they can stick it on short rations as well as most animals, as their courage keeps them going. Who can deny that our thoroughbreds’ shoulders, hocks, action, and speed are centuries ahead of any Arab. The thoroughbred can carry more weight, go through more dirt, and stand up on slippery ground in a way that no Arab can. Therefore, let Arabs be bred in their own country, they are most useful in their proper place, but we cannot afford room for them in our crowded country, where land is so expensive.

throughout a long campaign, to face danger courageously, to possess fair speed, immunity from disease and sickness (especially pulmonary complaints), and to bear the jar of galloping on hard ground.' ('Our Cavalry,' General Rimington.)

But Government Breeding Stud Farms have many disadvantages which other authorities consider outweigh their advantages.

(1) Undoubtedly the cost of the remounts will be greatly increased.

(2) The pasture of these stud farms after a certain number of years becomes horse-sick. More especially on certain soils, such as clay or any of the heavy retentive lands.

It is admitted amongst our most experienced horse breeders that grass-land should be well grazed down by cattle and sheep. If this is not done the quality of the grass deteriorates and the land becomes sour, and docks and other weeds replace the finer grasses. There is an old true saying amongst farmers that 'the horse and the goose are the worst tenants on land.'

(3) If the above is admitted, it may reasonably be concluded that the best results can be obtained by encouraging the existing owners of land throughout the country to keep a few brood mares to run through their ordinary stock.

The farming out of suitable brood mares to farmers and others has been taken in hand by the Government (or rather with Government funds). At present this departure is in its infancy and is being tried in a small way; it is to be hoped that this practical experiment will prove a success.

Suitable sound registered thoroughbred sires are now stationed in most of the horse-breeding districts throughout the country. The services of these horses can be obtained at moderate fees by owners of mares. The mares have to be approved as suitable, and free from hereditary disease.

Farmers and other people cannot be expected to go in for breeding Cavalry horses unless they get a fair return for their money and labour, and in the present circumstances this does not appear possible for the remount price of a sound four-year-old horse is only £40—not a tempting goal to aim at.

No breeder can expect that accidents will not happen to any of his horses and that none of them will be unsound. Therefore, as a business man he must make allowance for casualties, and aim higher

than producing an animal value £40. Let him try to breed a blood hunter up to 14 stone, whose market value as a three-year-old unbroken colt is, let us say, £100. If he is fortunate and has good mares he may reasonably hope to produce 20 to 25 per cent. of such animals, and this should pay him well.

Now, these high-priced three-year-olds are big horses, 16 hands and over (see photograph No. 1), and are, from their size, not quite suitable for campaigning on short rations. General Rimington states in his latest book *Our Cavalry* that :—

‘ The limit to the height of the horse suitable for a campaign should be 15.2; it is more difficult to say how small a horse is suitable to carry a Cavalryman. Chest measurement is the best-known test for stamina, and a good judge said that “ a 13.2-hands pony 64 inches round, will do double the work of a 14.2-hands pony of equal girth.” ’

Those who have bred and sold horses know to their cost, that if an animal fails to reach the standard 15.2, his market value is considerably less than that of a horse over that height.

Our polo friends fortunately come to the rescue of the breeder of animals between 14 and 15 hands.

The remount officer gets his chance, therefore, to buy horses, say, between 15 hands and 15.3.

The breeder grumbles at ‘ giving away ’ these horses at this low figure, in many cases at considerably below cost price. But the best course open to him is to cut his loss, and our Cavalry get many plums in this way.

Now that the system of training our remounts has been officially extended over two years (*i.e.*, from four years to six years old), it is all important that a fair start should be made. By this I mean that the remount should be a naturally well-balanced three-quarters bred or clean-bred horse. Breeders can breed for balance just as well as they can breed for any other qualification. Undoubtedly horses with long, sloping shoulders, well-set-up forehands, and with hocks well under them, are bred to balance. These naturally balanced well-bred horses train very smoothly and easily, provided of course that the temperament or mind is well balanced also.

It may seem strange to those who have not had much practical experience in horse breeding, that the size of our blood horse should vary so much. It is no very uncommon thing to find a full brother

and sister, the brother up to 14 stone and 16 hands, the sister a polo pony. First foals are often small, and when a mare begins to go downhill her produce frequently becomes small and weedy. It is in the centre of her breeding career that we may expect to find big upstanding valuable stock.

A good brood mare is an exceedingly valuable asset, even if she is not in the stud book. Unfortunately it takes a long time to find out if her stock are reliable and sound. In Ireland there is no great difficulty in procuring a good young mare suitable to go to the stud if the purchaser is prepared to pay say up to £100 for an unbroken three-year-old. This may sound rather extravagant, but in horse breeding, as in many other things, the best article is usually the cheapest in the long run. Nothing but trial, however, will prove to you whether she is to be a success or otherwise.

The following points should be remembered when selecting a brood mare (see photograph No. 2):—

(1) She should be descended from hardy stock, that stay well and are long-lived. Her dam and if possible her g.-dam should be seen.

(2) She should be free from any taint of hackney or harness blood (old Irish draft or pack horse excepted).

(3) She should be chosen preferably from the stock of a mare in the prime of her breeding career.

(4) She should be of a placid but courageous temperament, free from hereditary disease or any unsoundness, and of a good colour.

(5) She should have perfect action and be short in the leg, especially from the knee to fetlock and from hock to fetlock.

(6) She should be long, low, and roomy, yet have a short back. Her length is made up by her long, sloping shoulders and lengthy quarters. Her roominess depends on the depth of girth and width between the hips.

(7) She should have a clean, well-bred head, prominent full eyes, and broad, flat, intelligent forehead.

(8) Her hocks and knees should be large, square, and flat.

(9) Her bone should be flat, not round, and her legs, which should be free from coarse hair, should be clean and hard.

(10) Her pasterns should have the right degree of slope and should be neither too long nor too short.

Her feet should be hard, well-shaped, and with horn of firm, close grain, good soles, frogs, &c. (Mr. Jorrocks says truthfully, 'No foot, no 'oss.')

Lucky is the man who can find a young mare with all these good points. Perfection is not easily found in this world, but it is as well to start with as many good points as possible. Indeed, it is surprising if some small weak point is overlooked how invariably that weak spot seems to come out magnified in the mare's young stock.

Example.—I bought a very fine three-year-old filly in Co. Galway some years ago, price £100 unbroken. This filly had two slight faults—a slight dish with her near fore, also her head might have been better set on. These two faults unfortunately came out in some of her progeny.

I mention this to emphasise the point I am trying to make clear—namely, the importance of trying to get your brood mares as near perfection as possible. All foreign buyers—and there are no better judges—insist on an animal being perfectly straight in action, whether for remount or breeding stock.

Let us go back to the business aspect of the case again, and let us assume you have bought your three-year-old, and your knowledgeable friends as well as yourself are very pleased with the purchase.

Have the filly broken and backed during December, January, and the beginning of February. Then throw her out of work, feed her on soft food every evening, and during the day-time let her run out in a sheltered paddock with a good covering of grass. Send her to the sire in March.

There are several advantages in having young mares broken and backed; it makes them quieter and more easily handled when in foal.

Should this mare not prove herself to be a success at the stud, it is quite easy to have her again rebroken at six or seven years old. I have known mares which have had up to three foals, taken up, got fit, and retrained, make the most excellent hunters.

Mares that have had foals take usually twelve months to get really fit and hard again. The very fact of a mare having given birth to a foal often improves her temperament. Many excitable hot animals become calmed down and are therefore much safer and easier to ride; they often become much better feeders, and consequently carry more muscle.

This rest cure when breeding often causes them to last quite fresh up to a great age. I have known cases of mares treated thus, hunting when eighteen years of age. Their legs had received the advantages of an extra two or more years at grass.*

If you have two or three foals out of a mare, you obtain a guide, worth all the theory in the world, as to whether it is worth your while to keep her as a brood mare or not.

Do not be disappointed if the first foal is a little small, provided he is well shaped and moves well.

There are many advantages in breeding from a young mare:—

If she proves herself a success in early life she is kept in the stud and may produce ten or fifteen valuable animals. By going to the stud in early life the production of milk is greatly increased. No artificial feeding is equal to the plentiful supply of mother's milk.

After having been put to the stud early, she is more easily got in foal, has little trouble in foaling, and is less likely to miss in after life. Her vitality goes into her produce instead of being used up in forming muscle. Her instinct as a good mother is developed in youth; she therefore nurses her foal far better than a mare put to the stud late in life.

Some very successful breeders on the score of economy advocate working the brood mares at light work on the land, almost up to the day of foaling; but this course should not be adopted unless the mares are in the hands of a very careful man, for choice the actual owner of the mare. The mare must also be exceptionally quiet. Many a small Irish farmer has produced a high-class weight-carrying horse out of a mare which he works on his small farm. There are undoubtedly many advantages in this system. The mare by her work is paying for her keep, and the value of the foal, minus the stud fee, is consequently a net asset to the farmer.

Suppose the mare is not in foal, the farmer gets a good year's work out of her, and she has paid for her keep. Many mares which breed good stock, only breed every other year; this class of mare certainly is best kept at work.

* Military history teaches us that good sound old horses between the ages of 10 and 16 are the ones that can best withstand the hardships of a campaign; therefore, a mare that has had two or three foals, when fit should be in splendid form to go through a campaign.

A French hussar troop horse 22 years of age carried one of the boldest of their men throughout the campaign of 1870-71 without being sick a single day.

A fifth of Ireland has been sold, or is in the process of being sold, to small farmers. These small farmers require one or two light agricultural horses to work their land. If the Government, through the Board of Agriculture, farms out to these small men a good type of young Artillery mare, the produce of these mares put to a registered thoroughbred sire would be a great national asset. Unfortunately, many of these farmers, owing to the smallness of their holdings, would not be able to keep the young horses till three or four years old. Large owners of land or graziers would have to take over foals when weaned or as yearlings. They would have to winter them well, and let them run thin on the land with their cattle and sheep, at a cost of between 3s. and 5s. per week, until they reach an age suitable for the remount buyers. Of course, it is futile for the Government to assist in the production of horses if they can be acquired by the agents of foreign governments before they have been rejected by our remount buyers. In order to secure these horses for the Government, legislation might be necessary to give remount officers the first option of purchasing the produce of these mares.

A Few Words on Feeding Young Stock and Brood Mares.—Foals a month before weaning should be accustomed to eat a concentrated food (crushed old oats). Dam and foal should be fed out of separate cast-iron pots on the ground. It is very easy to accustom foals to feed in a small fenced-off enclosure, guarded by a single rail which they can walk under, but which effectually debar the mares from getting at their food. The foals then go ahead after weaning and never miss the mother's milk. When weaned, they should, if possible, be housed in airy boxes at night; two or three can be put in one loose-box if necessary. They should have plenty of bedding; crushed old oats (2 lb. to 3 lb.) mixed with a little finely crushed linseed cake ($\frac{1}{2}$ lb.) morning and evening; plenty of good clean hay free from dust. They should be put in a large sheltered paddock, with good clean grass, every day and all day regardless of weather. If they are well fed they do not mind rough weather, which makes them hardy.*

* Foals should be given salt; they suffer much from worms, which must be got rid of. Lime and salt your land; rock salt in mangers; and give medicine if necessary; often an extra feed of corn constitutes the best cure, as worms, though sometimes present in well-fed foals, are inseparable from those low in condition.

Yearlings during the winter require to be treated in the same way, but they can do with a larger ration with advantage. In fact, if growing young stock have a good large run and are healthy, they cannot be over-fed. It is essential to get the growth in early life, for if you fail to get the growth in the first two years you can never do it later.

After the two-year-old winter is over, provided good winterage and plenty of shelter is available, they can run wild winter and summer till they are four years old, and they are all the better for this freedom. If the ground is rough, with boulders, and hilly, so much the better, as the young stock will become active and sure-footed. Their feet must be attended to occasionally, a matter of the greatest importance. They will be seen twice a day by the stock-man when he goes round the cattle and sheep. If anything goes wrong, they can be brought in, but nothing should go wrong provided there is plenty of good clean grass and water, and a little good hay with the cattle in winter.

These winterages must be on well-drained or naturally drained land, that does not poach and provides dry lying.

Most of the winterages in the West of Ireland fulfil these conditions; the land is porous, with underlying limestone rock, and the mildness of the climate preserves the grass usually till February or even March.

Feeding and Care of Brood Mares.—This important subject can only be lightly touched on in these short notes.

During the winter months, from Christmas until there is a good supply of spring grass, the brood mares should be taken in at night, put in loose-boxes, fed on good meadow hay, given a feed of oats in the morning, and of boiled or steamed grain in the evening. In fact, the brood mare that is not worked lives a life very similar to that of the milch cow, but her food must not be as bulky. She wants to be well fed in order to nourish the foal within her; at the same time it should not be forgotten that over-feeding with concentrated food is very dangerous. It is very seldom that brood mares are overfed in such conditions as this paper applies to, the opposite condition usually prevails.

If mares are too well fed they will get lazy and will not walk over the land and graze. This gentle, steady exercise is most beneficial to the health of dam and foal. After all, grass is the horse's natural food, and so long as there is a good supply of it they require very

little more. When I mention 'grass' I refer to good old pasture and pasture unfouled—farmers call it good clean land. If there is a deficiency of lime and phosphates in the soil the land must be repeatedly top-dressed. Top-dressed in the following six-year rotation—first year, 5 to 10 cwt. per acre basic slag; second year, no manure; third year, well rotted farmyard manure made from cattle—on no account must horse manure be used; fourth year, no manure; fifth year, common ground lime and salt (salt does not suit all soils); sixth year, no manure; seventh year, basic slag again. When your land gets in good heart the dressings can be made lighter and less frequent.

Phosphate of lime can be mixed with the boiled food, say a teaspoonful to a tablespoonful a day. But it is a far safer plan to get grass to assimilate the mineral requisites from the land that has been well top-dressed.

The Climate.—The climate of the west coasts of England and Ireland, being mild and moist, is favourable for keeping the fields covered with grass for certainly nine months out of the twelve. Owing to this mildness, stock can be kept in the open, leading the healthy natural life which encourages growth.

The Soil.—An ideal farm should have land with 18 inches of loam on mountain limestone, and should not be more than 300 feet above sea-level. Wherever beech trees flourish, the land is eminently adapted for horse-breeding. But those breeders who are not so well situated can still produce excellent horses by means of artificial shelter and judicious feeding. This, unfortunately, entails additional expense.

The Locality.—Mountain and moorland will produce the best of rough pony stock, so will the storm-swept islands from Achil to Shetland. Be content, therefore, to improve these native breeds by careful selection from animals indigenous to the soil and rough surroundings.

Please do not forget how our good hardy breed of Connemara ponies was utterly ruined by the foolish but well-meant introduction of hackney blood.

Let me emphasise this all-important point.—*The Shelter.* High beech and thorn hedges on a bank are the best protections against wind. Clumps or single trees in the centre of the fields are most useful for shade in summer. Beech clumps are most useful. In summer,

the wind blowing through them, renders them cool and free from flies. *The Range* is after all one of the most important factors in the successful rearing of young stock. If they have plenty of room they cost comparatively little, and thrive far better than in small enclosures with manger food.

I have purposely avoided statistics, which are always dull and often misleading, but, from the experience of twenty years, I find my four-year-olds cost me on the average, approximately, £60 each, handled and fit to go into a fair. These animals are from three-quarters to clean bred. I mention this because the better bred they are the more care and food they require.

The skin of the blood horse is finer than that of the common horse, so is the hair; therefore, to stand rough weather without losing condition they must have shelter and plenty of good food. If thoroughbred stock are not well-treated they will produce weeds which are of small value, although the parents may be fine upstanding animals of the best blood.

If you are fortunate enough to have a good farm in a suitable horse-breeding district, and if you have good men, and plenty of capital, breed thoroughbred stock of the best—it will pay you well. But if you have not the capital, breed three-quarter-bred stock: the demand for good horses is undoubtedly greater than it has ever been before, consequently higher prices than formerly can be obtained.

The demand, however, for second-rate stock grows less every day; there are fewer cabs to use up the misfits. Do not go in for a penny-wise-pound-foolish system. Insist on having as good brood mares as you possibly can get. The only way of getting this high standard of merit is to keep passing on those brood mares that are not a success.

Purposely, I have not gone into the question of breeding from old hunter mares. By old, I mean mares who have not been served until they are 12 or over. I have seen it tried often; the results were usually unsatisfactory and entailed financial loss. People who have tried breeding in this manner and have failed are inclined to complain that horse breeding does not pay. They do considerable harm to the country by spreading this information throughout the district, and thus prevent other and more intelligent people from attempting to breed.

These old mares said to be 12 are often very much older in

reality. Hunters are frequently far older than their owners have any idea of.

Here are just a few of the frequent causes of failure :—

- (1) The foals are usually small.
- (2) The mares have difficulties in foaling.
- (3) They often miss.
- (4) They are bad mothers and milkers.

My advice to those who wish to start horse breeding is :—

(1) Begin in a small way, say, with two good brood mares; your farm men then gradually get to understand the care of them.

(2) Avoid laying out money on elaborate buildings; it is unnecessary and you seldom get any return for the expenditure.

(3) When you have gained experience and your stud farm is paying, then, and only then, is it advisable to increase the number of mares.

(4) Avoid crossing a lot of different breeds, this usually ends in great waste of time and money. Some wealthy amateurs are never satisfied unless they are trying breeding experiments, most of which have been tried before and have failed.

(5) Avoid using any sire but the thoroughbred.

Horse breeding has always interested the landed gentry of this country, to say nothing of the interest it has for soldiers, and especially for Cavalry officers. But, unfortunately, the number of people who have failed to make a success of it is unnecessarily great.

The chief cause of failure lies in *not* starting with young mares and the very best of mares.

The chief consideration which should influence you in the selection of a sire for your mare are :—

- (1) That he is not too closely in-bred to your mare.
- (2) That he has a good constitution and temper, and is sound and free from all hereditary disease or faults.
- (3) That he is over eight years old; you will then get the opportunity of seeing and learning how his stock is turning out.

You will soon hear :—

- (1) If his stock is sound and hardy.
- (2) If they are temperate, good fencers, and stay well.
- (3) That he comes of a strong sire line (by this I mean that he is a descendant in male line of some horse like St. Simon, a horse that

stamps his stock not only in outward shape and conformation, but in the sterling characteristics of staying power and stamina.

If you want advice, go and talk with practical men who have made money out of their breeding; they are only too anxious to assist, because they are always men very much interested in the subject, otherwise they would not have been a success. It is also in the interest of such men if they own good sires to encourage as many people as possible to keep good brood mares, not indifferent or bad brood mares. A sire's reputation depends almost entirely on the quality of the stock he is getting. No horse can get good stock out of indifferent mares, as the mare has at least 75 per cent. of the problem to solve.

Roughly 95 per cent. of our Cavalry remounts come from Ireland.

I therefore trust that English breeders will excuse my quoting most of my examples from Ireland, in which country I have been fortunate enough to gain a certain amount of practical experience.

The Prussian Government Vote for the improvement of national horse breeding was £172,000 last year. Very high class race-horses are purchased for their remount studs and high prices paid.

Amongst noted Irish thoroughbreds which the Prussian Government has bought, were the Derby winner of 1897, Galtee More, for whom £13,700 was paid, and Ard Patrick, winner of 1902, for whom £20,600 was paid. These two horses, which came out second and third in the list of winning sires in Germany last year, were not bought for the purpose of getting remounts direct, but for breeding race-horses.

The Prussian Government hoped no doubt that they would get stock that would hereafter make stallions for remount studs. No less than 3,578 stallions are maintained for breeding remounts.

Not only are high-class sires purchased, but also some of the best of our brood mares, both in foal, and with foal at foot, whenever they come into the open market, say at our November blood-stock sales at Newmarket. These foreign buyers give up to four figures for Gallinule mares, and other mares of fashionable strain.

It is interesting to note how these mares are disposed of on arriving abroad. Their breeding, performances, and cost price having been carefully tabulated, they are put up to public auction with a small reserve, and in many cases are bought considerably below cost price.

Hence we realise the thoroughness with which other nations take up horse breeding for their armies. For many years they have bought our best, not only in blood stock, but in half-bred mares also, and they still insist on buying the best. Without doubt they have realised that this system pays them in the long run. Our Government, on the other hand, until comparatively lately has left the horse-breeding industry almost entirely in the hands of private individuals. During the last two years, however, it has raised its subsidies for the encouragement of the horse-breeding industry to the sum of £50,000 annually.

The Board of Agriculture, through the agency of County Committees, now purchase annually 200 half-bred mares of substance, with which they hope to breed horses of a weight-carrying hunter type. Grants for this brood-mare scheme amounting approximately to £20,000 have been made to these Committees, and they have purchased some 400 mares, the majority of which have been reported as suitable for the purpose in view.

Fifty pounds is the average price paid per mare, but this seems rather a small price if a higher standard is to be maintained.

To ensure the mare being satisfactorily mated, the choice of the stallion—which must be either a thoroughbred or hunter, to which a premium has been awarded, or a stallion of either of these breeds and registered by the Board for the current year—must be approved by the Committee. A custodian cannot be required to incur a higher charge for service fee than £2 for a leased mare, nor can he be granted a free nomination for her.

EXTRACT FROM CONDITIONS ON WHICH MARES ARE LET OUT TO FARMERS.

1. The "Custodian" means the person receiving the mare.
2. The mare may be used for such work in connection with Custodian's occupation as she may be capable of performing, having due regard to the foal and the period of foaling, but under no circumstances may she be used for hauling dead-weight loads. The mare must not be hunted or ridden with the Yeomanry.
3. All foals belong to the Custodian, but County Committees have first refusal of purchasing any of them whilst under four years old.
4. The Custodian to pay an annual rent of forty shillings for the use of the mare plus service fee.

ILLUSTRATIONS

These horses whose photographs are reproduced have been selected not only on account of their conformation, but also for their performances.

1 and 2. These two classic horses *Persimmon* and *Neil Gow* may seem altogether outside the scope of this article, but their sons and grandsons will soon become available as hunter or general utility sires.

The lines on which these horses are built are a training to the eye—look carefully at the conformation of *Persimmon's* hind legs built for strength and speed, and many of his progeny possess similar limbs; look again how near the hocks and knees are to the ground, the strength of loin and shoulder.

When *Neil Gow* reaches the age of ten, think what a low deep horse he will grow into; look at the beautiful forehead he possesses, and he is an equally good horse to stand behind.

3. *Sunbeam*, ch. mare, by *Merry Saint*, dam by *Favonius*, G.D. *Lucifer*, G.G.D. by *Solon*. First prize, Royal Dublin Show, 13 to 14 stone class, also prizewinner at Olympia.

This photograph was taken in the middle of the hunting season, which makes the mare look rather light.

This mare comes of good sound, staying blood which has proved itself, as many of her near relations have won steeplechases and point-to-point jumping prizes.

She is a roomy, broad mare, and should make a very valuable brood mare.

4. *Vade Mecum*, winner of the Hunters' Improvement Society Gold Medal.

5. The well-known polo pony *Energy*, a granddaughter of *Gallinule*, who played in the international matches both in this country and also in America.

This pony was also a beautiful fencer and hunter. She also won many prizes in the show ring.

6. Fine big upstanding 16.1 4-year old by *Bona Rosa*. Dam by *Lucifer*, G.D. *Roman Bee*. First prize, 14-stone class, Royal Dublin Show.


This horse was purchased for a large sum, and went to America, where he gained many successes.

It is these big horses which enable one to make breeding pay; they are usually produced in the centre of a brood mare's breeding career.

7. *Vinegar Hill*, winner of the Grand Military, 1911.


8. *Combined Training*, the winner of several international jumping competitions at Olympia, &c., formerly in the ranks of the 7th (Q.O.) Hussars, now at the Cavalry School, one of the many plums secured by our remount officers. This is a small, but compact active horse, the sort to go on service with.

Photographs by
1, 2, 4—W. A. Rouch, London.
3—Hally, Newmarket.




Photographs by
6, 7, 8—W. A. Rouch, London,
9—Chancellor, Dublin.


TYPES of HORSES




8
DUBLIN SHOW
FIRST PRIZE
1913
TYPE BUILDING



9
COMBINED TRAINING



5
ENERGY



7
VINEGAR HILL

THE AHMEDNAGAR STALLION BREEDING STUD

By MAJOR F. D. HUNT, A.V.C., *Superintendent, Remount Depot
and Stud Farm, Ahmednagar, India*

THIS Stud was founded in 1904 after the Royal Commission of 1900, the object being to make Government more or less self-supporting in stallion power, and to keep up the indigenous breeds which have of late years become nearly extinct, and also to reduce the expenditure of imported stallions—particularly Arabs, which for some years past have been brought into the country in much reduced number, of inferior quality, and for which much larger prices are asked than formerly. It must be distinctly understood that this Stud was never formed with a view to supplying actual remounts.

(2) When the Stud was first started, the number of mares was limited to 85, and made up as follows:—

10 T.B. Australians,
30 Arabs,
15 Deccanis,
15 Kathiawaris,
15 Marwaris,
—
85

with a stallion to correspond to each breed. After 6 years, owing to the want of type, the difficulty of getting the mares in foal, and often the delicacy of the foals themselves, it was decided to abandon the idea of breeding Australian thoroughbreds in India, as they could be imported better, and cheaper, when required, the numbers of this class being small. At the same time, as the Arab mares were doing well it was decided to increase their numbers correspondingly.

(3) The following year the Deccani breed, which was really a cross-breed of Arabs and English thoroughbreds on the indigenous mares of the Deccan, was discontinued; not that the productions were

indifferent, but they could hardly be said to have had sufficient time to be called a distinct type. And again, the Arabs were increased by 15. This was a very sound move because, having the type required, it was unnecessary to spend time in forming another class or type of horse.

(4) The Stud, as it now stands, consists of :—

55	Arabs,
15	Kathiawaris,
15	Marwaris.
<hr/>	
85	

which are kept pure.

Although the Stud has now only been a going concern for 8 years, it is quite easy to recognise that it has established itself, and is now producing exceptionally fine stock, chiefly due to the fact that all unsatisfactory mares have been eliminated, and in a few years there will be no mares in the Stud which do not belong to anything but the best families of each breed, bred in the Stud itself. When this object is attained there should be no difficulty in turning out a very large percentage of Imperial stallions. Of course, it must be recognised that taking one year with another fillies and colts divide honours as to their proportionate numbers.

From reports to hand of the Arab stallions, issued up-country as Imperial stallions, they are incomparably superior to what can be obtained in the Bombay market, particularly as to the size of bone.

It may be interesting to those who do not know these Eastern breeds to learn that the Kathiawari and Marwari classes are old breeds of the Indian horse, dating back hundreds of years before the thoroughbreds of England, and are as distinct types as the Arab himself. The Kathiawari is a small horse, standing from 14.1 to 15.0, full of quality, with a short back, and a beautifully turned head and neck. The Marwari is a larger horse, more powerful, has the same stamina as the Kathiawari, but is not what might be called a 'pretty' horse. These two breeds are of all colours. It is a mistake to think that all pure Kathiawaris and Marwaris are duns, with lists down their back, donkey crosses and zebra marks. In this Stud we have them of all colours, with the exception of black.

Statistics are never very interesting reading, but a few figures may not be out of place in this article.

Foaling for 3 years:—

1909-10	83.87 per cent.
1910-11	75.00 per cent.
1911-12	83.11 per cent.

It will be seen from this that these breeds are very prolific.

The mortality is given below for the same period, which will also show that they are a very healthy and sound class:—

1909-10	.	.	11
1910-11	.	.	4
1911-12	.	.	8

(Out of a total strength of from 190 to 220 head of young stock.)

A great deal of these results may be attributed to the excellent climate of Ahmednagar, and also to the fact that the stock are never pampered or over-fed, and lead as natural a life as it is possible to give them.

Breeding operations are carried on the whole year round. There is no particular foaling season as in England, at the same time the greater number are foaled in the early spring of the year.

The area of the Stud Farm amounts to 800 acres, divided into paddocks of from 5 to 30 acres. The mares are kept in small numbers in small paddocks, and drafted according to their stages of pregnancy. The foaling boxes are single, large and airy, and opening into separate wire-fenced enclosures less than a quarter-acre each. The mares rarely want any assistance when foaling. The naval cord is never cut or ligatured—but the naval is dressed as soon after birth as possible with a strong astringent and antiseptic dressing, and the mare and her foal are at liberty to move about their paddock at once. This means that the foal becomes acquainted with a wire-fenced enclosure from the day of his birth, and as the whole of the paddocks are fenced by wire we never have the troubles that are considered to attend wire-fencing at home.

The mare and her foal remain in this box and enclosure until she is again covered (the 10th day), when both mare and foal are drafted to a larger paddock; she has then to pass her testing trials before being moved on to a still larger paddock. The foals are weaned at 6 months

old and separated in batches of colts and fillies, which remain together for practically their Stud life up to $3\frac{1}{2}$ or 4 years old, and are kept in paddocks in mobs of from twenty-five to thirty. Each foal at 6 months old receives a general number which is branded on the near forefoot, and a Stud number with the last two numbers of the year of foaling branded underneath on the near shoulder, with 'A' on the off shoulder; he also receives a ticket which contains all particulars about him and his Veterinary History Sheet on the other side. The Stud books are carefully kept, so that anything bred in the Stud can be traced with little trouble.

As all stock are hand-fed, grazing in this part of the country being unknown, they are tied up three times a day for feeding at small troughs in the paddocks. This has manifold advantages:—

Firstly, it means that they are well handled; secondly, that every animal gets the same amount of food; and thirdly, it prevents all bullying, and minimises casualties due to kicks.

It would be interesting to some horse breeders in England to see a paddock with thirty young stallions all from 2 to 3 years old playing about together, and to move into the next paddock and find the same class from 3 to $3\frac{1}{2}$ years old, all as quiet as sheep. This does not mean that there is not a lot of horse-play and galloping, as these colts when not feeding are roaming aimlessly about the paddocks. When at play they look rough, but accidents are practically nil.

It would also interest the home breeder to see these colts and fillies galloping over ground which is as hard as a macadamised road, nothing having ever been done to their feet with the exception of being trimmed once every six weeks. This is done by a native farrier when the stock are feeding at their troughs, and he can do this operation on all four feet, seldom having to require the assistance of a single man.

At $3\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 years old the stock are taken up. Fillies that are required for replacements in the Stud are broken to saddle, harness, and plough. Colts are ridden, misfits are castrated, and transferred to the Remount Depot. Undersized stock are broken and prepared for sale by public auction at Poona and Bombay—and it is satisfactory to notice that the numbers of the latter are, year by year, decreasing.

It is also satisfactory to observe that this stock is appreciated by the public, who at last sale gave an average of £27 per head for what

in England would only be called 'small ponies' and mostly under 4 years old.

All stock at 4 years old to the day are struck off the Stud strength, and the colts selected as Imperial stallions are railed up to the large horse-breeding centres in the Punjaub and elsewhere, where they are further worked and limited to a few mares, and they are in full work at 6 years old.

Fillies, geldings, and misfits are treated as mentioned before.

The strength of the Stud at the time of writing is:—

Mares	85
Stallions	6
3-year-old Colts.	41
2-year-old Colts.	22
Yearlings	27
Weanlings	21
Foals at foot	12
Total								214
3-year-old Fillies	17
2-year-old Fillies	22
Yearlings	30
Weanlings	14
Foals at foot	7
Total								90

Economy is one of our marked features. Without going into minute details, it may be mentioned that the Stud is worked by one superintendent, one veterinary officer, and two European subordinates, the rest of the establishment being Indian. It must not be concluded that the Stud finishes these officers' duties, as in addition to the Stud there is a Remount Depot, which in normal years contains 500 Australians and 100 Arabs, which are purchased by the superintendent and veterinary officer in the Bombay market, railed to Ahmednagar, and broken and acclimatised, and then issued to various branches of the Service that require them.

This article has been written at short notice, but the writer will only be too glad to answer to the best of his ability any questions made by interested readers through the editor.

THE ENLISTED CLASSES OF THE INDIAN CAVALRY
(Continued)

By CAPTAIN R. W. W. GRIMSHAW (34th P.A.V.O.), Poona Horse

As the writer's personal experience of the various classes dealt with in this number has been restricted to those representatives who have found their way to Saugor, he has chiefly confined his remarks to direct quotations from one or two well-known authorities coupled with observations from data placed at his disposal by officers of units in which these classes are enlisted.

THE PATHAN

MANY Mussalmen enlisted in the Indian Cavalry style themselves Pathan in their sheet-rolls—*vide* Deccani, Hindustani, and Madras Mussalmen. It was pointed out in a previous number how such designations originated. The Pathan at present under consideration is that hailing from the vicinity of the North-West Frontier, but excluding those Pathans who come under the head of Derajat Mahometans or Multani Pathans.

The origin of the Pathan from these parts is, like the Jat, rather clouded. Whether he came to his present habitat with the first advance of Islam or is a convert of the original Aryan stock inhabiting Afghanistan in those far-off days, is open to conjecture. Probably he is descended from both.

It is generally accepted, however, that in the main they came east with the Sword of Islam. Unfortunately, the Pathans have little or no literature dating back many years, and as most Orientals, in the absence of any authentic records, suit their origin to their fancy, it is hard to say who they are or where they came from.

The chief Pathan tribes enlisted in the Indian Cavalry are, to quote from the official handbook :—The Yusafzai from the Peshawar valley, the Mohmunds from north of the Kabul river, the Afridis from the Tirah, the Orakzais from south of the Afridi country, the Darwesh Khel and Masuds Wazaris from the south of the Kurram. Many other small clans are enlisted too numerous to mention in a paper like this. In fact, a volume might be contributed on the various clans and

subdivisions of all those tribes which are embraced under the general term 'Pathan.'

To give a rough outline of the characteristics of the average Pathan it is proposed to quote again direct from two well-known authorities. Both may be somewhat out of date, but from all accounts they still afford a very accurate description, which will, perhaps, interest those who have not had the good fortune to obtain a personal acquaintance, or access to the necessary literature.

'As a soldier, the Pathan displays great dash and *élan*. His passionate nature, however, which he has never been taught to control, soon carries him away, and he is very apt to lose his head in the heat and frenzy and excitement of battle. And this leaves him at a disadvantage as compared with cooler-headed troops who, though in physique his inferior, being in full possession of their mental faculties and having their emotions well under control, can fight with greater deliberation and cooler courage. Bloodthirsty, cruel, revengeful, and treacherous, the Pathan has, nevertheless, some claims to respect, for his grit and nerve are things to be proud of, and if he is ready to inflict death and reckless in the shedding of blood, he is generally as reckless of his own life. He takes a just and manly pride in himself, and his resolute look, upright gait, tall and muscular frame, and firm step betoken many of the genuine qualities of the genuine man.'

Sir Denzil Ibbetson says: 'The true Pathan is, perhaps, the most barbaric of all races with which we are brought into contact in the Punjab. His life is not so primitive as that of the gipsy tribes. But he is bloodthirsty, cruel, and vindictive in the highest degree; he does not know what truth or faith is, insomuch that the saying "Afghan be Iman" (an Afghan is without conscience) has passed into a proverb amongst his neighbours; and although he is not without courage of a sort, and is often curiously reckless of his life, he would scorn to face an enemy whom he could stab from behind, or to meet him on equal terms if it were possible to take advantage of him, however meanly. It is easy to convict him out of his own mouth. Here are some of his proverbs: "A Pathan's enmity smoulders like a dung-fire"; "A cousin's tooth breaks upon a cousin"; "Keep a cousin poor but use him, when he is little play with him, when he is grown up he is a cousin, fight him"; "Speak good words to an enemy very softly, gradually destroy him root and branch." At the same time he has a

code of honour which he strictly observes, and which he quotes with pride under the name of "Pakhtunwali." It imposes on him three chief obligations—"Nanawatai," or the right of asylum, which compels him to shelter and protect even an enemy who comes as a suppliant; "Badal," or the necessity of revenge by retaliation; and "Melmastia," or open-handed hospitality to all who may demand it. And of these three perhaps the last is the greatest. And there is a charm about him, especially about the leading men, which almost makes one forget his treacherous nature. As the proverb says, the Pathan is one moment a saint and the next the devil. For centuries he has been, on our frontier at least, subject to no man. He leads a wild, free, active life in the rugged fastnesses of his mountains, and there is an air of masculine independence about him which is refreshing in a country like India. He is a bigot of the most fanatical type, exceedingly proud, and extraordinarily superstitious. He is of stalwart make, and his features are often of a markedly Semitic type. His national arms are the long heavy Afghan knife and the matchlock or jazail.'

Hardly a pleasant word-picture. Certainly the types which are to be met with at the Cavalry School have little in common with above; and although the Pathan is depicted as one to whom the word 'fidelity' might sound a mere mockery, it is universally allowed that when admitted to that savage training atmosphere of service in a regular or irregular unit of the Indian Army, with rare exceptions he becomes a loyal and devoted soldier.

From a purely Cavalry point of view the Pathan makes an excellent trooper, and if somewhat lacking in what one might term the equestrian temperament, and, owing to his want of education, is handicapped at systematic reconnaissance, he fills the gap by his sterling qualities as a fighter and tough nut. He is a good shot and a dangerous swordsman, and of a devil-me-care disposition. He is exceptionally strict over all matters concerning his women folk, and most of the blood feuds are due to quarrels over the fair sex, who, as a rule, are kept in strict seclusion, and if detected of infidelity, however trifling, are deprived of their noses.

The Pathan, considering his extreme poverty, is well-housed, and the villages are less filthy and dilapidated than those of India proper. He is chiefly agricultural and pastoral, but traders and

travelling merchants are on the increase. As education spreads, as it is certain to do under present-day conditions (*vide* the present Chief Commissioner's proposals), the Pathan will certainly lose many of his most striking idiosyncrasies, let us hope only the less desirable ones. The Pathan speaks a language called Pushtoo or Pakhtoo, the pronunciation varying according to locality.

The following units enlist Pathans: 9th, 10th, 11th, 23rd, 25th (half a squadron each), 17th (2 squadrons), 22nd ($\frac{1}{2}$ squadron), 19th, 21st, 31st, 35th, 36th, 37th, 38th, Guides (1 squadron each); totalling 13 $\frac{1}{4}$.

THE DERAJAT MAHOMETAN

The appellation Derajat Mahometan is one embracing all Mahometans who come from the Derajat country (see map, July number), the most important town being Dera Ismail Khan. The Derajat country really comprises several districts, and is not in itself an administrative area under any one particular Government official. Even the area located to the Derajat Military Brigade does not quite tally with what a native from those parts alludes to when he speaks of the Derajat country. Part of it is under the jurisdiction of the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, part of it under the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. As a country it has played little or no part, either politically or commercially, in the history of India, although it has been traversed on several occasions by invading armies. It contains few, if any, monuments of interest; in fact, if one excludes its military importance, a more uninteresting tract of country would be hard to discover.

For Europeans, climatically it enjoys probably the most evil reputation for all-round discomfort in India. And, although it can boast of a pleasant cold weather, its hot season is one never forgotten by anybody who has the misfortune to weather one out.

For the purposes of this paper, the Mahometans who enlist in the Cavalry from these parts will be grouped into three divisions: (1) The Derajat Pathan; (2) the Derajat Baluch; (3) the Multani Pathan.

This arrangement in no way corresponds to any geographical areas. The villages of (1) and (2) are found scattered promiscuously throughout the Derajat country, whilst (3), Multani Pathans are rather more concentrated about Dera Ismail Khan.

The term Derajat Pathan embraces several tribes whose exact origin is, like that of other Pathans, rather obscure, and space prohibits any discussion here.

The most important tribes are Niazis and Merwats. The former at one time were far more numerous than they now are, but are still a considerable community. Both they and Merwats make excellent troopers. At one time they showed a marked disinclination to enlist, but latterly they have improved in this respect. These Pathans are reputed less brutal and treacherous than others, and are more truthful. They are good agriculturists. They speak a soft kind of Pashtu. Like all Pathans, they have little or no experience of horses or horsemanship before enlistment. This, however, is a misfortune they share with many other classes, including their comrade-in-arms, the present-day British trooper. They make good horsemasters and efficient horsemen when once put on the right lines, and possess all the fighting instincts incidental to life on the frontier.

The following units specially enlist them, although they are found in many others: 35th, 36th, 37th.

For a short description of the Derajat Baluch and Multani Pathan, the writer will quote direct from the historical records of the 15th Lancers (Cureton's Multanis), which unit has been specially identified with these two classes since the dark days of 1858, when, under their famous commander (Cureton), they set out to render assistance to that devoted band who were keeping the old flag flying before Delhi.

MULTANI PATHANS

In 1657 the Duranni Afghans lived in Khandahar, and came under the rule of the Moghul Emperor of Delhi, Shah Jehan, when Khandahar was ceded to him by Persia. In 1648 Shah Abbas II. of Persia re-took Khandahar, before Aurungzeb, the son of Shah Jehan, could march to its relief. The Duranni adherents of the Moghuls joined the advancing army of Aurungzeb, and took part with him in several unsuccessful attempts to recover Khandahar. At last, however, a considerable number of them, sooner than submit to the Persians, abandoned the country of their birth, and Aurungzeb, in recognition of their faithful services, established them as a colony in Multan, giving their chiefs military service and their dependants sundry monopolies of trade and exemptions from taxation.

Until 1740, though doubtless many of their own race and family joined them from time to time, nothing much is known of these original Duranni Afghans settled in Multan. But between 1740 and 1770 considerable numbers of them again came into India from Khandahar in the several invasions of Nadir Shah, the Turkoman Shah of Persia, and Ahmed Shah, the first recognised Shah of Afghanistan. Many of these afterwards joined their brethren at Multan, and eventually adopted the name of Multani as their recognised nationality, if, indeed, this name had not been adopted previously by those who came in the time of Aurungzeb. Ahmed Khan, Shah of Afghanistan, was himself a Sadozai Duranni, and their principal chief, on which account this particular clan is still considered the chief among the Multani Pathans to this day.

The Multani Pathans prospered for several years at Multan, many friends and relations of their own race joining them from Khandahar from time to time, and they successfully resisted the arms of the Sikhs under Rajit Singh for many years. However, in 1818 they were eventually driven out of Multan by the Sikhs, at which time Nawab Muzaffar Khan, a Sadozai Duranni, was their chief and also Governor of Multan under the then Afghan Shah, Mahmud Khan, the grandson of Ahmed Shah.

After the capture of Multan in 1818 by the Sikhs, though certain numbers of them remained in or about Multan, the great majority of the Multani Pathans emigrated to Dera Ismail Khan across the Indus, and this city has been their principal headquarters ever since. They still, however, look upon Multan as their old home, and adhere tenaciously to 'Multan' as their national name. And although they have now lost all connection with their original home at Khandahar and the characteristics and language of their old race, they are proud of their descent from the Duranni soldiers of Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah, and still cling to their old tribal and clan names and divisions, the twelve principal ones amongst them, called the barah Tuman (twelve tribes), being the Sadozai, Alizai, Badozai, Bamezai, Barakzai, Ismailzai, Khwajakzai, Khwakwani, Adozai, Malizai, Pirzai, and Popalzai.

The Multani Pathan has always been noted for his unflinching devotion to the British Raj.

As they have served in the regular Cavalry for close on sixty years,

they have developed a keen interest in all matters pertaining to horse-soldiering; in fact, have to a great extent become imbued with a Cavalry tradition. Further, two generations of military service have obliterated the less desirable traits usually associated with the Pathan, and to-day the 'Multani' supplies the very best of material for the only unit which enlists them—namely, the 15th Curzon's Multanis.

Bearing in mind their relatively small numbers, they have just cause to be proud of the lengthy roll of distinguished men whom his Majesty has been pleased to honour. Quite a large number of them have earned the highest and most cherished decorations that their position could entitle them to.

THE DERAJAT BALUCH

Very little, if anything, is known of the Baluchi tribes inhabiting the Sind Sagar Thal prior to 1740 or thereabouts, if, indeed, they existed at all previous to that time. But in the several invasions of India by the Persian Nadir Shah great numbers of them came from Baluchistan as camel owners and drivers in the train of the Pathan soldiers of that chief. As a reward for their services, Nadir Shah gave them land on both sides of the Indus, but chiefly in the sandy Sind Sagar Thal to the east of that river, opposite Dera Ismail Khan, to settle in.

Among the principal Baluchi chiefs were the three brothers—Ismail, Ghazi, and Fateh—who founded and gave their names to the three towns of Dera Ismail Khan, Dera Ghazi Khan, and Dera Fateh Khan, on the west bank of the Indus in the Derajat. The two former towns have grown to considerable importance, while the third is now little known, and is not much more than a small village.

Since those days the Baluchi tribes have increased and occupy themselves in camel owning and breeding, as their ancestors did, and for which the sandy Thal is suitable, and to agriculture whenever possible in such a sandy country. In latter days they have enlisted in considerable numbers in certain Indian Cavalry Regiments, many of which have them in their ranks.

These Baluchi tribes have now lost their connection with Baluchistan, also their old characteristics and customs, chiefly in the fact that, though they still wear their hair long, like the Derajat and Multani Pathans do, they cut their hair and beards, which a Baluch from

Baluchistan never does. The principal distinction in their dress, when in their native costume, is that, whereas the Baluch of Baluchistan still wears the white smock-frock and voluminous pyjama, the Baluchi of the Thal generally wears a white shawl thrown round the shoulders and upper part of the body, and a white sheet round the loins and legs.

Though the Baluchis of Sind Sagar Thal have lost all connection with their old home in Baluchistan, and have adopted the language and customs of the other inhabitants of the Sind Sagar Thal, they are proud of their Baluch descent, and still cling to their old tribal and clan names, the principal amongst which are the Rind, Hoth, Laghari, and Korai.

Like the Derajat Pathan, the Baluchis of these parts have many desirable attributes noticeably absent from the true Pathan, the most prominent being, perhaps, a keener sense of fidelity and less bigotry. With regard to the latter trait, they are, if anything, rather lax in all that concerns their spiritual welfare.

They are addicted to gambling and quarrelsome amongst themselves, and do not hesitate to put into effect the old adage, 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.' In doing so, however, they are far less treacherous than the Pathan from farther north—in fact, are quite prepared to meet their adversary on fairly equal terms, and never vent their revenge on the women and children of their opponent. The Baluch is reputed a lazy fellow, and not over-careful in his personal cleanliness. He is an expert in camel-breeding, and knows a certain amount about rearing young horses. From this it might be assumed that he would make a good horseman or, anyhow, horsemaster. The writer is reliably informed that such is not the case, and that in this respect he is probably the least gifted of the three classes who find their way to the Cavalry from the Derajat.

It is, perhaps, just as well to mention, before quitting the Baluch, that few, if any, are to be found in the Cavalry who came from Baluchistan proper.

THE DOGRA

The Dogra is a direct descendant of the ancient Rajput stock of the plains, the present name being more geographical than racial.

There exists some doubt about the derivation of the word 'Dogra,' but it is generally accepted that it is merely a corruption of the Indian

word 'dogar,' meaning a hill, and that those Rajputs who forsook the plains adopted the appellation more clearly to distinguish themselves from their former associates.

The Dogra country is about 150 miles long by 80 broad, being bounded on the north by the higher ridges of the Himalayas, on the east by the Sutlej, on the west by the Chenab, whilst to the south a line running from Rupar on the Sutlej, through Hoshiarpur and Gurdaspur and Sialkot, gives the reader some idea of the recruiting limits in this direction. Almost the entire country is of a hilly nature.

As pointed out in a previous number of this journal, the only Hindu kingdoms which were able to maintain a vestige of their independence, traditions, and customs, under the Mahometan yoke, were those States which were situated away from the beaten tracks of the Mahometan invading armies. For example, it has been explained how the Rahtore Rajputs, placing the Rajputana desert between themselves and Delhi, were able to maintain their essentially Hindu characteristics. So it was with the Dogra. The very nature of their country protected them from undue oppression at the hands of the victorious Mahometans, and consequently, like the 'pure-born' Asl Rajput of Rajistan, they have been able to maintain the purity of their stock. Again, just as the Mahometan rulers learnt how valuable was the friendship of the leading Rajput princes, to whom they eventually entrusted high offices of State, so they learnt the value of the Dogra, who, like his Rajput kinsman, eventually filled with lustre many civil and military appointments under the suzerainty of the Delhi Court.

Thus, it can be easily pictured that the Dogra and Asl Rajput have many points in common; further, they are remarkably alike in appearance and manner, so much so that to the uninitiated it is no easy task to tell one from the other.

One or two authorities maintain that the Dogra has a keener sense of pride and a higher feeling of national integrity than the Rajput, and that the more bracing climate of their hills has given them a finer physique. Having seen a good many specimens of both, the writer cannot endorse this view, certainly as far as the Asl Rajput from Rajputana is concerned. On the whole, he would put the verdict, if anything, the other way. The Dogra country is remarkably fertile and free from climatic vicissitudes, and the man reared in it has far

less acute struggle with nature than the desert-born Rajput from Marmar, and is, in consequence, probably of less tough fibre.

Dogras can be divided into three well-marked divisions, viz.:— (1) Upper, (2) Middle, and (3) Lower classes. The upper are extremely proud of their breeding and traditions, and, like the Asl Rajput, abhor the plough, keep their womenfolk in strict purdah, and are most discriminating in their matrimonial alliances.

They address one another as Mien-ji, and hence are sometimes described as Mien Dogras, but the term has nothing to do with any tribe, or tribe branch, and was only adopted when the Dogra passed under the suzerainty of the Delhi Court.

The other two divisions are not so particular about their womenfolk or matrimonial affairs, and even commit the solecism of widow remarriage like the Jats. They also handle agricultural implements, specially class (3). The horror of having to descend to the plough is such a marked feature of the high-born Dogra that when, through misfortune, he has to do so, he frequently works under cover of darkness, so that his disgrace may not be so marked.

It is chiefly class (1) that are sought for as personnel for the mounted branches, although no inconsiderable numbers of (2) are also accepted. The Dogra, as enlisted in the Cavalry, makes an excellent trooper. Being a hill-man, he has little or no experience of horses or riding before entering the Army. His quiet, gentle, but firm manner should make him an excellent trainer of remounts, but opinions on this point are varied. As soldiers pure and simple, one cannot do better than quote from the handbook on Dogras, which says, 'Dogras are not remarkable for daring or impetuous bravery, but they can be depended on for quiet, unflinching courage, patient endurance of fatigue and orderly habits.'

They are shy and reserved, and not overburdened with brains, very superstitious, and inclined to indolence. They are remarkably honest, truthful, and loyal to the employer, strongly resenting any impeachment of their honour. They are decidedly good-looking, being of very similar build to the Rahtore Rajput, but taller and slighter.

They are rather caste-ridden, and in this respect inclined to be troublesome at times, although in emergencies will do almost anything.

The ordinary apparel of the high-caste Dogra consists of a white

cotton frock reaching to the knees and white pyjamas. Like Rajputs, they are fond of coloured pugarees and jewellery.


Several dialects are spoken in their country, but owing to military service Hindustani is known throughout the country. The following units enlist this class:—The 7th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 16th, 1 squadron each; 9th, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 25th, and Guides half a squadron.


(THE END.)



NOTES ON ILLUSTRATIONS

25. Dogra Indian Officer apparelled for a local Durbar.
26. Dogra Indian Officer in full dress.
27. Dogra N.C.O. in ordinary mufti.
28. Multani Pathan Officer in gala apparel.
29. Multani Pathan Officer in gala apparel.
30. Derajat Pathan Sowar in drill order khaki.
31. Derajat Pathan Sowar in village costume.
32. Multani Pathan N.C.O. in drill order.
33. Mahratta Recruit in village dress.
34. Baluch Sowar in full dress.
35. Mahratta Indian Officer in village dress.
36. Mahratta N.C.O. in field service dress.
37. Mahratta Sowar in drill order.
38. Pathan Sowar in transfrontier apparel.
39. Pathan N.C.O. in non-military apparel.
40. Pathan Indian Officer in ordinary mufti.





NAPOLEON'S FAMOUS 'GUIDES'
OR
LES CHASSEURS-À-CHEVAL DE LA GARDE IMPÉRIALE


By PERCY WHITE

EVERYONE who has visited the Royal United Service Museum, Whitehall, has, no doubt, seen the relics of the Battle of Waterloo, amongst which there exists the elaborate Sabretache and Scabbard of Count Lefèvre-Desnouettes.

It is not the writer's purpose to relate the history of this French officer, who became one of our prisoners of war, but to present to the reader the origin and history of the famous corps of which he was colonel in 1813.

The 'Guides,' or 'Chasseurs-à-Cheval de la Garde Impériale' (which were really one and the same corps), accompanied the great Napoleon on all his expeditions, from the earliest campaigns in Italy to his downfall at Waterloo. These soldiers were not only the constant eye-witnesses of the battles that were fought during the Consulate and the First Empire, but also took an important part in them. In times of peace they formed his escort at every *fête* and procession in which he appeared, and in battle they were his immediate attendants.*

In campaign, a peloton, or half-troop, was chosen in turn for special duty near the Emperor. One lieutenant, one sergeant, two corporals, twenty-two chasseurs, and a trumpeter always marched in front and behind him. A corporal and four chasseurs, one of which carried the portfolio and another his telescope, galloped on a short distance ahead. When Napoleon stopped and dismounted, the chasseurs did the same, fixing bayonets and forming a square, the Emperor being in the centre.



* Masson's *Cavaliers de Napoléon*.

From the time the 'Guides' were raised in 1796 to the end of the Empire, this famous regiment showed the greatest devotion to Napoleon, and those who fell in battle were immediately replaced by picked men worthy of the corps, so that during the whole period of their existence they were always kept up to the highest state of proficiency.

On all occasions Napoleon well recompensed these devoted and courageous men, whom he had selected from out of his vast Army, and gave ample proof of his admiration for them by always wearing their uniform in battle (on Sundays and at other times he wore the blue coat with colonel's epaulettes of the Grenadiers of the Old Guard).

Meissonier has immortalised Napoleon and the Chasseurs-à-Cheval de la Garde in several pictures; perhaps two of the best known are Jéna, 1806, and Friedland, 1807. Also the late Edouard Detaille leaves us a splendid representation of one of these *elite* horsemen in his great painting at the Panthéon, Paris, entitled 'la Chevauchée de la Gloire.' Other well-known artists, as Vernet, Raffet, Charlet, and Bellangé, have depicted the 'Guides' and the part they took in the famous battles of the Empire.

The first real information we have of the 'Guides' is in the year 1792, when three troops were raised and attached to the different generals' headquarters. They served as mounted couriers, military police, and escorts to the baggage wagons. At a little later period two other troops were added, but were disbanded and replaced by dragoons in the year 1800.

At this period the commanders of the various Army Corps had their own special troop of 'Guides,' and we read that General Augereau's corps took the title of 'Guides de l'Armée d'Allemagne, or Hussards d'Augereau.'

In 1796 Bonaparte organised a corps of men for his own body-guard, and in his memoirs, written at St. Helena, he relates the following facts which led to their formation :—

During the battle of Borghetto, when the French troops were pursuing the enemy, Bonaparte, becoming suddenly ill, returned to headquarters. Whilst having a hot foot-bath, a patrol of Austrian Uhlans passed in front of the door, and he, becoming somewhat alarmed, quickly mounted his horse, without waiting to put on his boots or stockings, and it was only by the greatest fortune that he escaped being

sabred. After this incident, Bonaparte felt the necessity of forming a guard, and ordered Captain Bessières to organise a troop of 'Guides' for this purpose.

Under Bessières they greatly distinguished themselves at the battles of Mondovi, Lodi, Castiglione, and Bassano; a few years later, when Napoleon created his Marshals, their captain received his bâton, and the title of 'Colonel General of the Cavalry of the Guard.'

At Arcole the 'Guides' performed prodigies of valour, and at Rivoli they charged the Austrians under Alvinczy. On January 7, 1797, Bonaparte wrote to the Directory from Verona, in which he says: 'I am sending you 11 flags captured from the enemy at Lodi and La Favorite. Citizen Bessières, who will bring them, is a distinguished officer, and has had the honour of commanding a troop of brave men, who have always driven the enemy's cavalry before them, and by their bravery and valour have rendered the greatest services during the war.'

These courageous soldiers accompanied Bonaparte to France on his return from the wars in Italy, and again when sailing for Egypt he gave orders for them to embark at the same time.

In Egypt they bravely fought against the Mamelukes at Ramanieh and Chebreiss, also taking part in the battle of the Pyramids. After entering victoriously into Cairo, their general gave them the jewelled and glittering Oriental arms and weapons, which had been left on the battlefield of Gizeh by Mourad Bey and Ibrahim Bey's Cavalry. They richly deserved this honour, for every single man of the corps could have related some great exploit in which he had taken part.

One of the incidents during the siege of Cairo is worth mentioning:—A non-commissioned officer, named Charroy, being sent with an order to General Verdier, took four of the 'Guides' with him. Cutting his way through a heavy fire from the Osmanlis, he placed one of the wounded 'Guides' across his own horse, and rescued a party of the 32nd Demi-Brigade. He then charged a detachment of the Mameluke Cavalry, killing six and taking the rest prisoners together with their horses.

Bonaparte, knowing full well the great value of these men, who had served him so faithfully in Italy and Egypt, brought many of them back to France, when he landed again on October 9, 1799. It was these weather-beaten horsemen who formed the nucleus of the corps called the 'Chasseurs-à-Cheval de la Garde Consulaire.'

In the records of the regiment, dated 1800, it mentions that amongst the men enlisted as 'Guides' in 1795 there were 25 chosen from the 13th Hussars, when that regiment was disbanded on the plains of Lodi in the same year. Others rejoined the corps after the final evacuation of Egypt.

At the great battle of Marengo, 1800, they covered themselves with glory. The Chasseurs and Horse Grenadiers of the Guard, led by Captain Bessières, had the honour of dealing the final blow at the enemy. They charged the Austrians, sweeping everything before them by their brilliant dash and energy, but at the same time conserving that feeling of humanity towards the vanquished foe, for in the thickest of the fight, Eugène Beauharnais, perceiving a wounded Austrian in danger of being trampled to death, cried out to his men to open their ranks and respect the courage of the unfortunate man. His Chasseurs at once obeyed, and the man's life was saved.

The 14th of June, 1800, was a glorious day for France, but also one of great sadness owing to the death of both Generals Desaix and Kléber. The gallant and handsome Desaix received in his heart the fatal ball at Marengo, and General Kléber, who had remained in command of the troops in Egypt, fell a victim to the dagger of a fanatic.

Kléber had kept near him the remainder of the 'Guides' who had not returned to France with Bonaparte. He was extremely fond of these men, and they of him. At Cairo, when he was stabbed to death, his last thoughts were for them. 'Come to my help, Guide; I am assassinated,' he cried, and with a look of great sadness he fell back dead.



After the evacuation of Egypt the remainder of the 'Guides' returned to France, and on September 20, 1801, they were united again to their old comrades—the Chasseurs-à-Cheval de la Garde Consulaire—which were formed on March 8, 1802, into a magnificent regiment composed of two squadrons, a troop of Mamelukes being attached to them. In July 1804, when the 'Garde des Consuls' took the title of the 'Garde Impériale,' the regiment was made up of four squadrons of two troops each, and in September 1805 four troops of Vélites were attached to the corps in order to complete their military

training, but it was on the battlefield that the Chasseurs gave them their best and most useful lessons.

On October 1, 1805, the French crossed the Rhine and marched against the combined armies of Austria and Russia, who awaited them in Moravia. On the 10th of the month the Chasseurs entered Augsbourg with Marshal Bessières, and the following day occupied Burgau. Four days later, at Langenau, they made a brilliant charge against an army division under Prince Ferdinand of Austria, and on the 20th they were at Ulm. The regiment greatly distinguished itself at Nuremberg, where Lieutenant Desmichels with an advance guard of 30 Chasseurs attacked and captured 500 of the enemy's Infantry, two flags, and four pieces of artillery, including the gun-carriages. For over two hours they pursued 400 Dragoons de la Tour, capturing the colonel, three officers, and 100 men, besides killing many others.

The regiment celebrated the first anniversary of Napoleon's Coronation by the battle of Austerlitz, 1805, when, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Morland, they were joined to the Grenadiers-à-Cheval, and ordered to crush or capture the Russian Imperial Guard. In this battle Morland was unfortunately killed, but during the night Dahlmann, who had taken over the command, reconnoitred the whole precincts of the battlefield with two squadrons, returning later with 1,500 prisoners and twenty guns.

Dahlmann died at Eylau, in the same way as Morland had succumbed whilst fighting at Austerlitz; in fact, one might almost say that the officers of this famous regiment seemed to sacrifice their lives even more than the men, for nothing less than a cannon-ball or a bullet through the heart seemed to stop their impetuous onslaught in these two battles.

The following incidents give us some idea of the kind of men that served in the regiment:—At Eylau, Lieutenant Perrier received two bayonet thrusts and a sabre cut at the same moment as a Cossack plunged his lance through the lieutenant's body. This brave man continued to fight until he fell. Another officer, Lieutenant Rabusson, met his death in a similar way. Two bayonet thrusts tore open his jaw, he received two more in his back, also through his head and chest, but it was afterwards seen how dearly he had given his life by the number of dead Russians that lay around him.

When Napoleon rejoined the Horse Chasseurs of the Guard in the Peninsula, he united them to Krasinski's Polish Lancers. Here they

helped to pursue the Spaniards through the heights of Somo Sierra, and chased them out of Old Castille.

Not only did they show the greatest courage on all occasions, but also patience, devotedness, and self-denial seemed to them things of no uncommon merit. In the Spanish Campaign, the French Army endured the greatest hardships when it became lost in the mountains which separated Madrid from Segovia; the oldest veterans of the Guard could not recollect ever experiencing such cold weather, not



1796-9.

even in Poland. The violent snowstorms obscured the daylight, and greatly impeded the advance of the battalions. The Horse Chasseurs of the Guard formed in close column and occupied the whole width of the roadway. They walked on foot, leading their horses, with the Emperor in their midst.

Always having had victory on their side, 400 of these men did not hesitate to charge a greatly superior force of English Cavalry at Bena-vente, but in this unequal combat most of them were either killed or

wounded. It was at this battle that Colonel Lefèvre-Desnouettes, having his horse killed under him, was captured and sent to England as prisoner of war.

After the regiment left Spain they were ordered to join the Army on the Danube. They drove the Austrians before them at Abonsburg on April 20, 1809, and four days later entered Ratisbon with the Emperor. On May 13 they encamped before the Imperial Palace at Vienna.



1804-15.

At the battle of Wagram they performed prodigies of courage and daring, and Napoleon, who witnessed their bravery, wrote from his headquarters at Wolkersdorff: 'The Chasseurs charged and broke up three Austrian squares, besides capturing four cannon. Unfortunately, their losses in this battle amounted to 80 men.'

In 1810-11 the Chasseurs returned to Spain and fought under Dorsenne and Bessières. In 1812 they shared the great hardships of the French Army in its disastrous retreat from Russia. At Malojaros-

lawetz they saved the Emperor from being captured by Cossacks, and took part in the fighting at Krasnoë and Borizow. After the Russian Campaign their ranks were so thinned that they had to be reorganised, and on January 18, 1813, Napoleon ordered the regiment to be raised to eight squadrons, and two months later the ninth squadron was formed, the tenth being composed of the Mameluke Cavalry.

They made a gallant charge through the Poserna Pass, and witnessed the death of Marshal Bessières, who was shot in the early part of the battle at Rippach. The death of Bessières was a great blow to the regiment, for he was greatly loved by the men, and in the early days as captain of the troop used to march at their head.

The regiment fought at Lützen, and at Würschen greatly distinguished themselves. It was in this last battle that Lieutenant Lhernault, who was quite near the Emperor, had his leg carried off by a cannon-ball, and was thrown under the feet of Napoleon's horse. In spite of his injuries, no cry escaped his lips, except the words 'Vive l'Empereur!' Napoleon, however, could scarcely conceal his grief, and with great emotion he turned to Marshal Duroc, exclaiming: 'Fortune is certainly against us to-day.' Duroc, in his turn, was mortally wounded on the following day.

At Hanau, 1813, Lieutenant Bugat, with 25 Chasseurs, charged a Bavarian square of Infantry, returning with only ten horsemen, but more than 60 of the enemy fell under the sabre cuts of these men.

They took part in nearly the whole Campaign of 1814—at Langres, Bar-sur-Aube, Brienne, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vauchamps, Paris. At Brienne Napoleon, wearing their uniform as colonel of the regiment, charged at the head of one of the squadrons, hoping thus to terminate his career on the battlefield! At Arcis-sur-Aube Lieutenant Allemant, with 27 Chasseurs, captured 64 prisoners, 13 pontoons, 2 baggage wagons, an ammunition wagon, and 98 horses.


After Napoleon's abdication to Elba they became the 'Corps Royal des Chasseurs de France,' but took their old title again during the Hundred Days. The regiment fought at Ligny, and also at the disastrous battle of Waterloo, when the *élite* of the French Cavalry made their unsuccessful charges against the British squares. After Waterloo they were disbanded.

The uniform worn by the 'Guides' from 1796 to 1799 was the same

as the other regiments of Chasseurs-à-Cheval, with the addition of the aiguillettes. Green coat cut 'à la française,' red collar and cuffs, green trousers, red waistcoat with two rows of brass buttons. Their head-dress consisted of a bicorne hat with cockade, green and red plume. During the Campaign of Egypt they wore the 'colback,' or busby, on some occasions.

Napoleon, thinking that this uniform looked somewhat sombre in comparison to his other Cavalry regiments, gave them also the red Hussar pelisse, green dolman, and tight Hungarian breeches, with boots like the rest of the Light Cavalry. They were armed in the same way as the Hussars and Chasseurs-à-Cheval. The elaborate sabretache which they wore from 1804-1815 had the arms of the Empire embroidered in colours on a green ground, with a brass eagle in the centre, as shown in the sketch; but during the Consulate it was ornamented with the 'cor de chasse' and 'faisceau de licteur,' the words 'Garde des Consuls' at the top, and two branches of laurel under the design in the centre. It seems natural that the Horse Chasseurs of the Guard should have worn the green uniform to correspond with the other Chasseur regiments, but we are told that Napoleon chose this colour specially for them solely on account of it being 'his' colour. Green was the colour of his 'livery,' and he also made it the national colour of Italy.

It was Napoleon's regiment of 'Guides' which gave the name to Lumsden's corps, now the Queen's Own Corps of Guides.



GREAT CAVALRY LEADERS

By BRIG.-GENERAL H. DE B. DE LISLE, C.B., D.S.O.

MURAT

OF the many distinguished Cavalry leaders in the Armies of Napoleon, none commenced life in such humble surroundings or attained to such exalted rank as Murat. The son of an innkeeper in an obscure village, and destined for the Church, he ran away from his ecclesiastical college and enlisted in a Cavalry regiment marching through Toulouse. He rose to be a field-marshal of the Army, the Grand Duke of Berg, and finally King of Naples. On many occasions he was favoured by fortune, but no one reading his many remarkable exploits can doubt his unusual qualities, or that he deserved the many honours bestowed upon him by Napoleon.

Born in 1767, he enlisted in the 12th Chasseurs, but his revolutionary character soon began to exert an influence on his comrades, and he was dismissed in 1789 after attaining the rank of quartermaster. Two years later, under the new regulations for conscription, the department of Lot had to find three men for the ranks of the guard of King Louis XVI. Murat was one of these. Strangely enough, another of these three conscripts was Bessières, who also became a field-marshal and received the title of Duke of Istria.

Napoleon, in his 'Mémoires,' quotes these two as the best Cavalry officers of the Grand Army. 'With very different characters,' he says; 'one an officer suitable for the command of an advanced guard, adventurous and hot-headed; the other (Bessières) more suited for the main reserve, full of dash, but prudent and cautious.' The guard in which Murat was enrolled lasted only six months, and he again enlisted in a Cavalry regiment which afterwards became the 21st Chasseurs. There he was soon made an officer, at the age of twenty-five, and in 1795 came under the eye of Bonaparte, then commanding the 2nd Home Army,

who, recognising his fighting spirit, placed him at the head of the regiment in which he had enlisted three years earlier.

When Bonaparte was given command of the Army in Italy, Murat suggested himself as his aide-de-camp colonel. This corresponded to our appointment of military secretary. Bonaparte was pleased by his boldness, and gave him the appointment. To be an aide-de-camp of Napoleon was no sinecure. He used them for important missions, and they were in turn attached to units during battles to observe the progress and to report anything of importance. On the day of the battle of Mondovi Murat was sent to accompany Stengel, who commanded the Cavalry. Stengel fell mortally wounded and Murat took charge of the brigade. At the head of the 20th Dragoons he made a successful charge. In recognition of this he was selected to carry the despatches to the Directory in Paris, and was promoted brigadier-general at the age of twenty-eight. In five years he rose from private to general's rank.

Murat continued to distinguish himself during the remainder of the war in Italy, and as a leader of an advanced guard had no equal. At the fight of Valleggio he charged 3,000 Austrian Cavalry, supported by 4,000 Infantry, capturing nine guns and 2,000 men. Bonaparte, in his report to the Directory, states: 'Our Cavalry, commanded by General Murat, performed prodigies of valour; the General himself released several Chasseurs whom the enemy were leading away as prisoners.'

In this campaign Murat commanded several different brigades of Cavalry. For some reason unknown he lost the favour of Napoleon, in spite of the good work he performed and the honourable mention made about him in the despatches from the generals under whom he served. When Napoleon organised the Egyptian campaign Murat was not included in the list of generals he wished to take, but his name was added by the Directory, thanks to the intervention of Madame Bonaparte, unknown to her husband, owing to the old friendship which existed between her and Murat. On the arrival of the Army in Egypt he again added fresh laurels to his fame as a Cavalry leader, and after the final battle on the Aboukir Peninsula, where the Turkish Army was annihilated, Napoleon Bonaparte attributes the principal share in the victory to him, and recommended him in despatches for promotion to divisional commander. As a further mark of his

satisfaction he inserted the following in Army orders: 'The General-in-Chief, wishing to express his appreciation of the work performed by General Murat's Cavalry Brigade, which covered itself with glory at the battle of Aboukir, directs the Commandant of the Artillery to present to this brigade the two English field guns captured in the battle and which were presented to Constantinople by the Court of London. On each gun will be engraved the names of the three regiments composing the brigade—7th Hussars, 3rd and 4th Dragoons—as well as the names of General Murat and the Adjutant-General Roize. On the muzzle will be written "The Battle of Aboukir."'

On the return of Bonaparte and his generals to Paris after the Egyptian campaign occurred a great crisis in his life, and Murat, at the head of fifty soldiers, greatly assisted him by entering the Council Hall and frightening the deputies to such an extent that most of them fled by the windows. For this service Bonaparte gave him his sister Caroline in marriage. Historians comparing the attractions of Bonaparte's sisters admit the perfection of figure of Pauline, who later became Princess Borghese, immortalised by the sculptor Canova, but are of opinion that Caroline was the more attractive of the two.

In 1800, when the Army was reorganised, Murat, with the rank of lieutenant-general, was given command of the Reserve Cavalry, composed of four brigades. At Marengo one of these brigades, under Kellermann, by a timely charge converted a defeat into a brilliant victory, which resulted in the capitulation of Mélas and his whole Army. Later on he was placed in command of the Army in Italy, but returned early in 1804 to take up the appointment of military governor of Paris.

When France became an Empire Napoleon's sisters received the title of princesses, and Murat, in addition to the promotion to field-marshal and grand admiral, was made a prince.

In 1805 Napoleon prepared for an invasion of England, and intended that Murat should command the Cavalry. On realising the futility of his plans, he directed his attention to Austria, and Murat accompanied him during the campaigns of 1805-07, as well as in 1812 and 1813. The Cavalry was then formed in six divisions under Murat in addition to the brigades attached to each corps for protective purposes. Murat's command consisted of thirty-four regiments of Cavalry.

Murat, after a personal reconnaissance of Austria, travelling incognito under the name of Colonel Beaumont, returned to Strasbourg

on September 7, 1805, and the same month led his Cavalry across the Rhine. Ten days later, after having screened the advance of Napoleon's Army, Murat achieved his first success at Wertingen, capturing 2,500 Austrians, ten guns, and eight colours. Napoleon, in spite of his satisfaction at the result, writes to his chief of the staff, Berthier, that he is disappointed; '2,000 prisoners is not enough. I expected the whole force would have been surrounded.' At the same time he expressed himself well pleased with Murat and his Cavalry. Immediately after this fight Murat was directed against Ulm, and had under his orders Ney and Lannes. Some friction arose owing to the fact that these field-m Marshals resented being placed under the Emperor's brother-in-law. In consequence, Archduke Ferdinand, with 20,000 Austrians, succeeded in escaping from this fortress. Napoleon sent Murat in pursuit, a task eminently suited to his abilities, and after several battles he captured 15,000 prisoners, 11 colours, 128 guns and 500 ammunition wagons.

The Emperor was not sparing in his praises. On October 17 he wrote: 'I congratulate you on the success you have attained; but do not stop. Pursue with vigour and sever all his communications.' On October 22 he writes: 'I am filled with astonishment at the wonderful march of Prince Murat from Albeck to Nuremberg.' Again, in the despatches of October 26, he says: 'Prince Murat has reached Munich; he has shown extraordinary activity,' &c.

Many other successes fell to Murat during the November of that year, and the battle of Austerlitz, on December 2, 1805, added much to the fame of his Cavalry. On this memorable day Murat commanded the left wing of the French Army, but gave Lannes the command of the Infantry while he directed the Cavalry divisions of Kellermann, Nansouty and d'Hautpoul. Many charges took place against the Austrian Cavalry and Infantry, which were eventually driven back with the loss of 11 guns and 1,800 prisoners. The action of his Cavalry enabled the centre, under Soult and Bernadotte, to capture the heights of Pratzen. After the successful issue of this campaign, honours were lavishly distributed to the successful generals, and Murat was given the Duchy of Berg, a territory in Bavaria, with the new title of Grand Duke of Berg.

In 1806 Napoleon decided on war with Prussia, and declared it on October 7. Murat again commanded the Independent Cavalry. On October 12 Napoleon writes to Murat to send his Cavalry like a flood over the Leipzig plain. This resulted in the Prussians being at a loss

to understand the route along which the main Army was advancing, and the capture by the French Cavalry of several convoys, as well as the important information that a Prussian Army was in position at Jéna. Napoleon, on this news, made preparations for battle, and recalled Murat's Cavalry. The battles of Jéna and Auerstädt were both successful, but the fruits of victory were gathered in the pursuit by the Cavalry, which resulted in many thousands of prisoners. The pursuit lasted from October 15 to 28, when the largest formed body of the Prussian Army, with the commanders, some 16,000 men and 64 guns, fell into the hands of the French.

Napoleon did not disguise his satisfaction at this result. On October 30 he wrote to Murat: 'My Dear Brother,—I congratulate you on the capture of Stettin. If your Cavalry are going to capture fortified posts, I must dismiss my engineers and melt down my siege train; but you still have to capture General Blücher and the Duke of Weimar. Work down the Oder and pursue them with vigour as far as Stralsund. If he goes there, there must be no rest until those two columns have surrendered.' At Lübeck Blücher lost 8,000 men and retired with the remaining 15,000 towards Denmark, but Murat cut him off and forced him to surrender on November 7. On this date Murat writes to the Emperor: 'Sire,—The war is over for want of men to fight with. The Cavalry corps is about to march to rejoin the Grand Army in Berlin.' This wonderful pursuit alone would have sufficed to raise Murat to the first rank as a Cavalry leader.

Hardly had Murat completed the destruction of the remnant of the Prussian Army when he was sent to Poland in chief command of an Army 80,000 strong. On November 9 he took over his command, already on the march, and on the 28th reached Warsaw, where he was received by the Poles with acclamation. The cold and damp, however, soon affected his health and he was obliged to hand over his command. An attack by the Russians on the left of the French Army brought Napoleon to Poland, and Murat, disregarding his weak state of health, immediately joined Army headquarters as commander of the Cavalry. On the Russians falling back, Murat in pursuit, was met by a strong rearguard of the enemy in a wood, composed of 12 battalions supported by Cavalry and Artillery. To reach the enemy it was necessary to cross a small bridge in column of sections. Murat immediately ordered the charge, regardless of the numerical superiority

of the enemy. This act, bordering on the foolhardy, not only succeeded, but 1,200 to 1,500 of the enemy were killed or wounded, and the remainder surrendered.

Two days later, on February 8, 1807, the costly battle of Eylau took place. The Russians were well placed in three lines, and in spite of losses, were not only able to beat back the French counter-attacks, but were following Augereau's corps. Napoleon then called on Murat and said: 'Are you going to allow us to be eaten up by these people?' Murat went off at a gallop and ordered a charge in three lines, Hussars, Dragoons and Cuirassiers. Two of the Russian lines were pierced, but for some time the third line held firm, until Bessières, with the Cavalry of the Guard, came to Murat's assistance. This was the turning point of the battle, and the Russian Army suffered defeat. The Campaign of 1807 having concluded so brilliantly for the French by the Treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon reached the acme of his power, the only corner of Europe holding out against him being Spain and Portugal, and there Murat was sent as commander-in-chief. Napoleon refused to issue any definite instructions to his lieutenant, who found himself in a position for which he was ill equipped. No man knew better how to carry out instructions, but to act on his own responsibility was beyond his abilities. Napoleon appointed Murat to be King of Naples, but to the chagrin of the latter he added: 'I intend the King of Naples to hold his Court at Madrid. I wish you to be King of Naples or of Portugal. Reply at once which you prefer, because it must be settled now.' In the meantime Murat was not having an easy task in Spain, and received with joy his Emperor's permission to go to Naples and there take over his kingdom of Naples and Sicily.

Murat found his position at Naples a difficult one, and his relations with the Emperor were becoming strained over the proposed conquest of Sicily when, in May 1812, Napoleon organised the Grand Army for the Russian campaign. The King of Naples, in spite of his annoyance with Napoleon, joined his headquarters with alacrity in his old capacity of commander of the Cavalry.

The campaign in Russia was disastrous to the French Cavalry. The day Napoleon entered Wilna, on June 29, a terrible storm broke over that district, lasting three days. The horses died in thousands, especially those of the transport. During this unlucky campaign Murat again showed the same daring leading and personal bravery. As King

of Naples, he led Cavalry charges with the same abandon as 15 years earlier he had done as a simple non-commissioned officer. When want of food, want of shoes and the intense cold of Russia had annihilated the French Cavalry and the Army was in retreat, Napoleon went post haste to Paris, handing over the command to Murat.

Murat, on the pretence that his kingdom required his services, soon deserted this unfortunate Army, and fearing Napoleon's anger at his action, began a series of intrigues with the enemies of his Emperor. He refused the invitation of Napoleon to visit Paris, but a war with Germany breaking out, he at once reported himself at the Emperor's headquarters in Dresden, and took over the command of the Cavalry, composed of five corps. The first battle of the campaign was fought at Dresden, on August 26 and 27. On the first day Murat with a small force defended Dresden against 180,000 troops, and on the 27th he with the corps under Latour-Maubourg, working wide on the Austrian left flank, surrounded the division of Metzko and compelled 12,000 to surrender. Seldom has such success been attained by Cavalry on the battlefield, but it is only fair to admit that Murat was ably supported by Marshal Victor's corps, and the Austrian Infantry were deprived of the use of their muskets on account of the rain. Napoleon expressed his satisfaction with this action in glowing terms, and Murat pushed on the following day on the Freiberg road and captured 6,000 more prisoners. At Wachau and at Leipzig Murat was still in command. In the former battle on October 16, 1813, his action aroused the admiration of Napoleon, but at Leipzig the wavering of the Saxon troops hampered the action of the French Cavalry. The following day Murat accompanied Napoleon in his retreat, and five days later, on the plea of being required in Naples, he said farewell to his chief and to the Army.

Within three months of reaching Naples he entered into an agreement with Austria, and we next read of him fighting in Italy as an ally of Austria against a French Army under Prince Eugène. Later on he desired an interview with Napoleon, but was refused, on the ground of 'his disloyalty to his country and to his benefactor.' He then retired to Corsica. There fortune did not favour him, and he was afterwards betrayed and handed over to the Neapolitans. Tried and condemned by a military Court, he was shot on October 13, 1815, at Pizzo, showing in this final act of his brilliant life the same courage as he had always exhibited throughout his remarkable career.



NAPOLEON AND HIS GENERALS.

GREAT
CAVALRY
LEADERS.



MURAT.

1767-1815.



KELLERMANN.

1770-1835.

KELLERMANN

THE name of Kellermann was made illustrious in the early years of the nineteenth century by two generals, father and son. The father, the conqueror of Valmy, was a most distinguished general, and was created Duke of Valmy for his services. The son became that splendid Cavalry leader, renowned in the French Army from Marengo to Waterloo. Born at Metz in 1770, François Etienne de Kellermann received a military education at Paris, and at the age of 15 became an officer in his father's regiment of Hussars.

Owing to the civil disturbances in France in 1790, Kellermann left for America for employment under his uncle, then Consul General at New York, but returned in 1793. In 1794 he enlisted in the First Regiment of Hussars, and the following year joined his father, then commanding the Army in Italy, as aide-de-camp. On General Kellermann being superseded, his son joined the Army under Bonaparte, and became colonel on the staff of a Cavalry division. We first hear of his distinguishing himself in 1797, when at the head of a squadron he swam a rapid river and overthrew an Austrian regiment of Hussars. Four days later, on March 16, we read in the despatch of the passage of the Tagliamento: 'Adjutant-General Kellermann, placing himself at the head of the Fourth Chasseurs and the First Cavalry, pierced the enemy's squadron, captured General Schulz and five guns.' For this feat he became a Brigadier-General at the age of 27, only two years after enlisting as a private soldier.

Kellermann was not in Egypt, but remained with the Army in Italy, serving under Berthier, Masséna and Championnet. In 1800, after the return of Bonaparte from Egypt, Kellermann was placed in command of the brigade he made famous at Marengo.

To appreciate the value of the action of this brigade it will be necessary to review in a few words the three phases of the battle. Bonaparte with the Reserve Army crosses the Alps by the St. Bernard Pass, captures Milan and cuts the Austrians' communications by the battle of Montebello. The Austrians, under Mélas, who were originally facing west, turn about and try to regain Lombardy by piercing the French over-extended line. The Austrians advance from Alexandria on to the Plain of Marengo, in spite of stubborn resistance of Victor's corps, supported by Lannes. Next the First Consul brings up Monnier's division and the Guards to stop the march of Mélas, but

finds himself forced to fall back. Bonaparte retires slowly, disputing every yard, until Desaix arrives. Thirdly, Desaix arrives, surprises the Austrians, who thought victory was assured. The latter are driven back to the town of Alexandria, and Mélas is forced to surrender.

In the early part of this battle Kellermann's brigade brought off a successful charge, and during Victor's retreat this brigade covered his retirement, and by the time Desaix arrived no more than 300 out of 800 remained in the ranks. What followed is best described by Marmont, an eye-witness. 'General Desaix, in front of Boudet's division, joined the First Consul and found affairs in a sad condition. He said to his chief: "We must open a heavy artillery fire before attempting another attack, if it is to succeed." Marmont collected 18 guns and opened fire, causing the enemy to hesitate and then halt. Meanwhile Boudet's division was deploying, and on its right stood Kellermann's weak Cavalry brigade. Desaix advanced with his leading regiment, and was killed immediately. His troops fell back, pursued by the Austrians. Almost at once Kellermann, with his 400 Cavalry, crossed in front of my guns and delivered a vigorous charge against the flank of the Austrian column, which surrendered.' General Zach and 3,000 Grenadiers were then captured by 400 Cavalry. Collecting 200 men, Kellermann next charged six Austrian squadrons, which turned and bolted. The tide had turned, and the word 'Advance' was heard all along the French line. At the left of the Austrian Army were 2,000 Cavalry. Kellermann, reinforced by the Cavalry of the Guard under Bessières, charged and finally dispersed these.

In spite of the far-reaching results of Kellermann's action, Bonaparte refused to acknowledge how much he was indebted to him. In despatches he baldly mentions: 'General Kellermann made a charge with so much dash and exactly at the right moment, which resulted in the capture of General Zach and 3,000 Grenadiers.'

Kellermann was made a Major-General on July 5, 1800, but this was his only reward for such a brilliant service on June 14. That evening, when Kellermann approached the table where the First Consul was sitting, surrounded by a number of his Generals, Bonaparte said to him coldly: 'That was a pretty good charge you made,' adding to Bessières in a loud voice: 'Bessières, the Guard covered itself with glory to-day.' According to eye-witnesses and military writers of the day, there seems little doubt that Bonaparte was intensely jealous of Kellermann's success, and never forgave him for a letter he wrote to his friend Lasalle

which the First Consul knew about. In this letter Kellermann said: 'Would you believe it, Bonaparte has not even promoted me Major-General, and I have just placed the crown on his head.' Later on, when Napoleon became Emperor, he gave Kellermann a large share of credit for the victory of Marengo.

In September 1805, when Napoleon abandoned his project of invading England and turned to Austria, Kellermann was given command of a Cavalry division, and at the battle of Austerlitz took an important part in that great victory. Situated on the extreme left, his division was met and driven back by 2,000 Austrian Lancers. He re-formed and successfully charged. He, however, was severely wounded.

In 1807 he was given command of a division under Junot, who was marching on Lisbon. His division was composed of the sweepings of depôts, and suffered much from want of forage, and the horses on arrival at Abrantès were unfit for service. By requisitioning the horses of the Portuguese, however, the squadrons were remounted and the division was again over 2,000 strong. Portugal, however, was lost to France by the battle of Vimiero, and by the convention of Cintra it was agreed that the French Army should evacuate the country. The convention, so favourable to the French arms, is said to have been due to Kellermann's skill as a diplomatist, and to the honour in which the 'Conqueror of Marengo' was held by the British.

Kellermann remained with the Army in Spain till 1811, when he was recalled owing to grave charges of corruption made against him by Masséna. On reporting himself to the Emperor, and when trying to vindicate his character, he was interrupted by Napoleon with the graceful remark: 'General Kellermann, whenever it is a question of yourself, I forget everything except Marengo.'

In 1812, however, when organising the Grand Army for the expedition to Russia, Kellermann was nominated to command a division only, showing that he was still in disgrace, but his services were too valuable to be dispensed with. At Lützen he was again wounded, but three weeks later was at the head of the Cavalry of the 3rd Corps at Bautzen, on May 20, 1813.

During the armistice of Plesnitz the Army was reorganised, and Kellermann was given command of the 4th Cavalry Corps of two Polish Light Cavalry Divisions. On October 14 this corps and Pajol's 5th Cavalry Corps took part in the battle of Liebertwolkwitz. In this great Cavalry battle the victory swayed first one way and then the other, and

in the end both forces drew back to their original positions, after great losses. Two days later, at Wachau, Kellermann, in command of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Corps, made two important charges, which, though successful, were meant to break through the enemy's reinforcements. When Napoleon fell back on Paris in face of enormous odds, it was again Kellermann's Cavalry which in numerous engagements covered itself with fame. When the Bourbon dynasty resumed the throne in 1814 many honours fell to Kellermann. He became Inspector-General of Cavalry, and received the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. When Napoleon escaped from Elba, Kellermann was sent against him, but the troops went over to Napoleon, and Kellermann retired to his home. However, on June 2, 1815, he was appointed a peer of France, and given command of the 3rd Cavalry Corps. This corps came under Marshal Ney, Prince of Moskowa, on June 16. Ney ordered him to charge with but one brigade, promising to support him with the bulk of the Cavalry. Then took place one of the most noted charges in the history of the Napoleonic wars. This brigade charged Picton's division, and galloped over the 69th Regiment, broke another square and almost captured Wellington, who saved himself by jumping a hedge. The charge spent itself and no support was sent. The British troops quickly recovered their positions, and Kellermann's brigade, now demoralised, regained the French line with all speed. Had Kellermann been supported it is difficult to imagine what might have been the result of his gallant charge.

On June 18, at Waterloo, the same mistake was made, and the French Army suffered much from the absence of Murat, having no one in authority to direct the action of the Cavalry. Ney sent forward his Cavalry piecemeal, and they were beaten in detail. Then Ney sent to the Emperor asking for Kellermann. This was accorded, and Kellermann prepared to charge. 'Never,' writes General Foy, 'in my long career have I seen such a sight.' Desperate as were these charges the British squares did not give way. Kellermann then returned for his reserve brigade, to find that Ney had sent forward the last reserve without his knowledge. Ney then demanded the Imperial Guard, but Napoleon had to use them against the advancing Prussians.

After Waterloo Kellermann retired, but in 1830 we again see his name as General-in-Chief of the French Cavalry. His career was illustrious, but his name goes down to history as 'the Hero of Marengo.'

THE SQUADRON OF DIVISIONAL CAVALRY *

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

THE foot-soldier is 'mistrustful' because the least fold in the ground, the smallest hedge some 200 or 300 yards away, is the limit of his horizon, and beyond that is 'the unknown' with all its terrible anxieties. Then, too, let us never forget that terror is the greatest enemy of the foot-soldier. It is then for us Cavalry soldiers, as General Cherfils has told us, to procure for the Infantryman peace and quiet, to give him *confidence*.

While far to the front the exploration Cavalry is seeking out the enemy in order that the chief may know in what direction to move his masses, while nearer at hand the Cavalry brigade of each Army Corps lies in wait and watches in order to give to the corps commander his liberty of action, so all round, and quite near the Infantry division, the divisional squadron (like the protecting torpedo net round the battleship) has the duty of guarding it from all surprise, and even more from all unnecessary moral strain which would disturb and weary it.

The rôle of the divisional squadron is not to go out of its way to give protection by fighting, but is above all to give warning. It will watch every crest from which the hostile guns could open on the column as it marches secure in the protection thus afforded; it will give warning when 'the decks must be cleared for action'; and at the moment of gaining contact it will draw the fire of the enemy's rifles in the covers, the woods, or wherever they are lying hid.

It will form a sort of dust of Cavalry which will envelop the Infantry just as the dust of the road envelops the column. But, unlike the latter, its action will be entirely beneficial, because it will procure peace and comfort. A task, truly, which weighs hard upon the horses and is strenuous for officers and men.

* Translated from *Cavalerie*, by Captain Loir, Major du XX^e Corps d'Armée, published by Librairie Militaire, R. Chapelot et Cie, 30 Rue et Passage Dauphine, Paris, a book which we strongly recommend to our readers.—(EDITOR.)

'The difficulties, ah! they are great,' wrote General Donop, in his 'Letters of an Old Cavalryman.' 'In a few days they may entail on the divisional squadron exertions which, if prolonged, would make it impossible for it to continue to carry out its task.

'This is bound to be so, if, as sometimes happens even now, in spite of everything, this unfortunate squadron is parcelled out among the three generals, the four colonels, the sixteen battalion commanders, to say nothing of the staff officers, until at last the squadron commander with his squadron quartermaster-sergeant, his confidential clerk, and his "states" alone remain with the divisional commander.

'What result can possibly be produced by such crumbling away of strength, such destruction of force as this? What can these poor Cavalry soldiers possibly effect, transformed as they are into extra officers' servants, even though such supreme confidence is extended to them that they may place on the top of their kit bags an officer's cloak or an officer's cane?'

All these minor missions of interior service to which The Old Cavalryman jokingly refers, and which use up the divisional Cavalry in pure waste, now fall to the lot of the mounted scouts of the Infantry, whose rôle has been defined by the ministerial instructions of January 24, 1908. It is they who will have to hover about, at 500 to 800 yards from the Infantry, and be split up among the battalions; while the rôle of the divisional squadron, as we shall see, ought to take it a little further afield.

To enable the divisional Cavalry to meet all the demands entailed upon it by its duty of ensuring the tranquillity of the columns which, with the increase of Artillery, grow ever longer and longer, General Donop demanded the attachment of two squadrons for this service to each division of Infantry.

However that may be, the frittering away of the strength of these poor squadrons would most certainly be avoided if the Infantry divisional general would limit himself to laying down in clear terms what he requires of his divisional Cavalry, without entering into the details of the patrolling. It is the business of the squadron commander to give these detailed orders, it is his prerogative; let us leave it to him, and in his desire to economise his troops he will only send out such patrols as are strictly necessary for the fulfilment of his mission.

Finally, let us remember that the squadron is an integral part of the division, and must under no circumstances be taken away from it.

Working again on the same hypothetical situation as we assumed in our study of the protective Cavalry, we will first consider the rôle of the divisional squadron on the evening of August 9, 1870, at the moment of the placing of the outposts by the III. German Corps. Then, supposing that the corps marches next day on Metz *via* Fouligny and Pont-à-Chaussy, covered by its Cavalry brigade, we will see what should be the rôle of the divisional squadrons of the two divisions during this march.

THE RÔLE OF THE DIVISIONAL SQUADRON AT THE HALT

The advanced guard of the III. German Corps arrived, as we know, at about midday on August 9, 1870, at Longeville. Taking into consideration the uncertainty of the situation, and the supposed proximity of the enemy, its commander threw out mixed outposts along the ridge Boucheporn-Longeville-Auberge-Les Quatre Vents, each piquet being composed of one company and one troop of Cavalry.

Under our present organisation it would be to the divisional Cavalry that this duty would fall.

We have already stated that the employment of Cavalry in the outpost line in a critical situation of this nature was perfectly justifiable. But it must be recognised that this participation in outpost duties imposes very considerable fatigue on an arm which, expending as it does a great deal of energy, has need of a great deal of nursing. It is for this reason that the War Minister on May 25, 1908, in modifying Article 34 of the 'Instruction Pratique,' laid down the conditions under which Cavalry should be employed on outpost duty.

The principle then established is to have the whole line selected for the outposts watched and reconnoitred by the squadron. The vedettes and patrols remain out until the arrival of the Infantry, and then the squadron withdraws to take up its billets, only leaving out with the outposts such portion of its strength as may be designated by the divisional commander as strictly necessary.

This circular has happily put an end to those misconceptions by which, in accordance with the instructions of the 'Service of Infantry in War,' the squadron remained out watching all day, and the Infantry did not relieve it until nightfall.

If the protective Cavalry of the III. Corps had carried out its duty as we have indicated in the preceding chapter, the advanced guard on


arrival at Longeville would have known that the French were seven or eight miles beyond the Nied, and were not moving.

The placing of the outposts of the III. German Corps could then have been quietly carried out as follows:—

On arrival at the junction of the roads from St. Avold-Longeville and Faulquemont, the squadron commander is informed by the divisional commander that the line of outposts will extend along the front Boucheporn-Longeville-Auberge-Les Quatre Vents.

Let us assume that at the end of the march the squadron commander still has three troops under his hands.

He at once directs one troop on each of these three points with the mission:—To hold it on the arrival of the Infantry piquets which are due to go there—to cover their march—immediately on their arrival



to give them information about the ground in the vicinity; this information will be obtained by patrols sent out by these troops and searching the ground all round them.

It is in this way that the villages of Boucheporn, Zimming, Bambiderstroff, Tritteling, and Landrefang would have been searched by small patrols of a corporal and two men each. In the same way the borders of the woods would have been reconnoitred.

As soon as these troops have handed over their duties to the Infantry, they would withdraw to the billets of their squadron—in Longeville, for instance.

These billets would be protected and covered by the Infantry. During the march the Cavalry has worked for the Infantry; at the halt the Infantry in its turn will ensure for the Cavalry the rest which is needful for it in order to renew its strength.

DUTY OF THE DIVISIONAL SQUADRON DURING THE MARCH

Rôle of the squadron of the leading division.

The enemy has retired to the west of the French Nied. The Cavalry brigade has spent the night at Fouligny; its reconnoitring detachments are on the French Nied.

To-morrow the division will continue its march on Metz.

What it requires of its divisional squadron is to prevent it from falling into an ambush, or being surprised by guns. From what positions can guns open on the column in the course of its march? This is the first question to ask oneself.

The march of the Army Corps from Longeville to Metz entails the crossing of three distinct zones:—

1. East of the German Nied.
2. Between the two Niefs.
3. West of the French Nied.

In the first zone, between the outposts and Fouligny, Artillery could only interfere by occupying a position to the north or south of the main road. To the north there is the plateau of St. Susanne, then that of the wood of Brouck; to the south the heights near point 403, to the south-west of Bambiderstroff, and point 399, to the east of Marange.

But if the patrol delays in occupying these different points until the column is within gun fire of them, the enemy's shells will go quicker than the orderly who brings in the report, and the column will be surprised; the patrol's mission will not have been fulfilled.

It is necessary then to arrange to see both earlier and further to the front; to push forward at once as far as Narbéfontaine and Brouck, and there to spread out the protective screen, at the same time keeping up connection with the detachment at Boucheporn.

In the same way, to the south of the main road, watch will be kept in the direction of Flétrange and Guinglange, which give access to the heights 403 and 399, already indicated as dangerous. On this side, in the same way, the squadron will endeavour to gain connection with the detachment at Faulquemont.

In the second part of the march the road ascends to the plateau of the wood at Ré.

The northern side of the plateau is covered by the two Niefs and the Forest of Varize.

To the south, on the contrary, the bare slopes descending from Servigny-les-Raville and Maizeroy offer numerous positions for batteries, which constitute a danger for the column.

The study of the third zone would be made in a similar way.

Consequently, at 6 o'clock in the morning, at the moment when the head of the column would have reached the Longeville-Auberge—that is, would have passed through the outpost line—the squadron of the leading division, and its detachments, might be thus disposed :—

1. One troop, with an officer, is opposite Marange on the march to Fouligny, which it has orders to hold on the departure of the Cavalry brigade with which it is to get into communication.

It is to wait at Fouligny for the main body of the squadron, which follows it at a little distance.

2. An officer, with ten men, including a sergeant and a corporal, is passing through Zimming, marching on Narbéfontaine.

Its mission :—It will watch this junction of roads in order to cover the right flank of the column during its passage of the defile between Zimming and Marange; it will keep up connection with the detachment at Boucheporn; it will remain out until 9.30 A.M., when it will rally on the squadron on the main road between Bionville and Courcèlles-Chaussy, marching *viâ* Bannay.

These instructions call for some explanation :—

(a) We notice again here the same characteristics as in the instructions given to protective detachments—that is, definitely fixed points and stated hours; the divisional squadron is carrying out a rôle of protection on a small scale.

(b) The patrol is strong, and strong in officers and non-commissioned officers—viz., one officer, one sergeant, one corporal. The reason for this is that the country, in order to be kept under observation, has to be searched. It presents, in fact, numerous hollows which cannot be seen into from any single point of observation. It is not a question in this case of some narrow valley which can be seen into by one vedette. It will be necessary to send out numerous 'soundings' in different directions, starting from a fixed centre; to have eyes at one and the same time at the Inn of Quatre Vents and at point 367, to the south of Halling; it is a veritable 'observation detachment' on a small scale.

(c) The hour at which the mission of this patrol will be completed is calculated on the following basis :—

Supposing that the time which the division takes to pass a given point is three hours, its head towards 7 o'clock will be between Zimming and Marange, its tail will pass the same point at 10 o'clock. The enemy will be too late on the plateau of St. Susanne, the point of danger for the column, if it has not arrived by 9.30 within 1,500 yards to the north of that point; under these conditions the mission of the detachment will be completed. This is a little calculation which officers of Cavalry must be able to make as a matter of ordinary routine.

3. A corporal, with four men, has been for the last quarter of an hour on height 405, north-west of Tritteling, from where he is watching in a southerly and south-westerly direction—that is to say, towards Flérange and Elvange; he will remain in observation until 9 o'clock, and will then rally on the squadron between Bionville and Courcelles-Chaussy, marching *via* Guinglange and the left bank of the Nied.

Our corporal will have no map; we must, then, help him to carry out his task, and must not tax his memory with names which he will forget or so mix up as to render them unrecognisable.

It is for this reason that we shall personally point out to him height 405 from the crest near Longeville-Auberge, and for the rest of his journey it will be well to give him a sketch, a mere outline, which will help him to find his way and to direct his reports.

Finally, these instructions will be completed by giving him the march table both of the squadron and of the Infantry.

The strength of the detachments enumerated above amounts in all to two troops with their officers.

The main body of the squadron—two troops—will march at a moderate pace—that is, five miles an hour; at 6 o'clock it will be to the south of Zimming, some 2,500 yards ahead of the Infantry.

In passing Marange, towards 6.30, it will detach a fresh patrol towards Brouck—strength one sergeant and six men—with a mission identical with that given to the officer sent towards Narbéfontaine to complete the system of observation on the right flank of the column.

It will arrive at Fouligny towards 7 o'clock—that is, one hour in advance of the Infantry. There it will only have to await the arrival of the Infantry in order to regain connection with it.

During this halt it will hold the western exit of Fouligny with one troop, which is sufficient to block the road. The squadron will march up on to the plateau and conceal itself on the slopes of the ravine to

the north of Fouligny, ready to occupy the wood of Brouck in case of attack, and to hold on to it until the arrival of the advanced guard. Finally, for its own protection, it will send vedettes towards the clump of Brouck, and towards Bionville.

Meanwhile it will prepare for its second bound in such a way that at the moment of the arrival of the Infantry at Fouligny, at 8 o'clock, all its posts will be in position on the left bank of the Nied and its observations already made.

Towards 7.20, with this end in view, it will detach :—

1. One corporal and four men to the south of Guinglange to watch in the direction of Elvange and Hemilly; they will have to remain in observation until 7.30 A.M., and then rejoin towards Pont-à-Chaussy.

2. One officer and ten men towards Frécourt with the task of watching in the direction of Aoury, Villers-Stonecourt, and Berlize, to cover the left flank of the column between Bionville and Courcelles-Chaussy; this post will get into communication with the detachment at the bridge of Domangeville (protective Cavalry).

3. One non-commissioned officer and four men, advanced patrol towards Pont-à-Chaussy.

4. One corporal and three men towards Vaudoncourt to watch the bridge of Varize and the plateau to the south of Vaudoncourt, and to reconnoitre the south-eastern outskirts of the forest of Varize; it will remain in observation until 11 o'clock.

Here again we have had to make detachments to the total strength of one troop, but the main body has by now got back the troop from Fouligny and has therefore still two troops in hand.

At 8 o'clock the squadron will resume its march, and in its next bound will reach height 337, 2,500 yards west of Bionville, with the object of securing the exit on to the plateau, and especially of searching all the copses lining the road. It will also send out 'soundings' into the forest of Varize.

There it will again wait until the point of the Infantry arrives at the wood of Ré; then it will march on towards Courcelles-Chaussy, from where it will detach a patrol towards Les Etangs.

At the bridge of Chaussy, the next halt, the detachments previously sent out will be called in, since their mission will have been completed, and preparations will be made for the third bound, on to the plateau of Ogy-Montoy.

Thus the march of the squadron will have been in a succession of bounds, and at each bound patrols will have been sent out to clear and definite objectives, relatively near, with precise missions both as regards time and distance.

The main body of the squadron acts as a patrol reserve in the hands of the squadron commander; with it he is enabled to search any particular points—for example, the woods which border the road between Bionville and Courcelles—and to obtain more precise information after the enemy is first reported. Sometimes, but more exceptionally, this main body (two troops at most) will play a tactical rôle by securing a *point d'appui* in advance of the Infantry.

The squadron commander will act up to the true spirit of Cavalry by making, as a matter of course, the most of every good opportunity offered him.

But he must never forget that to fight is not his real rôle; that his principal task is to warn, and above all to cover his Infantry, and in order to do that he must not hesitate, if necessary, to disperse his whole command.

The squadron of the 2nd Division.

Nothing is more exhausting for Cavalry than to march along a road sandwiched in between two bodies of Infantry.

From this point of view alone the divisional squadron of the 2nd Division of our III. Corps ought to try to free itself from the column and take the necessary room to march at its own pace.

But at 9 o'clock in the morning, at the moment when the head of the 7th Division arrives at Longeville-Auberge, the divisional squadron of the 6th Division is on the plateau of Plappercourt, and has no longer any part of its force on the right bank of the German Nied.

The mixed detachments which should have reached Pontigny and the bridge of Domangeville at 10 o'clock have now arrived at Varize, in the north, and Berlize, in the south.

In consequence, the directions of Faulquemont, to the south of the road, and of Boulay, to the north, have now become dangerous for the 7th Division.

It is the divisional squadron of this division which must guard against this danger. It will therefore send a patrol towards Faulquemont.

At what time must it reach there? In order to attack the head of

the division when it reaches Longeville at 8.20 A.M., Artillery would have to be on the heights of Les Quatre Vents. It is four miles from Faulquemont to this point—that is, for Horse Artillery, three-quarters of an hour.

This makes it necessary for this patrol to reach there at 7 o'clock in the morning at latest.

The passage of the division, with the whole of its train, &c., will take about five hours; this patrol, then, should remain in observation until about midday. A similar calculation would show us that the Boulay patrol should reach there at 7.30 and should remain until 12.30.

As to the main body of the squadron, if the two divisions follow each other without increased distances, it has merely to keep itself clear of the column, and march on the flank, slightly in advance of the head of the division following the road Valmont-Les Quatre Vents-Bambiderstroff.

On arriving at this point it will detach two small flanking patrols, which will march together as far as Narbéfontaine; one will remain there during the passage of the division between Zimming and Marange, the other will be directed on Brouck.

It will be an exceptional case for a corps in any Army to be marching alone in a single column and without any considerable masses of Cavalry round it.

But this situation, though rather unusual, is not abnormal; it does, however, make the protection of the flanks more difficult.

Cavalry can only hope to cover the flanks by giving warning. It is for this reason that this squadron has to disperse to such an exceptional extent on the front Boulay-Faulquemont. It is the necessity of this situation, this concrete case; do not let us see in this the sealed pattern solution of all other problems, because the work to be done by the divisional squadron can no more be regulated by a preconceived scheme than can reconnaissance or the Cavalry fight, and, in order to know in what direction to launch reconnoitring detachments, it is only necessary to put to oneself that eternal question 'What is required?'

The mission gives us the answer: To give warning of every danger. The knowledge of the rate of march of the column determines the conditions of time within which the warning must be given. The tactical situation defines the dangers to be feared. The ground indicates the spot to which one must go in order to obtain the required information.

LIEUT.-GENERAL SIR JOHN ELLEY, K.C.B., K.C.H.

By COLONEL R. H. MACKENZIE, *F.S.A.Scot.*

THE life of Sir John Elley is one of unusual interest. While it is given to very few to rise from the ranks of the British Army to the position of lieutenant-general, it is an unprecedented distinction for one of humble origin and without interest to succeed in mounting, step by step, from the position of an ordinary trooper to the command of, perhaps, the most exclusive regiment in the Service—the Blues. Elley's early life was not without a touch of romance. The son of a prosperous eating-house keeper in Furnival's Inn Cellars, Holborn, he was born in London in 1766; and, at an early age, was apprenticed to one John Geldard, a tanner at Meanwood, near Leeds. In after-life he used to relate how, amongst the various offices required of him, he was expected on wet Sundays to meet his master's good lady at church with her umbrella and pattens and escort her home. But young Elley bore all this with becoming patience, for there were not wanting certain compensating attractions in the person of the Geldards' daughter, Anne, for whom he acquired an intense admiration and affection. Being a handsome young man, standing over six feet and well-proportioned, with engaging manners, and some monetary prospects, his intentions were not despised by the young lady or her parents. But to his great grief she sickened and died, and her disconsolate lover, in his desire for a change of scene and surroundings, resolved on the life of a soldier. Forsaking the tannery, he enlisted at Leeds as a trooper, or rather a gentleman private, in the Royal Horse Guards, or Blues, on November 5, 1789, and then and there commenced that career which was destined to lead to so much honour and distinction. Even among the many smart and superior young fellows in that distinguished regiment Elley's appearance, character, and general efficiency soon attracted the notice of his officers, and particularly of his Captain, Miles Stavelly, a veteran of the Seven

Years' War; and it was mainly through his influence that Elley got his foot on the first step of the ladder of fame, and was permitted by the commanding officer, on June 4, 1790, to purchase a troop quarter-mastership in the regiment. At that time each troop in a Cavalry regiment had its quarter-master who received a commission signed by the colonel.

The war of the French Revolution brought him his first real chance. In the campaign in the Netherlands in 1793, in which the British Cavalry acquired so high a reputation, an English contingent under the command of the Duke of York accompanied the allies. The force included four troops of the Blues, of which detachment Elley had the good fortune to be selected as acting adjutant; and he sailed for Holland in June. On the conclusion of the campaign of that year the British troops went into winter quarters in the neighbourhood of Ghent until the spring of 1794; H.R.H. the Duke of York spending the winter at home. The Blues, with the 1st and 3rd Dragoon Guards, were then brigaded under Major-General Mansel and encamped on the heights of Cateau. They were engaged in the general attack on the enemy's position at Prémont on April 17, and in covering the siege of Landrécies. The Brigade was present in the brilliant Cavalry action of Villers-en-Couchée on April 24, when fewer than 300 horsemen routed a force of 10,000 French Infantry and Cavalry, with the loss of 1,200 killed and wounded and three guns. But the 15th Hussars, which so distinguished themselves, were for some reason or other not supported as they ought to have been, with the result that the Brigadier and the whole Brigade lay under some reproach. This they were not long in removing, for two days later they had their chance at Beaumont, when the principal column of the French was attacked and defeated by the Cavalry force under the Austrian General, Otto, losing 41 guns, 750 prisoners, and 700 killed and wounded of whom 1,200 fell to our sabres alone. The Blues, who lost 36 men and 50 horses, in the words of the Duke of York 'acquired immortal honour,' Elley particularly distinguishing himself and proving himself an accomplished swordsman. He was very favourably mentioned, and permitted to purchase a cornetcy in the regiment, to which he was duly gazetted on June 6, 1794. He was afterwards present in the action at Willems on May 10; in that of the 17th; in the attack by the French at Tournay on May 23; and during the siege of Valenciennes,

which surrendered in July. The Blues were not further engaged during the war, and, after participating in the disastrous retreat through Holland, they returned home in November 1795. So far Elley had not done badly—from the ranks to a cornetcy in four and a half years. He was further fortunate in his father's means and his own good service enabling him to purchase a lieutenancy in the Blues on June 26, 1796, the captain-lieutenancy * on October 24, 1799, and a troop on February 26, 1801. During the invasion scare in 1804 he was selected for employment on the staff of his former captain and patron, Major-General Miles Stavelay, who held a command in the South of England and reported highly of him. He further purchased a majority in the Blues on November 29, 1804, at the age of thirty-eight.

His star was still in the ascendant, for the Peninsula War brought him the much sought after appointment of Assistant-Adjutant-General to Major-General Lord Paget, afterwards Marquess of Anglesey, commanding the Cavalry Division. He entered upon his duties on Christmas Day, 1807, and on March 6, 1808, he purchased a lieutenant-colonelcy in the Blues. He accompanied the Army in its campaign in Spain in 1808-09, when, with not more than 30,000 men, Sir John Moore held at bay five times that number, and finally, at Corunna, covered the embarkation of his worn-out troops in the face of Soult's 20,000 men. If there is one episode during that famous retreat which stands out conspicuous, it is the brilliant Cavalry action of Sahagun, in which Lord Paget, with the 15th Hussars, surprised and defeated a superior body of French Cavalry on December 21, 1808. Elley's energy was conspicuous on this occasion; as also at Mayorga on the 26th; and in the action of Benevente on December 29, when a body of French Imperial Guards sustained a severe repulse by our Cavalry pickets; their General, Lefebre Desnouettes,† whose sword and *tasche* are in the Royal United Service Museum, being taken prisoner. In the subsequent retreat, a time of suffering for man and horse, the Cavalry brought up the rear, and were in daily contact with the French, in whom they inspired a wholesome fear. They played their part particularly well, for our Army suffered no misfortune

* Senior subaltern of the colonel's troop.

† Desnouettes broke his parole and escaped from England to France in 1812; was again taken prisoner at Waterloo; and was finally drowned off the Irish coast in 1822.

nor lost a single gun. Elley emerged from the campaign with a much enhanced reputation, a gold medal, and a good prospect of further advancement, for he had proved himself an invaluable staff officer.

He was next employed in the second phase of the Peninsula War, as Assistant-Adjutant-General of Cavalry to Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton, afterwards Lord Combermere. He was present when Wellington, after his success at the Douro, attacked Marshal Victor at Talavera in July 1809; he particularly distinguished himself in leading the charge, so graphically described by Napier, of the two squadrons of the 23rd Light Dragoons on Villatte's Division, in which of the 160 men who rode in it all but Elley and seven were killed or wounded. He was under fire, with the exception of a few hours at midnight, from 10 in the morning of the 27th to the close of the following day. Lord Hill, in a letter to the Duke of Northumberland, says 'he led on the British Cavalry in a manner that did honour to his abilities and intrepidity.' Of the actual charge Wellington had a better opinion than Napier, and admitted that it succeeded in stopping the enemy's turning movement on the left.

The winter of 1809-10 passed without any open conflict, but Elley and the Cavalry had plenty to do on outpost duty and otherwise. They never let the enemy out of their sight. They covered the long retreat to the lines of Torres Vedras, an operation so skilfully performed that not a gun was lost, not a regiment hurried, nor a baggage-waggon abandoned. Wellington wrote very favourably of Elley's exertions; no officer, he said, 'was more deserving of His Majesty's favour.'* Elley was present at Fuentes de Onoro on May 5, 1811, an action fought against great odds, including four to one in Cavalry. Ours had not a gallop left in them, yet, by a timely charge, they checked the French squadrons, helped Norman Ramsay to bring off his guns, and covered the retreat of Houston's Division. He was with the covering Army during the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz; and in the brilliant Cavalry action, little noticed by historians, of Llerena, or Garcia, on April 11, 1812, when a superior force of French Cavalry were completely defeated. He was very favourably mentioned by Cotton, who wrote: 'To Lieut.-Colonel Elley, my Assistant-Adjutant-General, I am much indebted for the very great assistance which I have derived from him; particularly in conducting

* Wellington Despatches, December 1, 1810.

my right column to the point of attack.' He was present in the affair at Castrejon on July 18, 1812; and two days later in Wellington's great victory of Salamanca, the fate of which was mainly decided by the gallant charges of the Cavalry of Le Marchant and Anson led by Sir Stapleton Cotton and Elley. The effect was instantaneous. In a few minutes the whole enemy's left was thrown into confusion, more than 2,000 prisoners taken, and the broken remnants of the French Division thoroughly routed, driven into a wood, and, from a military point of view, annihilated. Elley, who received a severe bayonet wound and had two horses shot under him, highly distinguished himself, and was very favourably mentioned by Wellington. He was in the affair at Celado Lamino on October 23, 1812; and, though he never reported sick, was extremely unwell for some time. He was promoted to the rank of colonel on March 7, 1813; took part in the battle of Vittoria on June 21; in the series of actions known as the battles of the Pyrenees in July and August; in Wellington's first battle on French soil—Orthes—on February 27, 1814; and in that of Toulouse on April 18, when the curtain finally fell on the Peninsula War after nearly six years' continuous fighting. Elley's services were acknowledged in the following Farewell Order to the Cavalry:—'Lieut.-General Sir Stapleton Cotton cannot sufficiently express his gratitude to Colonel Elley for the able manner in which he has effected the duties of the Adjutant-General's Department. The zeal which that officer has displayed for the Service, and his indefatigable attention to the welfare of the Cavalry, claim the Lieut.-General's warmest thanks.' Elley also received the Peninsula gold cross, with three clasps.

He was again in the field in the Waterloo campaign of 1815, the culminating triumph of the British Army, as Deputy-Adjutant-General of Cavalry to his former chief, Lord Paget, now Earl of Uxbridge, and afterwards Marquess of Anglesey. He was a guest at the Duchess of Richmond's celebrated ball in Brussels, took part in the successful action at Genappe, which Lord Uxbridge described as 'the prettiest field-day of Cavalry and Horse Artillery' he had ever witnessed, and was unusually active in the great battle of June 18, when his horsemanship and skill as a swordsman stood him in good stead. In more than one of the charges of our Cavalry, and particularly in that of Lord Edward Somerset's Brigade, which Lord Uxbridge and he led, he attracted unusual notice. Surrounded at one time, wounded, and almost overpowered, he cut his way out and left several of his assailants

dead or terribly wounded. Sir Walter Scott, in his 'Letters to his Kinsfolk,' says 'there were found on the field of Waterloo more than one of Napoleon's Cuirassiers cleft to the chine by the stalwart arm of this gallant officer.' This terminated his active service in the field. He was rewarded with the Waterloo medal, the Orders of Maria Theresa of Austria and St. George of Russia, and was created a K.C.B. and a K.C.H.

He remained with the Army of Occupation until 1818, when he returned home and assumed the command of the Royal Horse Guards. He was promoted to the rank of major-general on August 12, 1819, and lieutenant-general on January 10, 1837; appointed Governor of Galway on January 19, 1826; and colonel of the 17th Lancers on November 23, 1829. He represented Windsor in Parliament, as a staunch Peelite, in 1835, and he died at his residence, Chalderton Lodge, near Lincoln, on January 22, 1839, in his seventy-third year; leaving legacies to the Royal Horse Guards and the 17th Lancers. He was buried in St. George's Chapel, Windsor, in the north aisle of which is his beautiful monument surmounted by a full-sized figure. His portrait, painted by Andrew Morton, was exhibited in the Royal Academy in 1837, but I have not succeeded in tracing it, and he is depicted in the well-known painting of the 'Waterloo Heroes.'

Although, perhaps, the most distinguished officer who has ever risen from the ranks of the British Army, there is little to be learned from his life. He was fortunate in the possession of ample means, a personality which procured him many friends, and a tireless energy as remarkable as his physical strength, scientific skill, and dauntless bravery. He was a more than ordinarily capable and reliable staff officer, and possessed many of the qualities which make for a successful Cavalry leader; but, as it was never given to him to command in the field, it is difficult to say how he would have acquitted himself.





SIR JOHN ELLEY.

—
1766-1839


PIGSTICKING



A Wily Jink



A Race for First Spear.



Triumph



First Spear



Camp

PIG-STICKING

By MAJOR A. E. WARDROP, *Royal Horse Artillery*

Which is best—pig-sticking or fox-hunting?
Let us drink to them both : kings of their lands.
To one man—the ride after a heavy boar,
'The wild mad dash for victory, loose rein and iron seat.
Joy at a rival's falling—curse at his own defeat,'

and then, when nerve is gone, a peaceful old age and quiet days with tigers. To another, wild goats, and dizzy peaks. To others—nay, to most—the 'free flying fences' of an English hunt—each to his taste.

Xenophon speaks of hog-hunting. Alexander partook of it. Our Norman ancestors hunted the boar on horseback with a lance. Modern pig-sticking dates from bear-spearing about 1780 in Bengal. In 1800 pig-sticking was firmly established. The spear was then a short one—like a javelin—always thrown. In a book on 'Hog-hunting' in 1828, the author says you should be able to spear your hog when at a gallop, up to a range of a thirty-yards' throw. At ten yards you should never miss. He advocates coloured ribbons on the shafts, for others claimed his spear and pig.

In 1840 the old magazines condemn the 'dangerous innovation' of those who job their pig, spear in hand. Yet the practice held; and by 1850, pig-sticking, as we now know it, was universal.

To name modern soldier pig-stickers, is to recite the Army List.

Of the old names, Outram, stout Skinner, Nightingale, and Simpson stand out pre-eminent. The three first had speared their tiger—Outram, I believe, on foot and from a rock. Of Nightingale, I heard from my first general, who, when a youngster, was a protégé of his, of the 60 bears he speared, of his 300 tigers, of his countless pigs, of his terrible method with a jibbing horse, of his regiment who beat for him.

The days of hundreds of tigers are, alas, past. But pigs are more plentiful than ever. The Delhi and Cawnpore hunts are the latest examples. More crops, local famines, the cutting down of heavy

jungles and good preservation are the chief reasons for this. Pigs are, as yet, no asset in the credit side of a K.C.S.I. or hospitality in England. In parts of the Central Provinces and the United Provinces the inhabitants petition to have them slain.

In the Punjab there is little sport—and that poor.

In Southern India pigs are generally hard to come by in riding ground; though in the Nizam's dominions I believe a good man could do much.

Bombay is chiefly famous for its Nuggur and Gujrat hunts.

Central India is full of good boars. Their pursuit over the rocky hills and cracks of the cotton soil is as bad for horses' legs as it is for riders' nerves.

In the United Provinces and Bengal practically every station has pig-sticking at its front door. And where there is none, you can generally blame the apathy of the sportsmen. In Bengal there is considerable scope for private hunting parties on trips of a month or more.

Hunting is of two sorts. Either you beat in line and ride with the beaters, or you take post outside a thick patch of jungle and beat your pig out. Of the latter form in Northern India I am fond. There are tedious waits; one is taking no hand in the beating; and the country between is generally easy-going, often fields. In Central India and over the big cactus fences of Gujrat the last objection does not exist. And everywhere a hog who fails to make his point always fights.

I prefer the beating in line through the long grass as in the churs of Bengal and all our Kadir lands. There is no tiring waiting. There is a constant excitement. The sea of grass, with its jhow, its tamarisk, its river beds, and winding nullahs, calls forth in the highest degree the boldness of the horse and the hunting qualities of the rider.

The yellow waving grasses, league long on either hand,
With cloudless skies and sun-dimmed eyes and burning river sand.

There is a sense of freedom, of elation as boundless and as healthful as the sea.

You may enjoy this sport alone, or in a tent club, or with a small hunting party, for some weeks. This is perhaps best of all. Each man is anxious his friend should have as good sport as himself;

there is no jealous riding; the one idea is to kill the pig; the country is wild; the pig savage. It means some expense and many horses. Not necessarily first-class ones. The 10th Hussars had some fine sport in this way.

The old adage that a man should kill several hogs alone before he thinks himself a hog-hunter is sound. Many youngsters who take proud first spear in company could neither find, hunt, nor kill a boar single-handed. It is the cream of sport. Its one drawback is that it makes a man slow. It is easier to spear well alone, than in a tent club where you have the ever-present feeling of being hustled.

Yet I would not have it otherwise. The joy of pig-sticking lies largely in the generous race for first spear. Till converted by the 15th Hussars I was a great advocate for 'steady' hunting. I am now convinced that, though a few boars may be over-ridden, far more are killed in the 'let-the-man-on-the-pig-wait-till-all-eternity' system. Even so, you must race with discretion; nurse your hog in thick cover; shout as he turns—all spears abreast.

I offer no opinion as to whether a spot of blood or a 'good' spear should constitute first spear. The 9th Lancers at Muttra awarded a spear—If I remember right—only when it was a good one. The Inniskillings rule that no spear in rear of such and such a rib shall count.

In Bengal a short jobbing spear is used, in Bombay a long under-hand one. In Northern India many use a shortish spear under-hand. After using all sorts I find one 6 feet 8 inches best. Lead is a matter of taste and wrist. In thick cover you can use this spear over-hand. The spear must never be 'in rest.' If you thrust you will miss. The Kadir Cup has been won as often by a sure hand as by a fast horse. The speed of your horse will give the blow. If the hog turn in, you should kill him with scarce a touch through spine, heart, or lungs. It is no vulgar sledge-hammer business. Your horse must be going faster than the pig. The final spurt is a great art. If the pig will not come in you must cross his bows.

Your spear must be literally like a razor. Soft Indian steel is best. Use a hone—not a file. The descendants of the Hannan Arabs kill lions with swords. I am told their edge is a thing unknown to us. A friend of mine, collector of a northern district, sends his spears to the man who sharpens the weapons of the dacoits of the district.

I have no space to write here of tent clubs; their making or their management.

Whether in a tent club or alone, the help of the civilian is of great value. The difficulty with them is ever how to repay them for their trouble and open-handed hospitality.

Hunting on a 'line' requires several horses. Beating a cover, less. A run of a mile at absolutely top speed through long grass is very exhausting. You have but to run ten yards on foot through the same grass to prove it. Tired horses cause grief. I like three horses on the line and five or six for the season. Sprains and wounds make many casualties.

In one meet of three days I have known one horse killed, one very severely injured, eight horses cut, five of them badly, numerous sprains, and two riders knocked out.

I remember taking four horses from Rawalpindi to hunt alone. Within four days all were *hors-de-combat*. Luckily there were big game jungles near.

If you want a pig-sticker laid up—rest him.

I do not much care for the English horse after pigs. I find him clumsy. I doubt his legs.

For rocky ground the Arab is as good as any. For stamina and handiness he is without equal. But he is not up to the weight of a big man. He lacks both pace and power to get through heavy jungle or live with a galloping horse. From his sagacity he is oftener shy of pigs than other horses.

Of the high-class Waler I can say nothing but good—staunch, gallant, and true. I have seen one twice mauled by a panther and treating the matter as dirt. Neither bear, pig, nor panther can affect his fine courage. And remember your horse runs more risk than you do.

I see no point in the country-bred beyond his cheapness. He is generally light of bone.

Fifteen years ago 300 Rs. was a very fair price for a horse. Now, 1,000 Rs. for an untrained horse and 1,500 Rs. to 2,000 Rs. for a high-class horse is not uncommon. As long as all are equally mounted there is no particular advantage in the more expensive horse. But he trebles the enjoyment.

Pig-sticking is more expensive than polo. The daily expenses of a meet amount all-in to about 12 Rs. a day. Tent club charges,

messaging, coolies, extra pay for servants, rail and cart fare—none of these occur in polo. Hunting alone is dearer.

The margin between 1,000 Rs. raw, and 1,500 Rs. or 2,000 Rs. trained, is so small that, when rail of purchases from Bombay and the decided risk of injury while hunting are considered, a man can hardly hope to cheapen his sport much by a legitimate profit on the sale of his horses.

I consider 15-2½ for a pig-sticker, no matter what your size. Never buy a horse without a perfect rein and shoulder. This is vital. If you buy a horse with a small eye or a bump between the eyes you ask for trouble. Swollen muscles behind the jaw tell of a hard mouth and unhandiness. Crooked action is fatal. A vulgar horse can never be your friend. Having watched all this you may go for the usual points of speed and staying power; your fancy; your purse.

A good pig-sticker requires as much training as a polo pony and as much school work. Especially cantering up and down, and about on the haunches. But I find that horses, owing to their greater size and weight, show signs of training in both fetlocks and temper quicker than ponies. You cannot school them as much. Finish after cattle. I do not regard a tame pig. Some roughness with both hand and leg (no spurs) is in my opinion good in these final stages—when the horse is galloping hard and sticky in turning. But it must be only for a fraction of a second—and then loose rein as before. Never forget your horse is your best pal. Frequent bursts into full gallop from a halt are good. Train with another horse alongside if you can.

Spurs should always be worn when after pig. Horses get so casual that nothing but sharp spurs will sometimes make them get their quarters out of the way of a dangerous fighting boar you may be holding.

You must ride with an absolutely loose rein. I have seen a man finish with all reins on one side. To you the country is blind. The horse sees most of it. Leave it to his honour. Your business to see and hunt the pig—his to take you over the country. If a man falls often, applaud his hard riding—doubt his hands.

In all hunting there are three golden rules:—‘Your horse can go where a boar does.’ ‘If you lose a pig—cast for’ard.’ And ‘You must lie first in the run.’ A spear where you have not cut out the work can never be the same.

I think our hunting instincts are poor. I wrote some years ago for—not of—the 17th Lancers—‘Slow to start, conspicuous, jabbering, blind; a faint shout, a flick of dust, waving grass, disturbed cattle, convey no meaning.’

In sixteen years’ pig-sticking the number of men I have seen really first-class all round is small.

You have no time, if on the pig, to look after a man who falls. ‘The pace is too good to enquire.’ A friend of mine in the 2nd Lancers told me once, when hunting with a small party, one of them, R——, a noted spear, fell. ‘Ah,’ said the others when they killed, ‘poor old R——, fear he must be dead—let us go and look after him.’ They found him unconscious—otherwise well. ‘That’s good,’ said they, ‘he’s only knocked out. We’ll have the photo, after all.’ So they photographed the group with the pig and prostrate R——.

I have not enlarged on the boar’s pluck—it requires no tribute from me. I have tried to avoid personal anecdotes.

After some experience it seemed that one had tried hog-hunting in most forms. However, hunting late one day, a year ago, we speared a boar who took refuge in a thick bush. We set fire to this, but the hog did not come out till the bristles on his back were burning. And it was by these smouldering bristles that we hunted and speared him in the inky darkness. *Semper aliquid novi.*

The two great competition meetings are the Kadir Cup and Gujrat Cup. To win either is the ambition of us all. The former has a field of some 120 horses. The latter, owing to its comparative inaccessibility, rather less. Luck is a large element of success. Still, a cup is seldom won except by a good horse and a man who will gallop. All honour to them.

The military qualities of keen sight, quickness, resource, and horsemanship are taught by this sport perhaps more than by any other. I think fox-hunting will give you a better eye for a country. A run after a pig seldom lasts two miles. If minded to hack out to your meet after dinner you may practise marching by the stars.

And in the end?

Nothing can rob you of the past. You shall dream of old scenes—‘You shall see the vision splendid of the sunlit plains extended, And at night the wondrous glory of the everlasting stars.’ There shall remain with you an imperishable memory of happy days, tried comrades, gallant horses, and—the hunt of the great grey boar.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Revue de Cavalerie.—December 1912.—*Le projet de loi des cadres de la cavalerie* is at once an explanation of the reorganisation introduced this month and a plea for the increased efficiency which may be expected for its application. The effect of the new law is the abolition of the *brigades de corps*, which are no longer considered to have any definite rôle, since it is claimed that the best means of ensuring protection is to be sufficiently strong to prevent surprise by attacking oneself. By suppressing these corps brigades it is now possible to increase the number of Cavalry Divisions, each having its three brigades, its machine-gun section, Horse Artillery, Cyclist Infantry, &c. These divisions can be united to form Cavalry Corps at short notice, and can then either be placed at the disposal of the commander-in-chief, or as Army Cavalry at the disposal of the G.O.C. Army. It having been found that a single squadron was insufficient for the purposes and duties of Divisional Cavalry, each corps will have in future a Cavalry regiment of six squadrons, at the disposal of the O.C. Army Corps as a regiment, or handed over as three squadrons of Divisional Cavalry to each division. In the last of the series of studies by Captain d'Aubert on *la cavalerie dans la guerre de demain*, he discusses the effect which the new *loi des cadres* is likely to have on the future employment of the French Cavalry. The conclusions he comes to may be thus summarised: Cavalry will remain as always the battle-weapon; it is not merely the arm of exploration, and it would be a mistake to reorganise it solely in view of this one function. The importance of Cavalry has been increased tenfold by the accuracy of the information supplied by the aviator, who has made of Cavalry, more than ever before, an arm of strategic manœuvre, of tactical action, and of *exploitation du succès*. Thus the rôle of Cavalry has widened rather than diminished, and its strength should be maintained—until it is possible to increase it. This paper is succeeded by an account of the Cavalry operations of last year which took place under General Sordet, the first period from August 26 to 30 about Châlons, and which contained only purely Cavalry manœuvres; while the second period, from August 31 to September 2, was concerned with the operations of all arms, which took place about Rethel. In the first period General Sordet had under his command the 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions and two brigades of Cavalry, with the cyclist companies from the 9th and 18th Battalions of Chasseurs—a total of fourteen regiments of Cavalry. To these were attached for the second period a regiment of Infantry, two battalions of Chasseurs, and some Horse Artillery. The operations are fully described and are illustrated by a good map. Under the title of *Variétés* are included some letters, never before published, written by General de Brack in 1831-33. These are not themselves of any particular military interest, being letters addressed to the firm which published his

Souvenirs d'avant-postes, but it would seem that there are very few of any of de Brack's letters in existence, and for this reason alone these are of special interest to all soldiers, and particularly to Cavalrymen. These few letters—there are no more than five of them, and these are mere extracts—are preceded by two or three pages of memoirs which explain how the man of action became a military writer. Constantly in the field, under Lasalle, Montbrun, Colbert, and Maison, from 1807 to 1815, he had, equally with his contemporaries, no time for writing, and even during the fifteen years immediately following the fall of the First Empire, de Brack does not appear to have taken to writing, though doubtless those years were given to study. Employed in 1830 by the Government of July and given command of the 8th Chasseurs, he was struck by the inferiority of the Cavalry as compared with that arm as he remembered it. He devoted himself and his pen to the renovation of the Cavalry, and more particularly of the Light Cavalry, wrote his *Souvenirs*, and became a regular contributor to the *Revue de Paris* and the *Spectateur Militaire*. These letters are contributed by M. Le Lorier, *sous-intendant militaire en retraite*.

January 1913.—One who calls himself 'Pierre ou Paul' opens this number with an article entitled *Agir objectivement*, and appears to complain that the full scope of the rôle of the Cavalry in war is neither understood nor practised in peace. The training of the arm is too much limited and coloured by the restrictions of ground, which leads to the cultivation and pursuit of false ideas. He finds fault with the fact that Cavalry is too much restricted in its employment to operations against Cavalry, and that its action against and effect upon the other arms do not receive sufficient consideration. He points out—what we too often notice at our own manœuvres—that the instructions given by the high command to the Cavalry leaders are either too vague, or so detailed that the unexpected often finds the Cavalry leader wholly unprepared—the usual attitude of the high command, not being a Cavalryman, is one of satisfaction *d'avoir envoyé la cavalerie au diable*. He discusses the dismounted action of Cavalry, and appears to be rather against the attachment of Cyclist Infantry, and he warns Cavalrymen against the modern tendency to dismount and take to the rifle or carbine, pointing out that, while the actual loss inflicted by fire may be greater than by *l'arme blanche*, the former leaves the *morale* of the opponent unimpaired. It is not easy clearly to determine what the writer would have, but it seems that he complains that the time of the Cavalryman is too much occupied with matters of detail, of administration; that the time for learning the actual employment of the arm, already short enough, is taken up with matters which are not of the first importance. This is followed by the first instalment of an account of the work of the Cavalry during last year's manœuvres, and, by way of contrast, we then have a disparaging review of the programme proposed for the year 1913, which is stated to disclose what is described as *un fâcheux recul*. It is pointed out that the actual number of regiments detailed to take part in the manœuvres is less than in 1912, that the number of days given up to operations or manœuvres has been reduced, and that in lieu of these there will this year be no more than one *manœuvre d'ensemble*. It is insisted that since during the greater part of the year the regiment is almost wholly occupied with the training of recruits, for the most part in garrisons where little or nothing is possible *en plein champ*, the period passed in camps of instruction is the only opportunity the commander enjoys for training his regiment—that even then he is largely engaged in *applying*

the principles of the *instruction* which his command has hardly as yet had time to assimilate. Under *Raids et épreuves de Fond*, Colonel Maître reviews a book published by Commandant Smits, 1st Regiment of Belgian Guides, wherein is to be found what purports to be a detailed account of the measures to be adopted for successfully taking part in such performances in regard to the training of man and horse.

February.—General Armand Lucas, who was formerly a very frequent contributor to this review, has now returned to it with the first of what promises to be an interesting series, called *Causeries cavalières*—the subtitle of this one being 'About the Army Manœuvres of 1912.' Looking round for the lessons to be drawn from the similitude and the actuality of war, he has some useful remarks on the part played in the Balkan struggle by the Cavalry on either side, and points out that no one battle has been in any sense decisive, for the reason that there has never been any Cavalry pursuit; it is possible to *conquer* with the Infantry alone, but no actual *rout* can take place without the effective and timely intervention of the mounted arm. Turning to the Cavalry of France, his complaint seems to be that the due proportion of the arms, without which true co-operation is impossible, is no longer being maintained; the Artillery and the Infantry are being sensibly augmented, while the numbers of the Cavalry remain practically as heretofore. He then very briefly discusses the manœuvres, and makes a comment which seems worthy of notice: he points out the reality imparted to these manœuvres—which, of course, was all to the good—by their continuity, but at the same time he seems to think that the disadvantage of this was not sufficiently recognised, and that in peace, and still more in war, some consideration must be given to affording rest to the troops. As matters stood the forces engaged were always on the *qui vive*, and men and officers sometimes simply *could* not keep awake. He insists upon the absolute need with young soldiers—not merely for *hommes jeunes* but for *les jeunes gens*—for a maximum amount of sleep. Of the manner in which the work demanded of the Cavalry in these operations was carried out, General Lucas proposes to write in a second paper. In 'The Lance for Light Cavalry' a Colonel of Hussars writes to point out that this armament is wholly opposed to their training, which he maintains is to 'get under the guard' of their opponent by means of their own small size and the smallness and activity of their mounts; to arm the Hussars with the lance would be to place them at an actual inferiority with the German Uhlan—though for the matter of that *all* German Cavalry are thus armed—while equipped with sabres he considers them superior to the lance-armed horsemen, more particularly in the *mêlée*. The record of the Cavalry Manœuvres of 1912 is concluded in this number, which the writer ends by pleading for full ranks, for the best possible materials of instruction in the way of *terrain*, *matériel* and *personnel*; for more frequent camps of instruction: first for Cavalry alone, then with the other arms; and the appointment of an Inspector of Cavalry for the co-ordination of effort and the unification of doctrine. Colonel Sainte-Chapelle continues his account of the operations in Morocco and brings it down to the successful action by General Brunard on January 25 near Sidi-el-Hacel; he also describes the present organisation of the portions most recently pacified and settled of East and West Morocco. General Dubois contributes a short paper descriptive of the French remount for Heavy Cavalry, and of the success which has attended the measures introduced some seven or eight years ago for its improvement. For this improvement acknow-

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ledgment is made to the manner in which the different societies—the *Société d'Encouragement*, *Société des Steeplechases*, and the *Société Sportive*—have worked hand in hand with the *Administration des Haras*.

Spectateur Militaire—February 15.—The only matter of Cavalry interest contained in this journal during the last three months is to be found in that under date, where are concluded the articles called *Questions de doctrine*, drawn from the translation of Colonel von Unger's account of the Imperial Manœuvres of 1909. It may be remembered that the German writer closed with some remarks on the employment and command of a Cavalry Corps. The French commenter holds that all that matters is whether the Cavalry Corps is to be regarded merely as an accident to be endured, or whether it shall be recognised as a distinct unit to be put together and trained. Too often, says the writer in the *Spectateur Militaire*, is the 'accident' theory the more generally accepted one, but it is at variance with the whole idea of Cavalry as an arm wherein nothing can be improvised, neither in the force nor in its commander; how then improvise the reunion of a body of perhaps 10,000 horse? The result of the manœuvres of 1909 does not lead to the belief that the co-operation of the Cavalryman is impossible with the action of the Army Corps, but assuredly must such co-operation be organised and cannot be left to chance. The writer warns his countrymen against drawing false conclusions from these manœuvres, and those which immediately succeeded them, in regard to another point—viz. the readiness which the German Cavalry displayed to enter, in large bodies, into the fire-fight; the conclusion must not be drawn from such action that the German Cavalry has any intention whatever of renouncing the mounted combat—they were only, like other Cavalry, under the influence of a phase which has passed. But the French writer urges, with much force, the absolute necessity for the Cavalry regiments of France, not merely of camps of instruction, but for the provision of more numerous, larger, more accessible, and more diversified pieces of country, where Cavalry may be able to *faire sans entraves des exercices d'application avec troupe, avec grandes unités*—perhaps France is not the only country in western Europe where the mounted arm is crying out for something of the same kind.

Kavalleristische Monatshefte.—December 1912.—Lieut.-Colonel Kerchnawe, of the General Staff, opens this number with an interesting account of the two great Cavalry actions of Avesnes-le-Sec and Le Cateau Cambrésis, fought in the early days of the Wars of the Revolution. Probably we all of us know something of the last named of these important combats, for the reason that several regiments of British Cavalry were there engaged, but of Avesnes-le-Sec we are more ignorant, although, as Mr. Fortescue tells us, it 'was one of the greatest achievements in the history of Cavalry.' Lieut.-General von Unger follows with a long paper in praise of 'the efficiency of the Army (independent) Cavalry in the Imperial Manœuvres of 1912'; he describes all that occurred almost from day to day, gives the detail of the opposing Cavalry forces, and concludes by a very warm appreciation of the work done as of the manner of its execution. These great manœuvres offer the best school which under existing conditions is possible for the training of the Army Cavalry; the arm suffers from the want of a higher organisation—presumably divisional organisation is meant—while it is also rather oppressed by all that in these days is expected of it. But the writer is of opinion that these *Kaisermanöver* bring out all that is best in the Cavalry and in its employment; the army commanders

learn how properly to make use of it, while its own leaders appear to be men at the very height of their powers. The work done demanded great skill and unusual exertion—the Elbe was crossed despite rain, storm and cold, even in the dark; reconaissance was carried on by day and night, and whenever opportunity was afforded the Cavalry fought both mounted and dismounted. Above all the writer claims that the Cavalry arm owes much to the army command, which so used the mounted arm as to prove that to-day, as in the past, it could still exert a decisive influence on the battle. The lesson he draws from all this, and to which he leads up with no little skill, is that an increase in the strength of the German Cavalry is imperative. Field Marshal Lieutenant von Gemmingen continues his studies and exercises on 'The leading of Cavalry in diversified country'; he insists on the absolute need for physical fitness in the Cavalry commander. Major Junk gives an account of the operations of the Second and Fourth Cavalry Divisions in the battle of Orleans on December 3 and 4, 1870. This number contains a very brief biographical notice of Lieut.-General von Windheim, who only took over the duties of Inspector-General of the Prussian Cavalry in April 1912, and who died suddenly of heart disease while following the Royal hounds in the neighbourhood of Berlin; he was only fifty-eight. He has been succeeded by Lieut.-General v. d. Marwitz, up to this time commanding the Third Division. 'W.' has a very short paper on 'Cavalry in the Battle,' the main object of which seems to be to try and prove that the improvement in small arms has actually diminished the possible losses which may be experienced in action. He takes the losses in the battle of Belgrade in 1717 and compares them with those suffered by Cavalry regiments in 1870, his intention being to show that while the losses in the more modern battles were less than those in the earlier action quoted, in neither were the casualties suffered by the Cavalry in excess of those which Infantry regiments experienced and are expected to sustain.

January 1913.—Major Baron von Schoenaich, of the General Staff, writes on 'The Prussian Cavalry in the War of Liberation'—of the years 1813-1815—and this is apparently to form one of a series recounting the deeds of the German and Austrian Cavalry during that period, but the present article, so far as it goes, deals rather with the armament, equipment, organisation, and regulations of the Prussian Cavalry than with its operations in the field. In 'With the Japanese Cavalry through Ichigo,' Lieut.-Colonel von Lerch describes a seven-days' march—operations in which he took part with them; it is in no sense a criticism of the efficiency of the Japanese Cavalry—rather a chatty record of a very pleasant time. One 'W. Scheibert,' whose rank is not given, contributes a short paper on the need for the provision of cyclists with the Cavalry divisions. He complains that the necessities and claims of the Cavalry have not been sufficiently considered in the general increase of the army, and declares that its fighting efficiency would be greatly enhanced by the attachment of cyclists; he also points out that in the last manoeuvres every effort was made to afford the Cavalry a *temporary* increase of fire-power by sending forward infantry in privately-owned motor vehicles, and contends that the results obtained proved the need for a permanent addition of this character. He then recapitulates the old arguments about the comparative fire-value of a Cavalry division, and states that while this is equal to no more than that of one-and-a-half battalions, it is further diminished, morally, from the men's natural anxiety about their led horses. Neither

horse-artillery nor machine-guns can ever afford support of the same value as that of riflemen, and the writer advocates the permanent attachment of a rifle battalion, a thousand strong, to each of the ten Cavalry divisions. He is against the folding type of bicycle. Lieut.-Colonel Müller Kranefeldt has a short paper, apparently epitomised from the account in the November number of the *Revue de Cavalerie*, on the manœuvres of the French Cavalry on August 28 and 29 last, and this is followed by a translation of an article which appeared in the *France Militaire* of December 18, 1912, by General Aubier, on the 'French Cavalry and the *loi des cadres*.' Rittmeister von Turner writes informally on the Arab horse, describing his breeding, breaking, shoeing, and care generally; and then Major Gessebner gives an extraordinarily accurate and complete history of our Derby: this is to be continued. Among the shorter papers will be found one on the Bulgarian Cavalry, which is at the present moment of interest, and from which the following notes may be taken. The small Bulgarian horses are admirably suited, as are their riders, for operations in a hilly country, but there is no big type of horse bred in Bulgaria, and those considered necessary for the employment of army Cavalry are, for the most part, imported from Hungary, and on these are mounted Regiments one to four forming the Cavalry division, while those numbered five to ten are locally mounted. The officers' chargers, chiefly of English blood, are drawn from the stud at Sofia and from the remount dépôt at Shamla, and these appear to be provided free of charge. The Cavalry division (Regiments one to four) consists of two brigades, each of two regiments, each of four squadrons, and to every regiment of Cavalry a machine-gun company of four guns is attached. The Horse Artillery organisation, not being yet complete, the division has at present from one to two quick-firing batteries. The war establishment of the division is then 2400 sabres, sixteen machine-guns, four to eight quick-firers. The regiments, numbered five to ten, each of four squadrons, are split up on mobilisation and become divisional Cavalry. Besides these, there is a Household Cavalry Regiment of three squadrons, and a mounted gendarmerie of nine sotnias, which last is placed at the disposal of the army and army corps commands. The Bulgarian Cavalry is armed with the sabre and Mannlicher Carbine M.91, and the Cavalry division has Pioneer and Telegraph detachments. As the War and Peace establishments of the Cavalry regiments is practically identical (per squadron, five officers, 125 men, 130 horses, seventeen non-combatants) no time is lost on mobilisation.

February.—Major von Viereck, of the Great General Staff, opens this number with an article on 'The Employment of the Cavalry in the Balkan War of 1912'; he describes the Cavalry organisation of the contending armies and the operations which led up to the battles of Kirkilisse and Lule Burgas, and the conclusions he draws are that far more use was made of the Cavalry on either side than was to be expected from the nature of the country in the theatres of war; and that when the complete and trustworthy history of the war comes to be written, it will be found to contain many lessons of value to the mounted forces of the more western nations. Major Baron von Schœnaich, of the General Staff, writes an account of the battle of Gross-Görschen, fought just a hundred years ago this month, and points out that at this time not only was the proper employment of Cavalry not thoroughly understood, but that there actually then existed something like a prejudice against the mounted arm.

In an anonymous paper, an Austrian Cavalryman comments on the proposal to reduce the divisional Cavalry to no more than two squadrons per division in order to increase the number of squadrons available for forming Cavalry divisions; and points out that when these two squadrons have given all their detached parties, what remains has no tactical value, and is especially impotent against any infantry it may meet in the close reconnaissance. He proposes, therefore, that the divisional Cavalry be reduced to one squadron per division, and that the lost fire-power be increased by the attachment of machine-gun sections. Among the shorter papers in this number is a very brief account of the work of the Servian Cavalry in the Balkan War, which is of interest as showing, what has elsewhere been denied, that on occasion the Cavalry of the Allies did understand how effectively to pursue. The credit for the rapid and early occupation of Uskub is here given to the relentless pursuit by the Servian Cavalry division under Prince Arsen after the battle at Kumanova.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—In No. 7 for 1913 of this journal will be found a short account by Lieut.-Colonel Müller-Kranefeldt of the part played by the Cavalry in the battle of St. Quentin in January 1871; the writer draws particular attention to the extraordinary way in which Cavalry regiments were distributed and broken up among the different units of von Goeben's command—forty-seven squadrons among eleven different units—while in one case seven squadrons belonging to three different regiments were handed over to what was already *une gemischte Division*. Naturally, as is pointed out, any attacks made by the Cavalry were disconnected, and were only partially successful; still the attacks *were* made, and although, if the same force had been properly and systematically applied, the French might have been completely dispersed, yet the result even of such disunited action was to enable von Goeben to make next day a concentric attack upon Faidherbe, and so deal with him as to prevent the French Northern Army from playing any further part in the campaign. The same writer comments, in No. 10, on the new French *loi des cadres* for the Cavalry, and appears inclined to belittle its importance; he declares also that 'all the experts' are not in favour of the changes it introduces, but the only expert called in support of this statement is General Aubier, and he does not appear to dispute that these changes seem to put the French Cavalry more on an equality with German than they were before. The writer further declares that the new Cavalry Divisions cannot be *always* together, owing to the impossibility of evacuating existing garrisons and forming new ones; this, he states, was one of the reasons why Germany decided against the formation of permanent Cavalry divisions—it is not, however, clear whether this is also held to be a sufficient reason for the Germans not even bringing them together during peace as do the French. No. 20 of this journal, that for February 11, contains an article of very special interest: it is called 'Cavalry Experiences from the Balkan War,' and is by Major Veit, the commander of the 1st Regiment of Turkish Lancers. He divides his paper under five headings—Horse, the Lance, the Sword, the Carbine, and the Officers, and has much of interest and importance to say about each and all of these. He writes in high praise of the condition and endurance of the remounts, partly Asiatic, chiefly Hungarian, horses, but none the less the division to which the writer belonged, that under Salih Pasha, lost by reason of hard work, exposure, and the awful condition of the country, due to a week's heavy rains, no less than 60 per cent. of its horses, the casualties through action amounting to 10 per

cent.; there seem to have been no young or very old horses in the ranks, their ages running from six to ten years. The writer's regiment was the only one in the Turkish Cavalry armed with the lance, and he claims that the weapon fully established its moral and material superiority over the sabre, so much so that other Cavalry detachments often begged for the attachment to them of a few lancers. Major Veit declares that the Lancer needs no other steel weapon, and he himself returned his sword 'to store'; he describes it as a purely peace-time weapon. He speaks highly of the use by Cavalry of a firearm. At Lule Burgas, he says, the whole dismounted division supported by fire the left wing of the army, checked pursuit, and caused the enemy's advance much loss of time by forcing early deployment. He has the greatest admiration for the courage, devotion, and example of Salih Pasha, the divisional commander, and has something to say about the need for officers to harden themselves for war by every possible means during peace. No. 21 of the journal contains an interesting historical review of the Cavalry reformation in Prussia in 1813, more than half of the old Prussian Cavalry regiments having been disbanded after the disasters of 1806, while in 1808 only six Cavalry brigades were permitted by the conqueror to exist. In 1812 Prussia had to send an auxiliary corps to Russia with the Grand Army, and with this went twenty-four squadrons—viz. two from twelve different regiments. The new formations are then described consequent on the withdrawal of Yorck's force, and the regeneration in Prussia of the national spirit. This number also contains a detailed account of all that will follow the *loi des cadres* in the French Cavalry, and closes with the remark that the change will involve many and great disadvantages, but that the writer has no intention of giving the French a helping hand by calling attention to these in more detail!

Messrs. Gale & Polden, Aldershot, have added two more works to their military series—viz. 'Tactics Made Easy,' by Lieut.-Col. S. T. Banning; and 'Guide to Promotion' in subject (a) (i), by Major R. F. Legge.

These should both be useful to junior officers who may find the official training book insufficiently explicit.

'Wellington and Waterloo.' By Major A. W. Redway. (London: T. C. & E. C. Jack.)

In less than 100 pages Major Redway gives us the life of the Duke, with two excellent succinct chapters on the battle of Waterloo. We have recently visited the battlefield of Waterloo and found that Major Redway's account is quite the clearest and shortest that has been written.

'The War Drama of the Eagles.' By Edward Fraser. (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street.)

This is a most romantic book, which follows the fortunes of the 'Eagles' of France from the date of their institution in 1804 to the battle of Waterloo. The account in the first chapter of how and why Napoleon came to select the eagle as the Imperial emblem is most instructive and amusing, for it also shows the composition of the Imperial Council and how the Emperor dealt with them. The book is very well printed, and illustrated with old prints and maps.

A History of the 7th Dragoon Guards has just been published, and will be reviewed in an early issue of this Journal. The volume comprises 'The Story of the Regiment' from 1688 to 1882, by Colonel C. W. Thompson, C.B., D.S.O., and 'With the Regiment in South Africa, 1900 to 1902,' a slightly abridged form of the 'South African Reminiscences,' which appeared in the *Black Horse Gazette*. There are three editions: (1) popular edition, price 5s. (to past and present N.C.O.s and men of the regiment, 3s.); (2) special edition, price 7s. 6d.; (3) *édition de luxe*, price 35s. The postage on all editions is 7d. Orders should be sent to the O.C., 7th Dragoon Guards Depot, Seaforth Barracks, Liverpool.

'Guerilla Leaders of the World.' From Charette to De Wet. By Percy Cross Standing. Published by Stanley Paul & Co., 31 Essex Street, Strand, London.

This is a very interesting and romantic book containing accounts of the lives and designs of all the most famous guerilla leaders from Charette to De Wet. It is of especial interest to Cavalrymen as showing what can be done by men of energy and character without book knowledge, but with experience. It goes outside the normal bounds of military history and deals with the exploits of patriots and soldiers of fortune. Some chapters on the Confederate Cavalry leaders have already been published in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL. The book deserves a place in every Cavalry soldier's library.

'The Campaign in Alsace.' By Brig.-General J. P. du Cane. Published by Hugh Rees, 5 Regent Street, London.

General Du Cane gives us a masterly analysis of the battles of Weissenburg and Wörth. He then applies our modern theories, as enunciated by our present training books, to these concrete cases. The results are a most lucid exposition of modern tactical methods in the battle and the co-operation of the three arms as conceived by the brain of our General Staff.

It is only by close study of the methods of the other arms that Cavalry officers will be able to give of their best on the day of trial under the test of war. In no other book that we have read are the duties of the three arms so shortly and clearly put. We therefore hope that our readers will take advantage of this timely publication.

We have received the fifth edition of Mr. Bertrand Stewart's 'Active Service Pocket Book,' which has been brought up-to-date to August 1912. In a preface the author states that he was personally unable to conclude the necessary revisions owing to his imprisonment in a German fortress, and that the work has been carried out by Major Singer and Mr. R. Burrows, M.A., LL.D.

This book is published by William Clowes & Sons, Ltd., 23 Cockspur Street, London, at the price of 4s. It comprises 975 pages, and contains a wonderful amount of information on all military subjects. It should be of great value to the many officers and others who wish a complete military library compressed and ready to hand.

NOTES

SUB-EDITORS

Brigadier-General F. D. V. Wing, C.B., R.A., who has hitherto represented the Royal Artillery on the Journal Committee, having been appointed to command the R.A., III. Division, has resigned that position. The Journal is much indebted to him for his own contributions, and also for obtaining very interesting articles from R.H.A. and R.F.A. officers. Lieut.-Colonel Noel Birch, R.F.A., has kindly taken his place.

Lieut.-Colonel N. M. Smyth, V.C., 6th Dragoon Guards, on vacating the South African Sub-Editorship, has joined the Committee of the CAVALRY JOURNAL.

Major J. J. Collyer, Cape Mounted Rifles, Staff Officer for General Staff Duties, Defence Head Quarters, Pretoria, has been appointed the South African Sub-Editor.

Major C. B. B. White, Director of Operations, Head Quarters, Commonwealth of Australia Forces, has been invited to become Sub-Editor in Australia.

THE CAVALRY BENEFIT ASSOCIATION

A meeting of the Committee of Management was held on April 3, at 20 Victoria Street, S.W. The accounts for the year were presented and passed. A vote of thanks was accorded to the Secretary, Miss Crosse, for her splendid work on behalf of the Society.

The 1st (Royal) Dragoons and the 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars have lately become members, now making eight regiments in all.

It is hoped that during the coming year other regiments will join, and take advantage of the many benefits offered by the Association.

THE STORY OF THE AIGUILLETTE



Royal Regiment
of Dragoons,
1742.

(Aiguillette on
left shoulder.)

At the present time when attention has recently been called to the aiguillette a brief summary of the facts known with regard to its employment as an adjunct to military uniform may be interesting. As is the case with so many other portions of military dress no exact date for the adoption of the aiguillette can be absolutely assigned. That its origin is French is obvious from its name—at any rate in its present form—and the tradition as to the adoption of the aiguillette into military uniform is also French. The story runs that Louis XIV. desiring to honour one of his officers detached the ribbons tipped with what we in England called aglets (aigulets, aiglets, or aygulets) from his own costume and affixed them to the shoulder of the soldier he desired to decorate. Another version of the story affirms


that the portion of costume thus honoured did not belong to the King, but consisted of one of the garters of a lady high in his regard at the period in question, which his sacred Majesty pulled off for the purpose then and there! Upon which shoulder he fixed them is unknown. That aglets formed a part of British dress long before that time we know; and their use was to enable a cord to be passed through an eyelet-hole more easily in order to fasten a garment. They occurred on doublets, hose, and hoods—also as adornments to sleeves. Sometimes instead of points, the usual form, the aglet was fashioned into a small figure known as an 'aglet-baby' (see *Taming of the Shrew*, Act 1, Scene 2). Ascham, writing of archery, says:

"In a brace, a man must take hede of three things,
That it be fast on, with laces, without agglettes."

When Lord Leicester was created a Knight of the Garter the robe of Garter King-at-Arms had on the sleeves '38 paire of gold aglets.'

Spenser describing the hood of a man writes: 'And on his head a hood with aglets sprad.' We have therefore a very respectable antiquity for the aiguillette; but we may be pardoned for another historic reference.

It was with countless aglets that the dress of Prince Hal was trimmed on the occasion of his reconciliation with his royal father after the Gascoigne fracas, at least traditionally. Now as to the military use of the aiguillette. Until 1751 the wearing of the aiguillette was, like many other things, practically arbitrary. Some regiments wore aiguillettes on the right shoulder, others on the left. The term 'shoulder knot' was often used instead of aiguillette. Reference to the first official illustrated book of military uniforms—that of 1742—throws some light on the subject. In the 1st Troop of Horse Grenadier Guards the aiguillette, a double loop with a tag to each, depends from behind the right shoulder. Similarly in the 2nd Troop. Aiguillettes do not appear in the pictures of some other Cavalry regiments, possibly because only one shoulder can be seen, and they may be there, but hidden from view. In the Royal Regiment of Dragoons it is worn on the left shoulder, in the Royal Regiment of Dragoons of North Britain on the right, and it similarly appears in one way or the other in other regiments.



Royal Regiment of
Dragoons of
North Britain,
4th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 10th,
11th, 12th, 13th, 14th
Dragoons, 1742.
(Aiguillette on and
behind right shoulder.)

Whether a regiment did or did not wear aiguillettes probably depended on the whim of the Colonel until 1751. As is well known the dress regulations of that year were the first to be observed with anything approaching completeness.

Strangely enough these shoulder knots or aiguillettes were commonly used to adorn the liveries of male domestic servants in England and Ireland from the last half of the seventeenth century and well into the eighteenth. In dress they marked the distinction between master and man. The custom then dwindled till it became as now, confined to state liveries, civic liveries, and the dress liveries of noblemen or gentlemen of coat armour. The assumed liveries of the *nouveaux-riches* we need not consider. Now, after the Restoration military uniform proper had begun to be a recognised fact.

Aiguillettes later came into wear, that is to say some time between 1643 and 1715, or at any rate, before 1742. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, however, as a military decoration they appear to a certain extent to have fallen into disuse. Aiguillettes were, however, revived by the warrant of 1811, when Officers of Heavy Cavalry were ordered to wear at a drawing-room or levee 'long coats as at present with an aiguillette on the right shoulder.' A study of contemporary portraits shows that officers of Dragoon Guards wore silver aiguillettes with the scarlet coat on all occasions. The Household Cavalry of course had worn them then as now, on the right shoulder for officers, and the left for N.C.O.s and bandsmen.


The Dress Regulations of 1822 state that aiguillettes are to be worn by the Officers of the Household Brigade, Heavy Dragoons, and Lancers, but not by Light Dragoons or Hussars. In 1828 both epaulettes and aiguillettes were ordered to be worn by Officers of Heavy Cavalry.

Between 1820 and 1830 the wearing of cotton or worsted aiguillettes by the N.C.O.s and men appears to have been dropped; at any rate, no special orders can be traced. There is no mention of aiguillettes in the Dress Regulations for 1831, 1834, 1846, 1855, or 1857, but in 1840 the trumpeters of Dragoon Guards still appeared in aiguillettes on the left shoulder, except the Carabineers, who wore them on the right side.

We need not more than mention that A.D.C.s wear them and also that they form a portion of the naval uniform of some ranks.

Bandsmen have been in the habit of wearing aiguillettes. Only those, however, of the bands of the Household Cavalry are issued by Government, just as are those of the N.C.O.s.

Up to quite lately the bandsmen and trumpeters of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons wore aiguillettes, but not of Hussars or Lancers. These aiguillettes were supplied by the regimental bands funds, which were largely contributed to by the officers, and the same source supplied the music pouch and its shoulder belt, which is as essential a part of a bandsman's equipment as his instrument, but is not legislated for in the dress and equipment regulations.



1st Troop of
Horse Grenadier
Guards, 1742.
(Aiguillette on and
behind right shoulder.)

There was, however, a short break in this unofficial wearing of aiguillettes by bandsmen in the very early 'eighties. When General FitzWygram was Inspector-General of Cavalry he invariably forbade their use in every regiment in which they appeared. Once, however, in the case of the band of the 3rd Dragoon Guards, the wearing of aiguillettes by their band, to the joy of the regiment, escaped his notice.

It is much to be desired that the wearing of aiguillettes by the trumpeters and bandsmen of Dragoon Guards and Dragoon Regiments should be reintroduced, and an Army Order on the subject issued, for it is well known that regimental bands are the best recruiting agents, and hence the expediency of their being smartly dressed.

There is no doubt that some peculiarity in turn-out, such as the wings of infantry bandsmen, increases the *amour propre* of the wearer and makes for efficiency, in addition to the advantage of the bandsmen being distinguishable from the private soldiers.

C. R. B. B.

THE LATE VISCOUNT TREDEGAR.

WE record with regret the death of Viscount Tredegar, which occurred on March 11 at his seat at Newport, Mon. He had been ill for some considerable time.

Lord Tredegar was the second son of Sir Charles Morgan Robinson, first Baron Tredegar, and was born at Ruperra Castle, Cardiff, on April 28, 1831. Having been educated at Eton, he entered the 17th Lancers as cornet in July, 1849, became lieutenant on May 31 following, and captain on April 22, 1853.

He accompanied his regiment to the Crimea, and was present at the battles of Alma, Balaclava, and Inkerman, remaining on duty at the seat of war till his retirement early in the year 1855, which was probably accelerated by the death of his elder brother in January, 1854. At Balaclava he led a squadron in the famous charge of the Light Brigade, and was one of the only three officers of the regiment who came out of the charge unscathed. In 1858 the Hon Godfrey Charles Morgan, as he then was, entered upon a political career, being elected Conservative member for Brecon, which constituency he continued to represent till he succeeded to the barony on the death of his father in April, 1875.

Lord Tredegar was essentially a man of action, and of many and varied activities, for irrespective of the attention necessary to be devoted to the details of the management of an estate of some 40,000 acres, he was honorary colonel of the Royal Monmouth Engineers, master of the Tredegar Hunt, Lord-Lieutenant of Monmouthshire since 1899, Deputy Lieutenant and J.P. for Brecon, as well as J.P. for Glamorgan, and also sat as vice-chairman and alderman on the Monmouthshire County Council, and acted as president of the Monmouth County Association since its institution.

Lord Tredegar was an original subscriber to the CAVALRY JOURNAL, and always took the greatest interest in the publication.

Balaclava, the frontispiece of this Number, (reproduced by kind permission of the Officers of the 13th Hussars), depicts an incident during this immortal charge :—

Sergeant J. Malone, 13th Light Dragoons, with Troop Sergeant-Major Berryman and Sergeant Farrell, both of the 17th Lancers, rescuing Captain Webb of the 17th Lancers.

These three Non-commissioned Officers, for their heroic bravery, were all subsequently awarded the much-coveted Victoria Cross.

WEIGHT OF HORSES.

A system has been started at the Cavalry School, Netheravon, by which the horses are weighed at various periods during their training. The first results are now to hand. In March 1912 thirty-five horses were weighed, of these nineteen were three years old, fourteen four years old, one five years old, one six years old. They were weighed again in October and November.

The average weight in March was 1,010 lbs.; in November, after their first stage of training, they showed an average increase of 113½ lbs.

'NO SURRENDER OATES'

BY A BROTHER OFFICER.

CAPTAIN L. E. G. OATES was an officer whose death is an irreparable loss to the Cavalry—quiet and unassuming, fond of horses and of adventure, brave with a cool courage, which had been put to the proof time after time, earnestly keen on his profession, and a born leader. One of his most marked characteristics was the esteem in which he was held by the men of his regiment. He secured their admiration and confidence at the same time as he gained his soubriquet 'No Surrender' at the outset of his career, when a recruit on his way to join his regiment. This esteem was never lessened, and was fully justified by his every word and deed, from the time he joined to his death. He possessed an unusual combination of reticence and humour. Although a most modest man, his wit was audacious, and he had a great gift of humorous expression. It is believed that those who were with him in the Antarctic regarded this quality as one of his most valuable assets in the dreary circumstances which they necessarily encountered.

Captain Oates was the eldest son of the late Mr. W. E. Oates, of Gestingthorp Hall, on the borders of Essex and Suffolk. Mr. W. E. Oates was a well-known sportsman and big game shot, and from him and his uncle, Mr. Frank Oates, Captain Oates inherited his love of adventure.

He went to Eton (Mr. Rawlin's House) in 1894, and left two years later, owing to a severe attack of pneumonia. During this short time he made some mark at both cricket and football.

He entered the army through the Militia and was posted to the Inniskilling Dragoons on May 30, 1900. He was sent out to South Africa with a draft of recruits a few months later; on arrival, instead of being sent on to join their regiment in the Transvaal, they were kept for some time in Cape Colony attached to the force under Colonel Parsons.

It was now that Oates distinguished himself on the occasion referred to above. Early in March, Aberdeen was invested by the Boers, and Parsons was sent to its relief. He forced his way into the place, and next day sent out three officer's patrols. Oates was in charge of one of these with fifteen Inniskilling recruits. The following account of the gallant fight they made is taken from *With the Inniskilling Dragoons in the Boer War*, by Lieut.-Colonel J. W. Yardley:—

'Meantime the other Imperial Yeomanry patrol had been captured, whilst Lieut. Oates, with the Inniskilling patrol, was making a splendid fight in a river-bed about six miles out. Taking advantage of all cover, he directed each man, as he finished his ammunition, to creep back to the town with his rifle; several were seriously wounded, but managed to crawl away. In the end, after four hours' fighting, only Oates himself remained; with one of the last shots fired by the enemy he was shot through the thigh, the bone being broken. Twice during the engagement, Scheepers, who was in command of the Boers, had sent a white flag demanding surrender, but on both occasions got the same reply—viz. "that they were there to fight, not surrender." At one time the Boers got up to within twenty yards of the small party, but finally gave up the attempt to capture it, and did not secure a single rifle. It was not till 6.30 P.M. that Lieut. Oates was picked up by the ambulance under Captain White, which had been searching many hours for him, for he had lain wounded in the hot sun since 10 A.M.'

Oates was then invalided home for a short time, but was back again by the end of the year. After the war his regiment moved to Ireland, where his chief amusements were hunting and steeplechasing. He succeeded in winning the following amongst other races :—

Military Cup, Dundalk, 1904, won by Gesting Thorp.

St. Stephen's Plate, Leopardstown, 1904, won by Gabriel.

Irish Grand Military, Punchestown, 1905, won by Gabriel.

Grand Military Handicap, Sandown, 1907, won by Gabriel.

He was also very skilful at sailing a small four-tonner, and in his spare time he was never happier than in taking her out in rough weather.

After a year or two in Ireland Oates went on with his regiment to Egypt, being then Adjutant, and from there to Mhow, Central India. Here he showed good sport with a pack of hounds he had collected at home and hunted himself.

Whilst on manœuvres near Delhi in January 1910 Oates read of Scott's preparations for the South Pole expedition. The idea appealed to him at once; he cabled and offered his services, as a Cavalry officer and master of hounds, to look after the ponies and dogs. Scott accepted him, and his services were lent by the War Office. Oates then returned to England, and spent his time before the expedition left in a thorough study of navigation. At this time his chief ambition was to be one of the five selected to make the supreme effort to reach the Pole. The remainder of his story, so far as is known at present, is soon told.

The small party under Scott was struggling back in face of stupendous difficulties after having succeeded in their mission. They were delayed by a blizzard, with their food supply running out. The only chance that the stronger members had of reaching safety lay in dashing on without delay the moment the blizzard ceased. Oates was very ill; weak, and with badly frost-bitten hands and feet, he was unable to travel without his comrades' help. Captain Scott left the following record of his death, which took place on his thirty-second birthday, March 17, 1912: 'He was a brave soul; he slept through the night hoping not to wake, but he awoke in the morning; it was blowing a blizzard. Oates said 'I am just going outside, I may be some time.' He went out into the blizzard and we have not seen him since. We knew that Oates was walking to his death, but though we tried to dissuade him, we knew that it was the act of a brave man and an English gentleman.'

This act was typical of the young officer who eleven years previously had remained fighting, wounded and alone, whilst his men got back to safety near Aberdeen.

At first thought we cannot but question whether the end aimed at, the conquest of the South Pole, could ever be worth the loss of such a life as his, or of those he tried to save. But in his sacrifice, we, his fellow-countrymen and comrades, have gained an example which should endure for all time.

What courage and firmness may not weaker natures in future times of stress be able to borrow from his record, if those 'beset by hardship' or in other difficulties decide on their line of action after asking themselves the simple question, What would Oates do if he were here in my place now?

A Memorial Fund to the late Captain L. E. G. Oates has been formed, and officers who are desirous of subscribing should send their contributions to Colonel E. A. Herbert, M.V.O., 15 High Street, Shrewsbury.

PROBLEM No. XII.—RESULT

THE two following N.C.O.s have been each awarded a prize of a silver wrist watch for the best solutions of this problem :—

Staff-Sergeant-Major J. S. Bryant, 26th Light Horse, Tasmania.

Sergeant F. White, 7th (Queen's Own) Hussars.

An extra prize of an English silver mounted hunting crop has been awarded by the Managing Editor to :—

Jemadar Safdar Husain Khan, 23rd Cavalry, Indian Army.

The following is the correct solution (the Problem and Map will be found in the October Number, 1912).

SOLUTION

SITUATION I.

A.I. (a) He should look round his horses, leave behind any that he does not think fit to do a long day, and see to the fitting of the saddlery and the shoeing of the remainder.

(b) He should see that the men's water-bottles are filled, and that they have food for themselves and forage for their horses.

(c) He should explain his instructions and his plan to his men, so that every man will know how to carry on the duty in the event of accidents.

A.II. Sergeant X's instructions are to reconnoitre the country in the direction of Driefontein and to ascertain, &c. In order to do this he should send out :—

(a) A right patrol, consisting of one N.C.O. and two men, to work round the eastern end of the Pienaars Poort ridge and thence along the east side of the Paarde Kop-Roode Kop ridge to Spitz Kop with orders to report to him at Roode Kop.

(b) A left patrol, consisting of one N.C.O. and two men, to work round the western side of the Pienaars Poort ridge and thence along the west side of Wildebeeste Kop to Brand Kop with orders to report to him by signal at Roode Kop.

Sergeant X himself should move with a small advanced guard of from two to three men via Pienaars Poort and thence along the west side of the Paarde Kop-Roode Kop ridge. He should keep close to the high ground, but should warn all his men to be careful not to expose themselves unnecessarily. He should move by 'bounds' and should move quickly from one tactical point to the next.

SITUATION II.

A.I. No. Since the fire was not heavy and no enemy could be seen it is probable that the ridge is only held by at most a few scouts. The country on either side of the road is open, so there is nothing to prevent him from galloping forward and trying to get round the enemy's flank. In this case it is improbable that the enemy will be holding both sides of the Poort, so he should gallop for the high ground west of the Poort.

SITUATION III.

A.I. No. Sergeant X should adhere to his original plan and work along the west side of the Paarde Kop-Roode Kop ridge with his patrol. The

N.C.O.s in charge of the left patrol on arrival at Brand Kop would search the country in the direction of Driefontein with his glasses and would report by signal to Sergeant X as ordered.

A.II. No report should be sent in. Sergeant X has not yet seen anything which throws any light on the questions on which information is required.

SITUATION IV.

A.I. Sergeant X is still in the dark as to the whereabouts of the enemy's main body about which the officer commanding requires information. Hence no report should be sent in.

SITUATION V.

A.I. Sergeant X should write the following report :—
The Officer Commanding.

Truter's Drift.

(Date) No. 1. A hostile column, estimated strength about 300 mounted infantry moving south-east along the Driefontein-Klipbank road, passed the bridge half mile north-west of V in Vaal Kranz at 9 A.M. I am held up by a force estimated at 35 holding Roode Kop. I shall hold my present position until forced to retire, when I shall retire towards Paarde Kop. There is no sign of any enemy at Driefontein.

Bosch Kop
9.30 A.M.

X SERGEANT,
12th Hussars.

A.II. Sergeant X should send such an important message in duplicate by separate messengers, one of whom should be the man who actually saw the hostile column moving along the Driefontein-Klipbank road.

The answers received from the following are worthy of mention :—

Corporal of Horse, J. Jordan, Royal Horse Guards.

Sergeant W. Evans, 8th (K.R.I.) Hussars.

Lance-Sergeant H. Davies, 11th (P.A.O.) Hussars.

Sergeant A. Dadd, 14th (King's) Hussars.

Sergeant T. Roxby, 14th (The King's) Hussars.

Corporal C. Ryland, 15th (The King's) Hussars.

Lance-Sergeant R.M.D. Dunning, 16th (The Queen's) Lancers.

Sergeant J. Rawlinson, 17th (D.C.O.) Lancers.

Sergeant H. E. Harrowven, 20th Hussars.

Sergeant F. Easterford, Essex Yeomanry.

Sergeant G. W. Colyer, Royal East Kent Yeomanry.

Sergeant O. C. Whiteman, Surrey Yeomanry.

Q.-M. Sergeant D. Barrow, Per. Staff Royal Monmouth Engineers.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL Committee is greatly indebted to Colonel Coventry Williams, commanding the North Midland Mounted Brigade, and to Major J. Knowles, 15th Hussars, Brigade Major, for kindly setting the problem and adjudicating the solutions.

Problem No. XIII., which will appear in the July number, will be for native officers of the Indian Cavalry, and will be set in Roman Urdu.

A. L.

THE KING'S BIRTHDAY.

The King's birthday will be celebrated on June 3 at all naval and military stations, as well as in London. This is the actual date on which His Majesty attains his forty-eighth year.

APPOINTMENTS AND COMMANDS

Major-General W. E. Marsland has been gazetted Colonel of the 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards, vice the late Major-General R. T. Godman.

Colonel C. J. Briggs, commanding the South-Eastern Mounted Brigade (Territorials), and formerly of the 1st (King's) Dragoon Guards, has been selected to succeed Brigadier-General Kavanagh, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., in command of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot.

Colonel G. F. Milner, D.S.O., late 5th (R.I.) Lancers, has been appointed to succeed Major-General J. M. Babington, C.B., C.M.G., in the command of the Lowland Mounted Brigade.

ON SHOEING

By LIEUT-COLONEL C. B. BULKELEY-JOHNSON, *Royal Scots Greys*.

We are much indebted to Captain Rees Mogg for the clear and concise *précis* from the text-books contained in the first portion of his criticism of my article, and it should be of the greatest assistance to study to those officers who have not his opportunities and resources.

But, taking his criticism as a whole, I think it is only fair to myself and to the interests of Army shoeing to reply to the not very scrupulous attack on my article. I have neither the wish nor the ability to enter into a theoretical discussion on the formation and functions of the horse's foot, nor indeed the temerity when I see the formidable list of names quoted at the end.

It is only natural that an expert should feel resentment at the intrusion of a layman into the field of his special labours, especially when that intrusion implies criticism. That my article did imply criticism cannot be denied, in so far that its intention was to demonstrate the successful results of a system of shoeing which is not in accordance with the theories and principles held and taught by the veterinary authorities. It is indeed by abandoning some of these principles that results have been attained which appear to me to amply justify the departure.

His reply to my statement of successfully achieved results (tabulated by members of his own corps) appears to be only a reiteration of these theories, which, of course, are well known to myself and all others who have much to do with horses.

It was only after a thorough inquiry and an extensive experience of these results that I, and others, including men of standing and experience (not all connected with the Army), were converted. It would have been more satisfactory, and perhaps more fair, if Captain Rees Mogg had taken the trouble to make a cursory examination of these facts and figures on the spot before plunging into his denunciation.

Captain Millar's system of shoeing is either right or wrong. If it is right, its adoption would be to the benefit of shoeing in general and, therefore, add to the efficiency of the Cavalry, and should be practised by all.

If it is wrong, as stated by Captain Rees Mogg, backed up by many eminent theorists, it should be practised by none. Whether it is right or wrong can be proved only by experience and a study of results.

Its adoption in my regiment has very materially improved the efficiency of the horses and the state of their feet. It has also been taken up by many private owners, some of them with large studs, and by some of the large horse-dealers in Ireland, and it has met with the approval of a great number of men of experience and standing in the world of horses who have taken the trouble to give it a thought. Even if everyone does not agree with the system in its entirety, it is unthinkable to me that some benefits would not follow from a study of it and its results.

It is, I believe, the privilege in courts of law for the prosecuting counsel to have the last word. I will borrow that privilege and proceed to criticise his criticisms.

(1) This is evidence that he has not taken the trouble to read my article with any great care. I expressly stated that the nine horses were the property of acquaintances, met casually. I am afraid, therefore, that his researches into the archives of the Veterinary Service were labour wasted.

(2) I can only assert that his theoretical objections do not work out in practice. An ounce of fact is worth a ton of theory. An inspection of the feet of the horses of my regiment would have shown him that the frogs are not contracted, and are doing the full duty intended by nature.

(3) and (4) These are two of the main points on which we differ, after experience of the successful results of Captain Millar's work.

(5) I refer him to Instruction 3, page 24, of the manual of his own Service.

(7) and (8) As in Nos. 3 and 4.

(11) I wrote with the object of treading as lightly as possible on anybody's toes. The phrase 'so called' might perhaps have been clearer had I written it 'as diagnosed by certain Veterinary Surgeons.'

(12) As in 5. To rasp a toe to such an extent is only advocated when it is necessary to remedy the serious defects which have been allowed to arise by the system generally practised.

(14) Theory again. I was careful to point out that a happy mean must be kept.

(15) As in Nos. 3, 4, 7, and 8.

(16) I must point out that the nails are none of my drawing. They were evidently added by the printer's draughtsman in an attempt to improve on my amateurish effort, as, unhappily, I was unable to find any diagrams to suit my argument in either General Smith's or Mr. Hunting's books.

(17) and (18) My words are misquoted and the sense twisted. The phrase was 'as if shin sore.' This state is only temporary during treatment, and is surely preferable to a permanent laminitic condition.

(19) Anyone with much experience in riding, and who has ridden hacks with long and sloping pasterns and those with short and upright ones, let the state of their frogs be what they may, could put Captain Rees Mogg right on this point.

(20) He could always have obtained this information from the V.O. in charge if he had taken the trouble to enquire before writing his article. The answer he would have been given is 'None.'

(21) As in Nos. 3, 4, 7, 8, and 15.

(22) If the word 'too' is omitted in the second part of this criticism, these paragraphs, although not taken in the sense intended by the writer, exactly sum up the contention I put forward.

A SHOOTING TRIP IN THE PAMIRS AND THIAN SHAN MOUNTAINS

By CAPTAIN C. H. PETO, *10th Royal Hussars*

SOME sportsmen may be deterred from shooting in Chinese Turkestan by an exaggerated idea of the trouble of making the necessary arrangements and ignorance of how much the trip will cost. I hope that these notes may be of use to anyone wishing to shoot in those parts.

The first permission required is that of the Government of India to use the Gilgit Road to the Pamirs; this should be applied for quite six months before the date of departure. If this permission is not granted, leave to use the Leh route over the Karakoram Pass must at once be applied for to the Secretary, Game Preservation Department, Srinagar. As there is little chance of getting an *ovis poli* of much over fifty inches on the Pamirs, some may prefer the chance of ammon, Tibetan antelope, and burhel which the Leh route would provide. Supposing that, probably after three or four months' delay, permission is granted the sportsman to use the Gilgit Road, applications must at once be made to:—

(1) H.B.M.'s Minister at Pekin for Chinese Passport, stating route through Chinese Turkestan.

(2) H.B.M.'s Ambassador at St. Petersburg for permission to traverse Russian territory, and stating arms and ammunition.

About a fortnight before departure one should apply to the Political Agent at Gilgit to arrange for the journey through Hunza, and to the Consul-General in Kashgar to send the required number of yaks to the Hunza frontier. I did neither of these two things, and was delayed in consequence.

The question of personnel is a difficult one. A Kashmir shikari is generally a thief, and his knowledge of Turki is sure to be practically nil. I took with me an Indian bearer with a fair knowledge of Turki, a Kashmiri cook and a coolie—neither of the latter had been further than Gilgit, but the former had lived in Kashgar. The coolie went sick in Hunza and returned; I was well rid of him. My battery consisted of two .375 rifles and a .22, which serves to fill the pot and saves taking a scatter gun. Ammunition must be new and in tin-lined cases. Through ignoring this my ammunition in the Thian Shans required the 300 yards sight to hit a bull's-eye at 120 yards, with the result that most of my time was spent in tracking wounded ibex over precipices—heartbreaking work for me and brutal to the ibex.

Stores should be cut down to bare necessities, as the cost of the trip depends on the amount taken; tea, baking powder, tobacco should be taken to last the whole trip; a few tins of meat for emergency, and enough jam to last over the Pamirs, as more can be made from fresh fruit in Turkestan.

Shooting boots must be of the very best, and three or four pairs, with plenty of spare nails, should be taken.

If, on leaving Bandipur, one's kit does not exceed twenty coolie loads, £300 should cover the cost of the trip (all in Rawal Pindi to London) from May to the end of October. This should give one ample time to get wapiti, as they lose their velvet about September 10.

It is better to hire ponies than to buy them, though it is hard to know the proper rates, as no two people seem to pay the same—and the natives of the plains, unlike the Kashmiris, would probably say they were satisfied if they received nothing at all. Of course, one must pay everyone oneself and not depute it to the servants, who will find plenty of chances of robbing their sahib and the natives without these extra opportunities being thrown in.

On arrival in the Thian Shan Mountains shikaris, ponies, and syces are hired at thirty, six, and fifteen roubles a month respectively. It is better to give the shikari two underlings, and these should be paid according to their deserts; they must all be made to cater for themselves, otherwise their appetites increase to an alarming extent, and as rice has to be fetched from about ten marches away, this means that one's personal servants are always away getting it.

For ibex and karelini the Agiaz and Koksu Nalas are best. In the former the ibex run rather bigger, but the latter is very much the best for the karelini. To reach the best ground—the watershed beyond Karagaitash—two snow passes have to be crossed, and the going is rather harder than it is in the Agiaz. There are plenty of ibex on the Koksu, and though fifty-one inches was my best, I saw some better ones and came on a fifty-five-inch, which had been dead about a month. As the natives are poachers and nomads, the shooting varies with their movements. The Agiaz is inhabited by Kalmucks, the best shikaris and worst poachers, and suffers more than the Koksu, which is not much poached except from the Juldüz Valley.

The easiest, cheapest, and quickest way to shoot in the Thian Shans is to go from England by the Trans-Siberian Railway to Omsk, thence by steamer up the Irtish River to Semipalatinsk, and ten days on by tarantass to Kuldja, which is only four marches from the mouth of the Koksu. The Altai Mountains are easier still to reach either from Irtish or Yenisei Rivers.

The British Vice-Consul at Omsk—Mr. A. Jordan—is very kind in giving advice and assistance to sportsmen, but to go without consulting the diaries of other sportsmen, some of which are in the possession of the Royal Geographical Society, would be waste of time, as the best shooting ground is very limited in area and difficult to find.

The rivers Irtish and Yenisei are free from ice roughly from April 15 to October 15. If the rivers are still open the Siberian route is quicker than the Tashkent, and the Russian Government are more willing to allow travellers by that route. The Siberian Post Road is better than the Tashkent, and the Russian police do not bother one as much as they do in the Russian Turkestan. A few English sovereigns and the rest in Russian notes, or a letter of credit, will take one anywhere, but if the start is made from India about Rs. 1,000 in silver will have to be carried.

FOREIGN

Austria-Hungary.—It is stated that important Cavalry manœuvres will this year be held under the direction of General von Brendermann, the Inspector of Cavalry. These will last ten days, from August 28 to September 6, and will be carried out in the region enclosed by the towns of Komorn, Totis, Kisber, and Batolna. The units taking part will be the 2nd Cavalry Division from Pressburg—temporarily reduced to two regiments by the withdrawal of those which are required to attend the operations of the 3rd and 5th Army Corps, but strengthened by the attachment of a regiment from the 3rd Cavalry Division; the 3rd Cavalry Division from Vienna; and a Division of Honved Cavalry, formed from the second and third brigades—making a total in all of eleven regiments. The programme includes three days of brigade manœuvres, three days of divisional operations against a flagged enemy, while the remainder of the period will be occupied by the manœuvres of Cavalry corps opposing one another—two corps being formed for the occasion, the one, by the combined two divisions of the common, or joint, army, the other by strengthening the Honved Division with an additional regiment.

France.—The following are the arrangements proposed for Cavalry manœuvres in France during this year. At the beginning of September operations of Cavalry—*manœuvre d'ensemble*—will take place near Sissonne and will be attended by the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Cavalry Divisions, the third of these being increased to a strength of six regiments by the inclusion in it of the 6th Cavalry Brigade; they will be exercised under General Sordet, who commands the 10th Army Corps. The 1st, 2nd, and 8th Cavalry Divisions will have two days' manœuvres, and they will also attend the operations of the 3rd, 8th, and 20th Army Corps. The 1st Cavalry Division will remain at a strength of four regiments, but the other two will be temporarily increased to six regiments each. Three days' manœuvres are provided for the 6th Cavalry Division about La Courtine, and during its march to the theatre of operations this will have the Cavalry brigade of the 13th Corps attached to it. A brigade which has been put together for general manœuvre purposes will have two days' exercise in brigade; the 7th Cavalry Division, the Cavalry brigades of the 4th and 5th Corps will have six days' manœuvres in La Beauce; while the brigades of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 10th, 11th, and 14th Corps will also be exercised in five days' operations.

The main alterations in the organisation of the French Cavalry due to the *loi des Cadres*, which came into effect in December last, are as under: there is a total increase of two regiments of Chasseurs à cheval; the corps Cavalry is reduced, each corps having only one Cavalry regiment—the 6th and 20th Corps on the eastern frontier retaining, however, their brigades—and the number of Cavalry divisions can, therefore, now be increased from eight to ten. Each regiment will consist of one dépôt and four service squadrons, and will be increased in strength by thirty-two to forty horses and 100 men, while a substantial addition is made to the establishment of officers and non-commissioned officers. The cost of these changes amounts to six million francs.

As announced some months ago, several light Cavalry regiments—the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 8th Hussars, the 8th and 14th Chasseurs à cheval—were issued with lances for experimental purposes, but it seems to be considered that, while the difficulties of instruction are not insurmountable, the lances

appear to rather over-weight the smaller and lighter men and horses of such regiments.

Germany.—By the law of 1905 the establishment of the Cavalry was fixed at 510 squadrons; the law of 1911 gave it no increase; while that of 1912 added to this arm no more than six squadrons—five to the Prussian Cavalry, and one to the 5th Bavarian Cheveau-légers, which had up to then only four squadrons. Three other Bavarian Cavalry regiments have still only four squadrons each. There are as yet no signs of a permanent divisional organisation.

The veterinary report on the German Cavalry for 1911 has lately been published, and discloses a great increase in sickness among horses, amounting to an average throughout the Cavalry of 57.63 per cent. The highest percentage is in the 19th Uhlans, 116.47 per cent.; the 20th Uhlans, 99.36 per cent.; and the 7th Dragoons, 114.71 per cent.

Russia.—By the Prikaz No. 483 of last September, the price of remounts has been raised as under: for 1913, saddle-horses for Cavalry and Artillery raised from £41 to £42 10s.; draught-horses (Artillery) from £37 4s. to £38 15s. For the years 1914 to 1918 inclusive the prices will be, for riding-horses for Cavalry and Artillery £45 5s., and for Artillery draught-horses £41 15s.

‘AVESNE-LE-SEC AND LE CATEAU CAMBRESIS.’

Translated and abridged from the *Kavalleristische Monatshefte*.

By COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B.

THE time was the autumn of 1793—during the second of the campaigns undertaken by the First Coalition against the as yet unappreciated might of the young French Republic; at the close of the brief yet brilliant offensive, marked by such names as Aldenhoven, Neerwinden, and Löwe, an offensive which had completely destroyed the French army. Then came a time when this successful offensive disappeared in the mist of a hopeless campaign of positions, which wasted its energies in the siege and capture of the smaller French posts on the fortress-border—one small post being taken regularly every month, and time and opportunity being thus afforded to the French for the reorganisation of their army, and for once again putting it in the field against the Allies at a strength which these had never anticipated—a strength arrived at by calling up, in desperation, ever-increasing levies. Through Flanders and Belgium, through Luxemburg, and even into Germany, there stretched an apparently endless, and naturally somewhat weak, outpost line, covering the sieges of the different petty fortresses; while in rear of such of these as were not already invested, the newly created French army was collecting in huge practice camps.

The little fortress of Le Quesnoy had fallen on September 11; but the energetic Houchard, the Commander of the French forces in Flanders, knew only of the straits it had been in—he had not yet learnt of its actual capture. Consequently, on September 12 he directed four columns upon Marchienne, Douain, Saulzoir, and the Forest of Mormal—all four being supporting points in the Allied outpost line—with the intention of endeavouring to raise the siege of Le Quesnoy. The first two and the fourth of these columns, meeting with serious resistance, early gave up all idea of an advance, and fell back without having suffered any appreciable losses.

The third of these columns, however, met with a far worse fate. It came upon an opponent who was slow to loose his hold once he had come to grips—this was Prince John of Liechtenstein, the Pappenheim of the Austrian Cavalry during the war with Revolutionary France. He was in charge of the outposts about Saulzoi, and had under him his own regiment of Kinsky Cheveau-légers (now the 10th Dragoons) and five companies of O'Donnell's Free Corps. Receiving intelligence that 6,000 infantry, two Cavalry regiments (some 800 sabres), and twenty guns were moving in one column from Bouchain and Cambrai, he at once resolved to move forward and attack it. Two of O'Donnell's companies were placed in occupation of Saulzoi, so as to protect the right flank, the other three were stationed by the Prince to the east of that place as a reserve; he then sent a request for support to Major-General Bellegarde, who was at Avesne-les-Aubert with the regiment of Kaiser Hussars and a few companies of light troops. An appeal for assistance was also sent to Prince Hohenlohe, the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

Trotting forward in the direction of the enemy, Liechtenstein fell in with two squadrons of Nassau Cuirassiers (now the 5th Dragoons), then just returning from a reconnaissance. At once, and on his own responsibility, the Prince ordered these to join him, directing them to follow him as a support.

Increasing the pace, he now rode straight at the two opposing regiments of Cavalry, and, attacking with great vigour, he drove them back upon Villers au Cauchy.* One of the two French regiments of horse, the newly created *Hussards de la Mort*, who had sworn never either to give or to accept quarter—a desperate oath by which, as a matter of fact, they never really abided—left on the ground their Commanding Officer, who had been slain in the *mêlée* by Count Mensdorff-Pouilly, a cadet of only sixteen years. The pursuit came to an end at Villers au Cauchy, where the French Infantry and Artillery had by this time arrived, and under the fire of their twenty guns Prince Liechtenstein was obliged to draw back and re-form his squadrons behind the nearest cover. It was impossible to charge the guns and the unbroken Infantry, but by rushing out from cover as though with the intention of attacking, the enemy was held to his ground and could make no forward movement; while the swarms of skirmishers which broke out from the Infantry squares were attacked, ridden over, and cut down whenever they ventured beyond the support of their guns and Infantry. In this way sixty French *tirailleurs* were cut down, and for two full hours ten Austrian squadrons—about 1,200 horsemen—pinned down 6,000 infantry and twenty guns to the high ground about Villers au Cauchy. In the meantime help was drawing near to the scene of action—two squadrons of Kaiser Hussars, and behind them, accompanying the Chief of the General Staff, came two squadrons of the Regiment Royal Allemand.† At the same time there appeared on the right flank of the French four squadrons of Kaiser Hussars sent forward from Avesne-les-Aubert by General Bellegarde. To meet these the French, now formed in two huge squares with the guns in the interval between them, changed front

* Spelt thus in the original German.

† This regiment, enlisted wholly from Germans, was a *corps d'élite* of the old French Royal army. It was to have accompanied King Louis on his flight had he not attempted his escape in disguise. Thus compromised, the Royal Allemand went over to the Austrian service during the winter of 1792-3, and being made into two squadrons formed the nucleus of the present 12th Dragoons.

while falling back upon Avesne-le-Sec. It was at this moment that Prince Hohenlohe gave the order to attack.

Colonel Prince Liechtenstein led his Cheveau-légers—to which the Nassau Cuirassiers, the Royal Allemand, and Major Count Tauentzien, the Prussian Military Attaché, had joined themselves—round by the north of Villers au Cauchy against the square on the left, while Colonel Blaskovics, with the Kaiser Hussars, moved round the village by the south and east against the other of the two great squares. The French Cavalry gave way without making any resistance, while the French Infantry at first withheld their fire, probably because they imagined that this too was no more than a feint attack; only the guns continued to send their death-dealing shot against the oncoming horsemen. This time, however, the attack was no feint. When the Cavalry were within fifty paces volleys at last broke out from the faces of the squares, but, delivered hurriedly and in confusion, they did small harm to the charging squadrons. With exultant shouts the Imperial horsemen broke into the square—in front of all of them, waving his hat and leaving the bloody work to subordinates, was the Prince. In a few moments the square was rent asunder, the line of guns was silenced and captured, and then the sabres of the Austrian Cavalry began terrible execution upon the terrified Frenchmen.

Influenced by the sight of this achievement, the breaking of the other square was an even easier matter. Here the fire discipline of the French was worse; file-firing broke out from the square at an ineffective range, thus encouraging the Hussars all the more. And the French, recognising the futility of their fire, and having before them the fate of the other square—whence the Cheveau-légers and Dragoons, mad-drunk with victory, were now charging down upon them—did not wait the onset of the Hussars. Seized with panic they turned and fled, while, equally over those who stood their ground and those who ran, the Kaiser Hussars charged in full career, cutting down all to right and left.

Rallying quickly, and supported now by a division (two squadrons) of the Barco Hussars advancing from Douchy, the Austrian Cavalry took up the pursuit, which only ended under the walls and guns of Bouchain. Thus eighteen squadrons, counting no more than 2,000 horsemen and unsupported by either of the other arms, had completely overthrown a body of nearly 7,000 men. Two thousand of the enemy were left dead or wounded on the field, two thousand prisoners were made, while among the spoils of victory were eighteen guns, eighteen ammunition wagons, five stand of colours, more than 3,000 effective muskets—and all this with a loss of only two officers and seven men killed, four officers and fifty-eight men wounded, and forty-five dead and 142 wounded horses.

If the day of Avesne-le-Sec is one of the most glorious for the Austrian Cavalry, its glory is almost eclipsed by that of another, the day of the action at Le Cateau Cambresis on April 26, 1794.

The campaign of 1793 had been indecisive, and that of 1794 began where the other had closed; and although the war in the Netherlands had ended without a decisive battle, in January, despite the glorious storming of the lines of Weissenburg and despite other successes, the war had come to a close with something very nearly approaching a disaster, thus affording the French an opportunity of reinforcing their army in the Netherlands. At the same time the successful Commander of the Rhine Army—the thirty-three-year-old General Pichegru—took over the leadership of the Army of the Netherlands, now made up to a strength of 250,000 men.

The new Commander soon made himself conspicuous. On March 19, with 30,000 men distributed in six columns, he attacked the outpost position at Le Cateau of the Austrians under Kray and Werneck—with the first-named of whom were the Zezschwitz Cuirassiers commanded by Prince Charles Schwarzenberg. This attack was, however, beaten off.

Shortly after this the Emperor Francis joined the army, which now took the offensive—on April 17—for the purpose of besieging Landrecy; whereupon, in the hope of raising the siege, Pichegru, on April 26, made an attack along the whole line from Le Cateau to Beaumont. This attack was everywhere beaten off after a most obstinate encounter. The most brilliant part of the action was sustained by the Right Wing under the Duke of York, with whom was also present an Austrian Corps under Field-Marshal Lieutenant Otto, but even here at the outset matters did not look very promising.

The outpost work had here been entrusted to the English,* who being but little practised therein, had as usual performed it in a careless manner, so that their outposts were completely overwhelmed and driven in by an attack, delivered under cover of a fog, by two columns under General Chappuis, and composed, the one of 6,000 men on the Cambrai—Le Cateau road—the other of 4,000 men further to the right by Ligny and Berty. Before the main body had had time to prepare for action, the French had driven in the light troops from the villages of Caudry, Beaumont, Inchy, Berty, and Mauroy. As the fog lifted, the Duke of York and Marshal Otto perceived the unfortunate condition of affairs from the windmill crowning the height to the east of Inchy, where they had taken up their position. Otto's Staff Officer, Rittmeister von Mecsery of the Ferdinand Hussars, who had hurried out to the front directly the action commenced, now reported the overpowering strength of the enemy. 'Nothing but an immediate charge of Cavalry can now save us,' exclaimed the Duke; whereupon Marshal Otto, who had already noticed that the enemy had taken no steps for the protection of his left flank, quickly replied: 'I know the man to lead it,' and at once sent Rittmeister Mecsery for Prince Schwarzenberg. While the Prince was hurrying to the two Commanders, Mecsery led such squadrons as were standing ready in the low ground in rear of the windmill round the right of the infantry, now collecting in the valley between Inchy and Bethencourt. These squadrons were as under:

The Zezschwitz Cuirassiers, six squadrons,	} under Mansel.
Royal Horse Guards (Blues), two squadrons,	
3rd Dragoon Guards, two squadrons,	
1st Royal Dragoons, two squadrons,	
1st Dragoon Guards, three squadrons,	} under Vyse.
5th Dragoon Guards,† three squadrons,	

In the meantime Otto pointed out to the Prince the objective the flank of which he was to attack—the infantry column of 24,000 men with 2,000 Cavalry now marching from Cambrai on Inchy. Otto further explained that the twelve squadrons of British Cavalry were also placed under

* When the English in 1793 first arrived in the Flemish theatre of war, Hanoverian and Hessian troops were attached to them for the performance of the outpost duties, and also for instructing them in ordinary field duties. See Witzleben, *Feld-Marschall Prinz Josias von Koburg-Saalfeld*; also Dittfurth, *Die Hessen in den Feldzügen 1792 bis 1799*.

† It will be seen that this account makes no mention of the presence of the 16th Light Dragoons in the action.

Schwarzenberg's orders, and everything he now left to the Prince 'in fullest confidence in his bravery and skill.' 'If we can only first beat the Cavalry, we will very soon make an end of the Infantry,' replied Schwarzenberg, and, galloping off on his English charger after the Cavalry column, he overtook it just as it was about to march north-west from Inchy. While this was in progress, the stout Mecsery had instructed the light companies of O'Donnell's Free Corps, then falling back from Inchy, to reoccupy that place and line the outlying hedges and enclosures, so as to protect the left flank of the Cavalry during their attack. In order to use such cover from view as the ground afforded, Prince Schwarzenberg formed his horsemen into three lines, each of four squadrons and a reserve, and these lines, on emerging from cover, were ordered to charge in succession. Each line contained two squadrons of the Zezschwitz Cuirassiers and one British Regiment—the Blues in the first, the 3rd Dragoon Guards in the second, and the Royals in the third line. The two other British regiments formed the Reserve.

The French were now just arriving in the centre of the line Audoncourt-Troisville, the flanks resting on these villages, while the bulk of their artillery occupied the high ground near the windmill to the west of Audoncourt; here also was the French Cavalry. The Prince resolved to take this height as a point of direction so as to attack the French in flank and rear. He accordingly directed his squadrons to gallop forward to the ground east of Bethencourt, which led up to this high ground, and, arrived there, to incline to the left. Having reached this spot the Prince pointed out the direction to Mecsery, riding in front of the first line, and ordered him to attack the French Cavalry. As these then took ground to the left in the endeavour to outflank the heavy Cavalry bearing down upon them, Schwarzenberg let go his second line and flung it upon the French, who were thus smitten moving to a flank; and finally he himself with the third line, followed by the reserve, charged straight upon the flank of the guns drawn up on the crest of the little hill. The enemy fired both with cannon and muskets as fast as they were able, in the endeavour to check the avalanche of horsemen coming down upon them—it was all in vain. In front and on the left resounds the trumpet-call to 'charge' from the Imperial and British Cavalry; high above the smoke-clouds wave the sword blades, the black and yellow plumes of the Austrians, the red and white of the British Cavalry; and while the on-rushing storm of the first and second lines overwhelms the French horsemen, the third line, followed closely by the reserve, storms into the batteries, remorselessly cutting down all who attempt to make a stand. After capturing the guns, the Prince turns upon the infantry, now taken in flank and rear; these attempt to throw themselves into square, but the badly drilled soldiery fall into even greater confusion. Here and there a battalion is still firing volleys, but even these men are becoming unsteady; and while the heavy Cavalry, the young Prince still in the van, break with loud shouts into the ranks of the Infantry, there is heard a murmur, momentarily growing louder and more general, of 'Sauve qui peut.' Some even throw away their muskets, remove their headresses and cry 'Vive l'empereur!'

The storm of horsemen passes on down the whole of the enemy's line, until all melt away in wildest flight. Rittmeister Mecsery takes prisoner the opposing Commander, General Chappuis.*

* Mr. Fortescue seems to give the credit of this capture to the O.C. 3rd Dragoon Guards. (See *History of the British Army*, vol. iv. part i. p. 243.)

And while Prince Schwarzenberg was thus sweeping aside the enemy's main column, further to the south, between Honnechy and Maretz, Lieut.-Colonel Stephanic, with two squadrons of the Archduke Ferdinand Hussars, No. 3, and four squadrons of British Light Dragoons (the 7th and 11th), was treating the other column in the same manner.

It was no battle but a slaughter—*ein Schlachten war es, nicht eine Schlacht*—the infantry of the Allies was not engaged at all. The enemy left 4,000 men killed and wounded on the field—3,000 of these were of the main column, and 500, including General Chappuis, were taken prisoners. Thirty-three guns, of which the Zezschwitz Cuirassiers claimed 22, 44 ammunition wagons, 22 small-arm ammunition carts were captured. The Allies had gained their astonishing victory with the loss of one General (Mansel), 14 other officers, 384 men and 297 horses killed and wounded; of these the Austrians, and among them chiefly the Zezschwitz Cuirassiers, had the following casualties, viz. 4 officers killed and 5 wounded, 84 men killed and 153 wounded, 110 horses killed and 98 wounded. In the front ranks of the Cuirassiers there was hardly a man who did not bear a scar, scarcely one in the whole regiment who was not stained with his own blood or that of an enemy.

On the day following the action the Emperor Francis decorated Prince Schwarzenberg—then only twenty-three—with the Cross of Maria Theresa, and the Duke of York gave the men of the Zezschwitz Cuirassiers £20 for each of the twenty-two guns they had captured.

It is surely matter for very real regret that such a regiment as this is no longer in existence, having later been disbanded; but if the regiment is no more, its record survives and will live for ever.

(Of the two Cavalry actions above described, the historian of the British Army has said of Avesne-le-Sec that it is 'one of the greatest achievements in the history of Cavalry;' and of Le Cateau Cambresis that it was 'the greatest day in the annals of the British horse, perhaps the greater since the glory of it was shared with the most renowned Cavalry in Europe.')

RELIEFS

With the exception of the 1st Life Guards, moving from Windsor to London, and the Royal Horse Guards, from London to Windsor, it is proposed that there shall be no more changes of the stations of Cavalry regiments this year.

ST. GEORGE

Ever since the Crusades, St. George has been considered the Patron Saint of England, and in all countries recognised as the Patron Saint of Cavalry, since he was a soldier of the equestrian order, and during his miraculous appearances, when fighting in aid of the Crusader hosts, he is described as being mounted on a white horse, leading celestial squadrons, and clad in shining armour.

His banner was the Red Cross on a white ground, and the Rose his flower.

From this origin the rose became the emblem of England in heraldry and, therefore, roses should be worn by all true Englishmen the world over on St. George's Day, April 23rd.

SPORTING NOTES

POLO

The arrangements for the attempted recovery of the America Cup are nearing completion. The first match has been fixed for June 10, and the second match for June 14. If a third should be necessary the date will be mutually fixed by the players. Thanks to the generosity of the Duke of Westminster a grand stud of ponies has been collected and will shortly proceed to America. Captain E. D. Miller goes out as manager, and the following eight players from which the team will be selected—viz. :

Mr. W. S. Buckmaster as captain of the team, Mr. F. M. Freake, Captain Leslie Cheape (K.D.G.), Lord Wodehouse, Captain G. Bellville (16th Lancers), Major Mathew-Lannowe (Queen's Bays), Captain V. N. Lockett (17th Lancers), and Captain R. G. Ritson (Inniskilling Dragoons).

ABROAD

The Cairo Polo season has been a good one, and many players went from England for it.

The Cairo Inter-Regimental Tournament was won by the 3rd Dragoon Guards, who in the final heat beat the 1st Battalion Scots Guards by 5 goals to 3. Teams :

3rd Dragoon Guards: Mr. N. K. Worthington, Mr. N. McL. More, Captain P. D. Stewart, and Captain L. V. Owston (back).

Scots Guards: Captain C. E. de la Pasture, Mr. C. J. Balfour, Captain R. G. Stracey, and Captain M. Romer (back).

The Cairo Public Schools' Cup final was between Eton A and Marlborough, the former winning by 6 goals to 1.

The final of the Cairo Champion Cup Tournament was between the Khedivial Sporting Club and the 3rd Dragoon Guards A team, the former winning by 6 goals to 3. Teams :

Khedivial Sporting Club: Mr. E. Van Heller, Captain C. Mac G. Dunbar, Yousry Pasha, and Mr. A. P. Schreiber (back).

3rd Dragoon Guards: Mr. N. McL. More, Captain P. D. Stewart, Captain C. G. Leslie, and Captain L. V. Owston (back).

The Aden Polo Club.—To commemorate his visit to Aden, on the occasion of his journey to the Delhi Durbar, His Majesty the King graciously presented a Challenge Cup to the Aden Polo Club. The Annual Tournament for this Cup took place early in January. Unfortunately an East African team from Nairobi were unable to come, and the Middlesex Regiment stationed at Aden were unable to play owing to an accident to one of their players. The final resulted in the Aden Gymkhana defeating Somaliland by 4 goals to love. Lady Bell kindly presented The King-Emperor's Cup to the winners, expressing the hope that next December there would be a larger number of teams coming to compete for the Cup.

Indore State Polo Tournament.—The Maharajah Holkar kindly presented a £100 Cup and four small cups for this competition, which secured an entry of twelve teams. It was played on the handicap system. In the final between the 38th Central India Horse (conceding 8 goals) and the 14th Hussars A team, the former won by 9 goals to 8, the winning goal being obtained close on time. At the conclusion the magnificent cup was presented by the Maharajah's son, owing to the indisposition of the Maharajah himself.

There were eleven entries in the Sialkote Tournament for a cup presented by the 12th Lancers. The final was between the C and D teams of the 17th Lancers, the former winning by 5 goals to 3.

For the final of the Calcutta Jubilee Tournament the 17th Lancers beat Kishengarh by 6 goals to 4, winning the Jubilee Cup outright. Lady Carmichael presented it and also the Championship Cup, Lord Carmichael congratulating both teams.

The Punjab Challenge Cup Tournament final at Lahore was a great match, closely contested between the K.D.G.s and 37th Lancers. At the end of time the scores were equal, but with the game continued with widened goals the K.D.G.s made the winning hit.

The North-West Frontier Tournament was played at Peshawur. In the final the Guides Infantry defeated the 14th Lancers by 4 goals to 2. For the last three years these teams have met in the final, on the former occasions the Lancers being successful.

The Cawnpore Cooper-Allen Challenge Cup was won by the 2nd Lancers (Gardner's Horse).

Many well-known players have been playing at the Côte d'Azur Polo Club during the past three months. In a recent match a Cannes team consisting of Mr. Walter Jones, Captain Jaubert, Captain Ashton, and Mr. C. D. Miller, beat a Blues team consisting of the Duke of Westminster, Lord Alistair Innes-Ker, Captain J. Fitzgerald, and Lord Herbert. Others who have been playing are Sir Archibald Sinclair, the Earl of Portarlington, Captain H. R. White, Major Lord Tweedmouth, the Earl of Rocksavage, Captain E. Christie Miller, the Duke of Peneranda, who previously went to Cairo with Lord Ashby St. Leger's team of Quidnuncs, and many Continental players.

RACING

The Grand Military Meeting at Sandown Park on February 28 and March 1 was one of the most successful military meetings ever held. His Majesty the King honoured the meeting on the first day, being present throughout the racing. The fields were large, the riding good, and the racing most interesting and sporting. In the majority of cases owners were to be seen riding their own horses most capably. The military races commenced with a selling steeplechase, which Captain G. Paynter won on his own horse, Nimrod VI., Captain Denny's The Chemist, ridden by Captain O'Brien Butler being second, and his other horse, Stormcock II., ridden by himself, third. Then came the big event.

The Grand Military Gold Cup of £395; 11-7 each, with penalties and allowances; 3m.

Mr. E. Wyndham's br g Another Delight, by General Symons—Annie's Delight, a, 13-0, Owner, 1.

Major Kincaid Smith's ch g Razorbill, a, 13-0, Captain Tomkinson, 2.

Mr. R. Whitehead's b or br Couvrefeu II., a, 12-9, Owner, 3.

Mr. K. Parbury's Ruby Light, a, 12-0, Owner, 0.

Captain G. Paynter's Chapelizod, a, 12-0, Owner, 0.

Captain W. Wright's Sterling Lady, a, 11-10, Captain Springfield, 0.

Mr. Ian Straker's Stronvar, a, 11-0, Owner, 0.

Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's Marena, 5y, 11-0, Mr. O'Brien Butler, 0.

Mr. G. W. Liddell's Ruby Ring, 6y, 11-0, Owner, 0.

Mr. D. McCalmont's Fleeting Peace, 6y, 11-0, Owner 0.

(Started at 2.57. Winner trained by Withington, at Stockbridge.)

Starting Prices: 9 to 4 against Fleeting Peace, 3 to 1 against Razorbill, 4 to 1 against Marena, 10 to 1 each against Chapelizod, Another Delight, and Couvrefeu II., and 100 to 8 bar six (offered).

The Race.—After Ruby Ring had blundered at the first fence and unseated his jockey Another Delight settled down in advance of Chapelizod, Couvrefeu II., Stronvar, and Sterling Lady, with Razorbill next, and Ruby Light last. This order was maintained to the stand fence, where Another Delight and Fleeting Peace made mistakes, and Couvrefeu II. took up the running in front of Chapelizod, Another Delight, Razorbill, Marena, and Stronvar. After going half-way, Razorbill moved into fourth place, and with a mile to go Chapelizod refused, and Couvrefeu II. was left with a ten-length lead of Another Delight, Fleeting Peace, Razorbill, and Marena. Couvrefeu II. soon afterwards blundered, but, though making a good recovery, was joined by Another Delight, Razorbill now claiming third position. Marena and Ruby Light came to grief at the third fence from home, and Another Delight then took the lead. He was, however, headed between the last two obstacles by Razorbill, who appeared to have his race won when Another Delight came again, and, getting on terms within a hundred yards from the finish, won an exciting race by three-parts of a length; four lengths away Couvrefeu II. was third, Fleeting Peace fourth, Sterling Lady fifth, and Stronvar the only other to go the course. Time by Benson's chronograph, six minutes three seconds.

Mr. Wyndham rode a splendid race, and was greatly complimented on winning this great trophy for the second year in succession, on his good horse Another Delight. Following the Gold Cup came the Past and Present Handicap Steeplechase, which was won by Sir Peter Walker's Long Water, ably ridden by Mr. O'Brien Butler, with Captain F. M. Baillie's Ilston (Mr. J. B. Foster) second, and Captain Paynter's Jack Symons (owner) third. The Maiden Hunters' Steeplechase brought out a sporting field of fifteen; with two exceptions each horse was ridden by his owner, and Mr. J. Ainsworth had the satisfaction of winning a nice race on his own horse, starting at 10 to 1. Many horses fell, but luckily no one was injured.

Proceedings opened on the second day with an open selling hurdle race, which was won by an old Cesarewitch winner, Submit, ridden by that fine horseman Mr. Ussher. Then a field of nine turned out for the United Services Selling Handicap Steeplechase, which was won by Mr. Pigot-Moodie's Gallerain (owner), Mr. N. Davis's Durhamstown (owner) second, and Mr. J. Foster's Super Tax (owner) third. The Imperial Cup, an open hurdle race of £1000, was a fine sight, with twenty-one splendid horses running, Mr. T. Nolan's Rathlea (E. Piggott) proving the winner. The

big military event, the Grand Military Handicap Steeplechase, was a popular win for Captain G. Paynter, riding his own horse, Jack Symons, Major Kincaid Smith's Prefect (Captain Tomkinson) second, and Mr. D. McCalmont's Ebonette (owner) third.

Captain Paynter followed this up by winning the Tally Ho Steeplechase on his horse Chapelizod, Captain Banbury's Noble Roy (owner) second, and Captain Wright's Glenvictor (Mr. P. Hornby) third. One of the most successful military meetings ever held was brought to a close with Captain Springfield winning the Maiden Steeplechase on Mr. McMaster's Molinam, with Mr. Liddell's Ruby Ring (owner) second, and Mr. Settle's Brodrick (owner) third.

The Spring and United Services Meeting at Newbury was rather spoilt by the bad weather, and fields were rather smaller than usual, but some capital sport was witnessed. On the first day Captain O'Brien Butler was in great form, riding three winners, namely on Captain V. Beatty's Fast and Free in the Services Selling Handicap Steeplechase, then on Sir Peter Walker's nice horse Ben-a-Beg for the United Services Cup, a two-and-a-half mile handicap steeplechase, and finally on Mr. D'Arcy Edwardes's Marena in the Military Maiden Steeplechase.

On the second day the United Services Hurdle Handicap was won by Sir G. Abercromby's Gairnish Island, well ridden by Captain Bruce. The Army and Navy Handicap Steeplechase was won by Mr. F. Lort-Phillips's Succubus, with Captain O'Brien Butler in the saddle; Captain Banbury, riding his own horse, Noble Roy, won the United Services' Hunters' Cup.

The National Hunt held their annual meeting at the Cheltenham Steeplechase Club the beginning of March. Two of the finest days' steeplechasing ever witnessed in England took place. Good weather, good going, huge fields, £6000 added money, and a record attendance helped the sport. The National Hunt Steeplechase produced a field of thirty runners, and it was won by Captain Yates's (late 11th Hussars) genuine hunter Kransflugl, well ridden by Mr. R. H. Hall. Unfortunately Lord Ebrington and Captain Springfield both had bad falls in this race, the former sustaining severe concussion and the latter broken ribs, but both are now well on their way to recovery. The Foxhunters' Challenge Cup, a four-mile race of £1000 over the N. H. course, was a sporting affair, and a most popular win for Captain George Paynter who, riding a fine race on his own horse, Chapelizod, won by three-parts of a length from Fearless, ridden by Mr. Pigot-Moodie, with Major Purvis on his gallant little hunter, Our Philip, a good third.

The Royal Scots Greys Regimental Challenge Cup was run for at the Wetherby Meeting on Easter Monday, and won by Mr. R. Whitehead's Succint, ridden by Mr. W. H. Callander. At the same meeting Captain Tomkinson won the Ingmanthorpe Handicap Steeplechase Plate on Quinton.

At the Ward Hunt Races on Easter Monday the Military Steeplechase was won by Mr. E. W. Robinson's (5th Lancers) Lady Pilot, the Hon. R. C. Alexander riding. The Ward Union Hunt Cup was won by Mr. T. Ainsworth's Flying Hawke, which was also ridden by the Hon. R. C. Alexander.

At the West Norfolk Hunt Races the King's Cup was won by Mr. C. Bullard's Jenny Wren II. (Mr. S. Blair), and the Prince of Wales's Cup by Mr. B. Cook's Half Time (owner).

The Royal Artillery Steeplechases took place at Aldershot on March 29 in wretched weather and heavy going. Results :

The Royal Artillery Welter Hunters' Steeplechase. Two-and-a-half miles.

Lieut.-Colonel B. W. Breck's Spot White II. (Mr. C. T. Walwyn) first. Eight ran.

The Open Hunters' Handicap Steeplechase. Three miles. Captain Wallace Wright's Glenvictor (Mr. G. Phipps-Hornby) first. Seven ran.

The Royal Artillery Gold Cup. Three miles. Mr. S. C. Anstey's St. James's Park (owner). Eight ran.

The Royal Artillery Ubique Plate. Two miles. Mr. H. McMasters' Molman (owner) first.

The Royal Artillery Light Weight Hunters' Steeplechase. Three miles. Major J. F. Lamont's Roselike (owner) first.

ABROAD

The Army Cup at Lucknow was won by Major H. N. Holden's ch. Arab Manak, ridden by the owner. The race was remarkable for a record field of twenty-five, also for the record weight of 11 st. 2 lb. being carried to victory, and a third record in its being the first time for a horse to win under its owner's jockeyship.

Quetta Hunt Point-to-Point Races.—The annual Inter-Regimental Team Race was held in conjunction with the 23rd Cavalry Meeting last November, near Shekh Manda, over a course of about three miles. Captain Murray's Malaga, carrying 14½ st., came in first, thus securing the cup presented by the 23rd Cavalry. The Royal Welsh Fusiliers won the team Challenge Cup. The second meeting was held over a course of about four miles on the Siriah Road. Results :

English and Colonial Cup, Captain Murray's Malaga (Mr. Cotter) first.

Light Weight Cup, Captain Potter's Lady Betty, first.

Subaltern's Challenge Cup, Mr. Wilson's Grey Ghost (owner) first.

Country-bred Cup, Colonel Fraser's Petrarch, first.

Mrs. Gammon, the wife of the M. F. H., kindly presented the Cups.

POINT-TO-POINT

The Grand Military Point-to-Point Steeplechases took place this year in conjunction with the Belvoir Hunt at Long Clawson, near Melton Mowbray, on March 20. Unfortunately the course was in a terribly holding condition owing to the recent heavy snowfall and rains, the weather also was bad, and little of the course could be seen by the spectators. Despite these disadvantages a small sporting company assembled, and capital sport took place. For the Light Weight Race, 12 st., there were forty-seven entries, and over twenty went to the post, all of which, with three exceptions, were ridden by their owners. One regiment, the 19th Hussars, entered no fewer than eight horses, all of which, with the exception of two, whose owners had two running, started. The result was a good win for Captain H. D. Bentinck's (Coldstream Guards) Gold Coin, the owner up; Captain W. A. Murray's (R.H.A.) Righ Crinthaun was second, Mr. H. C. M. Porter's (King's Royal Rifle Corps) Kasr-el-Nil third, Captain G. Paynter's (Scots Guards) Typhoon II. fourth, Colonel P. A. Kenna's Deliberation fifth.

For the Welter Race, 13 st. 7 lb., there were twenty-three starters, a

grand finish taking place between Captain G. Paynter's Cobbler's Wax II. and Mr. M. B. Smith's (Coldstream Guards) Dublin V., the former winning by the shortest of heads, Mr. H. C. M. Porter's Castlereagh third.

The Belvoir Hunt Race was a sporting affair, Captain G. Paynter running the two horses and giving Major 'Lucy' Lockett his choice of mounts. Neither started favourite, but a good race resulted in Major Lockett's mount, Miss Patkin, being first, a length off Captain Paynter's other horse Ardri II., ridden by himself, second, and Mr. J. P. Grenfell's Tropic (Mr. Brooks) third. The class of horses running in the races was exceptionally good. Taking into consideration the great number of starters, we venture to suggest that another year the Grand Military Point-to-Point should be run in colours. Most officers who have not colours could borrow them or ride in a coloured shirt with a cap, and it would be a great boon to their friends and spectators.

The Irish Army Point-to-Point Races were held at Boheratrum, Limerick Junction, in fine weather, over a good sporting country. There were fifteen starters for the Light Weight Race, which was won by Captain A. Stokes's (4th Hussars) Dark Island (owner) by a length from Captain G. A. Bagwell's (Norfolk Regiment) Kilgrubbin (owner), Captain V. J. Heather's (R.F.A.) Tommy (owner) being third. The Heavy Weight Race was won by Mr. E. Austin's (4th Hussars) Brown Willy (owner) by two lengths from Captain Gausse's (R.L.I.) Countess (Mr. T. D. Dalrymple), with Mr. Cole Hamilton's (Y. and L. Regiment) Master Ned III. third. The Royal Artillery Race was won by Mr. E. Marston's (R.F.A.) Le Neve (owner), Major C. S. Holland's (R.F.A.) Peg the Race (owner) second, and Mr. C. Walker's (R.H.A.) Hard Nut (Mr. Walwyn) third.

The Royal Horse Guards Point-to-Point Race took place with the Pytchley Hunt Races, and was won by Captain Howard-Vyse's Charity (owner). Eleven ran, but only three finished, six falling at one of the water jumps.

The 2nd Life Guards held their races with the Grafton Hunt at Farthingstone. The Light Weight Race was won by the Hon. W. Beaumont's Goodbye II. (Mr. B. Silverstrip) from eleven runners. The Heavy Weight Race with sixteen starters was won by Mr. E. J. Speed's Little Kinton (Captain Penn).

The 5th Lancers Races took place at Ratoath, Co. Meath. Regimental Heavy Weight Cup, Mr. E. W. Robinson's Lady Pilot (owner). Six ran.

Regimental Light Weight Cup, Mr. E. Ramsden's Curiosity (owner). Ten ran.

Open Race, Mr. J. S. Ainsworth's Too Clever (Hon. H. C. Alexander). Fifteen ran.

The 1st Life Guards Point-to-Point Race took place on March 26, near Croxton Kerrial, in the Belvoir country. Mr. J. G. Leigh's The Priest, owner up, won from eleven starters.

The 4th Dragoon Guards held their races on March 27 at Penton, near Andover. Results:

Subalterns' Cup, Mr. B. Ashton's Peter (Mr. Darley) first.

Welter Cup, Lieut.-Colonel Mullen's Lyddington (Captain Hornby) first.

Regimental Cup, Major Gaunt's Turcoman (owner) first.

Open Race, Mr. Aylmer's Loughborough (owner) first.

The 18th Hussars Races took place at Blumsdon, near Cricklade, on March 28. Results :

Regimental Race.—Mr. V. C. Alcock's Ilmington (owner) first. Eight ran.

Chargers' Race.—Mr. Denroche-Smith's Mick (owner) first. Ten ran.

The 9th Lancers held their races on March 31 at Penton, near Andover. Results :

Light Weights, Captain Lucas-Tooth's Oliver Twist, first.

Heavy Weights, Mr. Reynolds' Bimbo, first.

Regimental Cup, Captain Grenfell's First Favourite, first.

Subalterns' Cup, Mr. Phipps-Hornby's Covent Garden, first.

The 3rd Hussars held their races at Stelling, with the following results :

The Subalterns' Cup.—Mr. W. McCliff's Moulin Rouge (owner) first. Nine ran.

Regimental Cup.—Captain T. B. Olive's Wendy (owner) first. Eight ran.

Foxhunters' Plate.—Mr. G. R. Turner's The Camel (owner) first. Nine ran.

The 20th Hussars held their races at Layer-de-la Haye, near Colchester. Results :

Chargers' Race.—Mr. S. Barne's Lady Madcap (owner) first.

Heavy Weight Races.—Mr. W. A. Silvertop's Kellar (owner) first.

Soldiers' Race.—Captain A. F. Irvine's Glencarn (owner) first.

Regimental Challenge Cup.—Mr. J. C. Darling's Joan of Arc (owner) first. Nine ran.

The annual point-to-point races of the Aldershot Cavalry Brigade were held over a course of three-and-a-half miles, near Hawthorn Hill. Each regiment of the brigade held its own regimental cup races for light-weights and heavy-weights, but in each instance the two races were run from one start. Results :

2nd Dragoon Guards' Cups.—Light Weights, 12st. 7lb. each.—Mr. E. Walker's Tommy (owner) first; Mr. F. D. R. Milne's Comet (owner) second.

Heavy Weights, 14st. each.—Major G. H. A. Ing's Gamecock (owner) first; Captain E. S. Chance's Kangaroo (Mr. C. N. Champion de Crespigny) second.

5th Dragoon Guards' Cups.—Light Weights, 12st. 7lb. each.—Captain R. C. Partridge's Rusk (owner) first; Captain M. A. Black's Calabash (owner) second.

Heavy Weights, 14st. each.—Mr. E. J. Nettlefold's Sambo II. (owner) first; Mr. V. D. S. Williams's Midget (owner) second.

11th Hussars' Cups.—Light Weights, 12st. each.—Mr. J. S. Ainsworth's Poultry (owner) first; Captain F. H. Sutton's Cleopatra II. (owner) second.

Heavy Weights, 14st.—Mr. J. G. Lowther's Tertius (owner) first; Captain C. L. Rome's Jim (Captain Halliday) second.

Brigade Subalterns' Cup.—12st. 7lb. each.—Mr. G. G. Marshall's (11th Hussars) Ginger Nut (owner) first; Mr. R. B. H. Lechmere's (5th Dragoon Guards) Lassie (owner) second; Mr. H. E. Talbot's (11th Hussars) Yellow-skin (Mr. D. McMurrough-Kavanagh) third. Won by a length; three lengths between second and third.

FOOTBALL

RUGBY

In the presence of the King and a notable company of about 7000 the officers of the Navy beat the officers of the Army in the annual Rugby match at Queen's Club on March 1 by three goals and one try (18 points) to one goal and one try (8 points). His Majesty was attended by Earl Granville, Sir C. Cust, and Major Wigram, and received by Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, General Heath, the Earl of Carendon, and Mr. Stoddart. Before commencing play the rival teams were presented to His Majesty and gave hearty cheers. It was a fast, open game, well contested, and the tackling was splendid.

The final of the Army Cup took place at Twickenham on March 29 between the 2nd Welsh Regiment and the 1st Gloucestershire Regiment, the former winning by nine points to three. The game was keenly fought out, and the tackling was superb.

ASSOCIATION

The annual match under Association rules between the officers of the Navy and the officers of the Army at Queen's Club was a fine game, resulting in a draw of two goals each. On the whole the Army seemed unlucky not to win, but the defence of the Navy was very good.

The final of the Army Association Cup took place on Easter Monday at Aldershot, before about 15,000 spectators, between the 2nd Durham Light Infantry from Colchester and the 1st East Yorkshire Regiment from York. It was a grand match, the sides being most even, but the Durhams had the luck, and at the finish came out the winners by one goal to love. Lady Wilma Lawson handed the cup and medals to the men.

THE CAVALRY CUP.

In the semi-finals the 19th Hussars beat the 3rd Hussars by four goals to love, and the 18th Hussars defeated the 16th Lancers by five goals to two. Both games were played at Fulham.

The final was, therefore, between the 18th Hussars and 19th Hussars, who met at Craven Cottage on April 10. It was a strenuous game throughout, at half-time neither side having scored. In the second half, however, the 18th showed their superiority, and by two goals to love became the holders of the cup for the first time in their footballing career.

GOLF.

The Army Golf Club Tournament was concluded at Deal, when for the third year in succession the Black Watch were victorious, defeating in the final the Seaforth Highlanders. Details:

Black Watch				Seaforth Highlanders			
Capt. Skene	.	.	0	Capt. Thornhill	.	.	0
Capt. Green	.	.	5	Capt. Burn-Marshall	.	.	0
Capt. Grant-Suttie	.	.	3	Capt. Buchanan	.	.	0
Capt. Baillie-Hamilton	.	.	0	Capt. Maclachlan	.	.	2
Total 8				Total 2			

RACQUETS

The Army Racquet Championships took place as usual this year at Prince's Club in March. The Doubles Championship was remarkable for the popular victory of the 15th Sikhs, who most sportingly sent over their representatives from India to compete and to win. In the semi-final rounds the 15th Sikhs (represented by Lieuts. A. H. Muir and H. E. Growse) beat the 2nd Battalion Royal Munster Fusiliers (represented by Major E. P. Thomson and Lieut. C. V. Deane-Drake) by four games to one. The Royal Engineers (Lieut-Colonel W. C. Hedley and Captain R. Oakes) beat the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps by four games to love.

In the final the 15th Sikhs beat the Royal Engineers by four games to love. Then the 15th Sikhs played the holders, the 2nd Battalion King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry (represented by Captain A. C. G. Luther and Lieut. C. E. D. King), for the championship, and, after some close games, defeated them by four games to two, thus carrying off the championship.

Thirteen officers challenged for the Army Singles Championship, obtained last year by Lieut. A. H. Muir, 15th Sikhs.

In the semi-final rounds Major E. P. Thomson (Royal Munster Fusiliers) beat Lieut.-Colonel W. C. Hedley (R.E.), and Captain A. C. G. Luther (King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry) beat Captain W. P. A. Hattersley-Smith (Royal Garrison Artillery). In the final round Captain Luther beat Major Thomson by three games to love, and followed this up by defeating Lieut. A. H. Muir (15th Sikhs), the holder, for the championship. The latter was a fine match, which Luther won by three games to two, and so regained the championship which he lost last year to Muir.

PIGSTICKING SONGS

(continued)

' I'LL LEND THEE THESE '

(Tune: ' I'll give thee all ')

' I'll lend thee these, for luck attends
 The aged sportsman's loan,
 My spurs and spear, the truest friends
 I e'er could call my own—
 My spur whose gentlest touch could coax
 The dullest nag to go,
 And better far my spear whose pokes
 Have many a boar laid low.
 Though hog may hide and steed may swerve,
 And blank may prove the day,
 Yet still the search itself may serve
 This lesson to convey :
 If ever care should bring thee pain,
 Or sorrow dim thine eye,
 Let spur and spear be used again,
 And see how grief will fly.

O. S. M.

February 1832.

' D. '

'HURRAH FOR THE SPUR AND THE SPEAR'

(Tune: 'Hurrah for the Bonnets of Blue')

Here's a bumper to spur and to spear !
 A bumper to challenge a song !
 A bumper to those who, where'er the boar goes,
 Are spurring and spearing along !
 It's good to be steady and cool,
 It's better to dare than to doubt,
 It's best to keep clear of the snobs in the rear
 And be always thrown in than thrown out.

CHORUS—Then hurrah for the spur and the spear !
 Hurrah for the zest of my song !
 Hurrah for all those who where'er the boar goes
 Are spurring and spearing along !

Here's a cheer for the charms of the chase,
 A cheer for a glorious burst,
 And who wouldn't cheer when the bold win the spear?
 For the fearless are always the first.
 There are some ever in the right place ;
 There are some who just toddle and trot ;
 There are many who love every danger to face,
 And many I swear who do not !

CHORUS—Then hurrah for the spur and the spear !
 Hurrah for the zest of my song !
 Hurrah for all those who where'er the boar goes
 Are spurring and spearing along !

There's a joy when the boar makes his rush ;
 There's a joy when the monster first bleeds ;
 There's a joy though *to-day* has now glided away,
 For *to-morrow* shall double our deeds !
 Here's a sigh for the sportsman afar,
 A welcome to those who are here,
 A health to the whole, who in spirit and soul
 Are friends of the spur and the spear.

CHORUS—Then hurrah for the spur and the spear !
 Hurrah for a jovial song !
 Hurrah for all those who where'er the boar goes
 Are spurring and spearing along !



THE BATTLE OF WORCESTER.

1651.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

JULY 1913

SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY

THE HERO OF ALEXANDRIA

By COLONEL N. M. SMYTH, V.C.

SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY was born in 1734 at Menstry in Clackmannanshire, and being destined for the legal profession was educated at Rugby and the Universities of Edinburgh and Leipsic, but following his ardent natural desire he entered the Army in March 1756 as cornet in the 3rd Dragoon Guards, and in 1758, serving in Germany, he was selected by General Sir William Pitt to be one of his aides-de-camp. In 1762 a troop was purchased for him, and in 1773 from the rank of major he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the 3rd Horse (Carabiniers), which regiment, then quartered in Ireland, was re-numbered 6th Dragoon Guards in 1788.

In 1773 he was chosen to represent his native county in Parliament. His opponent, Colonel Erskine, published a pamphlet reflecting on the conduct of Lord Kennet, an influential connection of Abercromby's, who, being a judge, could not vindicate his own character by demanding satisfaction. Lieutenant-Colonel Abercromby assumed that duty and a duel ensued, shots were exchanged, when the seconds interfered, and in consequence no reconciliation was acceded to on the part of Abercromby.

It appears that Colonel Abercromby was not seconded for Parliament, for though he was a member from 1774 to 1780 his signature appears on regimental documents during that period. A Parlia-

mentary life had no attractions for him, and not being prepared to surrender his judgment to a party leader he soon resolved that his services belonged exclusively to his country in the capacity of a soldier.*

He did not seek re-election in 1780, but hastened to devote himself to his military duties.

The previous year an incident is recorded which throws a light upon the customs of the time.

A certain Lieut. Coles was cashiered by a court-martial for behaving in a mutinous and disrespectful manner and sending a challenge to Lieut.-Colonel Abercromby, but in consequence of his former good character, his length of service, and large family, he was pardoned and allowed to sell his commissions.

In 1783 Lieut.-Colonel Abercromby was promoted from the Carabiniers to the colonelcy of the 103rd King's Irish Foot, a regiment which was disbanded after a brief existence when Abercromby retired on half-pay.

The question may reasonably be asked, how did it happen that Sir Ralph had never courted or obtained active employment during the war with America? The true answer is that Sir Ralph sympathised with the American colonists in their struggle, and he was fortunately able to avoid a conflict between his duty as a soldier and the principles which he had adopted as a citizen through being employed in the discharge of regimental or staff duties in Ireland.

On the commencement of the war with France, being esteemed one of the ablest and most intrepid officers in the whole British forces, he was appointed to the command of a brigade for service in Holland.

Promoted to the local rank of lieutenant-general, he had the sole command of the first landing in 1793, but the Duke of York subsequently arrived, and under him General Abercromby acted with marked success. After commanding the advanced guard on the heights of Cateau and being wounded at Nimeguen, the duty fell to him of protecting the British Army in its disastrous retreat out of Holland in the winter of 1794-5.

In 1795 for his recent services he received the Order of the Bath,

* See *Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercromby, K.B.*, by his son James, Lord Dunfermline, Edinburgh, 1861.

at that period the most highly prized honour of war, and he was appointed Commander-in-Chief in the West Indies.

In 1796 Sir Ralph sent an expedition to seize the island of Grenada by a *coup de main*. He subsequently captured St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad, and the settlements in South America of Demerara and Essequibo.

He returned home in 1797, being appointed colonel of the Scots Greys and raised to the rank of lieutenant-general.

In 1797-8 he held the chief command of the forces in Ireland and used his utmost endeavours to protect the people by re-establishing civil supremacy, in lieu of military oppression; but receiving inadequate support from the heads of the Irish Government he resigned the command, and in 1799 found himself again in Holland under the Duke of York, where the failure to attain any final strategical advantages is well known.

The next and concluding great service of this national hero was in the expedition, of which he was Commander-in-Chief, charged with the task of dispossessing the French of Egypt.

Sir Ralph's force of 16,000 men fit for duty and 1270 sick, including a Cavalry brigade comprising one troop of the 11th Light Dragoons, the 12th, 26th, and Hompesch's Light Dragoons, arrived by January 11, 1801, at the Bay of Marmorice, in Asiatic Turkey, with the object of combining with a Turkish force for the descent upon Egypt, which was to be supplemented by the landing of a force from India at Kosseir, to the south of the Gulf of Suez.

The British Cavalry were temporarily disembarked at Marmorice and received Turkish horses, but of such inferior quality that the commanding officer of the 12th Light Dragoons solicited permission for his regiment to serve as Infantry.

However, 300 of the best horses were trained by the 12th and 26th Light Dragoons, under the orders of Brigadier-General Finch.

After lengthy but unsatisfactory negotiations it became obvious that there was no hope of co-operation from the Porte, whose protestations of a reorganisation of the Ottoman forces were unworthy of confidence, and, unable to rely on the uncertain aid of the Red Sea expedition from India, Sir Ralph, perceiving that the success of this great enterprise would depend on his own troops, resolved alone and unaided to make the attempt. The Greek pilots unanimously declared

that it was impossible to land on the Egyptian coast till the equinoctial gales were over, but the fleet weighed anchor on February 23 and stood out to sea from the Levant. On March 2 the whole fleet anchored in Aboukir Bay,* precisely on the spot where Nelson's great victory had been gained three years before.

The state of the weather prevented the possibility of landing for several days, but on the morning of March 8, 1801, the first division of 5,500 men, in 150 boats, prepared to land in the face of a French force of about 2,000 men, supported by 15 pieces of artillery posted on the sandhills, with the Castle of Aboukir on their flank.

In order to guard as far as possible against the chance of any mistake being made, the first division had been continually drilled in disembarkation before leaving Marmorice.

The boats, which had been manned before daylight, remained for some time in the middle of the bay, menacing different points of the coast, and at length, the whole being assembled, at nine o'clock Captain Cochrane of the Navy made the signal to pull for shore. The French allowed them to approach within easy range, and then opened at once so heavy a fire that the water seemed literally to be ploughed up with shot, and the foam raised by it resembled a surge rolling over breakers.

Silently the boats approached the tempest. When they reached the fire several boats were sunk and the loss among their crowded crews was very severe, although, instead of being daunted, the men answered every discharge by a loud 'Hurrah!' and the glorious boat-race was so evenly contested that the prows of almost all the first division struck the sand at the same time. The troops instantly jumped into the water, and rapidly advancing to the beach rushed up the steep front of the heights with fixed bayonets and carried them in gallant style. In an hour the British were established on the heights and, the enemy retiring, with a loss of 300, left eight pieces of cannon in the hands of the victors.

On March 13 a bloody encounter took place with the enemy's vanguard, on which occasion Sir Ralph, having advanced to reconnoitre the ground, had a horse shot under him, and was saved by the 90th Regiment from being either killed or taken prisoner.

The French lost about 500 men and four field-pieces. At length

* Alison's *History of Europe*, vol. viii.

the British commander, deeming it prudent to desist, withdrew the Army at sunset, and the succeeding days were occupied in fortifying the position by the aid of heavy cannon brought on shore for that purpose.

On March 18 * General Menou with a large reinforcement arrived from Cairo, but the Castle of Aboukir surrendered to the British.

On that date the Cavalry were engaged and Lieut.-Colonel Archdall, 12th Light Dragoons, lost his arm. On the memorable March 21, the day of the battle of Alexandria, the British Army was, as usual, under arms at three o'clock in the morning. At half-past three the report of a musket, followed by the firing of a cannon, was heard at the extreme left flank of the position. This demonstration was, as it afterwards proved, only a feint, for shortly afterwards loud shouts were heard in front of the right, followed by a continuous rattle of musketry, and by break of day the action had become general. The French attack began to fail, but was supported by a great charge of a thousand Cavalry on the right and right centre. The Cavalry were beaten back with difficulty. No sooner did Sir Ralph perceive the Cavalry advancing than he moved up the 42nd and 28th Regiments from the second line to the support of the menaced wing. The first of these corps, charged by a second line of Cavalry in flank, was broken, but the brave Highlanders, formed in little knots, offered a stout resistance. The 28th Regiment was maintaining a severe action in front when they were startled by hearing French voices in their rear, and the rear rank had just time to face about when it was assailed by a French regiment which had got round unperceived, under cover of the mist and smoke. The attack upon their rear was repelled with admirable steadiness and resolution, and for this successful manœuvre the 28th (now the Gloucestershire Regiment) was subsequently authorised to bear the number of the regiment on the back as well as on the front of the head-dress. French Cavalry had also penetrated between the British lines, but the British reserve advanced in excellent order and brought a well-directed fire to bear upon the attackers, who were driven into the ruins, where a French battalion, which by its glorious record in the Italian wars had acquired the surname of the Invincibles, was obliged to lay down its arms after losing above two-thirds of its numbers.

* *History of the Wars of the French Revolution*, by Edward Baines, London, 1817.

On the first alarm Sir Ralph had mounted his horse and proceeded towards the menaced right flank. When he came near the ruins, where, at the commencement of the action the 58th Regiment was posted, he despatched his aides-de-camp with orders to different brigades, and, while thus alone, some French Dragoons penetrated to the spot, and one of them, supposed to be an officer, rode at him and attempted to cut him down, but Sir Ralph seized the sword and wrested it from the hand of his adversary, who at that moment was killed by a soldier of the 42nd Regiment. In this personal encounter Sir Ralph was wounded on the breast and he soon after received a wound from a musket-shot in the thigh, which compelled him to dismount and make his way on foot to the redoubt on the right of the Guards, where he remained for the rest of the day walking about, exposed to a terrible cannonade, insensible, to all appearance, to the pain of his wounds and the danger of his situation. Here he finally had the satisfaction of seeing the French retire, after nearly seven hours of determined fighting, and the victory decided, before the loss of blood began to darken his eyes.


Sir Sidney Smith was the first officer to come to the Commander-in-Chief when he was wounded, and to him Sir Ralph presented the sword he had so gloriously acquired, as a substitute for the sword of Sir Sidney Smith, which had been accidentally broken.

A singular circumstance happened almost immediately afterwards. Major Hall, aide-de-camp to General Craddock, whilst on a mission with orders, had his horse shot under him. Seeing Sir Sidney Smith he begged leave to mount his orderly's horse. Sir Sidney was turning round to bid him give it to the Major when a cannon-ball struck off the Dragoon's head. 'This,' exclaimed Sir Sidney Smith, 'is destiny; the horse, Major Hall, is yours.'

General Roize, the leader of the second line of French Cavalry, who had been hemmed in by the British, led his men in an endeavour to cut their way back to their own lines. They charged the English reserve with the utmost fury, but were met with so deadly a volley that most of the horsemen, with their General, perished on the spot. A copy of General Menou's orders was found in the pocket of General Roize, from which it appeared that it was the intention of the French General to make a false attack on the British left while the decisive attack was to be made on the right and centre, and he grandiloquently



RESCUE OF GENERAL SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY, AT THE
BATTLE OF ALEXANDRIA. — 21ST MARCH 1801.



THE DEATH OF SIR RALPH ABERCROMBY.

announced his intention of driving the English into Lake Maadieh. The losses of the enemy in this battle have been estimated at from 3,000 to 4,000 men. The British Army return shows the losses from March 8 to 21 to have amounted to 532 killed, 2,911 wounded, and 83 missing out of a force of less than 12,000.*

As darkness closed in the stricken Commander-in-Chief was placed upon a bier. An officer placed a folded blanket under his head for a pillow, when Sir Ralph asked: 'What is that you are placing under my head?' The officer† replied that it was only a soldier's blanket, on which Sir Ralph exclaimed: 'A soldier's blanket is of great consequence, and you must send me the name of the soldier to whom it belongs that it may be returned to him.' This was accordingly done.

On Sir Ralph's removal from the field of battle to Lord Keith's flag-ship, the *Foudroyant*, he nobly exclaimed: 'I can feel no pain, when I think of those fine fellows whom I have just left.'

He bore a painful and unsuccessful operation for the extraction of the ball with admirable firmness, and lived only till the morning of the 29th.

General Hely Hutchinson, his successor in the command, in his despatches, truly said that Sir Ralph Abercromby's memory would be sacred to every British soldier.

The hero of Alexandria possessed all the characteristics of greatness in a remarkable degree: to physical and moral courage, experienced judgment, self-reliance, decisive resolution, firmness, perseverance, personal endurance, and activity he added a character for integrity, sense of honour and consideration for others which gave him moral ascendancy, and commanded the respect and devoted affection of his brothers in arms. It is not too much to claim that he stands pre-eminent among the leaders who have served as regimental officers in the British Cavalry.

* *History of the British Campaign in Egypt*, by Sir Robert Wilson. These figures imply a loss of one quarter of the effective strength of the expedition due to sickness, detached and non-combatant or employed men.

† General Sir John Macdonald, Adjutant-General of the Army, then a lieutenant of the 2nd Queen's.

A CAVALRY STUDY

THE OPERATION OF MARSHAL BESSIÈRES BEYOND THE VISTULA,
DECEMBER 1806.

By MAJOR H. W. DAVSON, *Royal Horse Artillery*

THE Emperor Napoleon may be described as the inventor of strategic Cavalry. It was he who originated the idea of placing Cavalry in masses under a trusted commander with orders to clear the front of the enemy, penetrate his designs, and lastly, to mask the movements of his Army Corps. Sometimes there was one aim, sometimes another; sometimes all these duties had to be carried out, but in every phase of each campaign from the birth of the Grand Army until the exhausted Empire could no longer supply the necessary horsemen, we find the Cavaliers of the Empire engaged in operations which are a study in themselves. Amongst the far-reaching movements of the great *corps d'armée* they appear insignificant and oftentimes unnoticed, but when one is able to obtain sufficient information about any one of them it is of the greatest interest to the student and a fountain of knowledge—historical, strategical, and tactical.

The Emperor was served by many generals of note. Murat, Bessières, Grouchy, Lassalle, Montbrun, &c., were at various times much in the public eye, and it was to the first two that the handling of masses was generally entrusted. Compared with Murat, Bessières did not shine, but one piece of work of his is worth attention, namely, his manœuvres beyond the Vistula in the winter of 1806.

Napoleon had overthrown the power of Prussia, and on November 27 advanced to Posen, whither Davout had preceded him. That Marshal threw his light Cavalry about ninety miles in advance, and moving on a front of nearly a hundred miles, reconnoitred the approaches to Thorn, Klodowa, Wroclawek, and Kalish. The corps then occupied the line of the Vistula and the outlets at Thorn and Warsaw.

The hostile corps were placed as follows :—

The last Prussian Army, under Lestocq, occupied Soldau and the line of the Passarge towards Dantzig.

The first Russian Army, under Bennigsen, 55,000 strong, was in the triangle between the Rivers Narew and Wkra.

The second Russian Army, under Buxhoevden, 40,000 strong, was following the first, and was in and around Ostralenka.

Napoleon's plan was to debouch by Thorn and Warsaw, separate the Prussians from the Russians, throw the former towards the sea, and the latter eastwards into the interior of Poland. To carry out this he went himself to Warsaw with Davout, Lannes, Murat, and the Guard to push back the leading Russians. He sent Soult to Plock to move on the Upper Wkra, Augereau to the junction of the Narew and Vistula, Ney to Thorn, and Bernadotte to support Ney. To link up the last corps with Soult, Napoleon formed at Thorn the second corps of reserve Cavalry and gave the command to Bessières, whom he detached from the Guard for the purpose.

The formation of this corps was as follows :—

		Officers and Men.	Horses.
Light Cavalry of 1st Corps (General Tilly)	2nd, 4th and 5th Hussars	1,188	1,187
2nd Division of Dragoons (General Grouchy)	3rd and 6th Dragoons (Milet), 10th and 11th Dragoons (Roget), Ar- tillery and train	2,159	2,517
4th Division of Dragoons (General Sahuc)	17th and 18th Dragoons (Margaron), 19th and 27th Dragoons (La- planche), Artillery and train	2,419	2,497
2nd Division of Cuirassiers (General d'Hautpoul)	1st and 5th Cuirassiers (St. Sulpice), 10th and 11th Cuirassiers (Cle- ment), Artillery and train	1,665	1,741
	Total . . .	7,431	7,661

Napoleon's instructions to Bessières were sent to him at Posen on December 13.

' . . . The Marshal Bessières will start at midnight to-night with

his staff for Thorn, where Tilly's division arrived on the 12th, and where Generals Sahuc and Grouchy will arrive with their divisions on the 15th, and finally the Cuirassiers of General d'Hautpoul on the 17th . . . '

Here followed some information about the corps of Ney and Soult, to inform Bessières that the latter would pass the Vistula at Wroclawek on the 16th, and Bessières should gain touch with him at Lipno, whilst Soult's Cavalry stretched out towards Augereau, who was to cross at Zakroczyn.

He then gave Bessières his orders.

Firstly, 'to move and sweep the plain so as to join up his right with Soult's Light Cavalry.'


Secondly, 'to throw the enemy beyond the Wkra and assist the passage of the corps of Augereau and that of Davout, and finally that of the Cavalry of the Grand Duke of Berg.'

Thirdly, 'to reconnoitre the enemy towards Pultusk and Willenberg, and find out his intentions.'

He added, that he supposed the enemy would form line with the left on Pultusk, hold the lines of the Bug and Narew, and join hands with the Prussians on the Passarge, and told Bessières to try and induce the latter to retreat.

In fulfilment of his tasks, therefore, on the 16th Bessières passed Tilly's division across the river and sent them along the Drewenz towards Rypin and Lipno. Things were to be simplified for him as, on the 11th, Augereau had managed to throw some light troops across the Vistula at Zakroczyn and had sent down the river in search of boats to carry the heavier portion of his army. He proudly announced to the Emperor, on the 18th, that he had found sufficient at Wroclawek to take his corps over. On the 13th Davout passed his troops over the river at Warsaw and moved on to the Narew.

On the 17th the heavy Cavalry of Bessières crossed the Vistula at Thorn, and Tilly's division got into touch with the enemy at Lipno. They occupied that village and Kikol and pushed a reconnaissance on to Skompie. Grouchy pushed on to Wola. Sahuc occupied the left bank of the Drewenz as far as Gollub, and d'Hautpoul passed some of his Cuirassiers to the right bank of the river. Soult reached Wroclawek, and in the afternoon of the 17th wrote to the Emperor complaining that he could not cross because Augereau had



sent down the river and taken the boats which he had relied upon to assist his passage. This, as it happened, did not matter, as a letter from Berthier crossed this despatch, saying that 'the Russians appeared to wish to deliver battle before leaving Pultusk,' and that he was 'to direct Legrand and St. Hilaire on the Bzura and send word to Leval to follow.' Leval's division had previously been ordered to Thorn to support Bessières. Soult, therefore, moved his corps southwards with much misgivings at having to cross the Bzura as well as the Vistula, which was then about five hundred yards wide, but Bessières does not appear to have been informed of the change. On the same day Bessières moved his headquarters to Kikol. Tilly advanced to Skompie and met the enemy at all points. Grouchy and Sahuc followed, and Ney supported them from Gollub. Bessières' front now extended from Bobroniki to about thirty miles. Next day, Tilly reached Sierps, where he overthrew a small hostile force, and, after a march of thirty-three miles, he drove four Prussian squadrons out of Drobin and occupied the village. In the evening Bessières came to Sierps, and sent Milet's brigade to Plock to clear the banks of the Vistula: a most difficult task, for the country was all woodland and marsh, and its condition was rendered worse than usual by the wet weather which prevailed—weather such as the 'oldest inhabitant' had never remembered. Napoleon wrote to the Empress to say that 'the weather was very mild, but the roads were bad'—the roads really were a negligible quantity—and he added in the forty-fourth bulletin that it was 'as mild as Paris in October, but the rain was inconvenient.' The rain indeed flooded all the rivers and streams, and blocks of ice floated down the larger rivers.

When one considers that all the troops were short of food, and were working in a country which the Russians had left bare of supplies, the difficulty of their tasks becomes more pronounced. On the 17th Bernadotte was informed of Soult's change of orders and at the same time put in command of Ney and Bessières—a somewhat unfortunate move, as will be seen. Bessières, however, now knew about Soult, and at 9 P.M. on the 18th he ordered Tilly to send a patrol to Plonsk to try and find Augereau. This patrol met Lapisse's brigade on the 20th, whilst the remainder of Tilly's regiments, having made marches of from twenty-five to thirty miles, were spread out between that place and Skompie. Tilly having now carried out the

first part of the Emperor's orders, returned to Drobin *en route* for Biezun, whilst Bessières himself, in order to execute the second part, marched forward with Grouchy and drove the enemy out of Biezun and across the Wkra. Bessières' troops now extended from Plock to Rypin on an arc of sixty miles, placed roughly as follows:—

Headquarters at Rosciozewo.

d'Hautpoul at Sierps.

Milet on the road between Plonsk and Biezun.

Grouchy at Biezun, trying to gain touch with Ney towards Rypin.

Sahuc at Biezun.

Tilly round Drobin with patrols towards Plock.

At 8.30 P.M. on the 20th Grouchy sent in from Biezun to say that the enemy were in strong force along the Upper Wkra, and evidently expected a fight on the morrow, and that a skirmish had taken place at the bridge of Poniatowo. Next morning he reported touch with Ney at Rypin, but that no other French were on the road, and at midnight he sent in to say that a reconnaissance had returned from Radzonowo giving further information of hostile patrols, but showing a lack of formed bodies of troops on this side. He added some minor information obtained by personal reconnaissance, and stated that Ney showed no signs of moving towards him.

Bernadotte, Ney and Bessières then received a despatch from Berthier, which had a baleful effect on Bernadotte and Bessières, and probably stopped the latter from exerting a more vigorous pressure on his opponents. It was dated from Warsaw on the 20th, and opened thus:—

'The intention of the Emperor is that you manœuvre with prudence and do not engage yourself too much; above all it is necessary that you should establish communication with Zakroczyn . . . '

That it should have been thought necessary to send such warning to the impetuous Ney is easy to understand, but the reasons for sending it to Bessières and Bernadotte are not so apparent. The former never erred on the side of rashness, and as for Bernadotte, a level-headed soldier of vast experience, the Emperor had evidently forgotten his behaviour at Auerstädt six months before, and remembered only that at Halle.

On the 21st Bessières moved with great caution. He sent patrols in all directions and across the river towards Srensk. Milet arrived

from Plonsk, and Gardanne, who belonged to Ney's corps, and who, having arrived from Drobin, had been scouring the marshes south of Plonsk with one of Milet's regiments, rejoined later.

Bessièrès had so far fulfilled all the Emperor's wishes. He had made his junction with his right and left as ordered—for we may accept the substitution of Augereau for Soult—and had driven the enemy beyond the Wkra. It was now his duty to reconnoitre on the line Pultusk-Willenberg and lay bare the intentions of the Russian and Prussian commanders. Grouchy had supplied him with excellent information, and it only remained with him to act upon it promptly. This he failed to do, and perhaps Berthier's despatch was the cause.

On the 22nd Bernadotte and Ney remained at Rypin until the afternoon, and then Bessièrès drew in his flanking detachments. Grouchy meanwhile remained on the far side of the Wkra and reported Prussians at Kutzburg and Srensk and Russians towards Pultusk, and Bernadotte, writing to Berthier concerning the prospect of a fight at Pultusk mentioned in his letter, said there must be 15,000 Prussians at Neidenberg, and propounded excellent reasons for a move on Clechanow, but he never carried it out.

He had, however, been correct in his appreciation, for the next thing that happened was a strong counter attack against Biezun. Bessièrès had as yet no Infantry except six companies sent on in advance by Bernadotte, and the brunt of the fighting fell on Grouchy's Dragoons. The Wkra at this place divides into two channels and most of Grouchy's force had two bridges to cross before coming in contact with the enemy. Considering the force at his disposal, Bessièrès had comparatively few troops on the left bank, and the Prussians, advancing from Poniatowo and Kutzburg, seized and threw some Infantry into Karnyszyn, formed a line of battle along the edge of the plateau from that place to Sadlowo, and supported it with twelve guns.

Bessièrès then ordered Grouchy to retake the plateau, and that General sent the 3rd Dragoons across the river to reinforce his advanced posts, which were trying to hold on to the ridge. The leading regiment, having crossed the further bridge, found itself in a defile opposed to the whole of the Prussian right wing, and supported only by a few Infantry and *Dragons-à-pied*, who were still clinging to the slopes between Karnyszyn and the river. The 3rd Dragoons then

charged the village in front, and the 6th, following up, swung on to the Prussian right flank, whilst Margaron followed up with his brigade. Both attacks were successful, and the leading regiments, despite artillery fire concentrated upon them, carried the pursuit for two miles across the plateau until stopped by marsh land. The French captured five hundred prisoners, two guns, and two standards.

Then Bessières stopped. Instead of pushing on and following up his victory he listened to the representations of Bernadotte and Ney, who were without Cavalry, spread his regiments along the Wkra, and kept a regiment of Tilly's at Raciaz in order to keep in touch with Augereau.

Bernadotte was certainly short of Cavalry—in fact, he had written to the Emperor to say that he could not count on more than fifteen men with which to make his reconnaissances—but still Bessières was there to cover him, and in any case, it could not have been necessary to withdraw Grouchy's division six miles, which was what happened. Bessières threw weak patrols towards Clechanow and Mlawa, but there his useful work ended. The inroad of Cavalry towards the south-east, which might have seriously incommoded the Russian commanders during the day of Golymin and Pultusk, was conspicuous by its absence. It was only Ney's engagement at Soldau which finally induced Bessières to move, and then he was too late to assist either that Marshal, or Davout and Lannes, in their struggle on his right. A few days afterwards Napoleon decided to cease operations, and the troops withdrew to the Vistula and Bessières' command was broken up.

The foregoing affords a good example of the handling of Cavalry in mass. Bessières was well served by his generals, and they by their troops, and, so far as the narrative has been carried his campaign could not have been improved upon. Taking command of a newly formed corps, and moving into the heart of an unknown and difficult country in ignorance of the position of the corps on his flanks, and acting against an enemy well acquainted with the ground and his own dispositions, his troops had out-manœuvred that enemy on every occasion, had forced them back for a hundred miles, and ended up with a brilliant shock action which reflected the highest credit on all who took part in it.

One must note the depth of the column of march adopted by the French Marshal. In order that he might concentrate quickly he kept

his force on the one road—Thorn, Kikol, Sierps, Biezun—and ignored the road up the Drewenz to Gollub, thence by Rypin to Biezun, which was only used by patrols. In an unknown country split up by marsh and forest it was no doubt advisable, but in case of attack there would have been great delay in deploying his force. On the 17th his depth was twenty-five miles; on the 18th, sixteen; on the 19th and 20th, almost as much. In other words, if Bessières had had to sustain a stronger attack than was his lot at Biezun, it would have taken him about four hours to deploy his force on the Wkra.

It is not possible to collect details of the small encounters which led to the result, but one can learn enough to gather that the French horsemen were superior in self-reliance, dash, and training, and that their leaders, from the Marshal downwards, had made themselves more proficient in the handling of troops than those who were opposed to them.

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Rabel.—Le Maréchal Bessières.

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Bulletins de la Grande Armée.



A GOVERNMENT STUD FARM IN HUNGARY

By CAPTAIN M. CRAWSHAY, 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards

THE Hungarian Government was long ago, owing to heavy losses in the Turkish wars, confronted with the problem which faces us to-day in England, and which would prove a facer should war suddenly break out—the supply of horses of a suitable type for military purposes.

This problem has been solved by all the leading Governments of Europe by the institution of Government Stud Farms.

The Hungarians were pioneers, the 'Haras' (Stud Farm), which I was privileged to see, being established as far back as 1780 by the Emperor Josef II.

That it exists to-day on a far bigger scale is sure proof of its value.

A few remarks on the lines on which it is run may not be uninteresting, and if anything of the kind is ever undertaken in this country I am sure a great deal can be learned from the Haras of Mezohegges, with its 130 years' practical experience.

It indeed seems strange that the British Regular and Territorial Cavalry and Artillery should, on mobilisation, be badly and insufficiently mounted in a country which is more suitable for horse-breeding than any other, whose inhabitants pride themselves on their knowledge of horses, and from which all European nations obtain fresh blood to improve their own 'country-breds.'

At first sight it would appear that our War Ministers are much to blame, yet there are cogent reasons put forward against the establishment of Government Stud Farms, such as expense, killing of individual effort, a tendency to militarism, depopulation of area occupied, &c.

But I do not think that any of these weigh against the paramount necessity of having really good horses in the mounted branches.

The whole question is now under consideration, and it is quite possible that in time it will be found necessary to start Government Stud Farms.

I consider that in this event Ireland should be the country selected, because Ireland produces horses such as no other country can; the water, soil, climate, and grass being more suitable to them than that of any other country. Also, owing to emigration, the population to acreage is low, and ground should be more easily obtainable.

The history of the Stud Farm which I saw is as follows. Suitable land was bought at Mezohegges, 100 miles south-east of the capital, Buda-Pesth, the terrain forming part of the great Plain of Hungary being absolutely flat and the population not large owing to Turkish incursions. Stables suitable for breeding purposes were erected; stallions and mares bought.

With us I should think it would be an economy to utilise in part our young mares broken down by manœuvres or accident for breeding, rather than sell them as carters for low prices in the local Irish market square, which is our present custom. The best foals being kept for continuing the breed, the worst issued as remounts.

These mares are now sold for very little money and constitute a dead loss, but if several good remounts were obtained from them the loss would be covered.

The whole establishment is under the Department of Agriculture, but the commandant of the Stud Farm is an ex-Cavalry colonel, and the organisation and *personnel* are purely military.

The officers are taken from the Imperial Cavalry and remain permanently employed in this department.

They are responsible for the welfare and training of the horses. They also ride the stallions and mares in their trials for stamina, &c. They seem to be fair horsemen only, and, in common with the majority of Hungarians, are very fond of driving. In my opinion, it is a fallacy that the Hungarian is a born rider and always in the saddle—in fact, the Irishman of the Near East. They mostly far prefer driving in a sort of light four-wheel dogcart at a very fast trot, and they will drive in these carts, no matter how bad or muddy the road or track, in preference to actually getting up on a horse. In the regimental steeplechase of one of their best Cavalry regiments only five officers actually formed up, though there were about fifteen entries; and al-

though, like every other foreign Army, they have a few fine riders and officers, who have specially trained themselves for show jumping, I should say the general average standard of equitation is considerably below ours.

The men are third-year conscripts specially selected by regiments for good conduct and equitation.

The only civilians employed are a certain number of boys, who ride the stallions and young horses; these, however, wear uniform, and at the age of eighteen have to serve their time in the ordinary way.

The buildings are all clean, airy, and very well kept up, the general aspect of the barracks and stables being more cheerful than our own.

Far more good straw bedding is used, and the stables are kept warmer. Horse rugs are supplied everywhere. This not only applies to the Stud Farm, but to the troop stables of the regiment I saw.

The object of the Haras is dual :—

1st. To scientifically breed stallions of the required types and the highest possible standard, which may be used as sires throughout the country for the improvement of the whole breed of Hungarian horses.

2nd. The agricultural side, which does the same thing for cattle, pigs, sheep, fowls, &c., the types most suitable for the various districts being evolved and propagated. This latter side is non-military.

Five types of horses are produced, and so definite has the type become by careful selection that in a stable of nearly 200 mares and foals of the 'gidran' type not one varied appreciably in colour or size.

TYPES.

1. Gidran (Arab-English thoroughbred strain), Cavalry light.
2. English (Half-bred), Artillery.
3. Furroso (three-quarter-bred), Cavalry medium.
4. Nonius small (English-Norman bred), military.
5. Nonius large, draught and farming purposes.

The strong strain of Arab blood in the gidran type produces a very taking animal for light Cavalry, whose disposition combines seemingly the tractability, temperateness, and intelligence of the Arab with the fire and dash of the English thoroughbred. Considerably more attention and consideration is given to the disposition and temperament of horses in breeding abroad than is the case with us.

In England or Ireland a stallion is chosen because he has won some good races on the flat and is of good descent and symmetry.

In Hungary he is chosen for descent, symmetry, *stamina* and *disposition*; these two latter attributes are in my opinion very important for military horses.

All young stallions, before being classified as sires, must pass trials in jumping, hunting, and long-distance racing, in order that a thorough knowledge of their capacities may be obtained.

At the commencement the breeding was primitive, stallions in a fixed ratio being allowed to run wild with herds of mares. But now all covering is done by hand, the mares being brought to the stallions. It has been found that mares who travel considerable distances immediately before being covered are most easily put in foal; it is, therefore, the custom for them to go 40 kilometres before being covered.

The breeding season lasts from November 1 to June 1, and during this period the stallions are exercised only at a walk and trot.

Each stallion covers a mare once a day, exceptionally twice, but the number of times in a week must never exceed ten. The age and temperament of the stallion are taken into consideration.

The covering takes place in the morning or in the evening after exercise.

Usual exercise is two and a-half or three hours a day.

Before covering the mare has shoes of rope put on with felt heels; her tail is plaited and held by a rope.

The stallion is led by two men, one on each side, and every endeavour is made to ensure the covering being as natural as possible, as it is considered that this has a decisive influence on the fecundity of the mares.

Young stallions before being chosen as sires are sent to the Cavalry School and Cavalry regiments, where they are ridden by officers and put to severe tests; and stallions which have been at stud are also sent to regiments for officers to work and hunt, which has three advantages:—

1st. Getting them fit and hard.


2nd. Improving their manners, the stock obtained in consequence being more docile. Certainly, horses in Hungary are tamer and less nervous than anywhere else in Europe. I walked into a kraal of over 200 young two-year-old stallions fed on oats, and they were all per-

fectly quiet and tame, taking a friendly interest in one, which is not shown by young horses in this country. In fact, I felt rather like Gulliver amongst the 'Houyhnhnms' when they all came round, nuzzled my coat, and looked in my pockets.

3rd. They are earning their keep in the non-breeding season, thus saving expense.

In summer the young colts and fillies range the pasture land, and as there are no fences they are watched night and day by mounted soldiers, who play the *rôle* of shepherds. In winter they live in stables, and take their daily exercise by being driven round a large ring at a trot and walk.

The plan shown in diagram illustrates method of exercise.



The young fillies are kept in a similar way, and are submitted to trials on two successive days, weights being arranged according to age in months.

The best are kept for continuing the stock in the Haras; the ones who fail are issued as remounts for Cavalry or draught purposes according to their type.

In stables each horse has its own manger of cement let into the wall; it is quite separate from the next, which prevents stealing, and consequent bolting of food. Slow and quick feeders are also kept together as much as possible.

The foals commence eating crushed oats at the age of three weeks, taking their feeds at the same time as the dams from specially low troughs placed beside them.

At four months they wear a halter when feeding, thus early becoming accustomed to be handled by men, who must put it on and take it off at every feeding time; in consequence, the foals are very bold and friendly, as they associate men with food.

They are weaned when five months old.

The foals to be weaned are assembled in the morning in the central stable; they are marked, and registered in the Stud Books, then placed in the stable for foals, both sexes together. The foals remain five or six days in this large stable until they have forgotten their dams and become accustomed to freedom, at first in the exercise-place shown in the diagram, then out at grass.

The weaning is made in the order of dropping by groups four times a year.

After the weaning of the last group the sexes are divided. Great attention is paid to exercise and feeding.

The general health, condition, and growth of all the horses at the Haras was excellent, their annual mortality at present being only about 4 per cent. At the same time I do not think that the condition of horses for hard work is understood as well as it is in England and Ireland.

Their horses are kept too gross and too short of work. In the races for stallion trials which I witnessed at Buda-Pesth all the horses sweated excessively, and I think had any horse in the race been trained on English methods it would have beaten the winner.

Grooming and clipping is behindhand, and some officers appear on horses whose appearance would, to our ideas, be more suitable to hired transport.

Some idea of the importance of this Hungarian Stud Farm may be gained from the census. The present number of stallions, mares, foals, and working horses is 1950. Including the agricultural side there are over 17,000 head of live stock at Mezohegges.

At present, although our system of horse supply for the Army is somewhat haphazard, the fact remains that we probably obtain a fairly good class of remount cheaper than any foreign nation, by which I mean we get a better article for our money.

But we must look to the future; motor traffic must gradually, but surely, oust the horse. In London, which sets the fashion to the rest of the country, the number of horses is diminishing rapidly.

The 'bus horse, so useful in South Africa, is no more. Hunting is indirectly a great mainstay of our present system of procuring remounts; and, fortunately, the sport, although faced with many difficulties non-existent in old days, more than holds its own.

Again, the foreign market also keeps up horse-breeding in Ireland. As things are the foreigners pay better prices and take many of the best mares out of the country. At the same time this causes a demand; consequently, the farmers continue breeding, and our Government profits by buying misfits cheaply.

Luckily for us, so favourable is this country to the propagation of horses that even a misfit four years old can turn into a good troop horse at eight years.

When one sees what excellent horses foreigners can breed by careful selection, though continually fighting against Nature—for in all countries the tendency is to go back to the original type unless fresh blood is constantly brought in—it seems a great pity that we do not systematically and scientifically attempt to produce a type which for military purposes should far excel any other in the world, for in Ireland everything is in the breeder's favour.

In India, although conditions are no doubt very different, I believe the type of horse has been greatly improved by the Indian Government. Why should we not make an attempt at home?

The possibilities of breeding to a type are, when one reflects, very considerable; a really badly shaped horse should not exist, yet in England many are to be seen, unfortunately, in our troop stables, too.

How very much has been done with cattle, sheep, and pigs, and how very little does a show Shorthorn or Southdown ram resemble the original type of wild cattle or sheep. He is an entirely artificial animal, produced by the ingenuity of mankind. Therefore, why not produce a type of horse which is exactly what we require for the Army, if we can produce the exact type required for the butcher? Perhaps we could then sell our misfits to the foreigner and keep the best ourselves, which seems to be more businesslike and more dignified.

I am aware that I am bordering on very debatable ground, and with, I fear, not very much knowledge. Still, my contention is that our breeding is haphazard, while that of the foreigner is systematic, and our methods are only successful because we have the best natural horse country in the world; and although we do fairly well in actual practice in our horse-breeding, we might do very much better.

SKOBELEV'S CAVALRY IN BULGARIA.

By PERCY CROSS STANDING.

SEEING that he was born in 1843, Michael Dmitrievitch Skobelev was only thirty-three years of age at the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish War in the spring of 1877. But some fine Cavalry work in the somewhat barbarous conquest of Khokand had already marked the young officer out for high command, and he was predestined to play a leading rôle in the stirring events of 1877-8.

The 'stormy petrel of the Tsar's army,' as he has been styled, was prominent in the terrible July battles about Plevna, when the Muscovite legions were beaten back in blood by Osman Pasha. But on August 3, 1877, Skobelev led out a brigade of Cavalry, five battalions of Infantry, and two horse-batteries on a 'reconnaissance in force.' They occupied several villages, and on the 3rd came in touch with a Turkish force some 20,000 strong. Skobelev, who always wore a white uniform and bestrode a white charger, was unhorsed in the resultant *mêlée*, while three of the half-dozen Cossacks who formed his personal escort were shot down. Mounting another horse, the young General again dashed forward, only to have this fresh steed also shot under him. By a miracle he himself escaped however; and as it was claimed that the object of the reconnaissance had been attained, his force slowly withdrew from the Turkish front.

It is impossible not to be struck by the genius he displayed in the handling of large bodies of mounted men in that most difficult of hostile countries. On September 2 he captured two mountain-peaks, which exercised no inconsiderable effect on the future course of affairs. In the bloody fighting that ensued and was maintained for several days, the important Loftcha position was taken and re-taken by Skobelev's men. The general result was that the Turks still held their own ground, though their position was by way of becoming somewhat contracted. But on November 9, the gallant Skobelev concerted with General Gourko a combined Cavalry and Infantry assault upon an eminence which dominated the famous Loftcha position.

The troops moved to the attack at five o'clock on the afternoon of a raw and foggy day. Skobelev decided to lead his men in person, and the outcome was a complete surprise of the Ottoman position. 'On the approach of darkness,' wrote the late Mr. McGahan, the famous War Correspondent of the *Daily News*, 'the roar of eighty guns was heard, that vomited splashes of flame upon the murky fog and then were silent. In the dense fog every noise was magnified, and as the shells screamed past and exploded with a sharp, ringing sound behind us in the village (of Loftcha), it seemed as if they were ten times the ordinary size. The darkness was impenetrable.' Sabre and bayonet were indiscriminately used in the hand-to-hand struggle, which left the Russians in possession of a veritable key to Plevna. A month later, Skobelev enjoyed the satisfaction of riding into the blood-stained fortress at the head of his all-conquering Cossacks and Dragoons.

We come now to one of the most brilliant, as it has ever been one of the most neglected by military writers, of all General Skobelev's exploits. I allude to the battle of Senova, in which he held independent command and which culminated in the capitulation of Vesoul Pasha and nearly 30,000 officers and men. As usual with the 'stormy petrel's' offensive operations, Cavalry played a very big part in this enterprise. It may be of interest, by the way, to recall to students of the Cavalry arm that the late Colonel Valentine Baker Pasha was with the Turkish headquarters at this time, and that he represented to the Ottoman Generalissimo—but without effect—the significance of the Russian movement having Adrianople for its ultimate objective.

On New Year's Day 1878, three distinct columns prepared to move against the Turkish positions in the snow-capped Balkans—viz., Skobelev's on the right, Radetzky's in the centre, and Prince Mirsky's on the left. The first commander took with him twenty-five battalions of Infantry and twenty squadrons of Cavalry, representing nearly 20,000 effectives. On January 5, Skobelev published an Order of the Day in which he told his devoted troops: 'Without Artillery, without roads, we shall have to push our way through the snow and to do this in the presence of the enemy. When over the Balkans, a large and powerful Turkish Army, commanded by the best Generals of the enemy, will await you. This army ventures to stop your advance. Russia expects you to be victorious—God asks you to be heroes!'

On the 6th he moved, his Cossacks smartly driving in such stray parties of the enemy as were encountered. 'The march,' we can readily

believe, 'was extremely arduous.' On the 8th, realising that his original idea of surprising the enemy was exploded, he stormed the village of Imitli in fine style, losing some two hundred men in the operation, many of them in the Cavalry. But now came a drastic change of plan, enforced by the circumstance that Prince Mirsky, in attempting to join hands with the column under the veteran Radetzky, was attacked by a superior Turkish Army and, in the course of a day's hard fighting, lost no fewer than 4000 men. Moreover when, on January 9, General Radetzky sought to come to the aid of his colleague he was hurled back.

In this desperate predicament, the genius and resource of Skobelev saved alike the situation and the Tsar's Army. From the heights of Imitli he perceived that a great battle was raging, and as soon as possible he put his wearied men and horses in motion once more and, in Moltke's expressive phrase, 'marched on the cannon's thunder.' The odds were great, Cavalry could only with difficulty operate in such surroundings, and Vesoul Pasha's Artillery consisted of forty Krupp cannon against the Russian's few small mountain-guns. 'All now depended on Skobelev, and it was his promptitude and valour which changed the fortunes of the day. He determined not to march on Schipka as he had been directed to do, but to place himself to the south of Senova. An hour after daybreak his troops were on the road.'

The Cavalry did good and useful work, in scouting and in so manoeuvring as to counteract any effort of the enemy to break out by way of Kezanlik. It must have been dramatic, for this battle 'above the clouds' was fought in the midst of a snow-covered environment.

In endeavouring to get out towards the Kezanlik road, the Turks were turned back by Skobelev's judiciously posted Cavalry. A bayonet charge all along the line resulted in the capture of most of the formidable Artillery of Vesoul Pasha, who now sent in a *parlementaire* with proposals for a capitulation. Unconditional surrender was all that Skobelev would consent to, and in the result some 26,000 men and 280 officers, with forty Krupp guns and seven battle-flags, became the prizes of the victors. They had lost about 2000 killed and wounded, as against four times as many on the Turkish side.

Senova was the Sedan of the Russo-Turkish War, and very shortly afterwards the Tsar's Army entered Adrianople. It was a magnificent triumph for Skobelev, who had the additional joy of witnessing the success of his beloved Cavalry as well as the supremacy of his favourite weapon—the *arme blanche*.

THE CENT-GARDES

By A. E. PEARSE

WHEN the French Imperial Guard was reconstituted by Napoleon III., he, unlike the former Kings of France and even his Uncle Napoleon I., patriotically limited himself to only French troops, and instead of the *Mamelukes* for his own special body-guard, he raised on March 24, 1854, the corps called the *Escadron des Cent-Gardes à Cheval*, and, as its name implies, it consisted of a hundred mounted Guardsmen.

This squadron was under the command of a captain, and made up of troopers specially selected and recruited from among the N.C.O.s of the regular Cavalry who had an exemplary character, a height of at least 1.80 metre (say six feet), and of fine physique generally, so that these men were of a similar type of men that make up our Household Cavalry, and the squadron although small was the crack corps of an already *élite* troop of Guards.

After a time, however, the requirements of the corps were so varied and numerous that the squadron was increased, and divided into two troops. Although the strength was more than doubled the original appellation of *Cent-Gardes* was still retained notwithstanding that at the same time it became a misnomer. To fill up the ranks of the new corps, however, it was found impossible to keep to the former regulations, and the recruiting was therefore no longer restricted to N.C.O.s, but picked troopers with a certain period of service and possessing an irreproachable character were also admitted, the height of the men, however, being never under any circumstances reduced. The rate of pay was high, especially when the increase given after seven years of faithful service was added.

Instead of being only under the command of a captain, the new corps of Hundred-Guards was commanded by a colonel, having under him

a major, an adjutant, a medical and veterinary officer. Each troop consisted of a captain in command, a lieutenant, two sub-lieutenants, twenty-eight N.C.O.s, four trumpeters, and 150 Guardsmen; these latter took rank with the N.C.O.s of the Army. That the corps was indeed an aristocratic one may be gathered from the fact that a certain number of men were attached to the squadron to help with the fatigue duties in quarters, besides which grooms from the remount corps were generally detailed to look after and superintend the horses, all of which were bays.

The *Cent-Gardes* held a privileged position in the French Army, similar to that which the Royal Horse Artillery holds in ours—that is, of taking the right of the line on all parades where other troops were present; besides this they also took precedence before all other corps. This last-named privilege, however, it is said, was once contested. It was after a review held at Versailles, both the *Cent-Gardes* and the Military School of Saint-Cyr were on their way back to quarters, when they met simultaneously at a cross-road; for a moment both corps halted and hesitated before proceeding. The trumpet-major shouted that his corps, composed entirely of *non-commissioned officers*, should, of course, pass first. To this the Saint-Cyr drum-major simply ordered his drummers to resume beating, and although this made the trumpet-major's horse prance, the drum-major, swinging his stick, led his men on, exclaiming as he went by that the battalion of Saint-Cyr, known as the first one in France, was made up of *officers*. The incident ended in a duel the next day.

The *Cent-Gardes* being the premier corps of the French Army and existing at a period when uniforms were designed for show rather than comfort, it was, therefore, only to be expected that their dress was both handsome and brilliant, which admirably suited the martial carriage of the troopers and gave them a most imposing and prepossessing appearance.

In style the dress was almost the same as that of our Household Cavalry; the tunic, however, was light blue with scarlet collar and facings, worn with fringed epaulettes and aiguillettes hanging from the right shoulder, these ornaments being of gold lace half mixed with red silk. On great occasions the corners of the tunic, both front and back, were fastened up, showing triangular patches of red lining, which gave a most effective appearance.

The steel helmet was of the French Cuirassier pattern with brass crest, having a red tuft on top, a red hackle feather was fixed on the left side and a long white horse-hair tail hung behind; this white tail was the most attractive part of the whole uniform.

The saddle-cloth was light blue with a wide scarlet border and embroidered at the fore and hind corners with an N surmounted by the Imperial crown.



1854-1870.

For ordinary dress the Guardsmen wore a light blue tunic with scarlet facings, and dark red pantaloons having a double light blue stripe along the seams. In common with the rest of the Imperial Guard, the men carried the *épée* in a leather scabbard and wore a cocked-hat when walking out; this was also the headgear worn when the corps escorted the Emperor Napoleon III. at the beginning of the war in 1870.

The arms of the corps were altogether different from that of the other Cavalry regiments, and consisted of a carbine of a special model and a long straight sword in a steel sheath. This sword could be fixed to the carbine like a bayonet, bringing the total length of the united weapons to 2.10 metres (say 7 feet). As the mounted escort usually carried this, the butt resting on the thigh, the glittering of the long blades could be seen high above the heads of the troops.

In imitation of their Emperor, most of the Guardsmen wore the moustache and 'goatee' beard, known as the 'Imperial.' This was so much the fashion that it almost seemed to form part of the uniform.

When on duty inside the palaces on State ceremonials the Guardsmen discarded their cuirass and wore instead an over-vest with the Imperial Arms on the breast. On these occasions the troopers were posted in different parts of the corridors and rooms of the palace; but where they showed to the best advantage was on the great staircase in the Tuileries, when the place was adorned with flowers and ferns and on both sides of each step stood a stalwart trooper. On these duties the sentries would stand as motionless as if they were made of waxwork.

It was on one of these occasions that a most comical and at the same time undignified incident took place. The Prince Imperial when a child once dropped some sweets inside a sentry's boot, without, however, eliciting any signs of life from the Guardsman, but the incident caused much amusement at court and eventually got to the ears of the Empress Eugénie, who, when she mentioned the occurrence to the colonel, received the reply that none of his men when on duty would move on any pretext, except, of course, when obeying military commands. The Empress could not believe this and unceremoniously bet the commander that she would manage to do it. Her Majesty, accompanied by the colonel, there and then walked backward and forward in front of the sentry, trying her utmost to attract his attention and make him move. The non-success of her scheme so enraged her that she suddenly went straight to the trooper and by standing on tip-toe just managed to give the man a loud smack on one of his cheeks; even this did not make her victim move a muscle, very much to the disappointment of the Empress, who frankly admitted having lost her wager. As a compensation for this extraordinary conduct, she sent to the Guardsman a tempting present, which was, however,

proudly refused, the trooper stating that he was very much honoured to have had his face touched by Her Majesty's hand.

The active service of the Corps was almost *nil*, but like our Household Cavalry, the *Cent-Gardes*, once they got there, were as brave in action as they were smart on parade. They accompanied Napoleon III. in Italy and were present at Solferino in 1859. As stated before, at the beginning of the Franco-Prussian war they only acted as escort to the Emperor, but as reverses were reported they inwardly revolted against their monotonous duty and were most eager to be sent to the front, especially as they were looked upon with contempt by the other troops. At last they were incorporated into the Army of the Rhine and took part in the defence of Sedan, where, unfortunately, half the corps was made prisoners. The other half was merged into a regiment of Cuirassiers, with whom they charged on several occasions. Some of the Guardsmen under their colonel managed to find their way to the Capital and took an active part in defending it.

The corps was broken up in the war, and was officially disbanded on September 4, 1870.



FIELD TROOPS

By CAPTAIN E. W. COX, R.E.

I. FIELD Troops are the engineers that accompany the British Cavalry Division.

The need of mounted sappers has been felt since the Peninsula War. A detachment of sappers of the Guard was sent across country on horseback, to clear a bridge over the Sambre for Napoleon's light Cavalry in their advance on Charleroi.

In the American Civil War the Cavalry generals on both sides made constant use of mounted pioneers to interrupt communication on their famous raids.

In the Franco-Prussian War the mounted pioneers with the German Cavalry were credited with a large share in the victory of Wörth, as, by cutting the railway between Saargemünd and Bitsch, they prevented the arrival of French reinforcements, while the 6th German Cavalry Division used its mounted sappers to destroy the railways radiating from Vierzon, and to bridge the Rhine-Marne canal.

Gourko, in 1876, used mounted pioneers to assist the passage of his wagons over the Balkan pass, and afterwards in destroying railways and telegraphs.

In the later stages of the South African War, every column had, attached to it, either a field troop or a detachment of mounted sappers from field companies.

At the present day mounted engineers, under various names, are allotted to the Cavalry divisions of France, Germany, Austria, and Russia, so that there can be no doubt that the need of them is universally recognised.

In order to appreciate the true value of field troops as they are to-day, it is necessary to review very briefly their origin and their history.

In the Egyptian War of 1885 it was decided to try the experiment

of adding a detachment of mounted engineers to the corps of mounted Infantry. This experiment proved so successful that a permanent 'mounted detachment' was created in 1887, as the nucleus of a larger force to be raised in war. This 'mounted detachment' was gradually increased between 1887 and 1898, and the first year of the South African War saw it expanded into four field troops.

At the end of the war three troops returned to England and one remained in South Africa. One of the Home troops was soon disbanded, leaving three troops to provide for three Cavalry brigades.

In 1904 the peace establishment was reduced, but in 1907 two more troops were formed, making five in all—four for the Cavalry division at home and one for the Cavalry in South Africa.

Before these two extra troops were sanctioned, the possibility of a reduction in the peace establishment must have been considered very carefully. No reduction was made, however, and it was not till five years later, *i.e.* in the spring of 1912, that a further reduction was ordered, at a gross saving, on all the troops, of some £10,000 a year.

Such is a very rough outline of the history of the field troops. Is there anything to be learnt from it? One fact stands out clear beyond all others: that peace is the only enemy the field troops have to fear. The same may, perhaps, be said of every arm, but it can be said more truly of the engineer arm than of any other, and of the field troops most truly of all.

They were raised in one war, and increased in another; it is only when the false lessons of peace manœuvres begin to blot out the realities of the last big war that the field troops suffer, and there can be no doubt that, had war been waged last autumn in the field instead of in the office, the troops would not be the crippled units that they are now.

II. It is laid down in *Field Service Regulations*, Part I., section 5, paragraph 1, under 'The fighting troops and their characteristics,' that engineer field troops are allotted to a Cavalry division to assist the mounted troops in the passage of rivers, in the improvement of roads and other means of communication, in placing localities in a state of defence, and in interrupting the enemy's communications by the destruction of bridges, railways, and telegraphs. (These duties are

amplified in *Cavalry Training*, section 237, and in *Engineer Training*, sections 114 and 115.)

It should be noted that only two of these duties are ever carried out on manœuvres—namely, water supply and rafting. The pace of both the advance and the fight is accelerated to such a degree that Cavalry cannot wait for work that would have to be done in war.

Paragraph 2 defines the characteristics of field companies, which form part of an Infantry division, to be the construction of works of defence, and the improvement, or construction, of roadways and bridges. (See also *Engineer Training*, sections 113 and 115.) Both troops and companies assist in the preparation and maintenance of watering arrangements.

These two paragraphs emphasise very distinctly the chief difference between the duties of field troops and field companies. The troops are too small, except for demolitions, to do more than assist and supervise working parties of dismounted Cavalrymen or civilian labourers (see *Cavalry Training*, section 237, paragraph 3), while field companies are expected to work without, as well as with, help from other sources. Special prominence was given to this duty of supervision by Sir Douglas Haig in his report on the Cavalry Divisional Training of 1909.

Another difference is the restriction which is placed on the work of field troops by the pace at which Cavalry move. A troop cannot undertake work which would delay it to such an extent that it would lose touch with the force to which it is attached.

Again, a field troop is not expected to take part in siege warfare, whereas sapping and mining form one of the most important duties that may fall to the lot of a field company.

III. In order that the field troops may be used to the greatest advantage in war, the four troops at Home are organised as Cavalry divisional engineers, and a lieutenant-colonel, with an adjutant, is appointed to superintend their training in peace and to command them in war. As, however, the brigades of the Cavalry division are quartered at different stations, the field troops are not kept together in peace: each is attached to a Cavalry brigade, in order that both arms may be in the closest possible touch one with the other, and to give the Cavalry brigadiers an opportunity of learning the possibilities

of field troops, of using them in brigade training, and of keeping them up to a high standard of horsemastership.

Each troop consists, in peace, of a captain, a subaltern, 31 non-commissioned officers and sappers, and 20 drivers, with 20 riding and 26 draught horses. This establishment is increased in war by one subaltern, 14 non-commissioned officers and sappers, and seven drivers, with corresponding additions to the number of horses.

In war, the officers, the non-commissioned officers, and 18 sappers are mounted, while 15 sappers ride bicycles.

Entrenching, cutting, and carpentering tools are carried in two double tool-carts, together with water supply stores and explosives. The tool-carts are drawn by 6-horse teams and are expected to keep up with the mounted men. In order that field troops may be equal to any emergency, certain tools are always tied on to the bicycles or carried by the mounted sappers in tool buckets, small quantities of explosives can be carried in sandbags *en banderole* by both mounted men and cyclists, and five pack-horses are available for heavy tools, large quantities of explosives, and electric generators.

A collapsible boat equipment is carried in a special wagon. This equipment provides a raft which will take the heaviest horsed vehicle in the Cavalry division. Under the most favourable conditions it takes 35 minutes to unload the wagon and get the first raft load across a river 100 yards wide.

Lastly, there is a G.S. wagon for odd stores and baggage, in addition to the usual supply wagon, cook's cart, and water cart.

The organisation and equipment of a field company are naturally somewhat different. At present there are two companies to each Infantry division. The need of a third has been felt so keenly that a special inquiry was set on foot, to see whether some reductions could not be carried out in other branches of the corps, in order to cancel the additional expenditure which the six new companies would entail. The reductions have been effected, but the Infantry divisions are still waiting for the third field companies.

The peace establishment is three officers and 116 sapper non-commissioned officers and men, expanded in war to six officers and 157 sapper non-commissioned officers and men.

A field company is, therefore, more than twice as strong as a field troop.

The sappers are dismounted, except for 32 cyclists, and their engineering equipment is carried in four double tool-carts, while four pack-horses are provided for emergencies.

The chief difference between the equipment of a field troop and that of a field company lies in the river-crossing equipment. A troop has only a raft, while a company has 75 feet of pontoon bridge, which can be joined up with the equipment of the other divisional field company and of half a bridging train, to form a bridge 120 yards long; in all normal cases, therefore, the waste of time that is inevitable in rafting or bridge building is avoided.

IV. Sappers who enlist for service in field troops are sent to Aldershot, and are trained in the *depôt* in drill, musketry, riding, and military engineering, before they are posted to units.

Dismounted sappers, on the other hand, are sent to Chatham on enlistment, and are put through their recruit's courses of drill, musketry, and military engineering, in the Training Battalion. The terms of service are 'six and six' for both mounted and dismounted sappers.

The drivers of every unit in the corps are enlisted and trained at Aldershot, their terms of service being 'two and ten.'

The training of both troops and companies may be roughly divided into two distinct periods during the year—technical training at trades during the winter and spring, and military training during the summer and autumn.

The military training of a troop is rather different from that of a company. Every sapper, whether in a troop or a company, must be, first of all, a skilled field engineer; but a field troop sapper, in addition, must be able not only to ride, to look after his horse, to shoot and to swim, but also to read a map, find his way at night, and act, under any circumstances, on his own initiative.

A brief summary of the annual training of the Aldershot troop is as follows:—

When the annual manœuvres are over, every sapper settles down to work at his trade till the end of the year. In January or February he undergoes half-troop training; each half-troop in turn is trained for a month in riding (up to M.I. standard), horsemastership, elementary field engineering, musketry (preliminary training), map

reading by day and night, and semaphore, with daily lectures on the various subjects.

The sappers of the half-troop which is not under training are either working at their trades or on furlough.

March is devoted to drills, both mounted and dismounted, and the annual musketry course.

Thirty working days in April and May are spent on the annual military engineering course, at the end of which the sappers return to their trades, while the non-commissioned officers give a three weeks' course of fifteen Cavalry pioneers from each regiment in the brigade. The sappers remain at their trades, and the non-commissioned officers work at day and night reconnaissance, till the troop, with the Cavalry pioneers, goes under canvas for three weeks of summer training, *i.e.* bridging, rafting, the use of every kind of expedient for river-crossing, and horse swimming. This is followed by three weeks of combined training, during which the three troops stationed in England are trained, under the officer who will command them in war, both in practical engineering and in tactical schemes which have been submitted to a Cavalry officer on the General Staff. Then follow brigade training, Cavalry divisional training, and the various manœuvres.

V. It is extremely difficult to grasp the possibilities of a unit, the characteristics and duties of which are unfamiliar, if the only information that can be obtained is confined to the generalities laid down in *Field Service Regulations*, Part I., and *Cavalry Training*.

The duties that may fall to field troops will, therefore, be enumerated in greater detail, and the less obvious ones will be illustrated from the schemes set during the combined training of the last two years:—

(a) Entrainment and detrainment.—Approaches would be made or improved, ramps constructed, and sidings laid down.

(b) Passage of rivers.—The troops would be responsible for the rafting of the limbered G.S. wagons and the R.H.A. guns and wagons; the Cavalry regiments and all the gunner horses would swim.

Field troops are able to practise horse swimming much more regularly than Cavalry regiments; every horse, both riding and draught, on every day of summer training, is made to swim across a river and back, and it is suggested that these well-trained horses

should be used to give a lead, whenever Cavalry regiments are likely to lose valuable time through the refusal of their horses to take the water.

(c) Engineering reconnaissance.—It has been already explained that field troops cannot carry out any piece of protracted engineering, but they may often be able to send back to the C.R.E. of an Infantry division in rear not only a report of the work that awaits him, but valuable information about tools and materials.

In the unusual event of mounted troops investing a locality, the engineering reconnaissance would take the form of impressing tools, materials, transport, and possibly labour.

The work of a field troop in carrying out the three duties that have already been outlined is so obvious that no illustration is necessary.

(d) Rapid reconnaissance of a position and deliberate preparation for defence.

(e) Defence of river crossings.

(f) Defence of close billets.

(g) Bridge demolitions and hasty defence of localities.


(h) Raid on railway communications.

(i) River crossing at night.

(j) Fighting.

These duties (c) to (j) will be illustrated by a short narrative.

On June 1, 1912, war broke out on the Continent between Blue-land and Blackland. Blue-land quickly gained control of the sea north of




Scale of Miles
0 20 40 60
MAP A

the English Channel, and, just as England had completed the mobilisation of her one Cavalry and six Infantry divisions, and was preparing to send them to the Continent to help Blackland, Blue-land invaded England with a force of one Cavalry division, cyclists, and two corps, which landed at King's Lynn and marched on London. England concentrated her Infantry by rail south of Cambridge, with the Cavalry division about Royston (Map A).

On June 15 the Cavalry division moved forward to make good the high ground between Gunner's Hall and Cherry Hinton (Map B),

and the field troops were ordered to strengthen the position between Worsted Lodge and Reservoir.

The C.R.E. allotted sections to the troop commanders and ordered them to meet him with their reports at a central rendezvous.



The troop commanders had to reconnoitre their sections at the trot in order to reach the rendezvous in time. While the C.R.E. wrote his report the troops collected tools and materials and began work. On receipt of the report the G.O.C. detailed one regiment

as a working party, and sent the report to the C.-in-C. in rear, to inform him of the possible expansion of the line.

The Cavalry division held the defensive position on June 16, but were hard pressed towards the evening, and on the 17th the field troops were ordered to hold the river crossings over the Granta while the division retired to the line Grantchester-Whittlesford. Three squadrons were detailed to assist the field troops, who had no time for more than the most hurried reconnaissance before the retirement began. As the regiments crossed the river they were met by mounted sappers who led them to their positions.

On the next day the Infantry columns began to arrive and the Cavalry division re-crossed the Granta and went into close billets at Six-mile Bottom, Little Wilbraham, and Lode. The field troops were attached to brigades for the night, arranged water supply, and assisted the brigades to prepare their billets for defence.

On June 19 and 20 the Cavalry division drove the enemy back to Thetford (Map A), but on the afternoon of the 20th reinforcements for the enemy were reported to be advancing on Cambridge from Wisbech. The C.-in-C. decided to change his line of communications to the line Hertford-Cambridge, and on June 22 the field troops were ordered to destroy all bridges over the Granta from Whittlesford Station to Great Chesterford, to prevent any crossing between those points, and to hold Ickleton. The C.R.E. allotted bridges and detailed patrols. The bridges were blown up on receipt of an order from the commander of the rear guard.

To illustrate a river-crossing at night and a railway raid, another narrative is necessary.

In July 1911 war broke out between two States north and south of the Thames.


The south were ready, the north unprepared.

To cover the mobilisation of their regulars the north assembled a large force of local levies, which, with one Cavalry brigade, two batteries Royal Horse Artillery, and a field troop, crossed the frontier, and on July 10 encountered the enemy some 30 miles south of Maidenhead (Map C).

Heavy fighting took place on the 11th and 12th, and by 4 P.M. on the 12th the northern forces were driven back on the line Hurley-Maidenhead Thicket-Maidenhead.

Maidenhead was held by one Cavalry regiment, while Cookham and Marlow bridge-heads were defended by Infantry from the local levies, who had prepared the bridges for demolition.

At 6 P.M. the local M.I. were ordered to retire across the Thames at Marlow and blow up the bridge.



The Cavalry brigade covered this retirement, intending to cross at Cookham and blow up the bridge there, while the regiment in Maidenhead was ordered to hold on until the bridges at Marlow and Cookham had been destroyed.

At 11 P.M. Marlow bridge was blown up, and shortly afterwards the

R.H.A. and field troop, who were waiting at Park Farm, were ordered to retire to Cookham. Just as they passed through Cookham Rise a violent explosion was heard from the east, and word was brought back that Cookham bridge had been destroyed.

The field troop was ordered to get the guns across the river at Cock Marsh. Volunteers swam the river with their horses, and with this lead the majority of the horses swam over free.

The rest were taken over behind the raft, which made 30 journeys, ferrying the last wagon over at 4.30 A.M.

From July 13 to 15 the south made several unsuccessful attempts to force the passage of the river, and on the 16th the Cavalry division moved to the west to cross above Reading, leaving a holding force of one Cavalry brigade, one battery of Horse Artillery, and one mounted sapper detachment on the line Hurley-Maidenhead.

At 6 P.M. on the 16th information was received that large quantities of stores were being removed by rail from High Wycombe to London and Aylesbury. Scouts reported that the outpost line along the river had been weakened, and that the turning movement at Reading was beginning to cause a general retirement of the northern force.

The O.C. mounted detachment was ordered to cut the railway east and west of High Wycombe that night.

Three parties, each of one officer, one non-commissioned officer, and two sappers, swam the river as soon as it was dark, and went across country on foot. One party was captured, the other two got through—one blowing up a short rail at a curve, and the other dropping an iron girder over a culvert.

They hid in the woods on the enemy's side of the railway during the next day, and rejoined the unit the next night.

VI. It has already been stated that water supply and rafting are the only duties in which field troops can prove their value on peace manœuvres. An attempt has been made, by quoting from history, and by giving an account of present-day training, to illustrate the rôle of field troops in war, and the various ways in which they can be of assistance to Cavalry. There are still some points, however, which have escaped attention, and these can best be illustrated by imagining the questions that a Cavalry commander might be expected to ask himself when studying, in peace, the best way of getting the utmost out of his field troops in war.

(1) What is the best place for the troops on the line of march?

The answer to this depends of course very largely on local circumstances, but certain principles are clear. A field troop officer, with, possibly, six mounted N.C.O.s and sappers, should invariably accompany the advanced guard.

This is laid down very distinctly in *Engineer Training*, section 96, paragraph 3. A well-trained officer will notice at once any opportunity there may be of helping the Cavalry, and by sending word back to the C.R.E. will enable the latter to prepare for work before he actually reaches the scene of it.

This implies that the C.R.E. must be in the closest touch with the headquarters staff. The necessity is self-evident, and is anticipated in *Engineer Training*, section 95, paragraph 1. Until there is work for the troops, the C.R.E. must be where he will get information and orders without delay in their transmission. This principle should be maintained when a field troop is allotted to a detached Cavalry brigade. The troop commander is then the C.R.E. of the brigade, and should invariably be with his brigadier until he gets work for his unit.

The main body of the sappers, with tool-carts and pack-horses, may very well follow the gunners, unless it is more expedient to use them to assist the transport or train. The latter duty should never be assigned to the troops in peace, as it is unnecessary and would discourage both officers and men.

The heavy G.S. wagon, and the boat wagon, should be relegated to the train, the boat wagon being kept with the first line transport only when there is a possibility of using it.

A Cavalry commander can, in this way, free his fighting troops from all encumbrances, as they would be accompanied by nothing less mobile than mounted men, cyclists, and limbered wagons.

Another case may arise. If the enemy is met unexpectedly, and the first line transport is uncomfortably close, it might be a sound plan to send the main body of the sappers back to the transport, with orders to take it to the nearest defensible position, such as a village, and to prevent its capture.

A Cavalry commander should never forget that he possesses over 40 rifles in each troop, which might be invaluable at a *point d'appui*. Musketry training in field troops has been raised to the same standard

as that of Cavalry regiments, and it is expressly stated in *Engineer Training*, section 3, that fighting is one of the duties of engineers.

This possibility should be borne in mind even if it is not considered necessary to take special precautions for the safety of the transport.

The rifles of the field troops could be used, as they often were in the last war, to escort machine guns, or R.H.A., or even to assist dismounted Cavalry.

Peace manœuvres would be rendered much more interesting to field troops if Cavalry commanders would remember this, and would occasionally give them some other order than to follow the guns.

Lastly, when the Cavalry are going to billets or bivouacs for the night, the troops should be sent on well ahead, so that they can have something ready, in the way of water supply, by the time the Cavalry begin to arrive. This is laid down very clearly in *Engineer Training*, section 96, paragraph 8.

It is a point that can be practised every day on peace manœuvres, but only if the C.R.E. is with the headquarters staff, and gets his orders without any loss of time.

(2) What is the best use to make of field troops in the Cavalry fight?

This question has been answered mainly under (a) above. Further uses will depend chiefly on the nature of the country. In open country the mounted sappers, all of whom carry tools, might be used as an escort to machine guns or R.H.A. In enclosed country some mounted sappers with cutting tools should certainly be with the regiments, while the remainder, with the cyclists, should be with the R.H.A., in order to cut gaps in hedges, break down fences, and generally facilitate their movements.

Whether the country is open or enclosed the tool-carts and pack-loads should be left under cover, or, possibly, sent back to the first line transport. They are not wanted with the fighting troops.

(3) How can the field troops be of assistance when Infantry begin to relieve Cavalry from the defence of a position?

They should be detailed to improve lateral communications on both flanks, so that the regiments and guns can move off easily and quietly, without exposing themselves in close formation to hostile fire.

(4) What is the object of training Cavalry pioneers, and how will they be used in war?

This can only be answered in detail by a study of the reports on Cavalry pioneer courses, but the three main objects of pioneer training may be said to be:—

(a) To render Cavalry regiments independent of any other arm in the passage of rivers. Experiments are being made with an air-bag equipment which, it is hoped, may be issued to Cavalry regiments in some mobile wagon, but, apart from this, pioneers are trained in every river-crossing expedient. That this training is essential may be gathered from the fact that a field troop cannot raft one R.H.A. battery across a river 100 yards wide under two hours. The Cavalry must be independent, therefore, unless valuable time is to be lost at every river-crossing.

(b) To enable Cavalry to carry out small demolitions, such as the destruction of telegraphs, telegraph and railway offices, railway plant, permanent way, etc.

(c) To give the pioneers an elementary knowledge of field engineering, and to accustom them to the use of their pioneer equipment, so that, when it is necessary for the C.R.E. to call upon the Cavalry for a working party, the men who are detailed will have a good idea of what they are expected to do.

VII. True co-operation depends on intimate knowledge and mutual confidence.

Cavalry commanders can inspire confidence by using field troops, not only theoretically on brigade and divisional staff tours, but practically on manœuvres, on the lines already indicated.

It is rumoured that certain changes affecting both the *personnel* and the *matériel* of field troops are being contemplated. An intimate knowledge of the units will be of great assistance to anyone called upon to express an opinion on the suggested changes when they are presented for consideration.

The points to which special attention should be paid may be outlined under the headings:—

A. Equipment.

B. Establishment.

A. (1) The collapsible boat equipment can, at present, only be used as a raft.

It would be an advantage if it could be so altered and strengthened

that it could be used in bridge. The Cavalry divisional river-crossing equipment would then be 75 feet to 80 feet of bridge, which would save valuable hours in the passage of small rivers and canals.

Assuming that no boats or rafting materials are available, the Cavalry division (fighting troops and first line transport), with the present troop equipment, will take over eight hours to cross a small river, even if the regiments are entirely independent of the field troops.

(2) Whether pack equipment could not be more advantageously carried in limbered G.S. wagons is another point for consideration.

When pack-horses were first introduced into field troops they carried empty cases and racks. At the present time each pack-horse is loaded with over 2 cwt. from the command 'Mobilize.' The weight is so high that the load is unsteady, and it is difficult to avoid a sore back and galls on the neck or quarters.

The mortality among pack-horses with Cavalry in South Africa was exceptionally high, but undoubtedly there will be occasions when pack-horses are indispensable.

If an improved saddle, such as the wireless pattern, were substituted for the present pack-saddle, and the loads were carried in limbered G.S. wagons until required, when they could be transferred to the backs of the lead pairs in the four-horse teams, it is possible that the mobility of the unit would be increased while the disadvantages of a high and noisy load, requiring elaborate lashing, might be avoided.

The limbered G.S. wagons would have the further advantage of providing the troops with a vehicle that could be used for carting, the need of which was constantly felt in the last war.

The proposal would mean a reduction of the war establishment by one man and six horses in each troop.

(3) Experience has shown that one-third of the quantity of explosives carried by a field troop might be expended on one raid alone, while the remainder would not blow up more than two bridges of normal dimensions.

The explosives carried by Cavalry regiments are not brigaded, but scattered in squadron wagons, and are intended for the use of Cavalry pioneers.

It is hardly possible, therefore, to look to Cavalry regiments for a reserve of explosives for the field troops.

Communication with the advanced depôt may not always be easy,

and as 100 per cent. of the war equipment of a field troop's explosives is neither heavy nor bulky it is a matter for consideration whether such a reserve could not be carried in the Horse Artillery ammunition column. Every campaign since the beginning of the last century has proved that raids on communications and the demolition of bridges are the most effective of a field troop's duties, and it would seem an advantage to ensure that such an essential store could be quickly and easily replaced.

(4) As certain tools are always carried by the cyclists, it is worth considering whether clips, and leather or canvas bags for small stores, would not enable them to get to work more quickly.

It would also seem wise to issue spare parts, such as inner tubes, etc., as experience shows that the passage of one regiment alone over a side-road is sufficient to puncture 30 per cent. of the bicycles.

B. Equipment, however, is of secondary importance. Battles are won by men, not *matériel*. When the changes with regard to the organisation and establishments of the field troops are being considered, attention should be paid to the following points:—

(1) Unless the peace establishment of officers is the same as the war establishment, the field troops will be completed on mobilisation by certain officers whose training with the men they are to lead in war will be limited to the three weeks in the year during which they attend combined training. Whatever their special qualifications may be, such officers will have but a superficial knowledge, not only of their duties, but also of the men under their command.

Yet the experience of war shows that in the first week of a campaign an officer may be called upon to carry out a task, such as a railway raid at night, for the proper execution of which he must have established the utmost confidence between himself and his men.

The peace establishment of N.C.O.s is governed by similar considerations.

(2) It is accepted as an axiom in every modern army that, as mounted men deteriorate very rapidly in the reserve, the peace strength of a mounted unit should never under any circumstances be less than two-thirds of the war strength. The peace establishment of a Cavalry regiment is in excess of its war establishment; the peace strength of the gunners of a Horse Artillery brigade, even on lower establishment, is over 80 per cent. of their war strength.

Field troop sappers must be individualists to an even greater extent than the men of any other arm; they never work in large parties, and a man who is untrained or has grown rusty on the reserve is worse than useless in war.

In determining the peace establishment of field troop sappers, therefore, the 'two-thirds' rule should be applied.

(3) But the most important consideration in the peace establishment of a field troop is the number of drivers.

This number must be such that every sapper can work steadily at his trade during the winter.

In some quarters the field troops, in this very question of trades, are undoubtedly suspect. It is said that technical training is sacrificed to riding and drill. Whatever may have been the ground for such a charge in the past, there has been no ground whatever in recent years.

There is not a field troop officer who does not know that the well-being of his unit in peace and its efficiency in war depends primarily on skill at trades.

Good tradesmen, unless they are convinced that they will have an opportunity of improving their skill regularly every year, will not enlist for mounted service, and yet the field troops, in order that they may be equal to all the demands that may be made upon them in war, must be able to draw upon the most intelligent class of men that enlists in the Royal Engineers.

A peace establishment of drivers, therefore, that is sufficient to allow every sapper to work regularly at his trade during the winter is indispensable to the existence of the field troops.

It is of the utmost importance that Cavalry commanders should appreciate this, and should press for a sufficient proportion of drivers to horses before the reorganisation of the field troops is an accomplished fact.

VIII. If due weight is given to these points there is no doubt that, when the day comes for the fighting machine to be tried by the test of war, that small part of it which is represented by the field troops will be found as efficient as the rest.



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1812

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AEROPLANES AND CAVALRY

By LIEUT. F. E. WALDRON, 19th Hussars—*Royal Flying Corps.*

BEFORE discussing the connection between the work of aeroplanes and Cavalry in war it would be as well to state briefly, for the uninitiated, what are the capabilities and limitations of aeroplanes.

One can state broadly that machines capable of flying at seventy miles an hour, as aeroplanes for war purposes ought to be able to, can fly in half a gale (a wind strength about 40 m.p.h.) and carry out the work allotted to them. They can fly in rain, but not in fog, except by compass, and of course run great risks in case of engine failure when flying in a fog or by night. It is obvious that reconnaissance carried out by aeroplane in a fog would be of no value, and night reconnaissance has not yet been successfully attempted. The average war machine has a petrol capacity of three hours or about 200 miles. This can be increased if a single-seater be employed and the weight of the passenger be replaced by the same weight of petrol and oil.

Most machines land at something approaching the speed at which they fly, and, having no brakes, require a fairly large space to come down on. This necessitates having special landing grounds for aeroplanes and restricts their usefulness, especially in a cramped country. The tendency in modern machines, however, is so to design them that they can land at a much slower pace than their flying speed. This is especially the case with biplanes, and although a monoplane can be designed to fly faster than a biplane with the same power engine it will not land proportionally slow.

Monoplanes can be quickly dismantled, the wings folded back, and towed along the road on their own wheels. Such machines can usually be prepared for the road in under fifteen minutes and re-assembled for flight in the same time. Biplanes, on the other hand, are seldom so handy for towing along the road and take longer to dismantle and re-assemble.

All aeroplanes are, of course, quite helpless on the ground and require an escort when not in the air.

The rôles of Cavalry as laid down in *Cavalry Training* are :—

- (1) Fighting.
- (2) Reconnaissance.
- (3) Protection.
- (4) Pursuit.
- (5) Intercommunication.

Aeroplanes cannot at present compete with the Cavalry rôle of fighting the opposing Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery for the following reasons: firstly, because, although some aeroplanes will be armed in the future with light guns for the purpose of combat with hostile aircraft, the effect of their fire against troops on the ground would be negligible, unless whole fleets of aeroplanes were employed. Even then their power would be very problematical, and the necessary numbers could never be spared from the small quantity available for reconnaissance. Secondly, because, although a few aeroplanes employed dropping bombs on troops massed under cover, in reserve or on the march, might spread a certain amount of alarm and despondency, their effect would at best be very local, and here again large numbers would have to be used, which is impracticable. Whether guns in action could be seriously interfered with by very accurate bomb-dropping is more than doubtful on account of the small size of the target they present to an aeroplane at a safe height. Bombs dropped amongst the teams could do little more than create some temporary confusion, as bomb-dropping could not be a continuous fusillade like the fire of Infantry or Artillery. It is the combination of these facts that leads one to the conclusion that Cavalry will not be supplanted by aeroplanes for fighting.

The main duty of aeroplanes at present, however, is reconnaissance, and in some forms of reconnaissance they will probably relieve Cavalry to a great extent, thereby freeing for fighting and protection large forces of Cavalry that would otherwise be used up in reconnaissance.

Given moderate weather there is no reason why strategical reconnaissance should not be carried out just as effectively by aeroplanes as by the large bodies of independent Cavalry at present so employed, and certainly much more quickly. An aeroplane can cover the odd hundred miles out and back in a few hours, which would take the

Cavalry several days to accomplish. If aeroplanes were to be used for this purpose much of the fearful wastage of Cavalry at the beginning of a war would be obviated.

There is an idea amongst some people that aeroplanes would have as much difficulty in war in getting back with their information as is experienced by the officers' patrols and reconnoitring squadrons of the independent Cavalry. Those people refuse to accept the results obtained at our own and the French manœuvres, because aeroplanes in those cases were allowed to pass one another, whereas they say that in actual warfare they would have had to fight.

This might be true if they were to actually meet, but in this connection one must remember the admitted fact that it is extremely difficult for the observer flying in one aeroplane to locate others, even when he knows them to be quite close. This difficulty is perhaps due to the immensity of the range of vision from an aeroplane.

Again, aeroplanes in a hurry to get back with their information are anxious to avoid risking a fight, and would probably fly at a great height and try to avoid other machines. Of course, if it were possible to distinguish a hostile from a friendly aeroplane, it is probable that on sighting a hostile machine flying over them the enemy might send up an armed aeroplane to intercept it and prevent it returning with its information. A fast scouting aeroplane, however, would have at least as much chance of escaping as a Cavalry patrol has of getting back through the enemy's lines after finishing its reconnaissance. In addition, an aeroplane can hide in the clouds and steer by a compass course.

Taking these facts into consideration, one can therefore assert that, except in very stormy weather or fogs which lasted all day, this part of the rôle of independent Cavalry would be equally well performed by aeroplanes.

Now as to the various methods they could adopt. The machines could start from the base carrying Staff officers and make for the particular points about which information was required and return direct to the base as soon as the reconnaissance was completed. This would undoubtedly be the quickest way for the General Staff to acquire the information hitherto gained by the strategical reconnaissance of the independent Cavalry. It is unlikely, however, that a General would rely solely on his aeroplanes for strategical reconnaissance at this early

stage of development of the new arm, particularly when it is remembered that aeroplanes cannot keep in touch with the enemy like Cavalry, and that independent Cavalry are anyhow required for other objects.

So one can fairly assume that Cavalry will still be sent out, probably assisted by fast aeroplanes capable of being towed along the road when not in use and assembled quickly for flying when required. These would greatly assist in finding out the position and movements of the enemy's independent Cavalry, and might even assist in the strategical reconnaissance itself. They could at any rate get back the information to headquarters, which patrols and even wireless troops cannot be relied on to do with certainty.

Now, as regards tactical reconnaissance, it does not seem that aeroplanes will be as useful as Cavalry, except in the case of an attack on a position, a siege, or a lengthy battle (such as the long-drawn-out battles on a front of anything up to 100 miles in the Russo-Japanese war), because the extra speed of aeroplane work does not amount to much in the short distances covered in tactical reconnaissance, when the time taken to convey messages from the landing ground to headquarters is taken into consideration.

Aeroplanes have also the serious drawback of being obliged to lose touch with the enemy before they can hand in their information. This is never a safe thing to do in tactical reconnaissance. Therefore, unless some reliable system of communication can be used, and the landing-ground be kept in constant telephonic communication with headquarters, tactical reconnaissance from aeroplanes can only hope to be useful when (as in the cases mentioned above) they could be spared to send up Staff officer observers to view an important situation of such a nature that it was unlikely to change with a rapidity that would render their information useless by the time it was got in.

Now to turn to the question of protection. It may be divided into:—

- (1) Protection against surprise.
- (2) Protection against attack.

It is possible that aeroplanes might assist Cavalry during the day-time as a protection against surprise by a system of patrolling, but it is obvious that against attack they would be no protection except in so far as reconnaissance constitutes protection. Their great draw-

back as a protection against surprise is again that they must come back themselves to warn the force they are scouting for, and so lose touch with the enemy; whereas a Cavalry patrol can send back a message by one man and remain out itself in observation. Therefore, as far as protection is concerned, aeroplanes do not promise to relieve Cavalry to any appreciable extent.

In a pursuit, on the other hand, aeroplanes might be of the greatest assistance. The rôle of Cavalry in a pursuit after a victory is to keep the defeated troops on the run, and above all not to lose their line of retreat. Aeroplanes could do little perhaps to increase the demoralisation of a defeated army, but they *could* make sure that their line of retreat was not lost.

Had Grouchy possessed some aeroplanes to assist his Cavalry after Ligny it would not have been possible for Blucher to elude pursuit and turn up at the right moment at Waterloo. A two-seater scouting aeroplane, such as we possess in our army now, would have been bound to discover in less than an hour that Napoleon's assumption that the Germans were retreating on Liège was incorrect, even if it had not been sent out till Grouchy's tardy pursuit in that direction with his army of 30,000 men had started. But it is much more likely that an aeroplane would have been sent out to reconnoitre at dawn, because, although the French neglected to send out their Cavalry, tired from the previous day's battle, they could hardly have neglected such an easy method of verifying Grouchy's position as would have been afforded by a simple aeroplane reconnaissance of at most an hour's duration, had such a method been ready to their hand.

The last and least important duty of Cavalry is intercommunication. For intercommunication between two or more large bodies, separated by a considerable distance, and endeavouring to execute a combined manœuvre, such as the combined holding attack of Lee and flank march of Jackson which led up to the second battle of Manassass, the advantages of aeroplanes are obvious. Although wireless can be used for this purpose it is always liable to be interfered with, and even read, by the enemy, whereas the aeroplane gives up its secret to none, for it can convey a Staff officer who knows the General's plans or else a written message which is easily destroyed. But for the smaller distances it is unlikely that aeroplanes would be of much use, as for this purpose the horse has already been assisted by the bicycle, motor-cycle, and motor-car.

To recapitulate shortly the relations between aeroplanes and Cavalry. Aeroplanes will not supplant Cavalry for fighting or protection, and help but little towards tactical reconnaissance, but will encroach to a great extent on their rôle of strategical reconnaissance and supplement their efforts in the direction of pursuit and inter-communication.

Now if the foregoing estimate of the extent to which the duties of aeroplanes and Cavalry overlap each other be correct, the first deduction that one would draw is that in future Cavalry, more than any other arm except possibly Artillery, will require to be assisted by aeroplanes, and for this reason ought to be trained with them in peace time.

The part which it is conjectured that they would be expected to play in strategical reconnaissance has already been stated. Either aeroplanes could be sent out direct from headquarters, in which case they would be entirely apart from the Cavalry, or else the independent Cavalry would have aeroplanes with them to assist in the reconnaissance and to assist in getting back information to headquarters.


To discuss briefly what type of machine is most suitable for this work, one must realise that for any work with Cavalry the type required is one that can be towed along the road over any country which was passable by a Cavalry brigade, since to follow by air would be to betray unnecessarily the position of the force it belonged to. This practically means any country which the limbered wagons of the first line transport can traverse. The machine to conform with these conditions would need to be very compact and narrow, not too high off the ground, strong, and light to draw. In addition, as the characteristic of all Cavalry action is the rapidity with which the situation changes, it would be essential that the machine should be easy to assemble again quickly for flying; and since they may also be required to assist in the strategical reconnaissance, or take the information back long distances to headquarters of the army, they should be fast fliers as well.

There are, of course, some countries, such as Morocco, where the French took no wheeled transport, and in that case the machines had to start their reconnaissance from the base.

Although some small tractor biplanes fly fast, and occupy quite a short time to take down and reassemble for flying, one is forced to the conclusion that on the whole the small space taken up by a monoplane

on its own wheels, with its wings folded back along the fuselage, the speed, lightness, and strength of this type of machine, and the ease and quickness with which it can be got ready for the road or for flying, makes the monoplane the more suitable for work with the Cavalry.

Having endeavoured to prove that aeroplanes with Cavalry will be essential in war, to assist in at least half their tactical and strategical duties, the obvious deduction is that some aeroplanes, of whatever type may be considered best for the work, should form a permanent part of the organisation of Cavalry brigades and divisions, to enable the new arm and the Cavalry to get used to working together in peace as they will have to in war.



THE WORTH OF A WEAPON

By LIEUT. AND ADJT. W. LOWRY-CORRY, 23rd Cavalry (*Frontier Force*).

THERE are some subjects upon which it seems impossible to write without beginning with a tedious banality; and the subject of musketry is one of them. Let me, therefore, quickly say that it forms a very important part of modern Cavalry's training, and so have done with it at once.

Few military critics will deny that Cavalry fire tactics are essentially different from those of Infantry, both in their aim and in their object. Their only resemblance, in fact, lies in their common endeavour to kill a live enemy. Yet, for all this difference in war, the peace musketry training of both the arms is identical. The object of this article is to put forward a plea for a special training for the Cavalryman, which shall suit his especial needs, and one which shall be apart and distinct from that of his Infantry comrade, for whom the present system no doubt suffices.

What is the main difference between the tactics of the two arms to which I allude? It can be summed up in a nutshell—namely, the time taken by each to develop its offensive power. Infantry fire tactics are based upon the knowledge that the nature of that arm, and the general tactical rôle that it plays upon the battlefield, will necessitate long and persistent attacks upon a target which will be exposed (on and off, and more or less) for hours and days. Cavalry, on the other hand, being more mobile, and having in consequence a different tactical rôle to play, adopts a policy of ceaseless—one might almost say restless—activity all over the battlefield, against ever-changing decisive points which are the key to some immediate situation. The targets which are offered us, in fact, are generally fleeting, and our time for action is now or never.

Infantry fire tactics from their very deliberateness allow of considerable elaboration, and almost constitute an exact science; our

success in fire action, on the other hand, depends more upon our ability to meet the unexpected, and to rise to the sudden occasion. This remark, of course, applies to all Cavalry action, shock or fire, when we compare the work of the two arms; although by this it is not intended to imply that Infantrymen have no need of a ready initiative as well. Cavalry's moment for action is always shorter than that of any other arm; we are always in the uncomfortable position of having to get somewhere quickly, and do something at once. If our men are to be hustled in war, they must be hustled in peace; and this being the case the deliberate methods of Infantry training can scarcely be found satisfactory for Cavalrymen in musketry instruction, or indeed in anything else.

This fundamental difference between the fire tactics of Cavalry and Infantry is significant; and although for the purpose of emphasis I may have exaggerated it in the foregoing lines, it certainly does exist.

Now in all musketry training there are two main subdivisions into which our systems must be divided—namely, range work and field practices. The former is the forging of the human weapon we are to use against our enemy; the latter is our practice in using it. But, before we make or use any weapon or instrument at all, we must clearly consider the purposes to which it is intended to put it. One does not, for instance, use a scythe to remove an appendix, nor a lancet to mow the grass; both instruments have their own peculiar uses, but the purposes they serve are very wide apart.

The question before us now is, do we keep a similar sensible regard for the especial objects in view when we train two different arms for purposes that are widely divergent on exactly similar lines? It is open to discussion. It is an evil practice at any time to dogmatise upon what will or will not happen in tactical situations of the future, in order to air our own pet theories for clearing them up. Such speculative theorists are apt to find themselves in the awkward position of Molière's hero, who stood dumbfounded when his opponent lunged *en tierce*, when by all the rules of the game he (as a matter of fact it was a 'she') should have lunged *en carte*. Nor in this specific case will it be wise to pursue the basic difference between Cavalry and Infantry methods of work too far into the realms of detail; or to prophesy confidently what our squadron will or will not have to do in the next war through which we have the good fortune to lead it.

Suffice to say that there are some aspects of war which are common to every age, from Alexander the Great to General Oyama; and among them we find the unchanging peculiar characteristics which distinguish each different arm. Such constant factors as are obviously apparent to us can, and must, be allowed for when training an army for war. Are we allowing for the unchanging factor we have quoted above when we make no distinction between the musketry training of Cavalry and Infantry?

The fact that the importance of Cavalry fire tactics has only become apparent at a comparatively recent date all tends to complicate the whole problem, for no very definite policy has ever been laid down for our guidance in dismounted action, and before the Boer War few Cavalry officers were interested in the subject at all. Musketry matters in the past have always been considered the private domain of the Infantry instructor, who was considered an expert in the use of his own arm. And so he is an expert, as far as its use concerns himself, but he can scarcely be expected to legislate for Cavalry requirements as well, and it is high time we did some hard thinking for ourselves. Let us now examine the present system of musketry training as it stands; investigate those points which may seem to us unsatisfactory from a Cavalry point of view; and then let us take our doubts and our difficulties to the musketry school specialist to deal with. In nine cases out of ten he is an Infantry officer, and despite his wisdom in musketry matters he is naturally ignorant of the peculiar problems which await his Cavalry comrade's solution; and the best specialist in the world cannot prescribe satisfactorily if he is in ignorance of the patient's symptoms.

Most regimental officers will agree with me when I say that at the present moment the first portion of the annual musketry course—namely, work upon the range—is the all important thing in a squadron commander's eyes, and that the field practices come only second in importance in the scheme of things. It is only natural, for by the academic triumphs of the range is a squadron judged by the powers that be; the result of the field practices affect the squadron's musketry reputation but little. Now, it is possible to mistake means for ends (as we learned to our cost in South Africa), and any such academic spirit in an army, which lends itself to the mesmerism of the paltry triumphs of peace, contains not only the germ of failure—to use a well-

worn military phrase—but also is in itself a positive disease. I have used the word ‘mesmerised’ with intent, for mesmerism is a mysterious thing, and it is possible for a ‘subject’ to be under its influence without being aware of the fact. Are not we Cavalrymen being mesmerised by the rifle range to the detriment of more practical training, which should first and foremost contain for us that element of ‘hustle’ that I have already suggested is necessary for our arm, on account of our fleeting opportunities for action? In fact, is not the range, with its hot tedious tyranny and artificial atmosphere of unreality, a sort of fiery Moloch to which we are sacrificing the enthusiasm, the patience, and even the efficiency of our men?

At best, what does the range teach them?

The elements of individual shooting under the most unnatural of environment; how to hit a fixed target at a known range; and how to go on hitting it with mechanical precision if there is no wind and the light is good. It is a step in the soldier’s education, and a good step, too; still, *only* a step. All this elementary business is, of course, indispensable for the recruit—we must learn to walk before we can run—but the question is, does it (considered as a recurring annual event) teach the soldier anything which assists him to kill his man in war, or does it become mere formal drudgery once he has learned the fundamental lessons which it teaches? After all, like the art of swimming, the fundamental principles of shooting once learned are never forgotten—at any rate, not to the extent that we seem to imagine at present when we insist upon the annual repetition of our long and complicated course upon the range. It may here be argued that the brilliant individual accuracy that the Cavalry recruit learns from range practices could never be maintained by field practices alone in after years. This is a perfectly fair criticism and probably quite true; but it is open to doubt if this much vaunted individual accuracy is ever maintained even now when the marksman is hurried from his comfortable firing point into the breathless confusion and scurry of a Cavalry firing line. The range-reared soldier is in the same position in war as the paper tactician—he may, or he may not, retain his former superiority over his less brilliant contemporary in peace. It is, of course, a specious argument to say that a third class shot is as good as a first class one (because in war the ranges are unknown), for the factors which tend to avert a bullet from its billet are far more complex

than those who put forward this sophistry would have us believe. Still it is not too much to say that a squadron but little practised upon the range but well accustomed to all the vicissitudes with which Nature obstructs the path of those who attempt any open air enterprise (from a picnic to a Polar Expedition) will inevitably defeat an equivalent number of Bisley marksmen who are tyros at the game, and who have not learnt the great lesson of making use of their greater technical skill.

The reader will by this time have grasped, with a thrill of horror, that I am putting forward a most damnable military heresy for his serious consideration—namely, that range shooting is of very little value for our soldiers. I will go further than that (if the Editor of the CAVALRY JOURNAL will permit me!) and attempt to argue that after the recruit stage of a soldier's career its excessive abuse is absolutely injurious to our arm's general efficiency, besides wasting a great deal of valuable time in our already limited training season. In support of my seemingly wild theories I will first call attention to the fact that no renowned big game shot has ever looked upon the range with a favourable eye: but a few weeks ago one well-known sportsman wrote to the daily Press on this very subject in connection—as far as I can remember—with the Territorial Force. He admitted, however, that he had no knowledge of military requirements, but only based his remarks upon his own particular experience of shooting. Some of us soldiers are, in a humbler way, big game shots ourselves, and we are therefore in a position to compare more usefully these two forms of sport—beast killing and man killing. Although certain differences do exist between the two, the fundamental principles of each are quite similar, as most soldier-sportsmen will admit. In support of this contention I will quote the case of the Boer marksmen, who learned all that they knew about straight and intelligent shooting from practice on the—no, *not* range—wild animals of their native land. They contrived to kill our men with almost uncanny success considering their lamentable ignorance of butt memorandums, fire registers, and aim correctors.

Now we cannot all go about shooting wild beasts. Lions and tigers, for instance, do not exist in England save in the Zoo, and the fauna of Aldershot are but a poor substitute upon which to commence operations; but we *can* study as our model the old 'shikarri,' and note how far his methods are in keeping with military requirements.

Like him, the military marksman needs to be severely practical and quick-witted; able to co-operate with those who can assist him in the attainment of his object; careful to make an intelligent use of the ground over which he works; and, in a word, capable of outwitting his enemy in every way before he ever has a chance of testing the accuracy of his own marksmanship. The range, it is true, can give him some empirical skill, but musketry is not a mere matter of pressing a trigger with care and holding your breath till you burst. Rather, considered as a science, its successful elaboration is dependent upon a hundred side issues not directly connected with technical skill in actual shooting at all—all of which are of the utmost importance.

The range seems to cramp and paralyse the soldier's mind, and make him incapable of shooting intelligently in the open when none of his well-known landmarks of stop butts and firing points are there to make him feel at home. It has a paralysing effect upon the officer, too. I once heard an officer at Aldershot say, when his men had done badly in field shooting, 'Oh, nobody ever hits anything field firing; it's all a matter of luck.' As field firing is our nearest approach to war, from which it only differs on account of its comparative simplicity, and as we exist for war, would it not be wise to overhaul our whole system of training, with its avowedly poor results, before we give way to such fatalistic resignation? For the officer I have mentioned is not the only one in our army who takes up this attitude.

Range firing has its legitimate uses, but, like many other useful things, it may degenerate into a vicious abuse, and, like morphia, may obsess its victim's whole outlook upon life. Surely it is time for some sort of Keeley cure to deal with this especial form of mental debauchery in the musketry world, which affects our branch of the service more than any other. Taking into consideration the hurried rough-and-tumble nature of Cavalry fire tactics, it is possible that we may discover in the future that the intricate human weapon we are now forging in the narrow confines of the workshop is more ornamental in peace than useful in war. Incidentally, its tedious manufacture seems to take up so much of our time as to leave us but little leisure to perfect ourselves in its use.

But all this is mere destructive criticism, which, like everything else of a negative nature, is in itself quite valueless. It now behoves me to propose a constructive policy which may give us better results than

the system I condemn. It is not my intention to go into too much detail; minutiae, as I have already intimated, can only be settled by the specialist. My aim is only to outline a new policy, and not to write a new edition of musketry regulations; and, giving my own views, I do so with all diffidence and merely in the form of a suggestion for the musketry specialist's consideration.

First and foremost, let us put the recruit through the existing table 'A' without meddling with its carefully thought-out system of progressive instruction at all. Soon after its completion he will finish his whole training and be ready to join the ranks. After he has satisfied the commanding officer as to his general efficiency, but *before* he actually joins the ranks of his squadron, let him fire table 'B' as it now exists. We have now finished with the recruit, and it only remains for us to determine the nature of his future annual musketry instruction as a trained soldier. It is my contention that Cavalrymen, lacking the time that their Infantry comrades possess, are not skilled in the tactical and other practical aspects of musketry, and that, taking into consideration the peculiar characteristics of our arm, our way to salvation lies in the elaboration of our field instruction and 'jungle lore' rather than in perfecting ourselves as mere bull's-eye hitters. We shall, of course, all differ as to the minimum number of range practices that it will be necessary to retain in order to refresh the soldier's memory in the elements of shooting, and to test the continued accuracy of his rifle. Many officers will say that the present course cannot be usefully reduced, however important schemes with blank and ball in the field may be; some, on the other hand, may agree with me and believe that a couple of practices would be sufficient for all save his Majesty's bad (musketry) bargains, for whom I confess I cannot legislate. Let us arrive at a happy medium and say five range practices, the nature of which I show below. I will afterwards explain why I have suggested this number in particular.

It will be observed that the above skeleton course of 35 rounds refreshes the soldier's memory in the three principal aspects of shooting, viz:—

- (1) Deliberate fire at a stationary object.
- (2) Snapshooting at moving or disappearing objects.
- (3) Firing rapidly against time.

In addition, the first practice tests a man's rifle and emphasises any

TRAINED SOLDIER'S ANNUAL COURSE.

PART I.

Range Practices.			Nature of target and remarks
Number of practice	Range	Rounds	
	yds.		
1	100	5	Grouping target test.
2	200	5	Small figure : deliberate firing, first 3 rounds with a rest, remainder without.
3	300	5	Disappearing target with and without rest as above.
4	300	5	Running man : with and without rest as above.
5	400	15	Figure target without rest, any hit to count within 60 seconds (except ricochets).
		35	

error in his shooting due to the lapse of time since he last fired. If, after this short experiment, we find that our men have not forgotten all that they learned as recruits (as I contend will be the case), and if we find that their standard of shooting is still, comparatively speaking, good, there remains no earthly object in keeping them longer upon the range with its artificial environment, but we should remove them from its baleful influences as quickly as possible. By doing so we save both time and ammunition for the more practical part of our training; by remaining there we merely attain an illusionary (because artificial) pitch of perfection which vanishes the moment we attempt to make use of it in open country. As to what could be done in detail with the greater time and ammunition that would now be at our disposal annually for work away from the range (Part 2), I will leave it to the reader's imagination to determine. It is a matter that should essentially be decentralised and left to the discretion of the O.C. unit responsible during inspection for the practical results of his training, rather than controlled by any rigid programme, which can never legislate fully for the different local conditions which exist in our far-flung military cantonments.

Apart from field-firing, fire direction practices, &c., &c., there are many pleasing possibilities for the squadron commander to contemplate. We might, for instance, train our men to dismount and get into action in half the time it takes them now; to train them to carry out all manœuvres connected with dismounted action with the lightning rapidity of a circus trick, and with as little apparent effort; for with

Cavalry ability to seize the fleeting opportunity is half the battle: it is no good being able to shoot straight after the target has disappeared.


It will be seen that there is nothing very revolutionary or original in my scheme after all. It is merely a suggestion to readjust the existing relative importance of the two main subdivisions of our present system, and to relegate the range to the background of our musketry perspective, in order that we may regain—what I believe we have partially lost—our true sense of proportion in musketry matters as a whole. My excuse for making any new suggestion at all is the admittedly poor results which at present obtain, and which cannot satisfy the least critical among us. I shall never forget the remark of a Spanish Cavalry officer with whose squadron I once found myself during a rear-guard action in Morocco when we were being somewhat hustled by the Riffian tribesmen. He was attempting to splash some lead upon a most tempting target some half a mile away, but without success. ‘Caramba!’ he cried (as a matter of fact, it was a much more expressive oath), ‘if only I could catch them on the parade ground at Malaga!’ We, too, would annihilate our foes if they would only be considerate enough to attack us at Bisley; failing which desideratum we must learn to annihilate them under less favourable conditions, undismayed by confusion, excitement, and fatigue, and confident in our own power to surmount every obstacle that Nature and chance may maliciously thrust in our way. These lessons can only be learned by accustoming ourselves (as approximately as possible) in peace to what we must expect in war, and by remembering that all ideal methods of instruction are like the lines in a child’s copybook, which, though having their legitimate uses, do not of themselves advance the general cause of literature as a whole.

On re-reading what I have written I perceive that my ‘damned reiteration’ of ‘away from the range and into the country’ lays me open to the charge of confusing musketry instruction with tactical training; but the point at which I am in reality labouring is that both must overlap rather than be kept in watertight compartments. I think, in fact, that our present system tends to divorce them, which is worse than confusing them, since, in war, both are mutually dependent upon each other before anything decisive can be achieved by their exponents.

To epitomise my own proposals it is only necessary to point out

that by reducing our range work to a minimum of five practices we shall save sufficient ammunition to enable us to double the number of our field practices. In addition, we shall gain a considerable period of time which we can devote exclusively to the acquiring of practical experience in all that pertains to work out of the saddle, about which (judging from Continental manoeuvres and the Manchurian and Balkan wars) the Cavalry of every nation at the present moment has still much to learn, though but little time in which to learn it.

In conclusion, I will quote what Livy (or some other equally distinguished literary gentleman) has to say on the subject of specialism in one's own particular line of business, which may be taken to apply in this instance to the Cavalryman who is content with Infantry methods in his own musketry training. I cannot remember the name of the learned work in which it occurs, for it is some time since I was forced to read this sort of classical literature; but it runs something after this esoteric fashion: 'The husbandman to his sickle, and the soldier to his sword: else what is the worth of a weapon?'



A A

ADVANCED GUARDS

By LIEUT.-COLONEL D. G. M. CAMPBELL, 9th (Q.R.) *Lancers*.

It is not intended to discuss the broad principles of Advanced Guards, as these are clearly set out in Field Service Regulations, Part I., 1912, Sections 66 to 69.

These notes are simply intended to show how a force of mounted troops detailed as vanguard to a mixed force, or Advanced Guard to a Cavalry force, may be worked.

First let us consider what are the duties of an Advanced Guard. They are:—

(1) To brush aside minor opposition and to prevent the march of the main body being delayed.

(2) To give time to the main body to deploy, should the enemy be met with in force.

(3) Should the enemy be unexpectedly encountered, to give the Commander information on which to base his plans, and to give him time to put them into execution when formed.

(4) To prevent the main body coming under unexpected effective Artillery fire. (Note: Effective Field Artillery range, 2500 to 4000 yards.)

(5) To occupy and to form a bridge-head to the exit from a defile before the main body enters it.

The above are, broadly speaking, the duties of an Advanced Guard. It will be noted that, whereas the main duty of an Advanced Guard is supposed to be 'protection,' still it will constantly be necessary for it to become 'information-seeking' as well.

To quote General Henderson:—'The study of Advanced Guard actions in past wars leads inevitably to the conclusion that the value of these forces depends much more on the efficiency of their reconnaissance than on their fighting strength. Information sufficient to enable an Advanced Guard Commander to decide when to attack and when to defend is worth many battalions.' (*The Art of Reconnaissance*.)

Under no circumstances, however, must the desire to gain informa-

tion allow an Advanced Guard to be drawn away from its main duty of protection—*i.e.*, it must seek for information *within* and not *beyond* the area of its responsibilities, and must never uncover the force it is protecting.

If the enemy moves away and it is desired to keep touch with him, he will be followed up by an 'information-seeking' patrol specially detailed by the O.C. Column. For this reason, it is unwise in a mixed force to detail all the available mounted troops to the Advanced Guard, as is so often done. The Commander must always keep some mounted men in hand.

Before proceeding further it is necessary to deal with two questions which are eternally cropping up:—

(1) At what distance from the main body should the Advanced Guard march?

(2) Should the Advanced Guard regulate its pace by that of the main body, or the main body by that of the Advanced Guard?

Let us deal with the first question. There is no fixed distance at which the Advanced Guard should move ahead of the main body. It must move sufficiently far ahead to carry out its duties properly.

It may be remarked, however, that in open country, such as parts of South Africa or India, where strong Artillery positions are frequently encountered, it will be found that the necessity for seizing these positions before the main body comes within effective range will, as a rule, more or less determine the distance at which the leading *formed* body of the Advanced Guard should move ahead of the main body—*i.e.*, $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

In intricate, hilly, wooded countries, however, such as many parts of France or Germany, the distance will usually be determined by the length of the longest defile to be met with on the march. The Advanced Guard must have command of the exit from a defile before the main body enters it. Whatever the length of the longest defile may be, so far ahead should the leading formed body of the Advanced Guard move from the time the march commences.

The only exception to the rule, that the Advanced Guard must secure the exit from a defile before the main body enters it, may occur when the defile is of extreme length, say over seven miles. In this case it may be necessary to take it in two or three bounds. In the case of the defile being formed by enclosed roads or woods, these

bounds should be from cross-road to cross-road, and also the Advanced Guard Commander must lose no time in passing a strong patrol right through to the exit.

It should be further noted that as the different portions of the Advanced Guard advance by bounds, and each party of the Advanced Guard takes over tactical points from the party in front, so the distances between the different portions of the Advanced Guard are constantly changing.

It will be clearly seen from the above that no fixed distance can, or should, be laid down at which the Advanced Guard should move from the main body, or one portion of the Advanced Guard from another.

The solution of the second question is equally clear. No rule can be laid down as to whether the pace should be set by the main body or by the Advanced Guard. The most that can be done is for the Commander of the force to tell the O.C. Advanced Guard at what rate he wishes to move, and it will usually be found that :—

(a) In open, easy country, when there is no opposition, the Advanced Guard will have to regulate its pace by the main body. In an easy, open country a small body like an Advanced Guard will be able to move much quicker than the larger body following. (Note: The Advanced Guard will regulate its pace by making longer halts after each 'bound,' and not by any slowness in making these bounds.)

(b) In enclosed country, when there are many features to be made good, or when opposition is met with, it will frequently be found that the Advanced Guard cannot carry out its duty fully, and yet move at the pace named by the O.C. Column. In this case the main body *must* regulate its pace by that of the Advanced Guard. Should, however, the O.C. Column wish *for any urgent reason* to move at a faster pace than that at which the Advanced Guard finds it can carry out its duty properly, the O.C. Advanced Guard must inform the O.C. Column, and then conform as best he can.


If the Commander accompanies the Advanced Guard, as he usually should, he then regulates the pace himself, and this difficulty is diminished.

It is clear from the above that no rule can be laid down as to who is to set the pace, but under all circumstances the Advanced Guard is responsible for keeping touch with the main body.

Having dealt with the foregoing questions, let us now consider the advantages and disadvantages of different forms of vanguards.

In each case we will suppose a squadron has been told off as vanguard. The first form of vanguard we will consider is that which was most generally employed during the South African War.

Advantages.—The squadron commander had three formed troops under his hand.



Disadvantages.—(1) The sections had to keep touch towards the centre, which resulted in :—

(a) The leader having to constantly look towards his flanks in order not to lose touch, which prevented him concentrating his attention on his main duty, which was usually in front.

(b) The formation being rigid.

(2) The flank sections being too much 'en l'air.'

(3) If the flanks were held up, a troop had to be sent all the way from the centre to reinforce, which resulted in a great waste of horse-flesh.


(4) If the centre was strongly opposed, the flanks again had to be reinforced before they were strong enough to push forward and reconnoitre effectively.

(5) At one moment there were sufficient points for all sections to reconnoitre, and at another a few scouts would have been sufficient.

(6) Once the troop was opened out it was impossible to concentrate it quickly for concerted action with the other troops.

In conclusion, it must be noted that, although this formation answers fairly well in an open country like South Africa, or India, where the range of view is good, it would be quite impracticable in intricate wooded countries, such as parts of France and Germany, as, in order to cover sufficient front, either the sections would lose touch or the number of sections would have to be increased to an unwarrantable extent.

The next form of vanguard we will consider is that recommended by Commandant P. S. in his excellent book, 'Instruction pratique des cadres dans la Cavalerie.'



Note.—All detachments joined by dotted lines are only sent out as the situation or nature of country demands.

This form of vanguard requires special attention, as it is recommended by a thoroughly practical soldier, with the idea of its employment in the very class of country which most concerns us, viz., a 'Continental Country.' It is, moreover, the form of Advanced Guard which is most generally employed in the French Army.

The formation is as under:—

The advanced troop is responsible for, roughly, 3000 yards (say, two miles), of which the advance section is responsible for 1000 to

1200 yards. (Note: 1100 to 1200 yards is the extent of front a patrol of the strength of a section may be expected to make good.)

The advance section leader tells off his men as occasion demands.

The troop commander tells off his flankers D and C as occasion demands.

Advantages.—(1) A very concentrated form of Advanced Guard.

(2) In the area to be explored, detachments are only sent to those points which require investigation.

Disadvantages.—(1) The extent of front covered by the vanguard is too narrow.

(2) If the immediate front is held up, there is no force on the flank ready to push round, and either the flanking section E will have to move up or a troop from the support move out. This means delay.

(3) If a defile is encountered, when it is necessary to push the flanks widely round, time must be wasted whilst patrols are sent from the centre to the flanks.

In applying this form of Advanced Guard to meet the requirements of our Field Service Regulations, it must be noted that the vanguard only explores a front of under two miles, or less than one mile on each flank of the advance. Under ordinary circumstances protection outside this area is provided to a certain extent by one or two patrols pushed out some miles ahead of the Advanced Guard along the line of advance of the column and towards the dangerous flank. These patrols are termed the 'Sûreté éloignée' and are specially told off in Operation Orders. The extent, however, to which a patrol can explore towards the flanks is a very limited one, and its investigations are usually confined to a definite route. It is clear, therefore, that in at all an intricate country it would be quite possible for the enemy to lie in ambush without being discovered. This point is fully recognised by French authors, as when the country, beyond that made good by the vanguard, is of an intricate nature, containing dangerous localities, a flanking detachment is told off, which, although its main body moves roughly on a line with the head of the main column, pushes patrols well to the front as well as to the flanks, and so performs not only the duty which falls to our flank guards but also some of the duty of our vanguard. That there are undoubted advantages in this manner of 'protecting' will be clear to anyone who chooses to study the matter. Our Regulations lay down, however, 'The vanguard is responsible for

protecting the main guard against surprise. In any case, all ground within effective Field Artillery range must be searched.'

The commander of the vanguard is, therefore, responsible for searching all Artillery positions within, roughly, two miles of the line of advance before those positions become a danger to the main guard. Now, it must not be imagined for one moment that the vanguard commander has always to make that extent of front good. Sometimes, in flat countries intersected by hedges, a vanguard will be entirely confined to a road. Again, in flat, open countries it may be sufficient to make good a mile on each side of the line of advance, but, at the same time, where there are Artillery positions wide on the flanks and accessible to the enemy it is the duty of the vanguard commander to explore them.

It is quite clear from the above that no stereotyped form of vanguard can possibly be laid down. The most that can, or should, be done is to divide the vanguard into certain detachments, and make the C.O. of each detachment responsible for a certain area. The duty of each C.O. is then to send out such patrols as are necessary to ensure the exploration of the area for which he is responsible, *and no more*. These patrols, moreover, must have definite and precise orders as to :—


- (a) What tactical point, or points, they are to explore.
- (b) How, and when, they are to rejoin the detachments.

Now, let us consider what detachments the O.C. vanguard should make. This will entirely depend on the nature of the country and the tactical situation. In any case, however, we may say he should tell off a troop as advanced party. This troop is responsible, when necessary, for exploring about a mile of front on each side of the advance. The troop leader will probably send on a section to cover the immediate advance, and, say, five or six hundred yards on each side of it. From the remainder of the troop he will send out patrols *as the occasion demands* in order to explore the area for which he is responsible.

So far, we are working exactly on the French lines. The O.C. vanguard, however, is responsible for four miles of front and the exploration by the advanced party only covers two. He has now to consider how to explore the ground beyond that made good by the advanced party. This he can do either by means of patrols sent out to explore definite tactical points, or by means of a detachment similar to the advanced party, and which is responsible for reconnoitring the

ground outside that made good by the advanced party and up to 4000 yards from the main line of advance.

DISTRIBUTION OF VANGUARD.
(Strength one squadron).



Note.—All detachments joined by dotted lines are only sent out as the situation or nature of country demands.

The nature of the country and the tactical situation will help the commander to decide whether to employ patrols or a detachment. It may be said that, as a general rule, when the country is easy and opposition is not expected, patrols may suffice. When, however, the country is at all difficult, or an encounter with the enemy is probable, then the employment of a detachment will probably give the best results.

The advantages of a detachment compared with patrols appear to be:—

- (a) If an enemy tries to get information from the flanks, where he usually will, there is a formed tactical body ready to oppose him.
- (b) If the enemy tries to hold up the flank with a small force, there is a tactical body ready to drive him out.

(c) If the enemy holds up the centre, there is a tactical body ready to turn his flank or to reconnoitre.

(d) There is nothing rigid about the formation.

(e) Patrols sent out from the detachment will have a shorter distance to go than if they come from the centre, and will, moreover, have a support at hand.

(f) The O.C. detachment will be in a much better position to judge where patrols should be sent to than the O.C. vanguard can possibly be.

(g) The O.C. detachment can detail a party to hold a tactical point on the flank till the flank guard takes it over, and still have sufficient men with which to reconnoitre to his front.

When possible, to avoid all duplicate of work, the O.C. vanguard should detail the limits to which the advanced party is responsible towards the flanks. This can be done:—

(a) By naming the villages, woods, &c., up to which it will reconnoitre.

(b) By the O.C. vanguard drawing a line on his map showing the limits to which the advanced party will reconnoitre. The O.C. advanced party will copy this on to his map, and any commander of a detachment ordered to work on the right or left of the advanced party will do the same.

By this means there can never be any doubt as to whose duty it is to make good any tactical point, and this is a matter of the very utmost importance.

It will readily be understood by a glance at a map of France or Germany that flanking detachments will often be out of sight of the centre party, and the only possible way of keeping their position approximately correct will be:—

(a) By communicating whenever possible, and, at any rate, at fixed places.

(b) By using a watch and so being able to calculate approximately the position of the centre party by the rate of march of the main body.

Detachments working on the flanks will, of course, advance from tactical point to tactical point, and at one time may be ahead of and at others slightly behind the centre, but, as a general rule, detachments towards the flanks should be, if anything, forward, as they are then most favourably placed:—

(a) For reconnoitring.

(b) For turning an enemy who holds up the centre.

(c) For turning a defile.

We have said that this form of vanguard is so elastic that it can be applied to any country, and this is perfectly true; in very enclosed countries, such as parts of England, where movement off the roads is practically impossible, the Advanced Guard may be required to fill the functions of both advanced and flank guard. In this case the O.C. vanguard will tell off his advanced party as before, and from the remainder of the vanguard will push small patrols down roads leading to the right or left. These patrols will remain out till the rear-guard comes up, when they will come in and either :—

(a) Move up through the column and rejoin their unit; or

(b) Remain with the rear-guard till the column halts, and then rejoin.

Each patrol must have one man on the main road so as to recall the patrol when it is time for it to come in. This form of protection is used in mountain warfare in India.

The principle which governs the reconnaissance carried out by Advanced Guards is here applied, viz. :—Patrols should only be sent to explore tactical or dangerous points. Where an enemy is confined entirely to roads, then the roads are the tactical points that require reconnoitring.

We may add that the Commander of a force advancing should, when possible, ensure earlier information of any move on the part of the enemy that may interfere with his march than what can be given by a vanguard. This can best be done by sending one, two, or three patrols some seven or eight miles ahead of the leading patrols of the Advanced Guard. These patrols form, as we have already pointed out, what the French call the '*Sûreté éloignée*.' They are a sort of cross between an information-seeking patrol and a protective patrol—i.e., they are rigidly bound down to reconnoitre a certain route, but their sole duty is to get and send back information, and not to fight except with a view to getting it.

In conclusion, we may say that touch between the vanguard and main guard, and the main guard and main body, must be carefully arranged for, according to the nature of the country. In open country a couple of men dropped as required on good observation-posts may be sufficient, whereas in very enclosed country it may be necessary to string out men in Indian file.

SOUTH AFRICA AND A EUROPEAN WAR

By 'SOUTH AFRICAN'

POSSIBLY no Dominion in the British Empire has so many conflicting interests within itself and is so divided in opinion on the broader questions of policy as is the Union of South Africa.

Of the domestic causes of disagreement we are not here concerned; these may be found in every country whether the people of that country be all of one or, as is the case here, of two distinct nationalities. But on the wider and most vital question of all, viz., our attitude in respect to the Empire and its defence, any great division of opinion amongst us can only eventually lead to our own discomfiture. And yet it has to be admitted that this divided opinion at present exists, and that it does so is due very largely to an entire lack of conception as to what the word 'Empire' means, and what privileges and liabilities and vital interests are involved therein.

In the minds of some of our friends in South Africa loyalty to the Empire implies an expression of affection for Great Britain, its people, and its institutions, which they are very far from feeling; and anyone who in the late war was against Great Britain found giving publicity to any such expression is regarded to-day as a humbug or a traitor, or a bit of both.

Now, as I read it, loyalty to the Empire does not necessarily mean anything of a sentimental nature, but is rather, nowadays, a distinct business proposition which implies and involves a mutual safeguarding of common interests. And what we require in South Africa to-day to remove the erroneous prevailing opinion is an educating of the people in the arguments which go to prove that in the maintenance of the British Empire, as it is to-day, lies not only our own safety but that very independence which we are so anxious to maintain.

No independence which may be the coveted ideal in the minds of some people who still look longingly to the establishment of a

Republic in South Africa can approach in actual realisation the independence which is to-day enjoyed by the peoples of South Africa under the protection of the British flag. Every form of freedom is ours short of the privilege of declaring war on some outside foe, but while this latter privilege is certainly denied us it is equally true that no outside enemy may declare war on this Union without at the same time declaring war against the whole British Empire. These are such self-evident propositions that it seems almost superfluous to enumerate them, and yet they are propositions which are understood and appreciated by only a minority of South Africans.

There are to-day many thousands of otherwise intelligent people in this sub-continent, both English and Dutch, who seriously believe that if to-morrow England became involved in a Continental war the alternatives presented to us are either to take a part in it, if we so decide, or stand out altogether and look on, taking nothing more than an academic interest in the conflict. That the moment any Power declared war against England, that same moment was war automatically declared against South Africa, along with every other part of the Empire, never enters the minds of these people. That it is not the peoples of South Africa who will decide whether they will become parties to the conflict or remain neutral but the enemy of England, with whom the decision rests, cannot be conceived by them.

The next argument which has to be driven home into the minds of our friends here is that we have a direct pecuniary and personal interest in any European conflict in which England may become involved. Our overseas trade now runs into something approaching one hundred millions sterling, and this trade is represented by the export of raw gold, wool, mohair, ostrich feathers, wattle bark, and diamonds. All great sources of wealth, but all requiring that treatment and conversion which only the expert manufacturers of Europe can give them to make them available as articles of commerce ready and fit for use and consumption. In our present stage of development, with no factories worthy of the name, the unconverted raw materials are worthless to us if anything should occur to prevent us from exporting them.

Our imports, on the other hand, represent not only every form and variety of manufactured article, but many of the necessities of life as well. The Customs' returns show that even in such absolute

necessities as flour, sugar, tea, coffee, tinned meats and fish, and condensed milk, South Africa is not yet producing sufficient for her own requirements.

Now to realise the effect that a great European war would have on the individual in this country, we have to bear always in mind that all England's surplus naval strength, outside of her main naval forces engaged with the enemy, would have to be reserved for keeping open her own channels of supplies for the regular feeding of her people. And these supplies would be drawn from almost everywhere but South Africa, as we export little or nothing which is essential to England in time of war. Our exports, therefore, in the absence of the necessary protection at sea, would drop to a mere fraction of what they are now, and the prices realised by the farmer and the miner for their various articles of production would be speculative in the extreme. The individual here would be hit very quickly and very hard.

Nor is this all, for with the sudden stoppage of all imports in food-stuffs, prices of the locally produced article would commence to rise, so that every inhabitant, whether of the town or country, would experience at one and the same time the double hardship of loss of income and rise in the cost of living. If the war were to continue for any lengthy period the inhabitants of the larger towns in South Africa would be reduced to a state of semi-starvation—and all this distress would be experienced in a country comparatively free from any actual danger of attack by the enemy.

If it is admitted that this is not an exaggerated description of what may occur here in times of a great international struggle, it is sufficient to prove to us South Africans that we have a very direct material interest in the affairs of the Empire, and that to be 'loyal to the Empire' is after all but to be loyal to ourselves.

If, however, owing to the support which the various component parts of the Empire have been able and seen fit to supply, England emerges triumphant from the struggle, we, *i.e.* the Union of South Africa, will in due course recover from our misfortunes, but our recovery will be far slower than that of the other great Dominions with their greater internal resources and more advanced development.

But, on the other hand, what will be our position in the event of England's defeat? Is there any man, woman, or child in South

Africa, whatever their creed or nationality, who can afford to lightly contemplate any such calamity as this?

The defeat of England means the removal for all time of her fleet from the seas as a great dominating force. Any such fleet as she may be allowed to retain would be sufficient only for the immediate protection of her own shores. That she would be permitted to retain a fleet strong enough to give adequate protection to her overseas Dominions and possessions is inconceivable. What, then, would become of the latter? India and Egypt could no longer be held; Australia and New Zealand, with danger always well at hand, would turn to the only possible ally in the United States. The position of South Africa would be different, for with other nations scrambling for the smaller fry of our Colonial Empire Germany would be left free to deal with us, and Germany would offer us, and sooner or later we should find ourselves accepting, Germany's protection! (Save the mark!) The price, however, of that so-called 'protection' would be such that within the space of a very few years, so marvellously rapid would be the influx of Teutons, with their Teutonic capital and ideals, that 'Ons Land' as we know it to-day would have passed from us for ever.



*THE SECONDARY ARMAMENT OF
ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY.*

By MAJOR W. G. THOMPSON, R.H.A.

YEARS ago I was given three rules to qualify for promotion by my colonel; he has now reached the exalted rank of major-general, so I conclude they were the correct ones for those days, and so far have followed them myself carefully.

They were as follows :—

- (1) Never to go through a course of instruction.
- (2) Never to deliver a lecture.
- (3) Never to write for the *R.A. Journal*.

I trust that hereby I am not henceforth entirely disqualified under Rule 3; but I am stirred to make some protest against this extraordinary move of taking our rifles away and giving us that most dangerous substitute, the revolver.

Let me at once say I am not one who is in favour of all the fuss that has been made over R.A. musketry, but do hold that *the* weapon for Artillery is the gun every time.

One must, however, recognise that there are occasions when Artillery fire is impossible and that some secondary armament is necessary for our own protection.

Taking the cases that might arise :—

(1) When surprised limbered up on the move; say, from one position to another. The rifle is here useless, but not dangerous. The revolver or automatic pistol might be of some use but would certainly be a source of immense danger to everyone, certainly friend, perhaps foe.

On this sort of occasion to try and follow the example set by Norman Ramsay, when he was in 'I' Battery 102 years ago, seems to me the only solution. We have the swords now, but the regulation

that confines them to ceremonial parades only seems to want alteration.

(2) When in action and the wagon line is attacked by hostile Cavalry. I should prefer my men to have rifles.

(3) When *billeted*. If we are to provide our own protection, here again I prefer a rifle to a pistol.

It is quite possible, I think, for the units of a brigade to be billeted at different farms or hamlets, and if we are always to call on some Cavalrymen to come and do sentry go while we sleep, shan't we deservedly lose our popularity?

(4) *Marching*.—Surely rifles would be a more efficient weapon for the baggage guard to have than pistols.

There may be other situations, but personally I can think of no occasion when I should prefer my men to have pistols.

We had them just before the South African War, and I well remember the danger everyone was in whenever we fired them off. I never heard of them ever being of use to anyone out there; in fact, I think my major withdrew them as soon as we landed.

Will those with more experience than I have consider the following solution, and then we might get ourselves armed in a practical way:

Swords on the saddle for the active numbers mounted. Men to be taught simple points. This would encourage that excellent practice of 'heads and posts'—good for horse and man, and much to be preferred to tent-pegging, which we spasmodically play at.

54 rifles per battery, to be carried as follows:—

36 2 in *buckets* on each limber—not themselves strapped tight to the carriage so that it takes ten minutes to get them off, but in cases like the saddle bucket, so that they can be easily withdrawn.

These to be always taken out by all spare numbers and drivers as soon as the wagon line is formed.

12 12 with the dismounted party and baggage wagons.

6 6 on the saddles, in buckets, of the look-out men, patrols, and signallers; to be always taken out when the men dismount.

Under most conditions we could then be in a great measure self-protecting, and anyhow a great deal more so than if every man in the battery has a pistol.

I am, however, as before stated, all against too much stress being laid on musketry, which can only lead to other and more important things being neglected.

When general officers report on a battery's musketry I fancy they sometimes lose sight of the minor importance that musketry should bear to gunnery, and are apt to compare it unfavourably with that of Infantry and Cavalry units.

I suggest a still more modified course more applicable to our requirements.

Most batteries have now attained a certain proficiency with the rifle, and it seems a retrograde movement to throw that away and to kill what small interest there has grown up in musketry in the regiment. That anything like the same standard of proficiency can be hoped for with any form of automatic pistol I very much doubt.

That we have in our regiment more cranks to the square inch than most corps we are mostly, I think, willing to admit; but, excellent and amusing fellows as they usually are, surely it is a pity to let them be taken too seriously. The automatic pistol crank probably calls me one.



XIX



DRUM-BANNER

(being one of the pair)

PRESENTED BY

H.M. QUEEN ALEXANDRA


TO THE

19th (Q.A.O.R.) HUSSARS.

20th JUNE, 1913.

HOUNSLOW.

The Aden Troop



THE ADEN TROOP

BY CAPTAIN P. F. NORBURY, *Commandant*

SITUATED in a bleak and sandy waste, some seven miles to the northward of 'The Barren Rocks,' may be observed a compact, completely isolated little settlement—The Aden Troop.

Posted at this particular spot, for the complete command of the only land entrance into Aden, this small colony has stood like a sentinel for nearly forty-five years over 'the first possession added to Queen Victoria's Crown.'

To-day this colony comprises some three hundred and fifty souls—one hundred fighting men, thirty per cent. of whom have their families with them, and the usual proportion of public and private followers.

It was in the year 1855, after we had been in possession of Aden fourteen years, that the necessity for a small body of mounted men in Aden was first represented to Government by Brigadier Coghlan, the then Political Resident, who wrote as follows:—

'Our vast fortifications, while they effectually defy any land attack upon us, cannot protect the road beyond gunshot of the works; our Arab allies are unable to do so; the most obvious remedy, therefore, is that a body of Cavalry should form part of this garrison. Having this, the attitude of hostile neighbours would be almost a matter of indifference to us; and I have no hesitation in declaring my conviction that, for the future, such stoppages as have harassed us and injured our trade ever since our occupation of Aden would be unknown.'

As a result of his representations, at the end of the year 1855 the Honourable Court of Directors sanctioned a troop of horsemen for Aden.

A force was thereupon raised in India, by volunteers from the Sind and Poona Horse, but it never reached its destination. It is interesting to read the words of Colonel Merewether, who, writing ten years later (he was at this time Political Resident in Aden), still on the subject of a mounted force for Aden, said:—

' Nothing could be more complete than the Troop was when it left Upper Sind in January 1856, and it is very greatly to be deplored that it never reached its destination. Had it done so Brigadier Coghlan's hands would have been very greatly strengthened, and by this time stories of plundering near Sheikh Othman would have been things of the past. Unfortunately, the officer appointed to command the Troop had a morbid desire to go anywhere but to his proper destination. He sailed from Kurrachee on April 20, 1856, and when near Aden the ship in which he and nearly all the troopers were, turned and went to Bombay, where he remained the whole monsoon. The Persian War happening towards the end of the year, he volunteered the services of the Troop and went to the Gulf.

' Afterwards he and his Troop were employed in the Deccan and Central India in the suppression of the mutineers, till at last Brigadier Coghlan, evidently despairing of ever seeing them here, recommended their being disbanded, and that he should be allowed to raise a camel corps instead.

' This was raised in Lower Sind, *and was so far more successful than the Horse in that it reached Aden!* But on trial it was found that the Indian Camel Sowars could not for a moment compete with the Arabs in rapidity of movement or facility in handling the camel. This body was likewise disbanded.'

After this second failure it seems that Coghlan abandoned what must have seemed to him an ill-fated idea; but Merewether, a man who had had fifteen years' experience on the Sind frontier, still pressed for his mounted force. 'Change the name Arab,' he says, 'for Balooch, and you are on the Sind frontier'; and again, in urging the advantages of such a force, he says 'in a very few years the rich plain would once again be covered with fields of waving corn, and the villages filled with a happy and wealthy population, as has been the case on the frontier of Sind.' This happy state of affairs has, unfortunately, not been realised; but these two passages will perhaps assist those who have any knowledge of the Sind frontier to form some conception of the Aden Hinterland.

Eventually, sanction to raise a troop of horsemen on lines suggested by Merewether was accorded, and the force, which was raised in 1868, still exists. One of the most interesting features is the Arab Levy, corresponding, as it did, to the Balooch guides of that time. The

objects it was intended this force should secure were referred to in the following terms:—

‘Their scope is to afford protection to convoys coming into Aden with provisions and stores for the garrison and town, through a track of country where, hitherto, traders have been subjected to incessant molestation and loss of life and property; to perform police functions in a country where the inhabitants have been bred up in a state of ignorance of all the principles of orderly Government; to give confidence to the well-disposed by the ever active presence of a small disciplined, well-equipped body; to prove to the evil-doer that there is a paramount power ready and prepared to punish where punishment is necessary, and finally, by maintaining peace and security, to bring about the protection of those necessities of life which the country is so capable of giving in abundance, and for the supply of which the garrison and inhabitants of Aden are entirely dependent on that country.’

The Troop continued on these lines up to the year 1890. In this year it was reorganised, the main feature of the reorganisation being the substitution of fifty camels for a similar number of the horses then existing, and the reduction of the Arab Levy to one jemadar and five guides.

Many have been the arguments for and against this change. Other considerations being more or less equal, the great point of much reduced cost of upkeep carried the day; but it has been, and probably always will be, a debatable point as to whether the Arab looks upon this mixed force with as much respect as he did the purely horse troop. It must be remembered that he himself is a first-class man on a camel, and a first-class shot, and quite capable of considering himself the equal of any man under conditions which are not obviously to his disadvantage. His dread of a horseman is well known.

The change in local conditions, chiefly the more peaceful state of the country, was used as an argument in favour of the substitution of camels for horses. It was claimed after the Troop had rendered useful service in Somaliland that it should now be considered more as a fighting force and less as a body of patrols. It is difficult to follow cause and effect here; true, every camelier can take up an extra man behind him, provided the man is to hand, but, with this single exception, the substitution of camels for horses must of necessity reduce

the purely fighting power of the unit. Shock tactics are completely debarred, for the camel is useless for such purposes, and the small band of horsemen must, owing to their greater mobility, be used for all the most important patrolling work.

The Aden Troop, as constituted to-day, may very fairly be likened to half a squadron of Cavalry and half a company of M.I., though not quite equal in numbers.

Thus we come to the end of the history of the raising and organisation of the Aden Troop, and it only remains to give a brief account of its doings.

The first service of any importance entrusted to the Troop was the hoisting of the Union Jack on Little Aden—a place seven miles distant across the water, and twenty-one by the land route.

Inspired with this happy start, only the opportunity was required to set this young force off on deeds of daring and endurance—and the opportunity was soon forthcoming. For nearly twenty years the Troop, either in whole or part, was almost incessantly under arms, and many are the instances of hardships met and overcome; of deeds of personal valour, skill, and enterprise in dealing with a savage and treacherous foe.

Colonel Merewether need look no further than the records of the Troop to justify his insistent demand for a force of this kind, and it is hardly too much to say that the present-day peaceful state of the Aden Hinterland is largely due to the energies of the force he organised.

It is impossible to give in detail the many affairs in which the Troop has been engaged; it is proposed, therefore, to merely give a short synopsis.

1870-71, during the cold weather, the Troop under Captain Stevens performed a 'promenade militaire'—passed through the Abdali and Akrabi districts, the Fadthli country, the Yaffai valley, and parts of the Houshebi country, visiting many places to which no European had ever before penetrated, and covering a distance of some 440 miles.

1871, April.—Proceeded on a punitive expedition against a famous bandit, Mohamad-bin-Sherwet, the terror of the neighbourhood, killed him and nearly all his followers. One of the Troop guides in this expedition had lost three brothers in three months at the hands of this evil-doer. A march of 78 miles in twenty-four hours, chiefly over heavy sand, was a noteworthy performance of this little expedition.

The following letter from Lord Napier of Magdala, Commander-in-Chief in India, is interesting :—

‘ My dear Captain Stevens,—I read with great pleasure an account in the newspapers of the dashing exploit which you have performed against the banditti near Aden.

‘ I have not seen the official report, but the newspaper account is sufficiently detailed to enable me to judge of the value of the services performed, and I congratulate you on the opportunity of distinction which you have so well seized.

‘ Please convey to the officers and men of your corps my best congratulations.—Believe me, yours faithfully,

‘ NAPIER OF MAGDALA.’

1872-1877.—Extensive patrolling of the country round Aden.

1878, April.—A force of all arms under Captain Stevens was sent into the interior to punish certain tribes.

1879-80-81.—Constant small expeditions to suppress plundering and raiding by various Arab bands.

1882.—The Troop proceeded to Egypt. Disembarking at Suez, was ordered to Cairo. Reached Ismailia and was then ordered to return.

1886.—Thirty sabres under a native officer took part in the Jebel Aboukir expedition.

1887.—The Troop proceeded with a party on survey work to Somaliland.

1888.—Part of the Troop was constantly on service in Somaliland.

1890.—In this year the Troop saw its most interesting service, and, as it enjoys to this day a general holiday awarded for gallantry displayed in a certain incident during the expedition, it may be considered its best performance. For this reason an account of the episode is given.

The order granting the holiday reads as follows :—

‘ The 19th of January in every year will in future be observed as a general holiday on account of the gallant way in which the Troop dislodged the Eesa from dense jungle, and then successfully charged them.’

An account of the above (the Wadi Damel episode) :—

The Mamasin section of the Eesa Somel having given much trouble lately, and having made a raid on Bulhar, where they killed seventy

people, a field force was sent against them, commanded by Captain Domville of the Aden Troop, and composed of the Aden Troop, two companies 17th Bombay Infantry under Captain Hughes, Lieutenant Delamain, and Lieutenant Lester, a detachment of Sappers and Miners under Captain Russell, and some men from H.M.S. *Ranger*, with two Gatling guns, under Lieutenant Clarke, R.N.

The Mamasin are a nomad tribe, having no village of any description. The country they inhabit is a very difficult one for troops to work in on account of the total absence of cereals, the great scarcity of water, and the dense elephant jungle which stretches for miles under the Eilo Range, in which they can always take refuge when hard pressed.

The Troop embarked on board H.M. I.M.S. *Tenasserim* on January 10, 1890, and leaving Aden on the 11th, reached Zayla on the 13th, where the other detachments had already assembled. The harbour of Zayla is a most inconvenient one for embarking or disembarking troops of any kind, especially Cavalry. The transport cannot come within three miles of the land, and at low water, as when the Cavalry was disembarked, the boats cannot come within half a mile of the pier. Consequently, the animals had to be jumped out of the boats and walked through the water to the shore. The force marched from Zayla on the 14th, and on the 15th a patrol of Cavalry captured a herd of camels and a herd of cattle on the Hungagarah Plain. During the skirmish Captain Domville had his horse shot under him, and he himself had his cross-belt completely pierced by a spear.

From information received from a prisoner captured by Domville it appeared certain that the enemy was on that day encamped in the neighbourhood of Gerissa, in which direction the force marched on the morning of the 16th; but information having been received by the political authorities with the force that the enemy in large numbers was encamped at Bulaado wells, close to the sea, the force was halted and the direction of the march changed to Bulaado, 16 miles off. The Cavalry, moving off at a rapid pace, expected to find the enemy here. On arrival, however, it was found unoccupied, and the force entrenched itself near the wells, there being no material for making a zareba. On the 17th and 18th the Troop reconnoitred in various directions, but found no trace of the enemy. On the 19th, the field force being still encamped at Bulaado, Domville, Delamain, and Jones, R.E., with fifty-

seven Aden Troop and sixteen Arab Levy, reconnoitred towards Gerissa and the Eilo range of mountains; they explored a large tract of country, including the plains of Lanambar and Goraya Hissars. Near the banks of the Wadi Damel the Eesa were discovered in two kraals. They at once took up a position in some thick bushes, from which they were dislodged by the fire of dismounted men, and then successfully charged, pursued, and scattered, with considerable loss of killed and prisoners, including valuable captures of camels and sheep. Wadi Damel is nearly 25 miles from Bulaado, and the Troop set out on its return journey at noon. Domville and the other European officers, with twenty-five men and a few Arab Levy, escorted the prisoners and camels, and arrived at headquarters at 9 P.M., after having covered a distance of altogether 65 miles. The rear party, commanded by Resaldar Sheik Abdul Aziz, and consisting of two native officers, thirty Sowars, and six Arab Levy, were employed to bring in the sheep. All went well until the party reached the Lanambar Plain, in sight of the camp fires. At this moment most of the men got off to have a rest, when they were suddenly attacked by a band of Eesa who, it appears, had been dogging their footsteps for miles, and before order could be restored one native officer of the Aden Troop and nine Sowars were killed, and one Sowar badly wounded.

A party of Infantry, which had been previously sent for by Domville, arrived on the scene, and the combined parties marched to Bulaado. On the morning of the 29th, after ten days' reconnoitring and fighting, the force marched to Hussain. On the march it became evident that the enemy was near, the Cavalry during their reconnaissance sighting a beacon fire about ten miles to the westward of their line of march.

The zareba at Hussain was made in the best position possible in the circumstances, but the ground was enclosed and unfavourable. At 2.35 A.M., just as the moon went down, the zareba was attacked in the most determined manner by a body of Eesa (the advance guard of a force of 400 who were concealed in the surrounding jungle), who sent a shower of spears into the zareba, and then used other spears as leaping poles to surmount the hedge. A heavy fire was at once opened and they were quickly ejected with a loss of eight killed and seven wounded, while the main body, owing to the steady fire, would not make their attack. The Aden Troop behaved admirably. As the moon went down the Sowars were awakened and sat with their carbines at the

ready, so that instantly the alarm sounded they commenced firing. The consequence was that not a single man entered the zareba on their side; on the south side, however, the enemy was more successful, and effecting an entrance, killed five Infantry Sepoys, wounded seventeen, and also wounded Captain Hughes, 17th Bombay Infantry. After this the enemy's force broke up.

The difficulties of water have not been touched upon, but they were very great. Suffice it to say that on one occasion the Troop horses were for seventy-two hours with approximately only two gallons per horse.

1891-1901.—Portions of the Troop constantly detached for service in Somaliland and elsewhere.

1901.—Half the Troop, under Captain Gordon, proceeded to Jubaland to join the Jubaland field force, taking part in the Ogaden Somali expedition, and returning in September after seven months' absence.

In June of the same year one native officer and twenty-five men joined the Ad-Diraj field force.

1902-3-4.—The whole Troop in various detachments were constantly employed between Aden and Dthala during the Boundary Commission.

Unfortunately, since 1904 opportunities for such activities as the Troop had enjoyed up to this time have been wanting; but it is hoped they may yet come.


There have been altogether nine commandants, not including those who have only officiated, and the most noteworthy of these have undoubtedly been Captain, afterwards Colonel, G. S. Stevens, 1st Sind Horse, who commanded the Troop for sixteen years—from 1870 to 1886—and Captain F. W. G. Wadeson, 34th Poona Horse—1893-98—now Brigadier-General commanding the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade.

In more peaceful spheres the Troop has played a by no means inconspicuous part. Perhaps no unit in the Indian Army has so often had the distinction of providing escorts to high personages—the list includes, as well as many Viceroys of India, British, German, Russian, and other royalties—and in 1911 the Troop had the supreme honour of being entrusted with the escort of their Imperial Majesties King George V. and Queen Mary on the occasion of their visit to Aden, this being the first unit to ever provide an escort for a King of England in his Indian Empire.

Problem No. XIII.

TACTICAL PROBLEM KI SHARTEN.

1. Is shart men sab Hindustani risalon ke Sirdar log shamil hona azad hain.
2. Siraf Sarkari faujon ke Sirdar log (ke is men bhi Aden Troop mundarij hai) is problem ka jawab dena azad hain.
3. Fi Regiment men siraf ek Sirdar ko jawab dene ki ijazat hai.
4. Jawabon ki likhi hui kaghazon par bhejna wale ki dastkhatt ki sawai Adjutant sahib ya Squadron Commander sahib ki dastkhatt bhi hona chahiye.
5. Sirdaron ko apne apne jawab Roman urdu men likhna chahiye.
6. Indian Editor sahib Cavalry School Saugor is shart ka munsif mukarrar kea hua hai aur sab jawab un ke pas 30th October 1913 se age bhejna chahiye.
7. Betore inam ek ghari ya ek durbin ya ek zin (ke us ke arzish Rs. 75 hoegi) dea jaega.



PROBLEM NO. XIII.

PROBLEM No. XIII

HINDUSTANI RISALON KE SARDARON KE WASTE SAWAL.

Dekho Naksha jo sath hai.

A'M KHIAL.

Ek Convoy jismén 40 khachcharon par ammunition—5 khachcharon par Uráné ka sámán (explosives), aur 5 khachcharon par kambal hain, kul 50 khachchar, TANKI ke sarkari post se THANA post ko Jaegi.

Mulak—Hindustan ki Shumali Maghrabi sarhad—aur be bharosa diháti logon ke pas lambi már ki raflén aur talwárén hain.

KHAS KHIAL.

16 March ki shamko ápké Squadron kamander Sahab né apko bulákar yeh hukam dia.

(1) Kal apka Troop Jismen 4 Uhdedar aur 30 Jowán hain THANA ko Convoy ké Escort mén Jaegá jismen 50 khachchar hain.

(2) 2 roz ka arsa guzrá ki 40 loterón ka eh garoh UBA ke logon ko loot ke legaya hai.

(3) DODAI aur UBA ke log sarkar sé darte hain lekin unpar ziyadah bharosa mat karo Isi muafik HAMZA KOT aur TORDERI ke log.

SAWAL.

Sawal No. 1.—Kis raste par Jaogé aur Kion?

Sawal No. 2.—Chalné ki tayarián kia karogé?

Sawal No. 3.—Escort aur Convoy ki tartib?

Sawal No. 4.—(a) Rawana honé se 3 ghante bad khabar milte hai ki Dushman DODAI Gaon se West ki taraf hai—kia karogé? (b) Agar dushman ka hamla sakht hai aur barbardari pakré jané ka dar ho—to kia karogé?

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Revue de Cavalerie. March.—The opening paper in this number is by General Canonge, who tells the story of the charge of the 5th Cuirassiers at Beaumont on August 30, 1870, mainly to rescue from oblivion the name of a sergeant of that regiment—one Collignon—who alone of his comrades succeeded in reaching the ranks of the Prussian Infantry, and fell mortally wounded while engaging the captain of the company against which the charge was chiefly directed. General Armand Lucas continues his *Causeries cavalières*, and takes as his text some words uttered just a year ago by General Joffre, chief of the General Staff, who then complained that at the manœuvres the action of the Cavalry usually appeared too unpremeditated; that there was no sign of any prevailing idea of attack being carried out; and that regiments did not convey the impression of an intervention in the fight by well-formed units reaching the enemy in compact pre-arranged order. General Lucas holds the opinion that all this is due to the fact that the study of simple evolutions has of late years fallen into disrepute, that units only leave their camps and quarters for *la grande guerre*, and that work in the smaller bodies is neglected for evolutions in the larger only. The brigade, he declares, no longer occupies its proper place—only the division is now the fashion, and a division, *bien entendu*, composed of regiments and not of brigades. Then follows the first part of an article by Captain de Beauchesne entitled *À propos des Conférences du Colonel de Grandmaison*, wherein the writer seems to warn his comrades against too blind an adherence to the particular *doctrine* of the day, to the possible subordination of initiative. He seems to suggest that, however excellent and well defined a doctrine may be, theoretically at least, and however loyally its principles may be applied on the map or at drill, it may often fail at manœuvres directly an opponent is introduced into the scene. Captain Savtai contributes an interesting paper on the Cavalry regulations of 1732, drawn up at the request of M. d'Angervilliers, then War Minister, by the Chevalier de Saint-André, an officer who had seen service at Fleurus, at Steenkirk, and at Neerwinden, and who had been appointed Inspector-General of Cavalry in 1729. In *Automobiles et Cavalerie* M. Rupied suggests that there is room for the further development of mechanical traction in the employment of Cavalry in the field; it is in the interests of the 'supply' of Cavalry that their mechanical transport should not, as with the other arms, remain in the rearward communications of the army, but that only by the use of mechanically propelled vehicles can the supplies for the advanced Cavalry be certain of reaching them; while by their employment, in lieu of horse vehicles, can alone the Cavalry be early set free to fulfil the next day's mission, untrammelled by the usual anxiety about their empty supply wagons travelling slowly rearward to refill. The writer also suggests employing armed motor-cars for the services of exploration, reconnaissance, command, and communication, thus materially lightening

the work of the Cavalry. In 'Opinions' a writer points out that while the Cavalry Training Manual insists upon the importance, for the successful employment of Cavalry, of surprise, simplicity of manœuvre, and rapidity of attack, actually the orders of the regimental or brigade commander have to filter through so many channels of communication that opportunity may be lost, and that in the case of opposing Cavalry bodies rapidly approaching each other the result may well be that *la bataille s'engage comme elle peut*. It is suggested therefore that so soon as any formation is completed, each squadron commander should place himself immediately in rear of the commanding officer, leaving his squadron sergeant-major as an intermediary between him and the squadron. All these officers would see the ground, and be able to form as sound a judgment of the situation as the commanding officer himself. The colonel's orders, signalled, so far as concerned any necessary change of direction, by the sergeant-major to the commander of the leading troop, would be conveyed to the squadrons by their commanders. Result—no loss of time or possibility of misunderstanding. Under the title of *Un Guide de Napoléon* is a little story, the merest sketch, of the meeting between Napoleon and the curé of Mézières, one of his former teachers at the War School at Brienne, who acts as guide to his old pupil in the battle of January 29, 1814.

April.—In an article on 'Initiative' the author seems to warn us against an idea which is perhaps rather too prevalent—that initiative can take the place of knowledge; further, we are reminded that, while the cult of the initiative can hardly be pursued too far in the case of the educated class from which officers are drawn, so far as non-commissioned officers are concerned it would be better to furnish them with general rules for guidance. There is a long account, with a map, of the work of the German Cavalry in last year's manœuvres; this is unusually free from comment or comparison. General Armand Lucas continues his *Causeries cavalières*, and discusses the circumstances under which the Cavalry attack should or should not be preceded by manœuvre. Captain de Beauchesne, too, contributes a second instalment of his remarks on the *Conférences du Colonel de Grand-maison*. In this paper he appears to utter a warning against any attempt to establish a *doctrine* founded upon that which we believe our potential adversary to possess. Such a procedure, says Captain de Beauchesne, makes no allowance for the initiative of an exceptional commander on the other side, neither does it take the fact into consideration that one's possible future adversary may himself have founded *his* doctrine upon what he believes ours will be, hoping to exploit our passivity by his own offensive methods of action. The remainder of the contents of this number is conceived in a lighter vein, including some verses and a *feuilleton*.

May.—The most important paper in this number is an account by Captain Lelong of the operations of General Mishchenko's Cavalry during the four days' fighting known as the Battle of Sandepu. This article appears to be compiled from a translation which the same officer has made of a diary published by Captain Rostovzef, of the Fourth Don Cossack Division, and has been accorded a very appreciative preface by General de Lacroix. This officer supplies the comment to the more purely historical facts given by Captains Lelong and Rostovzef, and he insists upon the importance of the (1) *personality* of the Cavalry commander, which in this case enabled Mishchenko to bring into action his improvised Cavalry divisions, which were also badly equipped and which had received an instruction which was at the least unequal; (2) of the offensive value afforded to Cavalry by its modern

armament against both Cavalry and Infantry. But General de Lacroix lays equal stress upon the causes of the ultimate failure of Mishchenko's purpose; these were, the indefinite nature of the orders, insufficient reconnaissance, the number and divergence of the objectives, and the want of proper combination among the different units. Captain Lelong has provided a very good and clear map; his paper is to be continued. General Canonge has an article entitled *Vaincre*, which appears to be a review of a book which has this year appeared under that title by Colonel Montaigne and which deals with the *morale* in war. General Armand Lucas continues his *Causeries cavalières*, and deals chiefly with the different situations in which an advanced guard may be called upon to act. His discussion of the oft-debated question whether the commander of the force should or should not move with the advanced guard is well worth study. Captain de Beauchesne concludes in this number his comments on *Les Conférences du Colonel de Grandmaison*. He insists that all *exploration* must be co-ordinated and guided by the general in command, if he is to obtain all the elements necessary for him to form his decisions; that manœuvre is not merely the distribution of force along the enemy's front, but that it consists in the previous junction of all bodies and must precede *le contact d'engagement*.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—Number 32, dated March 11 of this year, contains a review by Lieut.-Colonel Müller Kränefeldt of the horse-breeding operations carried on in Prussia during the last twenty-five years, showing the enormous increase in expenditure and output. Thus while in 1888 Prussia imported only little over 87,000 horses, she now brings into the country 132,000; the export of horses has, however, diminished by over 3,000. The author of this paper hastens to point out that Prussia is absolutely independent of foreign countries for the remounts for her army, and that, were it necessary, East Prussia alone could mount the whole of the German Cavalry. The provinces whence horses for military purposes are almost wholly drawn are East and West Prussia, Posen, and Hanover. Six new establishments have been created, and the number of mares now covered is over 20,000 more than in 1888. The German Army requires some 14,700 remounts every year—viz., Prussia 11,400, Bavaria 1,700, Saxony 1,100, Würtemberg 500, and of these East Prussia alone furnishes 8,700.

Number 39, of March 27, has an anonymous paper—which has, however, rather the appearance of being inspired—putting forward the disadvantages of a permanent organisation into divisions of the German Cavalry. The arguments employed in the disparagement of such a measure do not carry with them very much conviction; among them are the suggestion that permanent Cavalry divisions would lead to the higher Cavalry commanders becoming mere specialists; and another, the divisional organisation might occasionally become temporarily dislocated owing to perhaps an outbreak of glanders, or some other form of horse-sickness, in some one or other cavalry regiment of a division.

Numbers 47, 48, and 49 contain a long criticism of the new English Cavalry training, which is described as a very carefully devised work, providing the British Cavalry with a most excellent foundation for training based upon thoroughly sound military principles, and as being worthy of the very careful study of German officers of Cavalry, who will find in it much that will repay their perusal.

Number 61, of May 10, has a short account of the Cavalry action at Aarhuus on May 31, 1849, in the Prusso-Danish War. Aarhuus is to the

north of Fredericia in Jutland, and the action resulted from a reconnaissance in force conducted by Major-General Kaminsky, commanding the 1st Prussian Infantry Brigade, with the object of discovering the position of the enemy and preventing the establishment of the Danish outposts to the south of the town. The Prussian Infantry having gone through the town were then fallen upon by the Danish Dragoons whom they had not noticed. These again in turn were charged by two squadrons of the Prussian 11th Hussars and driven back, but reinforcements reached the Danes, who presently brought six squadrons of Dragoons into action against the two squadrons of Hussars. The Danish Cavalry, besides being the stronger in numbers—some writers give their strength as barely *three* squadrons—appear to have been individually the better men. The Prussians seem to have been led by Prince Salm of Anhalt, who was wounded and taken prisoner; he was afterwards in Mexico with the Emperor Maximilian, and then, returning to the Prussian service, was killed at St. Privat commanding a battalion of the Augusta Regiment. The Prussian Hussars lost thirty-three men and fifteen horses killed, wounded and prisoners; the Danish Dragoons two killed, seven wounded, and nineteen men taken prisoners.

In Number 62, of May 15, certain proposals as to the armament of Cavalry are put forward by Rittmeister von Wentzky and Petersheyde, of the Ziethen Hussars. He discusses the carrying of the rifle or carbine on the back of the rider, which appears to be now the practice in the German Cavalry so soon as the order of route is broken up, and declares that while but little time in getting at the rifle is thus gained, it is liable to injury, is very tiring to the man, increases his risks in a fall, and is much in his way when riding through wooded country. He pleads then for the rifle or carbine to be always carried in the bucket. He also asks that the Cavalryman should be armed with a short broad-bladed dagger which can be fixed to the rifle to use as a bayonet, and provided on one edge near the handle with a saw for the cutting of wire fencing.

Kavalleristische Monatshefte. March.—The first article in this number is called *Kavallerie in der Sackgasse*, which may be freely translated as 'Cavalry in the Soup!' It treats of the various circumstances under which Cavalry would find itself at a disadvantage and unable to act, except perhaps at a walk, and when, met by a sudden outburst of hostile fire in close formation, they are not able quickly to get out of range or behind cover. The writer has especially in his mind cases where Cavalry, owing to heavy snow, deep mud, or to a surface rendered slippery by frost after rain, cannot move about freely, though perhaps he goes rather too far when he describes his arm purely as *die Waffe der schönen Jahreszeit*. This paper becomes an appeal for increasing the fire-power of Cavalry units, and particularly by the addition of machine-gun sections. Cavalry must, he maintains, have always present with it its own fire-power, and if this is a question only of cost, he would rather see Cavalry regiments diminished by the reduction of one troop each, if by the economy thus effected a machine-gun section could be added to every regiment. This is followed by a very short paper urging the need for German Cavalry to receive increased practice in shooting under service conditions, and pointing out that much good would result were the higher Cavalry commanders to evince more interest in the musketry of the Cavalry. Major-General von Gersdorff gives extracts from a brochure by Commander Mordacq, recently published in France, called *Tendances tactiques de notre cavalerie*, and this

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is followed by four papers devoted almost entirely to schooling and to the consideration of the relative advantages and disadvantages of long-distance rides. Lieut. Schreiber furnishes a very interesting article on the 'Horse in Bosnia and Herzegovina'; this animal appears originally to have had a fair share of Arab blood, and the race has of late years been improved by the importation of Arabs and Syrians, and very wisely no attempt appears to have been made to breed big horses, a small animal being far better suited to the country. The best are bred in Herzegovina. The Government price for remounts is only 500 krone—about £20—but the best of the available young horses are said to be bought up by the Italian Government, whose remount agents give as much as 900 krone for suitable remounts. Mules of excellent quality are also bred in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This number contains a translation of a paper which appeared in THE CAVALRY JOURNAL for January of this year entitled 'The Daily Round,' by Light Dragoon.

April.—General von Hennigs contributes to this number a short account of the work of the Prussian Cavalry when covering the retreat of the Allies after the battle of Gross Görschen during May 2-4, 1813. The Cavalry regiment upon which the brunt of the work and most of the losses fell was the 1st Uhlans, whose regimental record, originally compiled by General von Hennigs, has just been brought up to date by Colonel von Wickede. Lieut.-Colonel Kerchnawe, of the General Staff, furnishes an interesting paper on the organisation, armament, equipment, and training of the Austrian Cavalry a hundred years ago, succeeding a period during which the country had endured great sufferings. It is computed that in the wars from 1792-1809 it had lost 500,000 men capable of bearing arms and a quarter of its former territory, while its equine population had been almost wiped out by war and by the constant requisitions for horses made by the French. The writer goes into great detail about the composition of the Austrian Cavalry, its division into heavy and light, and the strength of the squadrons, which seem to have varied in number from four to twelve per regiment; and shows that while, as an instrument of war, the Austrian Cavalry of 1813 fell short of the requirements even of those days it did as well as under the circumstances could have been expected of it, considering that no Cavalry leader of any eminence—no Sporck, no Nadasdy or Schwarzenberg—came to the front. Rittmeister Krell, of the 4th Uhlans, makes some suggestions for the systematic training of Cavalry officers in patrol duties. He complains that while in the German service there are a large number of very excellently qualified patrol leaders, there are almost an equally large number whose qualifications in this respect leave a very great deal to be desired. The good and the indifferent are both thoroughly well known, and it is by no means uncommon, says Rittmeister Krell, for officers of other arms, to whose commands small bodies of Cavalry are attached at manœuvres, to make a particular request for the services of those officers by whom they know that the patrol service will be thoroughly well conducted. The writer makes certain suggestions for effecting a general 'levelling up,' and draws out a scheme or synopsis of work of an educational character for the whole year. Colonel von Horn breaks a lance with General von Bernhardt on the subject of the organisation of permanent Cavalry divisions in Germany. Those who know that general's writings will be aware that he has expressed the opinion that the disadvantages of permanent Cavalry divisions on the whole outweigh the advantages, but Colonel von Horn is of the school, the representatives of which appear

to be annually increasing in number, that believes that Germany is seriously discounting the service value of her fine Cavalry force by leaving its *en-divisionnement* to take place on the outbreak of war. The writer agrees with Bernhardt that the tactical training of the German Cavalry officer is *höchst stiefmütterlich behandelt*—whatever that may mean exactly—and that every year's manœuvres disclosed a great want of Cavalry leaders; suggesting that few are capable of commanding divisions even in peace, and leaving the obvious conclusion to be drawn that unless they are afforded in peace the necessary opportunities for acquiring the habit of such command, it will not be very profitable to look round for the required Cavalry divisional commanders when war breaks out. It appears from what Colonel von Horn states that the recently deceased Inspector General of Cavalry, General von Windheim, was entirely in favour of permanent Cavalry divisions, and that had he lived this reform would probably have been early carried out. Lieut.-Colonel von Lerch, lately attached to a Japanese Infantry division, was permitted to attend a long-distance patrol undertaken in 1911 by six patrols, each of seven men, furnished by the 17th Regiment of Japanese Cavalry. Colonel von Lerch gives a translation of the report of the colonel of the regiment, which enters into full detail of the training of the men and horses, distance and time, clothing, feeding and watering, weather, rate of march, &c., &c. The total distance was about 250 miles, covered in an average of about 57 hours 30 minutes. This is followed by a translation of an account which appeared in the February number of the *Rivista di Cavalleria* of the work of the Servian Cavalry in the Balkan War. The Servian Cavalry division commanded by Prince Arsen, the brother of the King, only consisted of four regiments, each of four squadrons, but appears from the account here given of it to have played a most useful part.

May.—Lieut.-General Baron von Ardenne gives in this number an account of an action of which not very much perhaps is known, that of Haynau, where the advanced-guard of Ney, then moving on Liegnitz, was ambushed by Blücher. Lieut.-Colonel Kerchnawe follows up his paper on the Austrian Cavalry of 1813 in the previous month's journal by another on the Russian Cavalry of the same period. This was an arm for which Napoleon himself had a great admiration, being reported to have declared in 1809 that with the Infantry of France, the Cavalry of Russia, and the Artillery of Austria he would conquer the whole world. These two papers by Colonel Kerchnawe are of high value for historians of that particular period. Lieut.-Colonel Count Spannochi gives, without criticism or comment, a translation of the more important parts of the Russian Riding Regulations of 1910, which he says are not sufficiently known or appreciated in Germany; and Major-General Wenninger criticises the new Cavalry Regulations which in July of last year replaced that which had been issued just a year previously in France, compares the two, and seeks to prove that the difference is so trifling that the need for the later 'Manual' is not apparent. Rittmeister Pfleger insists upon the need for a very high standard of shooting in any Cavalry employed in Northern Italy, and Dr. Zell writes a long paper on crib-biting in horses, and comes to the conclusion that it is no vice, but rather of the nature of a protest by the animal against our unnatural method of feeding, which prevents him from filling his belly, as in a wild state he would do for himself. For the same reason do sheep, declares the doctor, eat their own wool. Crib-biting, then, he seems to maintain, is found among horses which do not get enough of a filling ration and too much grain food. All horses will become crib-biters which get too much solid food, but food which does not fill their bellies.

'The Inniskillener,' the Regimental Journal of the Inniskilling Dragoons, for February 1913, contains the story of the late Captain Oates from the day that he joined his regiment to the day of his death.

'The Commonwealth Military Journal of Australia' is making great progress. The number for January 1913 contains much interesting matter written by our Australian officers and fewer reprints from English journals. The most interesting articles in it are: 'A Time-Saving System of Training,' 'The Psychology of a Citizen Company' and 'Lest we Forget.'

The Australian forces are evidently making progress, and the Australian people appear to be endowed with much commonsense and patriotism.

'Questions and Answers for Regulars and Territorials.' By Major C. H. Anderson Pelham. (Dolby Bros., Printers, Stamford.)
A useful little work published at the modest price of 3d.

'7th Princess Royal Dragoon Guards': 'The Story of the Regiment.' By Colonel C. W. Thompson, C.B., D.S.O., and 'With the Regiment in South Africa.' By Major N. D. H. Campbell and Captains W. S. Whetherly and J. E. D. Holland. (The 'Daily Post' Printers, Liverpool.)

The volume under notice is quite a model of what such regimental histories should be. It affords most interesting reading throughout, and is well illustrated by maps, sketches, plans and engravings. Major Dietz's panoramic sketches of South Africa are quite excellent, and the 'Story of the Regiment's share in that campaign' is very well written.

Volumes such as these, especially if published at a price within the reach of the N.C.O.s and men of the regiment, cannot fail to stimulate *esprit de corps*.

Colonel Thompson and his brother officers are to be congratulated on this production.

We have received a copy of the records of the 1st King's Dragoon Guards, written by Captain J. O'Donnell, the secretary of the K.D.G.s Old Comrades Association.

This is a complete and handy little work, and will serve as a model for the Association of other regiments.

NOTICE.

Native Officers of the INDIAN CAVALRY may now obtain single copies of THE CAVALRY JOURNAL one month after date of issue at the price of One Rupee, which includes postage.

Application, enclosing remittance, should be made to

The Managing Editor,

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL,

The Royal United Service Institution,

Whitehall, London, S.W.

NOTES

ANECDOTES OF THE FOURTH REGIMENT OF HORSE (7th Dragoon Guards).

IN these days when one frequently hears the elder generation pronounce anathemas over the younger on the score of the latter's sybaritic tendencies and lack of stamina, it may interest some of our readers to peruse the following extract from a well-known Dublin journal, which was penned some hundred years ago.

Apart from its interest as demonstrating that exactly the same views were held by our great grandparents of our grandparents at a time when Wellington's army was sweeping all before it, it further shows that the present-day tendency to grant more commissions to the ranks is also merely a repetition of history.

R. W. W. G.

Sir,—Taking a walk a few days ago towards Phoenix Park I had the good fortune to see a Cavalry regiment marching out to a review on the Fifteen Acres, and casting my eyes on the staff of officers in front I was absolutely dazzled with the splendour of their attire, glowing with gold lace.

Each seemed to me a representative of Plutus, the god of wealth, or of Mars, the god of war. Thinks I to myself, it is a pity that all this millinery and brocade should ever be exposed to the rude shocks of war—such finery belongs to the bandbox rather than to the tented field. I was tempted forthwith to consider that such plumage does not belong to the eagle or the falcon, but to the popinjay, the peacock and the cockatoo. But then I corrected myself and assumed that these gallantries were only displayed in the piping times of peace—that these puppy youths were now reposing in the lap of their softer conquests, like Rinaldo in the gardens of Armida, or Achilles masquerading among the handmaidens of Deidamia.

But still I could not help contrasting these gay trappings with the regimental accoutrements of my five grand uncles, whom, in my youth I remember to have seen in the full costume of the Ligonier Guards, and which said accoutrements are kept in great veneration by an old bachelor relative.

These old spolia have a different cut and character from the golden gauds that decorate our modern chivalry. Why, Sir, the iron helmet, crested with red horse-hair would weigh down the head of one of our present striplings, whilst the basket-hilted 'Andrea Ferrara' would sprain the wrist of the modern pretty officer.

To be sure my grandsires were not sons of noblemen, who chose the army *pour passer le temps*, but sons of Irish gentlemen who had nothing to give them but their swords, and thus sent them to win their way

through the world, like true Irishmen, by fighting those whom they never saw before, and cutting away, right and left, all before them.

They enlisted as privates in Lord Ligonier's Regiment of Black Horse, and in that boasted assemblage of gentlemen, as their commander with pride termed them, they passed through the gradation of wounds and promotions, and shared fully in the dangers and hairbreadth escapes which entitled the only remaining one which came home alive, with his scull trepanned, to retire as a Major.

In order to show the contrast between the Cavalry of the present day and a century ago, I call your attention to a paper published in the Dublin Literary Gazette some time ago which you might give a place to in your extensively read journal. I believe it was furnished by that excellent Irish antiquarian, Mr. Hardiman.

His Majesty's Fourth Regiment of Horse, commanded by Sir John Ligonier, continued upon the Irish establishment from the conclusion of Queen Anne's wars to the year 1742. This long period of thirty years naturally brought the corps to be almost entirely composed of Irishmen, as I do not recollect at any time more than two or three private men in it of any other country. A regiment eminently distinguished at the revolution, and in the Queen's wars under Marlborough, found no difficulty in recruiting. It was in general composed of the younger branches of ancient and respectable families, nor was it uncommon to give from twenty to thirty guineas for a trooper's place.

In the summer of 1742 the regiment was ordered for foreign service, and so very unexpectedly, that the troop horses were taken up from grass and the clothing of the men was in the last month of the period for which it was to be worn; under these disadvantageous circumstances was the regiment embarked for England, and upon their march for embarkation for Flanders was reviewed without respite or preparation, at Hounslow, by the King, in the centre between the Oxford Blues and Pembroke Horse, of nine troops each newly and completely appointed, and which had only marched from the neighbouring cantonments for that purpose. No wonder there was a manifest disparity in the appearance of the corps, the meagre horses of the Blacks being scarcely able to crawl under the rawboned, half-naked Hibernians who rode them. The old King, however, had discernment enough to appreciate the cause, and generosity to make the proper allowances, and wishing to afford their dejected Colonel (who no doubt experienced a little uneasiness on the occasion) some consolation, he good-humouredly said, 'Ligonier, your men have the air of soldiers, despite their clothes; their horses indeed look poorly, how is it?' 'Sir,' replied he, 'the men are Irish and gentlemen, the horses are *English*.' The regiment shortly afterwards embarked for Germany, and in the ensuing campaign in June 1743 were of the Brigade of English Cavalry at the battle of Dettingen.

The army being surprised into action, and not having an opportunity of calling in their outposts, the regiment was but a hundred and eighty strong in the field; after having sustained a heavy cannonade from three batteries for an hour and forty minutes, they charged the French gendarmerie, drawn up six deep to sustain the weight of the British horse. From the failure of the flank regiments of the brigade, of which the enemy promptly took advantage, the regiment was surrounded and overpowered, and forced to fight their way through the enemy, as the only means of preventing their total annihilation. In this charge the regiment

had fifty-six men and six officers killed and wounded, making nearly one-third of the whole.

For the remainder of the campaign the regiment did duty but as one squadron. Many had hitherto being the taunts and snouches which the two English regiments had thrown at the VIRGIN MARY'S GUARDS (for so the Blacks were termed for being mostly Roman Catholics), but from this period the tables were turned, and St. Patrick protected the honour of his countrymen. Having served in that engagement in the 33rd Regiment of Foot I had fortunately the opportunity of preserving the life of a French nobleman, and having occasion to fall in the rear of the line in order to protect my prisoner, I came immediately behind the Blacks and then saw an old veteran corporal, and half-a-dozen comrades, who had fought through the enemy and were literally covered with wounds; he addressed his companions with observing their wretched condition, that they had begun the day well, and hoped they would end it so, and collecting this small squadron of heroes, they recharged the thickest of the enemy and in a second of time not a man of the little band remained alive. Cornet Richardson, who carried a standard, received seven and thirty cuts and shots upon his body, and through his clothes, besides many on the standard, and being questioned how he managed to save the colours he observed (like a true Hibernian) 'that if the wood of the standard had not been made of iron it would have been cut off.' The regiment being provided with new standards the following winter, each cornet was presented with the particular standard he had himself carried as an honourable testimony of his good behaviour.

In 1745 the regiment was at the battle of Fontenoy, and on that field there was not a man or horse wanting of their full complement. One man indeed had been left behind at Brussels wounded in a duel, but there having been brought up to the regiment in a number of recruits one man more than was wanting the general had ordered him to be kept at his own expense till a vacancy should happen, so that in reality the regiment was by one man more than complete in its number. In this action there was a trooper in this regiment named Stephenson whose horse had been shot early in the morning. The regiment saw no more of him till the next evening till he joined them at Ath. The men of his troop insisted that he should give an account of himself; that he was unworthy of the regiment, and that he should not attempt to stay in the lines. Stephenson demanded a court-martial the next day; it sat, and the man being questioned what he had to say in his justification he produced Lieut. Izard of the Welsh Fusiliers, who declared that on the morning of the action the prisoner addressed him, told him that his horse had been killed, and requested to have the honour of carrying a firelock under his command in the grenadiers, which was complied with; that through the whole of that day's action he kept close by him, and he behaved with uncommon trepidity and conduct, and was one of the nine grenadiers that he brought off the field. Stephenson was restored to his troop with honour, and the next day the Duke presented him to a lieutenancy in the regiment in which he had behaved so well.


I returned with the regiment to Ireland in March 1747. From the time of their leaving Ireland there was never an instance of a man having deserted—there never was a man or horse belonging to it taken by the enemy, nor a man tried by a general court-martial. There were but six men who died a natural death; and there were *thirty-seven private men* promoted to commissions.

AFRICAN EXPLORATION AND THE MOTOR ENGINE

The climate of many parts of tropical Africa is so deadly to domestic animals that we find horses, sheep, oxen, and even the Asiatic elephant liable to succumb to a variety of diseases from which wild animals alone appear to enjoy immunity.

The value of the motor-car and motor-boat for strategical purposes in African warfare is well worth consideration, and this question has been brought to public notice by the important journeys through Africa of Paul Graetz, ober-leutnant of the German Army, who visited England early in the present year on return from his navigation of the Congo from its mouth to its source.

To show the advantage of the automobile over the usual methods of transport, it may be mentioned that Lieutenant Graetz made a record run by



motor-car, in German East Africa, from Kilimatinde to Tabora in two days, a distance which is usually covered by carriers in eighteen days.

During the years 1902-4 Paul Graetz was stationed with the Colonial force in German East Africa, and had the building of the motor road from Kilwa to Nyassa entrusted to his care. During the execution of this work he conceived the idea of travelling across Africa, especially German East and South-West Africa, in a motor-car, in order to test the limitations of automobiles for travelling in these parts. While he was seconded for service at the Military Academy at Berlin—1904-7—he prepared his expedition, which started from Dar-es-salaam in August 1907, and took 630 days to accomplish

the journey through German East Africa, across Lake Tanganyika, through North, North-West and Southern Rhodesia, the Transvaal, Kalahari Desert, and German South-West Africa.

When crossing the Chambesi River on this expedition, Paul Graetz decided to undertake a further expedition, to obtain geographical proof that this river is the true source of the Congo, by trying to reach the Chambesi from the east coast in a motor-boat, following the river's course through Northern Rhodesia, Lake Banguelo, the Luapula, Lake Mweru, the Luvua and Congo to the western ocean.

After starting in 1912, the expedition had to be temporarily abandoned, owing to a hunting accident with a buffalo, in which Graetz's companion was killed and himself wounded. He returned to Europe for a few weeks to complete his recovery, when he heard that the motor-boat he had left behind on the Luapula had sunk. With a new boat he completed the expedition, starting this time from the west coast and following the Congo as far as Kalonga, where he first stopped.

By this trip it is made evident that the Chambesi is the source of the Congo, which, consequently, must now be considered to be the longest river in Africa.

The question of exploration by airship is now engaging the energies of Paul Graetz and the interested attention of the British and German public.

APPOINTMENTS AND COMMANDS.

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to promote General Sir John Denton Pinkstone French, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., Aide-de-Camp General to the King, Colonel 19th (Q.A.O.R.) Hussars, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to the rank of Field-Marshal.

Colonel Simon the Lord Lovat, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., A.D.C. to the King, has been gazetted to the Honorary Colonelcy of the Lovat's Scouts Yeomanry.

Colonel Anthony A. Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, K.P., K.C.V.O., Brigade Commander, 1st South-Western Mounted Brigade, has been gazetted Honorary Colonel of the North Irish Horse, vice the late Right Hon. J. H. Duke of Abercorn, K.G., C.B.

Colonel H. C. Brown, who formerly commanded the 12th Lancers, has been appointed to succeed Colonel C. J. Briggs in command of the South-Eastern Mounted Brigade (East Kent, West Kent, and Sussex Yeomanry Regiment, with the Surrey Regiment attached).

Errata.

It is regretted that in the April issue there were several misprints in the article on 'Pig-Sticking,' by Major A. E. Wardrop—viz., 'tigers' for 'tiger,' 'pigs' for 'pig,' etc., etc.

MARMADUKE GEORGE NIXON
THE FATHER OF THE NEW ZEALAND CAVALRY

By COLONEL HENRY SLATER, V.D.

COLONEL NIXON'S military service in the Dominion covered about four years before he met a soldier's death, but, short as it was, he proved he possessed the qualities which make the true leader of men, and, whilst inculcating discipline in those under his command, he also gained their respect and affection. It has been truly said 'the greatest talent of a General is to secure obedience through the affection he inspires.'

Nixon was educated at Sandhurst. As a boy he was full of fun and 'devilment'—so much so that the authorities told his widowed mother she had better take him away, as he could never pass his examination. The lad, seeing her disappointment, begged hard for one more chance, which was given; and from that moment, long after lights were supposed to be extinguished, with a candle under his table (which he had covered over with his blanket to hide the light), he pursued his studies half the night through, the consequence being that he passed a brilliant examination, to the surprise of all who knew him. This anecdote is a proof of the lad's 'grit.'

Nixon obtained a commission in H.M. 39th Regiment, and served in the Gwalior campaign, being present at the Battle of Maharajpore on December 29, 1843, when Lord Gough finally broke the power of the Mahrattas. The victory was chiefly owing to the 39th Regiment and the 56th Bengal Native Infantry, who carried the main position at the point of the bayonet. Nixon must have been a young man on that day, but the 'devilment' of his early youth doubtless took him well to the front in the charge.

Having retired from the service with the rank of Major, Colonel Nixon in 1852 settled in New Zealand. At the first rumours of war with the Maoris in 1860, Colonel Nixon's neighbours naturally looked to him, a trained soldier, as their leader in any defence they might be called upon to make, while he on his part responded with all the energy and promptness of his character. He offered to raise a Cavalry corps for the defence of the settlers in the southern portion of the Auckland Province. This was accepted by the Government, and on April 5 the *Gazette* notified that Lieut.-Colonel M. G. Nixon was to be Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Cavalry Volunteers. This was the first notice of a Cavalry corps in a *New Zealand Gazette*.

Colonel Nixon threw himself energetically into his work, and soon selected the officers for the new corps. After-events proved his judgment in the selection was not wrong. On May 9, 1860, the *Gazette* announced James Walmsley was to be Captain, Howard Hutton Lieutenant, and Henry Hardington Cornet, in the Royal Cavalry Volunteers. The three did excellent service in the years to come. Captain Walmsley subsequently joined the Colonial Mounted Defence Force when it was formed in 1863, and rose to the rank of Major. Lieutenant Hutton served in all the events of the war up to 1865, when he retired with the rank of Captain, and shortly after left for the Cape, where he joined the Frontier Light Horse, with which he served with distinction. Cornet Hardington also served through the Maori War, becoming the senior officer of the Royal Cavalry Volunteers.

The new corps became popular; all the best men in the district interested themselves in its progress, and it inspired confidence in the minds of the country settlers and their families. The troopers, well mounted and drilled,

were soon in a high state of efficiency, 'proud of their corps and their Commanding Officer,' and 'under the truly gallant Colonel Nixon instituted a satisfactory surveillance over the outlying districts during a course of about two years.' On the arrival of Sir George Grey at the expiration of Colonel Gore Browne's term as Governor, Sir George disbanded the Royal Cavalry Volunteers 'from prudential considerations.' The corps does not appear to have taken part in the Taranaki campaign, 1861-62.

In 1863, when hostilities in the Waikato seemed inevitable, Colonel Nixon, who was a member of the House of Representatives, was entrusted by the Government to enrol a Cavalry force of a somewhat different character to the Royal Cavalry Volunteers, to be called 'Mounted Defence Force' of the colony. Many of the officers and men of the Volunteer Cavalry at once joined the new force, rather than be separated from their Commanding Officer, 'who at that moment was the most beloved, popular, and prominent man in the Auckland district.'

On July 14, 1863, the Royal Cavalry Volunteers was again formed, with Lieut.-Colonel Nixon as Lieutenant-Colonel, and Howard Hutton as Captain, and shortly after organised in three troops—namely, the Auckland, Howick, and Otahuhu.

The following extract from the Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1863, is worth recording: 'About the beginning of July Colonel Nixon was authorised by the Government to raise a troop of the Defence Force, and, owing to this gentleman's great energy and popularity, the troop was enrolled, mounted, armed, drilled, and the force on duty within three weeks from the date of the authority being given. The force has now been increased to a hundred, and they have had their full share of active duty. Colonel Nixon has also under his command four troops of Cavalry Volunteers, who take their regular share of duty, and have rendered good service as patrols in the suburban and country districts.'

In a dispatch, published in the *Gazette*, dated July 16, 1863, Colonel G. F. Murray, commanding troops at Drury, said, 'I cannot speak too highly of the promptness with which Colonel Nixon's force turned out, having only received orders at a very late hour of the night to join me at Papakura at 4 o'clock in the morning, as well as the orderly and efficient appearance under arms, which I think are due to Colonel Nixon to bring to the particular notice of the Lieutenant-General.'

The 'orderly and efficient appearance under arms' which gained the praise of Colonel Murray was no doubt in a great measure owing to the leaven in the ranks of officers and men of Nixon's old corps. On August 19, 1863, Lieut.-Colonel Nixon was gazetted Commandant in the Colonial Defence Force.

From the commencement of the Waikato War to the action at Rangiaohia 'Colonel Nixon may be said to have lived in his saddle, and no affair of any importance occurred at which he was not present.' Sir Charles Napier said an officer who commanded an outpost 'must be eternally on his horse; he should eat, drink, and sleep in his saddle; he has no right to comfort or to rest except when all is safe, and that can never be in the presence of an active enemy.' The nature of Colonel Nixon's duties in the war in which he was engaged demanded the vigilance required from an officer on outpost duty, and the Colonel fully realised this. It was said of Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, one of the finest leaders of Light Horse, that he 'was scarcely out of the saddle day or night' during the siege of Delhi. Ashby, who commanded 'Stonewall' Jackson's Cavalry in the Valley Campaign, was a man of the

same type as Nixon; and Hodson, who was 'the beau-ideal of a Captain of Light Horse,' was a man who 'thought little of riding seventy or eighty miles within the day along his picket lines.' Nixon, Hodson, and Ashby each possessed the power of stimulating devotion in their men, and each died a soldier's death. We have reason to be proud of the 'father of the New Zealand Cavalry' when his name can be worthily coupled with such leaders as Hodson and Ashby.

Lieut.-Colonel Thomas McDonnell, in his 'Incidents of the War,' relates that he and his friend von Tempsky (who afterwards fell at Te Ngutu-o-te-Manu) wished to obtain from Colonel Nixon permission to reconnoitre the rebel camp of Paparata, but for a long time he would have nothing of it, pleasantly remarking they were too valuable officers to lose. Eventually General Cameron gave them permission to start on their perilous enterprise. After some narrow escapes they returned on the fourth day with valuable information. They had been given up for lost, and on reaching headquarters, McDonnell says, 'our dear old Colonel (Nixon) was delighted to see us safe, and threw up his cap and cheered.' A small matter to record; but it gives an insight to Nixon's character, and how he gained the affection of his men. The Colonel's action was very human, and also the outward expression of the relief and joy he felt at the safe return of McDonnell and his friend; and this must have been of more value to them than any stiff official recognition. How different from Archdale Wilson's reception of Hodson when he returned with the King of Delhi a prisoner! McDonnell never forgot his Colonel's hearty greeting, and one is not surprised at his concluding words: 'Colonel Nixon, beloved by all who knew him, met his death wound some months after at the fight and taking of Rangiaohia, and the country sustained in him the loss of one of its bravest and best soldiers.' After this incident there remained a few more months of activity, but the day was fast approaching when the gallant soldier was to give his life for his country.

On Sunday, February 21, 1864, after a night march from Te Rore, at early dawn General Cameron with his force, consisting of the 65th and 79th Regiments, von Tempsky's Rangers, the Naval Brigade, the Mounted Defence Force, and Mounted Artillery, reached Te Awamutu. The Mounted Force was then sent forward to clear the enemy out of Rangiaohia. Having done so they returned to that village, taking prisoners on their way. Attention was drawn to a whare, near which a struggle was going on between Corporal Little, of the Mounted Defence Force, and a huge Maori. Little having secured his man, Corporal McHale was ordered to make prisoners of the Maoris inside who had been heard talking. McHale entered the hut, but was at once shot. At this moment McDonnell arrived and saw the dead corporal; then, to quote McDonnell, 'I quickly ran forward. The Colonel (Nixon) had only just come up with the others as I had appeared, and now requested Captain Walmsley and myself to come with him and charge the hut, a low slabbed whare, about five feet high, with sloping roof. The doorway we were going to charge could only have been entered in a stooping position. It was almost certain death, but I could not argue the point. I advised our Colonel to take off his scabbard, which he did, and we advanced, revolver in hand, round the corner of the hut, Nixon leading. A flash, a report, and our gallant and beloved Commander fell back in our arms. We carried him out of the line of fire, and laid him on the grass. I cannot describe the great sorrow felt.' And thus the 'father of the New Zealand Cavalry' met his death wound. Another writer said, 'His fate was more deeply felt and more sincerely mourned than that of any man who fell during

the war. The whole country was in mourning, proving more real sympathy than even the stone monument raised by the colony to his memory, and showing how deeply the settlers valued his unblemished character, his high military talents, and his fearless bravery.'

Colonel Nixon was accorded a public funeral, and a monument erected to his memory, which was unveiled by the Governor in 1866. On this occasion the three troops of the Colonel's old corps, the Royal Cavalry Volunteers, were present under the command of Captain Hardington.

Colonel Nixon's name appeared in the *Gazette* for the last time on April 6, 1864, when names were given of officers promoted for distinguished service in the field, among them being 'Lieutenant-Colonel Marmaduke George Nixon, of the Royal Cavalry Volunteers, and Commandant in the Colonial Defence Force, to be Colonel, February 21, 1864.' The same *Gazette* contained a dispatch from Major N. Butler, 57th Regiment, to Colonel H. Warre, commanding troops, in which the Major wrote, 'The Mounted Volunteers who accompanied me behaved throughout with their usual conspicuous courage and coolness.' How these words would have warmed the heart of the old Colonel!

On November 29, 1864, Major G. S. Whitmore (afterwards Major-General Sir G. S. Whitmore), when moving the Address in Reply in the House of Representatives, said, 'And having spoken of the Colonial Defence Force, he could not avoid mentioning the name of Colonel Nixon, whose fall in the performance of his duty excited so much sorrow throughout the colony. He was a very valuable member of the Legislature, and in every capacity, in fact—as an honourable, high-minded settler, or as an officer in the Army, or as a Commander of an Irregular Corps—in any position he was as perfect as one could wish to be. His name would not be forgotten in the colony. He was one of the great many distinguished officers and gallant spirits who had passed away during that lamentable struggle.' In 1865, by resolution of the House of Representatives, an allowance equal to the ordinary rate of a widow's pension was granted collectively to the two sisters of Colonel Nixon, commencing from May 28, 1864, the day after his death, in consideration of the Colonel's special service to the colony.

Surely the memory of so true a gentleman, brave soldier, and accomplished officer is worthy of being placed on record, not only to keep the memory of Marmaduke George Nixon green, but as an example for all time of a true soldier. To the Mounted Arm especially these notes should be of value, from the lessons they teach of the activity, regardless of personal care or comfort, which should be shown on service. And to officers of all arms there is a more important lesson—namely, the value of inspiring in those under their command that personal devotion which will lead their men to follow them for love as much as for duty.—*The New Zealand Military Journal*.

The Committee of the Imperial Services Exhibition, Earl's Court, have decided that all sailors and soldiers in uniform and all naval volunteers and Territorials in uniform shall be admitted to the Exhibition for half price, viz. 6d.

All boy scouts, boys belonging to various brigades and cadets in uniform, are to be admitted for 3d.

EXCERPT FROM MARSHAL MARMONT'S
'THE SPIRIT OF MILITARY INSTITUTIONS'

As to the Cavalry, correctly so named—Cavalry, that is, of the Line and Cuirassiers—I would make its armament lances and swords only half curved, suitable for the double use of thrusting and cutting, and a pistol. In each squadron there would be twenty breech-loading carbines.

I have elsewhere discussed the question of the lance; but in order to summarise the whole matter I will reproduce the arguments in favour of this arm, 'the queen of weapons,' as Marshal de Saxe named it.

I shall begin by remarking that it is quite unsuited for Light Cavalry, which, having to defend itself against several enemies of different kinds, must be provided with firearms and swords. However, in those countries into which Light Cavalry has been introduced as an exotic institution, the Light Cavalry has actually been given the lance. But we know how easily new customs are adopted; in the most civilised countries the example of authority ensures a blind confidence. No one investigates the origin or the circumstances which explained the origin of a custom; no one makes any allowance for essentially different conditions which cause the introduction of the custom to be faulty and unreasonable.

Thus whence comes the erroneous employment of the lance for the armament of Light Cavalry. It comes from the imitation of warlike tribesmen, like the Cossacks and Arabs, who inhabit plains where horses are abundant; they fight irregularly, each man for his own hand, and, without instruction or drill, become expert in wielding the lance. They have been classed as Light Cavalry, and hence Light Cavalry have been armed with a lance. But no one has investigated the origin of this arm, or why these tribesmen make such expert use of it. In an uncivilised country, where no industry has penetrated, where there are no manufactures or gun-shops, or wealth to buy arms from abroad, a mounted man wishing to arm himself cuts a long branch from a tree of light wood, sharpens a point on it, hardens it in the fire, and there's his lance! A little later he sticks a nail into the end of the pole; his weapon becomes more dangerous. Finally, the pole is furnished with a regular lance-point, such as has been adopted by regular troops.

It is not by choice that the Cossacks and Arabs arm themselves thus, but by necessity, and if they have become formidable by their skill in wielding the lance it is because from their infancy they have practised its use.

From their example there is no lesson to be drawn for Light Cavalry organised more particularly for service in a civilised country. The lance is the arm for the Cavalry of the Line, and especially for that required to engage Infantry. The sword cannot take its place: of what use are sabres to Cavalry if the men on foot stand firm and fearless? The trooper cannot sabre the foot-soldier; the bayonets keep the horse too far off. On the other hand, if the horse, which remains the only offensive weapon of the Cavalryman, is killed, he falls and makes a gap which the nearest Cavalry can pierce through. The encounter is, however, all in favour of the Infantry.

If, on the contrary, the same line of Cavalry is garnished with a row of spikes which protrude four feet in front of the horses, the chances of success will be reversed. But the sword is better suited to Light Cavalry than the lance. In single combat a short weapon is wielded more easily and gives more chances in attack than a long weapon. Other things being equal, it is certain that a single Hussar or a Chasseur will beat a Lancer. They have time to parry and return before the Lancer who has dashed at them has resumed the defensive.

The sword for Light Cavalry should be slightly curved; the absolutely straight sword does not lend itself so well to single combat.

The same troops will be also equipped with firearms, either to use in defence or to fire warning shots for those forces for which the Light Cavalry is carrying out the service of exploration and security.

As to the Cuirassiers, and all Cavalry of the Line, it would be best for them to have both the lance and the straight sword. The first rank would charge with the lance in rest; the second sword in hand. Once the shock has been given and the ranks been broken, the swords of the rear rank would do their work.

In the days of chivalry, frontal attacks were delivered, the onset was made straight forward: the long lance was then to be preferred. Hence the explanation of the use of the spear by the knights.

I will here cite an instance which in my opinion exemplifies the principle of the employment of the lance and the system by which great results may be gained by it.

In 1813, at the battle of Dresden, on the left of the Austrian Army our Cuirassiers had several times charged the Infantry, which was deserted by its Cavalry. The Infantry continued to resist and drove back our attacks, although the rain had made nearly all the muskets useless for firing. This resistance was only overcome by sending fifty Lancers to charge in front of the Cuirassiers; they were obtained from the escort of General La Tour-Maubourg. They pierced the line, and the Cuirassiers were enabled to charge through and annihilate the enemy. It must be allowed that very few shots were fired by the Infantry, but under any conditions there would have been no uncertainty as to the result if the Cuirassiers had only been armed with the formidable lance.

The lance is equally victorious in Cavalry engagements when line meets line and the enemy only has the sword. It is excellent at the moment of impact. It is also at its best in pursuit. To sum up, I feel justified in saying that for Cavalry of the Line the lance should be the principal weapon and the sword an auxiliary arm; that for light troops the armament should consist of swords and firearms. Doubtless 'red tape' and those who are adversely prejudiced will continue to oppose these principles, the truth of which appears to me to have been amply demonstrated.

During the absence of the Household Cavalry Regiments from London for the King's review at Windsor the King's guard in London was mounted by the 19th (Queen Alexandra's Own Royal) Hussars at Hounslow.

FOREIGN.

Austria-Hungary.—The effectives of the Austrian *Landwehr* Cavalry have been provisionally fixed at the following :—

For each squadron of Uhlans, six officers, eighty-five men, and seventy-eight horses.

For each squadron of Tyrolese or Dalmatian mounted Jägers, six officers, 118 men, and eighty-six horses. The strength of the dépôt squadron of each Uhlan regiment is laid down at four officers, fourteen men, and ten horses.

Belgium.—By Royal Decree of the 17th January of this year a remount dépôt has been ordered to be established at Brasschaet. It is to be used for acclimatising and breaking in young horses before issuing them to regiments, and to supply on mobilisation a reserve of saddle and draught horses sufficient for the replacements of equine casualties on service, and especially for completing units with horses on the outbreak of war. The remount dépôt is to be organised in four squadrons and will be in charge of a lieutenant-colonel; the staff will be composed of four captains, a paymaster, a sergeant-major, a quartermaster-sergeant, thirty-two sergeants, four trumpeters, 266 privates, and five orderlies. The dépôt is to be supplied with everything of the very latest pattern for the accommodation of 800 horses.

Germany.—This year Cavalry divisions are to be organised for manœuvres in the proportion of two each with the 4th and 10th Corps, and one each with the 7th, 14th, and 17th. The Division of the Cavalry of the Guard and the A Cavalry Division will be exercised at the camp at Alten Grabow, B and C Cavalry Divisions at Münster. During the last four days of the concentration these divisions will manœuvre under the orders of a director specially appointed. Cavalry Division D will be exercised at Senne, the last three days being devoted to work in combination with the other arms. E and F Cavalry Divisions will operate in the areas allotted to the 17th and 14th Corps for six days, working in combination for another four, and will also take part in the corps' manœuvres.

The composition of the Cavalry divisions will be as under :

Cavalry of the Guard : the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Guard Cavalry Brigades.

A Division : the 6th, 7th and 8th Brigades of Cavalry (of the 3rd and 4th Corps).

B Division : 3rd, 17th and 18th Brigades (of the 2nd and 9th Corps).

C Division : 13th, 14th and 19th Brigades (of the 7th and 10th Corps).

D Division : 15th, 22nd and 38th Brigades (of the 8th and 11th Corps).

E Division : 5th and 35th and Leib-Husaren Brigades (of the 3rd and 17th Corps).

F Division : 26th, 30th and 42nd Brigades (of the 13th, 15th and 21st Corps).

This reunion of twenty-one Cavalry brigades in seven divisions is claimed to be the most important Cavalry grouping ever realised in Germany.

A deputation consisting of Colonel von Baumbach, commanding the 3rd Prussian (Ziethen) Hussars, and Count Blücher, adjutant, recently waited on the Duke of Connaught at Clarence House and presented an autograph letter from the German Emperor to mark the Duke's silver jubilee as colonel-in-chief of the regiment.

Italy.—During this year two courses of instruction in Cavalry pioneering have been arranged for, in close proximity to the Cavalry school of Pignerola; every Cavalry regiment was directed to send to one or other of these courses three corporals, or privates, who were to receive an instruction precisely similar to that afforded to Infantry in these duties.

SPORTING NOTES

THE ETHICS OF BIG-GAME HUNTING

By MAJOR J. STEVENSON-HAMILTON, *late 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons*

UNTIL a comparatively recent date the pursuit of the great game of the world was, outside the settlers actually living in some of the countries in which it existed, confined to a relatively small number of persons mainly of British nationality. Locomotion was difficult and expensive, railways scarce, and huge areas of the globe had never been trodden by the foot of the white man. Firearms were imperfect. Not only were the native races entirely dependent upon primitive weapons, but they were, through intertribal conflicts and other factors, largely debarred from leaving their own particular areas, and these, when the inhabitants were not eaters of game meat, became accordingly so many sanctuaries for wild animals.

All that is now changed. Railways penetrate into the very heart of the African wilds, and a fortnight of luxurious travelling from London suffices to place a man in the midst of the finest game country of the present day. Firearms have become terribly deadly. A journey in the wilds is no longer beset by the hardships and dangers of earlier days. Indeed, if the sportsman elects to place himself under the wing of one or other of the outfitting firms which have sprung up in different parts of Africa his personal responsibility is mainly confined to the payment of the bill at the conclusion of his trip. Natives in many parts of the continent have acquired firearms, and, where the *Pax Britannica* reigns, are accustomed to move freely outside the limits of their respective tribal areas in a manner wholly unknown to their fathers.

Naturally the wild animals have suffered. Apart from those districts whence the settlers are steadily driving back and killing or have already exterminated the big game, almost everywhere in spite of regulations and sanctuaries there is a steady net drain on the fauna at the hands both of white hunters and of natives. When the rinderpest swept through Africa about twenty years ago this campaign had barely begun, and the animals subsequently had a chance to recover their status. No such chance would exist were another epidemic of similar magnitude to occur at the present time. In the old South African hunting days wild life was profusely and often wantonly squandered; but then it must have seemed as though no effort on the part of man could ever suffice materially to reduce the swarming hosts of the contemporary fauna. Writing of the vicinity of the Cape Colony, Transvaal border, in the year 1837 Colonel Cornwallis Harris remarks:

'I turned off in pursuit of a troop of gnus and presently came upon another, which was joined by a third still larger, then by a vast herd of zebras, and again by more gnus with sassabies and hartebeests pouring down from every quarter, until the landscape literally presented the appearance

D D

of a moving mass of game. Their incredible numbers so impeded their progress that I had no difficulty in closing with them, dismounting as opportunity offered, firing both barrels of my rifle into the retreating phalanx, and leaving the ground strewn with the slain. Still unsatisfied, I could not resist the temptation of mixing with the fugitives, loading and firing, until my jaded horse suddenly exhibited symptoms of distress and shortly afterwards was unable to move.'

Elsewhere the same writer describes the noise made by the hoofs of some 1,500 gnus and quaggas as 'comparable to nothing but the din of a tremendous charge of cavalry or the rushing of a mighty tempest.'

In the part of the country in which Colonel Harris witnessed these amazing sights and performed such prodigies of wanton and wasteful slaughter one might now seek fruitlessly for days for even one little duiker or steenbuck. Quaggas have been totally extinct for over thirty years, and the white-tailed gnus are preserved only on a few fenced farms, while last year the Cape Government returned the probable number of hartebeest existing in the whole Province at 9,700! I doubt if, even in parts of British East Africa where big game is now more numerous than anywhere else in the world, such a sight as that pictured above was ever seen, and yet muzzle-loaders held by a comparatively small number of settlers and sportsmen rendered the whole countryside bare of all wild life in about forty years.

It is, in fact, becoming more and more obvious that if it be desired to prolong the existence of the big game of Africa even within the limits of the present generation, a different spirit must animate many of those who pursue it. Regulations as to seasons and limitation of bags are excellent, and without them we should even now be bidding farewell to the last of the contemporary fauna, but something more is required. Big-game hunting is one of the most magnificent pursuits in the world, less as regards the actual killing of the animals than for the splendid training it affords to mind and body, and the complete change it offers from artificial conditions of civilised life to purely natural surroundings. Further, in the manner in which it develops character, teaches self-reliance, and imbues a man with confidence both in overcoming natural obstacles and in dealing with subject races, it has few equals and no superiors. If the big game goes the incentive to undertake such expeditions vanishes with it, and it would be difficult to over-estimate the greatness of the loss. Legitimate sport ought to be encouraged not only for the reasons given, but because if those who take a correct view of sport should tend to lose their interest in the wilds, their precept and example will be lost, and the killing of wild animals will become the monopoly of those who are actuated by motives of pecuniary gain.

The true sportsman is, indeed, the very bone and sinew of game preservation. He is the man to whom a 'bag limit' is of merely academic interest, for he seldom, if ever, cares to kill up to what the law permits. The soldier, from his teaching and traditions, ought to, and in fact does, stand right in the forefront of the real sportsman of the world. But, in addition to that self-restraint which he naturally imposes upon himself when brought face to face with wild animals in their natural state, the condition of things at the present day calls loudly upon him, in common with everyone else who has at heart the continued existence of the splendid game animals of the Empire, to become an active worker and proselytiser in the cause of true sport. Much can be done by example, even more by timely

insistence on the ethics of big-game hunting, not only upon novices, but upon those acquaintances of maturer experience, who may perhaps never have had the opportunity of learning of what true sport in relation to big game consists. Verbal and written boastings, bubbling over with complacency concerning various atrocities committed upon wild life, are unfortunately only too often heard or read; frequently, too, on the part of men who might have been reasonably expected to know better. But even the most grievous sinner may be capable of reformation! I believe, indeed, that more err through ignorance than from natural vice, and even in the most hardened game butcher there may yet lurk some saving grace, if only it be patiently sought out. The gospel of wild life protection is a comparatively new one, but it is one of which every true sportsman should regard it as a duty to become an active missionary. I may here interpolate that I am not much in love with the term 'sportsman' as applied to Africa, and use it only because none better offers itself. The word is, in fact, deteriorating, and has latterly come to include a great many people who are in truth quite the reverse of all it should imply. It should be rescued from falling into contempt, but at present the tendency is all the other way.

The Shikar Club has declared its leading object in the following terms:—
'To maintain the standard of sportsmanship. It is not swollen bags and squandered bullets which appeal to us. The test is rather in the love of mountains, forest and desert; on acquired knowledge of the habits of animals; the strenuous pursuit of a wary and dangerous quarry; in the instinct for a well-devised approach to a fair shooting distance; and in the patient retrieve of a wounded animal.'

The Camp Fire Club of America has among its excellent code of hunting ethics the following invaluable definition of true sport in relation to game:—

'In an ideal hunting trip the death of the quarry is only an incident, and by no means really necessary to a successful outing. The best hunter is the man who finds the most game, kills the least, and *leaves no wounded animals behind him.*'

While there are many men whose natural instincts require no stimulating upon these points, there exist others who, victims of ignorance, heedlessness, or mere lust of slaughter, stand in sore need of instruction or admonishment.

Various motives bring men to Africa. Of late years a certain type of sportsman has evolved who is induced to come less because he loves the life, or takes any special interest in the animals he proposes to pursue, than that he considers it to be the correct thing to do, or is impelled by the modern craze for change and new sources of excitement. The true call of the wild may or may not come to him later. In any case it is unfair to wild life that a complete novice, however excellent his intentions, should be turned loose, uncontrolled, and armed with a deadly modern rifle among herds of game. The novice, during his first hunting trip, ought always to be under the guidance of some friend of experience and of correct sporting instincts, who, among other necessary pieces of advice, will post him with the following maxims:—

Never shoot a female (if in doubt refrain altogether).

Never fire unless there seems a reasonable chance of killing with the first shot, which for a novice will not exceed 200 yards.

Never fire at animals on the move, except in the case of a wounded one making off.

Never fire when out of breath.

Never fire into the thick of a herd even when aiming at one particular animal, the bullet, even if truly directed, will very likely go through it and wound a female or a young one.

Never fail to follow up a wounded animal, no matter at how much personal inconvenience and discomfort.

The most favoured hunting grounds for the moment are the Sudan and British East Africa. In the latter the slaughter is going on apace, and the life of the game has, outside reserved areas, been estimated at another fifteen years. It took Nature rather longer to place it there! Probably its day as a big-game shooting-country will be over long before that period has expired. It is not so much the total number of animals actually brought to bag that makes for extermination—though the limit of 300 hoofed mammals on one licence seems an extravagant one—as the far larger number which escape to die sooner or later. For this we have mainly to blame modern small-bore rifles with unskilful or irresponsible men behind them.

Quite a number of people seem to consider it to be incumbent upon them to shoot right up to their bag limit, and are even at considerable pains to do so. It is often held that what the law does not expressly forbid must be right. The fact is that anyone who shoots an animal beyond the legitimate requirements of specimens or food, both of which ought to be very modest, is adding his little quota to the progressive annihilation of the wild animals of the country, and is destroying the sport and pleasure of those who will come after him. The practice of killing animals to feed native porters is universal, and though occasionally necessary, is frequently ludicrously overdone, and often forms a mere specious excuse for slaughter. Many native tribes do not eat game meat at all, and those who do are accustomed to consume it at home only at rare intervals.

When one or two specimens of the various species required have been secured the true sportsman should be satisfied. He need not be idle. He will find occupation of ever increasing attractiveness awaiting him in the photographing of wild animals in their natural surroundings, in the quiet observation and useful noting of their habits when they fancy themselves unobserved, and last, but not least, in the intensely interesting, and often exciting, work of hunting down the natural enemies of the game. With the exception of the elephant, the rhinoceros, and the buffalo, there are no ungulates whose pursuit involves the smallest risk to the hunter, while the difficulties of getting on terms with carnivorous animals are nearly always much greater. The latter are gifted with an intelligence far exceeding that of the animals upon which they prey, and, while understanding to the full every artifice of concealment and evasion, are often capable, when wounded, of providing as much excitement as the most ardent hunter can desire. There need be no fear of exterminating them so long as there is a sufficient number of animals left to satisfy their needs, and, so long as the sportsman employs fair means, he is entitled to all his skill can bring him.

To be really successful in hunting carnivora, however, I think it is necessary to confine the attention solely to their pursuit. Ordinary hunting parties, out for what they can see, seldom achieve much in this branch of sport. Lying up in his day lair, the lion or the leopard is quick to note the presence of anyone who happens to be shooting at antelopes anywhere in the neighbourhood, and he does not take long to make up his mind to a change of quarters. The casual hunter therefore seldom happens upon quarry of this description except by accident.

RECOLLECTIONS OF A SALMON MANIAC

(His wife was called the Fish-Widow)

BY 'THE WEAVER'

'Rivers and the inhabitants of the watery element were made for wise men to contemplate and fools to pass by without consideration.'—*The Compleat Angler*.

The Sparrow had promised to pick me up in his 'outside' at ten o'clock. Having duly attended to His Majesty's Affairs of State, which, as far as this morning's post was concerned, consisted of a bill for paraffin oil and some emotional platitudes by Those in Power on that perennial topic—whisper it respectfully—co-operation between the Various Arms, I reeled up my dried lines; then spent twenty minutes selecting some new flies and determined at the end that I still liked yesterday's best; collected biscuits and so on, and was just ready when The Sparrow's voice hailed me.

He brought news that the river had risen and that Micky Flaherty had seen any number of fish running up under Fermoy bridge yesterday. Good! Not much delayed by a general tendency of the local asses to roll in the high-road just in front of us, we whiled away the drive with some local gossip—or rather, I should say I did, for The Sparrow is decidedly more cautious with his tongue than he is when showing us the way over a country in that imitatively quiet manner of his.

He's an unusual sort of chap, The Sparrow! He's been my partner for years, and we have on more than one occasion rested our damp and weary bodies together by the riverside from 11 P.M. on, in the hope of catching fish at dawn next morning; but never, except in the instance that I shall relate, has he shown me that he possessed such things as 'nerves.' Always quiet, always courteous, absolutely devoid of 'side,' scarcely noticeable in the hunting field until hounds begin to run; he arouses respect, amusement, annoyance, or despair, amongst his acquaintances, according to their various sexes and characters.

Well, we arrived at the riverside, where the local herd—who, in consideration of a payment of a sovereign a year, prevents people (those he does not like and is not afraid of) from 'wetting a line' in our streams—assured us that 'we'd be apt to meet a salmon this morning as several had been afther throwing themselves, and one of sixteen pounds weight had been caught at —— yesterday.' We looked at the water, and, with the river in its present state,—i.e., the 'flats' more hopeful than the 'stream'—I mentally decided to go for the lower beat; we tossed, The Sparrow won, and I wandered up river looking for a morning's fruitless exercise.

There was a difficult breeze blowing, and the flat which offered the best chance of success in such water was much overgrown with brambles. I tried the top stream, then the flat between it and the next stream, and the next stream itself, with two flies, but without result. Then I put on a spoon, only to get fast on the bottom; I tried to wade across to get a different pull, but a nasty shifty bottom and a strong current gave an unpleasant sensation and, to tell the truth, I funked, and was glad to get off with the loss of only my spoon—generally it is the light-spinning line that breaks and you lose your trace too. While putting on another spoon, I thought I heard a shout and walked into the open whence I could see The Sparrow. It was no mistake! And as I ran painfully and slowly in my waders I could see a grand bend on his rod. It did not take long to learn that twice in

succession something had dived at his spoon, and the second time he'd got stuck in a fish, more than half-an-hour ago, but that he'd never seen it. The bank here is about twenty feet above the water, unpleasantly crumbly at the edge—a sheer precipice except for some very insecure lumps of soil at the bottom, remains of the winter's miniature landslips.

It is an impossible place to land anything but a completely played-out fish, and this fish showed no signs whatever of that condition. It was ten minutes more before we saw him and another twenty before I was kneeling near the water's edge, where the current passes round a comparatively quiet little bay about three feet six deep to-day. Once, twice, came the fish, all but up to the gaff; the second time I could have got him, but the stump I was hanging on to for grim death with my left hand gave, and I dared not make the effort. I'll get him next time, thought I, but—oh! that 'but,' just as I was making the move, the hold of the spoon on to the very centre of his back gave way, and he was gone. The Sparrow, high above me, and unable to see, so far forgot himself as to roar at me for gaffing the line; and, though an instant's consideration allowed him to become once more his usual undemonstrative self and to apologise for his rudeness, and though years have passed, I feel it in my bones that he still thinks I gaffed the line!

But all was not over yet, either with the day or even with this incident. For as we stood there in silent despair, I thought I saw a shimmer on the bottom through the somewhat coloured water.

Forgetful of the long day before us, I plunged in, above one corner of my waders too, and with The Sparrow hanging to my left hand I groped with my gaff along the bottom. Sure enough it touched something soft—a snatch—and I had him just threaded under the skin. I turned to get back through the water, long since muddy with the turmoil of the fray, dragging behind me the twenty odd pounds of glorious spring salmon—tripped over a boulder, fell head first in the river, and lost gaff and the new revived salmon together!

There really was nothing to be said, and having been so far successful as to retrieve my gaff, I slunk away up river again, finished putting on my spoon, and fished slowly down along the brambly bank, until close under my feet my bait was quietly but firmly snatched and taken out from the dead water into the current, which to-day was running well in the middle of the river. For a time I felt nothing but weight, but shortly there appeared a most murderous-looking head, one of the most ghoulisn objects I have ever seen. It belonged to a pike of nineteen-and-a-half pounds, to whom I would cheerfully have given my whole fishing equipment if he'd promised not to fly at me, like Mr. Briggs' pike, 'barking like a dog.' Anyway, I did the river a service by ridding it of that brute!

It was now time to change beats. The Sparrow saw me coming, and, after the way of mankind, we scrupulously avoided each other by the use of a patch of high furze, where I chanced this morning to put up a belated woodcock.

A fancy struck me to try a 'golden olive,' always a favourite fly of mine, of a size large enough to suit the considerable volume of very slightly coloured water that was coming down. I fished over the best of the long flat underneath the high bank (where we had had the morning's adventure) without event; quite at the bottom, a good 300 yards down, the bank juts out into a promontory, which will one day crumble away and precipitate some over-anxious angler into ten or twelve feet of water. Below the promon-

tory the whole current comes into our bank, leaving a wide deep flat on the other side, and above this narrow stream there is a thick copse coming right to the water's edge, so that the most one can do is to stand on the promontory and let one's line go down with the current under the wooded bank below. Even this requires some skill on account of an over-hanging ash tree which is the proud possessor of quite a nice collection of my flies and baits; also it is seldom that such methods meet with the rewards which they deserve.

But this morning I had my fly out as far as I intended and was working the point of my rod gently up and down, when sure enough I felt a sort of sucking sensation. Was it a fish? No! Yes, it was! and my line went in a stately manner into the flat beyond the current and up stream. The slack reeled up, the line was vertical from the point of my rod as the fish moved round the promontory into a big, wide, open bay above. Once there, whither I followed, negotiating a sort of Meath ditch *en route*, there was a couple of seconds pause, then a screech from my reel-sack as one hears but once in a season. Before you could think, almost, far away across the river and up stream a splendid bow of lilac silver shot up into the air! Well, this was an awkward place to land a fish unaided, if it came to that! but one looks ahead naturally, was my gaff all right? Goodness gracious where was it? I had left it lying on the ground where I had eaten my sandwich—at the upper beat! So I must do as The Sparrow did this morning and shout for help! I could see him half-a-mile up, wading in mid-stream; the morning whiskiness was gone from my voice, and, to my considerable astonishment, he heard me the first time and came to the sound of battle—but, as one would expect of him, at a dignified pace.

In the meantime my fish, which seemed to be hooked through the extreme point of the under jaw, was fighting as no other fish I'd ever felt. Over and over again across and back, round and round the bay he went, but never outside. Before I'd reeled up after each wild rush, he'd gone off on another! I knew this could not last very long, and The Sparrow was but a hundred yards off, when my fish dived furiously into the depths of the black hole immediately under the point of my rod, and line and fly came back to me with the hook straightened clean out! Can anyone explain why a hook should bend like this? And what could have happened down in that hole there? Of Life it has been said that Youth is a blunder, Middle Age a struggle, and Old Age a regret; did I blunder in the early moments of this incident? Was I guilty of 'baulking the end half-won for an instant dole of praise'—I mean was I too impatient for the capture? There can be no doubt of the struggle during the latter part of the time and as little doubt of the bitter regret which lasted some forty-eight hours—nay, even to this day!

Two days later, I got that fish! At least I hooked, on a shrimp, in exactly the same manner, and in the same place, a fish of similar size, who took the same course, and showed distinct signs of a puncture at the point of the under jaw. She weighed just under twenty pounds. Whether or not it was the fish I lost this afternoon, I don't think I shall ever again experience a feeling like that wild spasm of temptation to dive in where the fish had dived and either retrieve it or perish in the river's murky depths!

A record of failure, you say? Well, who is a fisherman, and an honest man as well, who will stand up and deny having had such experiences? And where would be the pleasure if we always met success? I, myself, own that I have travelled all over Ireland in pursuit of fish; but

I dare not acknowledge to myself how small has been the reward! At one hotel I saw in the book:—

Patience is the angler's virtue;
Imagination is his vice,
The boatman's last will surely hurt you—
Keep your first, if you'll be wise!

Still, many is the day that I have leant, palpitating with excitement and joy, over some shining trophy! Do you feel the weight, when you are carrying one, two, or even three such trophies home to an admiring household? Surely not! And, even if you do, think of the popularity which will be yours before so long. Why, you *may* even be allowed to bring a pal to lunch unexpectedly—until the larder is again empty of the fruits of your toil! And did ever anyone else's catch taste like your own?

With all its failures, this was a day to live in one's memory, and as I sit here in a dark office on a perfect fishing morning, harrying out the problem of how to make military bricks without straw, the map-decorated walls fade away and I am standing again with my cormorants, my herons, and my others, by the old Blackwater—I knew so well in all his moods—and with whom I spent those dreadful days when the world seemed so horribly empty. . . .

I don't know what it is that remains most vividly impressed on my mind—whether the long, low hillocks on the river's bank, broken by the two great rocks where the hawks had set up house, and backed by the heather-covered mountains to the south—or that combination so peculiar to Irish scenery, of vivid-green foreground, the palest blue sky, and much water. Almost every step along the bank has its history for me; here I'd got a right and left at duck on that bitter evening two years ago; there I'd slipped and plunged head over heels into the river amidst the plaudits of my family; this is where the kingfisher's nest was our first year; and this is where I got that great pull and saw a huge back following my fly, only to be caught by a minute trout! It was just at the point there, when I was learning to spin a Mallock reel, that my phantom was sucked in at 3.30 P.M. one cold March afternoon, and it was under the ash at the bottom that at 7.30 P.M., wet to the skin and tired out, alone and in pitch dark, I landed the first spring fish of the year.

Of course, not all days were like this—as I am only 'a man in a world of men'—I have fished from February 6 to April 10 without so much as a passing salute from a fresh fish.

Another day comes frequently to my mind. It was well on into the summer. Fishing had been bad, though I had surprised the neighbourhood by pulling out two nice little fish the previous day. Again this morning luck had been my way—my little 1½-inch-long shrimp had been sucked gently then gulped. I had had a wild ten minutes up and down the long high open bank before pulling in quite a minute little chap (6½ lbs.) to have made all that fuss! And I was resting after the struggle when I saw a peel jump in a somewhat unusual place, just where the cows drink. I went in and tried him but without success, and, coming out, met face to face, to my dismay, the local bull.

Not wishing to impede his stately progress to his tap-room, I walked up a side track and was exceedingly disgusted to see him turn round in the river only without waiting to drink and saunter up after me. Of course, I was in waders and much loaded up with rods and gaff and so on, and I turned left-handed through the gorse. But the further and faster I walked,

the further and faster he came after me, and it came to my mind that affairs were getting rather bumpy for me.

At this moment he came straight for me through some thorn trees, and I had but just time to slip round one and down into the river where I found a hole under an overhanging branch, in which I could crouch in water just up to my waist. The bull came to the edge above me, where, unable to see me though knowing I was there, and too impatient to move up a few yards to where I had run down, he remained pawing the ground, tossing any sticks and branches he could find, and calling aloud upon his father's gods to deliver the enemy into his hands. It was twenty minutes before anything further occurred and I was getting stiff as well as frightened when a chap came riding along the other bank. I attracted his attention and he shouted 'Sure and you're all right, he's gone.' This I knew from the tramplings going on over my head to be a lie, but it transpired that my equestrian friend referred to the water-bailiff, from whom he thought I was thus concealing my ample body. When he at last discovered it was the bull I was avoiding, he made haste to go and warn the local herd of the occurrence. And in another ten minutes I was safe, for a little girl of some eight or nine summers came down and shue'd the bull away.

'Let me live harmlessly, and near the brink.'

The Compleat Angler.

RACING

Favoured with fine weather and good going, the Aldershot Spring Races were a distinct success. Results:—

First Day.—The Bourley Selling Steeplechase: Mr. F. Marsham-Townsend's Sentry (Owner).

The Past and Present Military Handicap Steeplechase: Capt. F. Grenfell's Schwarmer (Mr. H. A. Brown), 1; Capt. G. Paynter's Jack Symons (Owner), 2.

The Tally-Ho! Maiden Hunters' Steeplechase: Capt. C. W. Banbury's Makeshift IV. (Owner), 1; Mr. Kenny's Prince Arthur (Mr. Phipps Hornby), 2. Eight ran.

Second Day.—The Aldershot Cup: Capt. C. W. Banbury's Lucky Lass (Owner), 1; Mr. F. Crossley's Signal Red (Owner), 2.

The Aldershot Command Hunters' Steeplechase: Capt. F. H. Sutton's Faugh-a-Ballagh (Owner), 1; Capt. H. M. Dillon's Union Jack (Owner), 2. Eight ran.

The Household Brigade races took place as usual at Hawthorn Hill in wretched weather. Despite this there were plenty of runners, and a large and fashionable crowd attended the meeting. Owing to the heavy going falls and refusals were numerous, and many favourites came to grief. Results:—

First Day.—The Royal Horse Guards' Regimental Race: Capt. Howard-Vyse's Chantrey (Owner). Seven ran.

The Grenadier Guards' Challenge Cup: Lord Gort's Peggy Royston (Owner). Six ran.

The 1st Life Guards' Challenge Cup: Mr. Wyndham's Red Knight II. (Lord Caledon). Five ran.

The Coldstream Plate Challenge Cup: Mr. Lambton's Suffolk (Owner). Nine ran.

The Household Brigade Cup : Mr. De Trafford's Red Stork (Owner). Two ran.

The 2nd Life Guards' Regimental Challenge Cup : Mr. Beaumont's Flying Start (Owner). Nine ran.

The Scots Guards' Challenge Cup : Capt. Paynter's Miss Patkin (Owner). Five ran.

Second Day.—The Household Brigade Selling Hurdle Race : Mr. Fenwick's Kilroe (Owner). Five ran.

The Open Military Selling Steeplechase : Mr. Harvey's Saturn (Owner). Thirteen ran.

The Household Brigade Handicap Steeplechase : Capt. Paynter's Jack Symons (Owner). Five ran.

The Household Brigade Hunters' Challenge Cup : Mr. Beckwith Smith's (1st Coldstream Guards), Dublin (Owner), 1; Mr. Lambton's (2nd Coldstream Guards), Suffolk, 2; Capt. Bentinck's (2nd Coldstream Guards), Gold Coin II., 3. Twenty-two ran. A good race won by a length.

The 2nd Coldstream Guards won this sporting race with 41 points, the 3rd Coldstream Guards being second with 37 points, and the 1st Life Guards third with 27 points.

Favoured with splendid weather, a huge gathering assembled for the Kildare and National Hunt Meeting at Punchestown this year. Huge fields and grand sport was witnessed. The racing commenced with twenty-three runners for the Tickell Challenge Cup, which was won by Mr. C. J. Wilson's Glide. Then came the Irish Maiden Military Hunters' Race, for which twenty ran. It was won by Sir J. H. B. Tichborne's (4th Hussars) All Gold (Mr. C. Blacker). The Kildare Hunt Cup was won by Capt. H. Dixon's Lord Charles, and the Drogheda Plate by Sir J. H. B. Tichborne's General Athel.

On the second day the Irish Grand Military, for which there were eleven runners, was carried off by Mr. Ramsden's (5th Lancers) Curiosity (Owner). Sir J. H. B. Tichborne's colours were again carried to victory in the National Hunt Cup on All Gold, ridden by Capt. Stokes (seventeen runners); and Capt. S. Cope took the Kildare Hunt Handicap with Mianna's Park.

This concluded a record Punchestown.

POINT-TO-POINT

The annual regimental races of the Cheshire Yeomanry were held at Waverton on the Eaton Estate of the Duke of Westminster. In the Inter-Regimental Race between the Cheshire Yeomanry and the Duke of Lancaster's Own Yeomanry, Major the Duke of Westminster's Rory O'More II. (Capt. H. A. Tomkinson up) finished first, Capt. C. Tomkinson's Redskin (Owner) second, and Lieut. J. B. Jarmay's Quarter Day (Owner) third. The Cheshires won by 61 points to 44. The Lancashire Hussars and Earl of Chester's Regimental Cups resulted as follows : Lieut. Jarmay's Rubicon (Owner), first; Capt. H. A. Tomkinson's Magpie III. (Owner), second; Capt. Talbot's Jess (Owner), third. The Yeomanry Cup race, open to Yeomanries in the Western Command, was won by Lieut. J. de Knoop's College Green (Owner). The Duke of Lancaster's Own Challenge Cup was won by Capt. Royds, and the Lancashire Hussars Regimental Cup by Capt. Talbot (Adjutant). Lady Mackinnon kindly presented the cups.

The Staff College Races took place at Braywood Farm, Hawthorn Hill, The Light-Weight Race, for which fifteen started, was won by Major E. Panet's (Royal Canadian Horse Artillery) Joyeux, and the Heavy-Weight Race by Capt. H. C. Jackson's (Bedfordshire Regiment) Milkman, from thirteen runners.

The 19th Hussars and Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry held their races at Kimblewick Farm in the South Oxfordshire country. Results :—

19th Hussars Light-Weight Race : Lieut. Lyon's Ardenville.
Heavy-Weights : Capt. Platt's Black Knight.
19th Hussars Subalterns' Cup : Lieut. Settle's Brodrick.
Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry Regimental Race : Capt. Dillon's Union Jack.

The 20th Hussars races were held at Layer-de-la-Hay, near Colchester. Results :—

Charger Race : Mr. Barnes's Lady Madcap (Owner).
Heavy-Weight Race : Mr. Silvertop's Kellar (Owner).
Soldiers' Race : Capt. Irvine's Glencarn (Owner).
Regimental Challenge Cup : Mr. Darling's Joan of Arc (Owner).

The 1st Cavalry Brigade Meeting took place at Lordland's Farm, Hawthorn Hill, on April 5. The sport was excellent, and witnessed by a large and fashionable crowd. Results :—

Queen's Bays Regimental Race.—Light-Weights : Mr. Watkins' Tommy (Owner). Heavy-Weights : Major Ing's Gamecock (Owner).

11th Hussars' Regimental Race.—Light-Weights : Mr. J. Ainsworth's (Owner). Heavy-Weights : Mr. J. G. Lowther's Tertius (Owner).

5th Dragoon Guards' Regimental Race.—Light-Weights : Capt. Partridge's Rush (Owner). Heavy-Weights : Mr. E. T. Nettlefold's Sambo II. (Owner).

1st Cavalry Brigade Subalterns' Cups.—5th Dragoon Guards : Mr. Lechmere's Lassy (Owner). 11th Hussars : Mr. Marshall's Ginger (Owner).

Capital sport was provided at the combined meeting of the Royal Scots Greys and York and Ainsty Hunt over a course of three and a half miles of good hunting country. Results :—

Members' Race : Capt. Malise Graham's Weathercock II. (Mr. Pigot-Moodie). Sixteen ran.

Grey Horse Race : Major Swetenham's Robert (Owner). Fourteen ran.

Open Sweepstakes : Mr. Wickham Boynton's Owbridge (Owner). Seventeen ran.

GOLF

The Service Clubs' Golf Competition was again won this year by the Naval and Military Club, who in the final beat the Army and Navy Club by nine matches to three.

THE ROYAL NAVAL AND MILITARY TOURNAMENT

This popular Tournament was opened in May by H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, and proved another record success. During its two and a half weeks' successful run the receipts totalled £2,000 more than in any previous year. The sailors' dog 'Toby' alone collected over £50. An innovation this year which gave general satisfaction was a series of events including driving, jumping, tent-pegging, &c., between the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge. The 'Varsities came out with great credit, the competitions were close and spirited, and Oxford won by three events to two.

On May 31 the King and Queen, accompanied by Princess Mary, visited the show, receiving an enthusiastic welcome. On this occasion the officers' jumping competition for the cup presented by the King took place. Colonel Kenna, V.C., won the first prize, Lieut. G. Brooke the second, and Lieut. Lawrence, V.C., the third. Their Majesties received the winners during the interval and presented the cups.

Sergeant Veysey, 18th Hussars, proved to be the best man-at-arms (mounted), and Squadron-Corporal-Major Grainger, 2nd Life Guards, the best man-at-arms (dismounted). The following is a list of the winners in the mounted competitions:—

MOUNTED COMPETITIONS

Officers

(1st prize, challenge cup value 30 gs. and cup value £10; 2nd, cup value £5; 3rd, cup value £2 10s.)

Sword *v.* Sword.—Lieut. M. Kennard, The Carabiniers, 1; Capt. R. Osborne, 20th Hussars, 2; Capt. R. Stewart-Richardson, 11th Hussars, 3.

Sword *v.* Lance.—Capt. C. Mangles, 20th Hussars, 1; Lieut. W. Micholls, 20th Hussars, 2; Lieut. W. Holderness, 2nd Life Guards, 3.

Tent-pegging.—Major D. Aherne, R.H.A., 1 (Challenge Cup value 50 gs.); Lieut. R. Grubb, 3rd Hussars, 2; Lieut. W. Holderness, 2nd Life Guards, 3.

Dummy-thrusting.—Capt. R. Osborne, 20th Hussars, 1; Capt. R. Stewart-Richardson, 11th Hussars, 2; Lieut. Lord Ebrington, Royal Scots Greys, 3.

Officers' Jumping Competition.—Colonel Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C., on Harmony, 1 (the King's Challenge Cup and £50); Lieut. G. Brooke, 16th Lancers, on Combined Training, 2 (£30); Lieut. T. Lawrence, V.C., 18th Hussars, on One, Two, Three, 3 (£20). Premium Prizes: Commandant, Cavalry School; Capt. F. W. Sopper, 18th Hussars; Lieut. G. Brooke, 16th Lancers; Capt. R. S. Hamilton-Grace, 13th Hussars; Major M. F. McTaggart, 5th Lancers.

Regular Army and Territorial Force

(1st prize, medal and 10 gs.; 2nd, 5 gs.; 3rd, 4 gs.; 4th, 3 gs.)

Sword *v.* Sword.—Trooper C. Turner, Royal Horse Guards, 1; S.S.M. A. Sturt, Cavalry School, 2; Lance-Corporal T. Clisby, A.S.C., 3; S.S.M. Langley, 19th Hussars, 4.

Sword *v.* Lance.—Sergeant-Major A. Webb, 7th Hussars, 1; Squadron-Corporal-Major Coggins, 1st Life Guards, 2; Sergeant Austin, 16th Lancers, 3; B.S.M. Lawrence, R.F.A., 4.

(1st prize, medal and 5 gs. ; 2nd, 2 gs. ; 3rd, 1 guinea ; 4th, a riding whip.)

Tent-pegging.—Sergeant Hatton, 20th Hussars, 1 ; C.S.M. L. Chambers, A.S.C., 2 ; Sergeant J. Elmer, 9th Lancers, 3 ; Sergeant Sibley, Lancer Depot, 4.

Dummy-thrusting.—S.S.M. A. Sturt, Cavalry School, 1 ; Corporal of Horse Ratcliffe, 1st Life Guards, 2 ; Squadron-Corporal-Major Coggins, 1st Life Guards, 3 ; B.S.M. J. Mann, Riding Establishment, R.A., 4.

Jumping Competition.—Cavalry School, 1 (medal and £3 to each man) ; 5th Lancers, 2 (£1 10s. to each man).

NAVY AND ARMY CHAMPIONSHIP

(1st prize, gold medal and 12 gs. ; 2nd, 10 gs. ; 3rd, 5 gs. Officers take cups in place of money.)

Foil *v.* Foil.—S.C.M. H. Grainger, 2nd Life Guards, 1 ; Corporal of Horse Moore, 2nd Life Guards, 2 ; Capt. R. Willoughby, 9th London Regiment, 3.

Sabre *v.* Sabre.—S.C.M. H. Grainger, 2nd Life Guards, 1 ; Lieut. E. Brookfield, R.N., 2 ; Sergeant-Major W. Palmer, A.G.S., 3.

Bayonet *v.* Bayonet.—Lance-Sergeant Randall, R.M.A., 1 ; Gunner F. Coleman, R.M.A., 2 ; Bombardier F. Durham, R.M.A., 3.

Sword *v.* Sword (Mounted).—B.S.M. J. Walker, R.H.A., 1 ; Trooper C. Turner, Royal Horse Guards, 2 ; Corporal of Horse Ratcliffe, 1st Life Guards, 3.

Sword *v.* Lance (Mounted).—Sergeant-Major A. Webb, 7th Hussars, 1 ; Sergeant J. Clark, Royal Scots Greys, 2 ; Capt. C. Mangles, 20th Hussars, 3.

Tent-pegging.—Sergeant C. Veysey, 18th Hussars, 1 ; Major D. Aherne, R.H.A., 2 ; Sergeant Hatton, 20th Hussars, 3.

Dummy-thrusting.—S.S.M. H. Kibler, 5th Lancers, 1 ; S.S.M. A. Sturt, Cavalry School, 2 ; Sergeant C. Veysey, 18th Hussars, 3.

HORSE SHOWS

Favoured by glorious weather, the popular Richmond Royal Horse Show attracted many thousands to the Old Deer Park. Queen Alexandra, accompanied by the Dowager Empress of Russia and Princess Victoria, visited the Show, and the Queen took a lively interest in the officers' jumping competition. The quality and quantity of the hunters exhibited were better than ever, the coaching teams above the average, and the jumping excellent. The Richmond Challenge Cup for hunters was awarded to Dondidier, the property of Capt. Laycock. In the four-in-hands for the Aldin Challenge Cup Mr. W. H. Moore repeated his triumph of 1910 with a grand team of bays, and Sir Lindsay Hogg's fine team of dark chestnuts gained the premier award in the event confined to members of the Coaching Club.

The Coronation Challenge Cup for jumping was won by Mr. F. W. Foster's Paddy.

The Officers' Jumping Competition was closely contested, the result being : Lieut. Thwaites' popular horse, Prussian Eagle, 1 ; Capt. F. Welwyn's (Royal Welsh Fusiliers) St. David, 2 ; Lieut. J. W. Aylmer's (4th Dragoon Guards) Turcoman, 3 ; Colonel the Hon. Adam Beck's Frontinac, 4.

THE INTERNATIONAL

This great Show at Olympia has again proved one of the most popular and best attended events of the year. The jumping was, as usual, the most attractive feature, and remarkable for the fine displays and friendly contests between the sporting officers of different nations. Our Army welcomes and looks forward to these annual visits of the splendid foreign horsemen, and many are becoming old friends. The jumping competition for King George's Cup was won for France by Baron de Meslome's champion mare, Amazone, with Capt. Paul Rodzanke's (Russia) Jilly second, and Lieut. Brignatt (France) third. The British officers did well. There was a gala performance on the occasion of the jumping for King Edward VII.'s Gold Cup. Their Majesties the King and Queen, accompanied by the Prince of Wales, Princess Victoria, and the Duke of Connaught, were present, and also the French President, M. Poincaré, with whom was M. Cambon, and received a great reception. Ambassadors, Ministers, and the Services were extremely well represented. There were seven contestants—Russia, France, England, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, and Canada. Russia led on the first round, with England second and France third, but, after many fine performances, the final result was a good win for Russia ($12\frac{1}{2}$ faults), with France second ($14\frac{1}{2}$ faults), and England third ($20\frac{1}{2}$ faults). Teams:—

Russia: Capt. D. d'Exe, Cuirassiers of the Guard (Argoust), Capt. Plechkoff, Cuirassiers of the Guard (Epire), and Capt. P. Rodzanke, Chevaliers Gardes (Jilly).

France: Lieut. de Meslome, 1st Cuirassiers (Amazone), Lieut. Brault, 1st Chasseurs (Neoline), and Lieut. A. Tenot, 26th Artillery (Jacobine).

England: Capt. M. Crawshay, 5th Dragoon Guards (Sue), Lieut. T. Lawrence, V.C., 18th Hussars (One, Two, Three), and Lieut. G. Brooke, 16th Lancers (Combined Training).

In the jumping competition for teams of two jumping abreast, Lieut. du Royde Bliquy's (Belgium) Magali and Lieut. Delvoie's (Belgium) Monette were first, with Miss Mona Dunn's Comet and Mr. F. W. Foster's Paddy third. The Cavalry School were fourth with Alice and Aliwal, ridden respectively by Lieut. G. Brooke and Lieut. Juler. Mention must be made of a really beautiful display of high-school and military riding, given by twelve lieutenants from the French Cavalry School at Saumur. This exhibition was a treat to witness, and was always received with thunderous applause. Another thrilling display was that given by the Arab horsemen.

Jumping for the Duke of Connaught's Cup, restricted to British officers, resulted in a tie between Capt. Stewart-Richardson's Clonsilla and Lieut. G. Brooke's Combined Training with only one fault each. In the run off Clonsilla won by making a faultless round. Third prize was also secured by Capt. Stewart-Richardson with Dan Leno, and Lieut. Bates, of the Canadian Army, on Lansdowne, was fourth.

ATHLETICS

At the Territorial Championship Meeting at Cardiff Pte. W. Applegarth, of the 12th Battalion London Regiment (The Rangers), established a world's record by running the 150 yards in 14 sec. Pte. Applegarth also equalled the British 100 yards' record by running it in 9 sec. Two grand performances.



THE RUSSIAN TEAM
WINNERS OF KING EDWARD'S CUP



18th (QMO) HUSSARS RIDE



LIEUT.-COL. A.A. KENNEDY'S
3rd (KQ) HUSSARS "CORONATION"



CAPT. R.M. STEWART-RICHARDSON
11th (PAO) HUSSARS ON "GLONSILLA"

THE INTERNATIONAL HORSE SHOW-OLYMPIA



15th (The King's) Hussars—Winners.

POLO - INTER-REGIMENTAL—FINAL.

(5th JULY, 1913.)

Lieut. General Sir Douglas Haig, K.C.I.E., K.C.V.O., C.B., presenting the Cup.



POLO

Twenty teams entered for this year's Inter-regimental Tournament.

First Round.—6th Dragoon Guards 10, 3rd Hussars 4, at Canterbury; 1st Life Guards 13, Coldstream Guards 5, at Ranelagh; Royal Horse Guards 5, 2nd Life Guards 2, at Ranelagh; Queen's Bays 8, 11th Hussars 3, at Aldershot; 5th Lancers 12, 4th Hussars 4, at Dublin; 20th Hussars beat 12th Lancers, at Colchester.

Second Round.—Queen's Bays 6, 5th Dragoon Guards 0, at Aldershot; 16th Lancers 5, 5th Lancers 3, at Dublin; 15th Hussars 14, King's Royal Rifles 2, at Aldershot; 1st Life Guards 9, Royal Horse Guards 3, at Datchet; 20th Hussars 8, 6th Dragoon Guards 3, at Hurlingham; byes, 9th Lancers and 2nd Dragoons.

Third Round.—4th Dragoon Guards 6, 9th Lancers 2, 20th Hussars 8, 1st Life Guards 7. A close struggle. Won after playing extra time. 15th Hussars 9, Queen's Bays 1, 16th Lancers 4, Royal Scots Greys 3.

SEMI-FINALS

20th Hussars v. 4th Dragoon Guards

This match took place in pleasant weather at Hurlingham on Tuesday, July 1, and was won by the 20th by six goals to one. The play was rather sticky at times and the game was a poor one. The 4th Dragoon Guards were not only out-pointed but also out-played. Capt. Hunter did his best, working hard and hitting well, but the members of the successful team were much quicker on the ball and more accurate in their hitting. The game took more of the nature of prolonged scrimmages than scientific polo, and neither side seemed to develop any combination, although there were some brilliant individual gallops. A remarkable feature of the game was the number of times the ball hit or was kicked by the ponies, but the ground was in anything but a good condition, which would account for the lack of science in the game, which was a rough and tumble affair from start to finish.

20th Hussars: Capt. J. S. Cawley, Capt. C. G. Mangles, Capt. F. B. Hurndall, and Mr. H. M. Soames (back).

4th Dragoon Guards: Capt. R. J. B. Oldrey, Capt. C. B. Hornby, Major G. B. Lamont, and Capt. C. F. Hunter (back).

15th Hussars v. 16th Lancers

Played at Hurlingham in good weather on Wednesday, July 2, the 15th Hussars winning by ten goals to three. It soon became apparent that the 15th were much the stronger team. Their hitting was harder than that of the 16th, and they had a greater variety of strokes. On the winning side Capt. Barrett and Bingham were seen to the best advantage, while Capt. Bellville was very good for the losers, working tremendously hard throughout. Towards the end of the second period a shot by Mr. Beech was turned in by Capt. Bellville, giving the Lancers the opening goal. In the third stage, however, the 15th simply rode through their opponents' defence, gaining five goals to one, while at the fourth interval they had advanced their lead to eight to two. Capt. Barrett, who brought off many clever strokes, obtained five goals, Capt. Bingham three, and Mr. Osborne two. The additional points for the Lancers were hit by Mr. Beech and Mr. Brooke.

15th Hussars : Mr. B. Osborne, Capt. the Hon. D. J. Y. Bingham, Capt. F. W. Barrett, and Mr. M. A. Muir (back).

16th Lancers : Mr. R. A. J. Beech, Mr. G. F. H. Brooke, Capt. G. E. Bellville, and Major C. L. K. Campbell (back).

FINAL

15th Hussars v. 20th Hussars

This match was played at Hurlingham on July 5 in dull and showery weather and won by the 15th Hussars by 12 goals to 3. At the commencement of the match it was very evident that the 15th Hussars were the stronger team, and during the first period they hit three goals. There was no score in the second period, but the 15th Hussars in the third obtained three more goals, while at the end of the fourth the board read 7—0 in their favour. During the fifth period the 20th Hussars gained their first goal by a long drive by Capt. Cawley, but the 15th Hussars still had the best of it, and finally won a most decisive victory. Their last goal was the result of a fine near-side backhander by Capt. Barrett. Capt. Bingham hit no fewer than eight goals for the 15th Hussars, and his performance throughout the match was worthy of all praise. Capt. Barrett's play throughout was brilliant; added to ripe experience and great natural ability he was seldom at fault and combined admirable boldness with caution.

Teams.—15th Hussars : Mr. B. Osborne, Capt. the Hon. J. D. Y. Bingham, Capt. F. W. Barrett, and Mr. M. A. Muir (back).

20th Hussars : Capt. J. S. Cawley, Capt. C. G. Mangles, Capt. F. B. Hurndall, and Mr. H. M. Soames (back).

The Cavalry School Polo Club's second annual Spring Tournament for teams not totalling more than sixteen points secured an entry of eight teams. Three teams represented the 9th Lancers, one being captained by Lieut.-Colonel D. G. M. Campbell; the 4th Dragoon Guards team was led by Lieut.-Colonel R. L. Mullens; and the Abingdon House team by Colonel John Vaughan, the Cavalry School Commandant. A fine game took place for the final between the 9th Lancers 'C' team and the 4th Dragoon Guards, the former winning by two goals. Teams:—

9th Lancers 'C' (13 points, six goals) : Mr. Whitehead, Capt. Lucas-Tooth, Mr. Phipps-Hornby, and Mr. Peek (back).

4th Dragoon Guards (12 points, four goals) : Capt. Oldrey, Capt. Hornby, Mr. C. Hornby, and Lieut.-Colonel Mullens (back).

THE CHAMPION CUP

The Quidnuncs won the Champion Cup, defeating the Woodpeckers in the final at Hurlingham by five goals to four. Teams:—

Quidnuncs : Duke of Penaranda, Capt. S. W. S. Palmes, Capt. H. A. Tomkinson, and Capt. F. W. Barrett.

Woodpeckers : Capt. H. Wilson, Lord Dalmeny, Capt. H. Lloyd, and Lord Rocksavage.

The match was, as usual, a fine one of good polo.

Aldershot Day at Ranelagh was, as usual, a popular fixture. For the Aldershot Challenge Cup eight teams competed. The final was between the 15th Hussars and Queen's Bays (+2), the former winning by seven to five.

ABROAD

Five teams entered for the Indian Inter-regimental Tournament, played at Meerut. In the semi-finals the 17th Lancers defeated the Inniskilling Dragoons by nine goals to three, and the King's Dragoon Guards beat the 8th Hussars by nine goals to three. In the final between the 17th Lancers and the King's Dragoon Guards the former were victorious by sixteen goals to four. Teams:—

17th Lancers: Capt. Melvill, Mr. Turnor, Capt. Lockett, and Mr. Boles (back).

King's Dragoon Guards: Capt. Rasbotham, Mr. Hawkins, Mr. Hatfeild, and Major Wickham (back).

Lady Creagh presented the cup, and the Commander-in-Chief made a speech encouraging polo as a soldiers' game.

The Indian Cavalry Tournament was played at Delhi, with the record number of nineteen teams competing. In the final the 18th Lancers defeated the 17th Cavalry by three goals to one. Teams:—

18th Lancers: Lieut. Railston, Lieut.-Colonel Maxwell, Capt. Gwatkin, Capt. Mills (back).

17th Cavalry: Capt. Kirkwood, Capt. Wilson, Major Henderson, Lieut. Atkinson (back).

HURLINGHAM AND THE COUNTY POLO ASSOCIATION

The following is a copy of the reply of the Hurlingham Club Committee to the letter of the County Polo Association, dated May 15 last, and which was published soon afterwards:—

May 31, 1913.

SIR,—I am desired by the Committee of the Hurlingham Club to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th inst.

My Committee notice with surprise that the Association makes no reference to the rescission of the rule which required delegates serving on the Polo Committee to be members of the Hurlingham Club, which the Committee looked upon as the principal objection of the C.P.A. to the present *régime*. My Committee expect to receive in due course replies on this point from the representatives of the Army in India, of the Dominions, and of the Crown Colonies.

With regard to the request embodied in the concluding paragraph of your letter, I am desired to inform you that the Committee of Hurlingham have in contemplation the development of the present Polo Committee into a Committee to be responsible for the entire legislation of the game, with the proviso that its recommendations be endorsed by a majority—which it is proposed shall be two-thirds—of a general meeting of the Hurlingham Club. The procedure of the M.C.C. in regard to legislation for cricket will thus be exactly followed.

My Committee intend the functions of the Hurlingham Polo Committee to be strictly legislative, without power to interfere with, or encroach upon, the vested interests, existing or to accrue, of any polo body or club. They desire specially to emphasise this point with a view to obviate the possibility of any misunderstanding or friction in the future.

Yours faithfully,

F. EGERTON GREEN, Major, Manager.

W. S. Buckmaster, Esq.,
President, County Polo Association,
12 Hanover Square, W.

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AMERICA v. ENGLAND

The great polo contest between America and England at Meadowbrook has again resulted in a fine victory for America by a narrow margin. The second game was probably the finest polo match ever witnessed, and most thrilling. Congratulations to the Americans on their magnificent play, and to our own representatives on their splendid efforts to regain the cup. Thanks are due to the Duke of Westminster for his patriotic endeavours on England's behalf. In the first match the Americans started off with impetuous dash, securing no less than three goals in the first chukker, and finally winning by $5\frac{1}{2}$ to 3. Teams:—

America: Mr. L. Waterbury, Mr. J. M. Waterbury, Mr. H. Payne Whitney (captain), Mr. D. Milburn (back).

England: Capt. Leslie Cheape, Capt. Noel Edwards, Capt. R. G. Ritson (captain), Capt. Vivian Lockett.

Towards the end of the game Mr. Monte Waterbury had the misfortune to sustain a fractured finger from a blow, and Mr. L. Stoddard took his place.

In the second historical match the teams were the same, with the exception that Mr. F. M. Freake took the place of Capt. Noel Edwards, and Mr. L. Stoddard again played for Mr. M. Waterbury. On this occasion England launched the attack and gained the first goal, but, after a neck-and-neck struggle all through, the game ended five goals all; but, owing to penalties allowed under the American rules, the result was a win for America by $4\frac{1}{2}$ goals to $4\frac{1}{4}$. This being the second game of the rubber of three, America retains the polo championship of the world. England's misfortune lay in the fact that her team was unavoidably short of practice together in fast games, owing to the officers composing it coming from different regiments, mostly in India, and, owing to bad weather, travelling, &c., the small opportunity of getting their combination previous to the first match. This was previously pointed out by Capt. Ritson.

FOOTBALL

ARMY F.A. ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

Colonel R. E. Cooper (Royal Artillery) presided at the annual general meeting of the Army F.A. at the Union Jack Club, Waterloo Road, S.E.

Major R. McCalmont (Irish Guards) having decided to resign the position of Honorary Secretary, Captain R. J. Kentish (87th Royal Irish Fusiliers) was provisionally appointed to the office, correspondence for the present to be addressed to the Union Jack Club as heretofore.

The Honorary Secretary proposed, and it was agreed, that Rule 5 (Section C) of the Association should read: 'Each unit entitled, when at home, to enter a team for the Army Competition, may send one representative to a general meeting, and each unit represented to have a vote at a meeting.'

A proposal by the Honorary Secretary to alter the second sentence in Army Cup Rule 17 (Section A) to read, 'Any soldier playing for or training with a professional team shall be ineligible to compete in the Army Cup Competition,' was agreed to.

A committee meeting was held prior to the annual general meeting, Lord Crichton presiding. It was announced that the 1st Battalion the Queen's Regiment, who have been playing in A.F.A. football, had been reinstated on the understanding that they stick to the Football Association.

CRICKET

The annual match at Lord's between the Navy and the Army resulted in a good win for the latter. In the first innings the Army scored 255 and the Navy 103. The latter, following on, made 171, and then the Army, with only twenty runs to win, knocked them off without the loss of a wicket. Captain Fowke, Gordon Highlanders, played a fine innings of 113 for the Army. It is a pity that this match should be fixed to take place at Lord's on Derby Day, as the attendance is naturally poor, and it ought to be one of the most popular events of the season.

THE ARMY

Capt. G. H. S. Fowke, b Sinclair	113
Lieut. D. C. Robinson, c Abercombie, b Leach	0
Major A. J. Turner, c Cantrell, b Leach	0
Capt. H. H. C. Baird, c Leach, b Cantrell	23
Capt. F. T. D. Wilson, c Boyd, b Leach	29
Major E. L. Challenor, b Abercombie	21
Capt. T. C. Spring not out	26
Capt. H. W. M. Yates, c Abercombie, b Sinclair	0
Major H. B. Fawcus, c and b Abercombie	16
Capt. F. J. C. Wyatt, b Abercombie	0
Lieut. A. G. Cowie, l.b.w., b Cantrell	1
Byes 21, l-b 4, w 1.	26

Total 255

In the second innings of the Army Major A. J. Turner scored (not out) 6; Capt. H. W. M. Yates (not out) 6; byes, 8; total, 20.

THE NAVY

1st Inn.		2nd Inn.	
Lieut. G. C. Harrison, c Challenor, b Fawcus ..	9	l.b.w., b Wyatt	17
Asst.-Paymaster C. Williams, c Wilson, b Wyatt ..	30	c Challenor, b Baird	21
Commander J. B. Sparks, c Robinson, b Wyatt ..	13	st Robinson, b Fawcus	4
Asst.-Paymaster E. B. Elstob, b Wyatt	8	st Robinson, b Baird	14
Capt. A. S. Cantrell, b Wilson	3	c Baird, b Wyatt	28
Lieut. C. H. Abercombie, b Fawcus	15	l.b.w., b Cowie	1
Lieut. W. R. R. Leach, c Yates, b Wyatt	1	c Challenor, b Wyatt	12
Lieut. J. L. Boyd not out	10	c Challenor, b Fawcus	9
Engineer-Lieut. J. M. Murray, b Fawcus	0	b Fawcus	29
Lieut. E. W. Sinclair, b Fawcus	0	c and b Fawcus	19
Capt. A. C. Barnby, b Fawcus	0	not out	1
Byes 12, l-b 2	14	Byes 8, l-b 6, n-b 2	16
Total	103	Total	171

PIG-STICKING

There was a large entry for the Kadir Cup, there being thirty rounds for the first heat. The three left in the final were Lieut. J. R. V. Sherston (11th Lancers), on Magistrate; Capt. D. G. Bromilow (14th Lancers), on Battleaxe; and Lieut. C. C. Gray (3rd Horse), on Audacity. All got away to an excellent start, and Sherston speared a good boar before he had gone 300 yards. The Hog Hunters' Cup was run in a fog, and half of the twelve starters lost their way. Capt. E. Corbould Warren's (81st Battery R.F.A.) Ballycar was the winner. The Pony Hunters' Cup was won by Lieut. H. O. Curtis's (4th King's Royal Rifles) Sir John.

THE MUTTRA CUP

This sporting competition is a new inauguration in pig-sticking which promises to become a most popular event. The cup has been presented by the officers of the Inniskilling Dragoons, the conditions being that first spears do not count, the death of the pig being the object. It is open to heats of three from any recognised Tent Club, Regiment, or Garrison; six horses per heat, which must be *bona fide* the property of members of the heat, to be allowed. The heat which kills the most pig in the aggregate runs to be the winners.

The following heats competed in this year's competition, viz.: 17th Cavalry, 6th Brigade R.F.A., 2nd Lancers, Inniskillings 'C,' Inniskillings 'A,' 'R' Battery R.H.A., Inniskillings 'B,' 13th Hussars. They ran alternately in the above order, and after three grand days' sport the result was: 'R' Battery R.H.A., 7 pig; Inniskillings 'A,' 13th Hussars, and 6th Brigade R.F.A., 5 pig each; 2nd Lancers, 4 pig; 17th Cavalry, Inniskillings 'B,' and Inniskillings 'C,' 3 pig each. Each heat had seven runs, and the total bag for the competition was thirty-five pig killed.

The winning team, the 'R' Battery R.H.A., consisted of Colonel White, Captain Paynter, and Mr. Bolitho. The Inniskillings 'A' team was Major-General M. F. Rimington, with his son, Mr. R. Rimington, and Major Ewing Paterson.

'HURRAH! HURRAH! ONE BUMPER MORE!'

Fill the goblet to the brim,
Fill with me and drink to him
Who the mountain sport pursues,
Speed the boar where'er he chose.

Hurrah! Hurrah! One bumper more!
A bumper to the bristly boar.

Hark! the beater's shout on high.
Hark! the sportsman's shrill reply.
Echo leaps from hill to hill;
There the chase is challenged still.

Hurrah! Hurrah! One bumper more!
A bumper to the bristly boar.

Ride—for now the sounder breaks.
Ride—where'er the grey boar takes.
Struggle through the desperate chase
Fearless, death itself to face.

Hurrah! Hurrah! One bumper more!
A bumper to the bristly boar.

See, the jungle verge is won.
See, the grey boar dashing on.
Bold and brave ones now are nigh—
See him stagger, charge, and die!

Hurrah! Hurrah! One bumper more!
A bumper to the bristly boar.

O. S. M.

October 1830.

'S. Y. S.'



THE MEETING OF BLÜCHER AND WELLINGTON.

—
WATERLOO.
(June 18th, 1815.)

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

OCTOBER 1913

FIELD-MARSHAL PRINCE BLUCHER OF WAHLSTATT

By COLONEL H. C. WYLLY, C.B.

GEBHARDT LEBERECHT VON BLUCHER, the subject of this brief memoir, was born on December 16, 1742, at Rostock, in Mecklenburg-Schwerin, the youngest of six brothers; his father, a cadet of an old and noble family, being at the time a captain of dragoons in the service of the Elector of Hesse-Cassel.

During the Seven Years' War young Blücher's parents sent him as a boy of twelve to the safe keeping of their son-in-law, who was then living in the island of Rügen, as being a place more removed than was any part of their own duchy from the horrors of the war then raging in Germany. At this period four of Blücher's elder brothers were serving in the Prussian, Russian, and Swedish armies, and it happened that there was then quartered in the island of Rügen a regiment of Swedish Hussars, and Blücher could not rest until he had been permitted to join this regiment as a cadet. Sweden was now at war with Prussia, and it is a curious coincidence that young Blücher should have drawn his sword for the first time in action upon an enemy against the very regiment of Prussian Hussars which he was afterwards to command and which is to this day named after him.

The Black Hussars, then known after their colonel as Bellings Husaren, had only been raised in January 1758, but had already at this date—August 1760—seen much service and won no inconsiderable share of distinction at Eger, Freiberg, Basberg, Hochkirch, Löbau,

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and Kunersdorf; but in the action at Kavelpass in Mecklenburg the Black Hussars were immediately opposed to the Swedish regiment in which young Blücher was serving, and, his horse having been shot under him, he was taken prisoner by one of the Black Hussars, whose name is variably given as Martin Krause or Gottfried Landeck. Blücher remained a prisoner for considerably more than a year, the Prussian colonel, who had taken a great fancy to him, repeatedly endeavouring to persuade him to enter the service of Frederick. To all these overtures, however, young Blücher made answer that having taken an oath of allegiance to the King of Sweden, he could not enter the Prussian Service until formally dismissed from the Swedish. In the course of time a final discharge was received for him, and Blücher was promoted to a lieutenancy in the Black Hussars, which had become vacant by the death of an officer in action. With this regiment he remained until 1772, having risen at that date to the rank of captain; but the then commanding officer was not so favourably disposed towards Blücher as had been his predecessors, and when a majority in the corps fell vacant, Blücher had the mortification of seeing a junior promoted to it over his head. Blücher now addressed a complaint to King Frederick, requesting permission to resign rather than to endure supersession, his application meeting the laconic reply — ‘Captain Blücher has leave to resign and may go to the devil as soon as he pleases!’

Blücher consequently left the Prussian service, married a Fräulein von Mehling, and settled down for fifteen years to farm an estate belonging to his father-in-law.

Upon the death of Frederick the Great, Frederick William II. restored Blücher in 1787 to the Prussian army, and appointed him major in his former regiment. He soon rose to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and within a year to that of colonel, while in 1789 he was granted the Order *Pour le Mérite*. During his temporary retirement from the army Blücher’s first wife, who had borne him three children—two sons and a daughter—had died, and he had married, for the second time, the daughter of a Herr von Colomb.

Blücher’s first experience of war in 1760 had not been altogether fortunate, and this was followed by a third of a century of peace, for it does not appear to have been until 1793 that he was again to see active service. In that year Blücher, at the head of the Black Hussars,

was attached to the corps which, under General Prince Hohenlohe, was to open the campaign against the French, and at Orchies and Luxembourg, and in the campaign of the year following at Morsheim, Kaiserslautern, and Kirrweiler, Blücher distinguished himself by his skill, caution, and valour, by the address with which he checked the depredations and incursions of the French Light Cavalry, and by the opportuneness and brilliancy of his charges in more serious actions. The regiment under his command captured at Weidenthal, Kirrweiler, and Edelsheim nine pieces of artillery, two howitzers, and five stand of colours, with upwards of 3,500 prisoners; at Kaiserslautern it made an extraordinarily successful attack upon an enemy six times its own strength; while during the whole campaign the Black Hussars are said to have not lost more than six men as prisoners. At the close of the war Blücher was raised to the rank of major-general; in 1801 he was promoted lieutenant-general; and shortly afterwards he was appointed Governor of Münster.

Blücher had now tasted the joys of success; in the years that followed he was to drink the dregs of the cup of disaster and humiliation. In the campaign of 1806 he was at first entrusted with the command of the right wing, and while the day was being lost at Jena, he was doing what man could to save it at Auerstädt. The morning of October 14 broke in fog—dense, impenetrable—and Blücher, now commanding the advanced Cavalry, was moving cautiously forward to reconnoitre with the advance guard of 600 mounted men, when he stumbled upon a small party of the French led by Davout's aide-de-camp. This was at once driven back, but was then reinforced, and Blücher, ejected from the village of Hassenhausen which he had seized, and the possession of which was for the French of the first importance, led charge upon charge to break the French defence. The Prussian Cavalry was badly shaken by the musketry of the French squares, and by the fire of its own artillery from which it had unfortunately suffered; Friant's division was rapidly approaching; Blücher's horse was shot under him; and, thus discouraged, the Prussian squadrons broke and fled rearwards, Blücher, now remounted upon the horse of a trumpeter, following shouting behind them, and vainly endeavouring to stay the panic and reform the squadrons.

Some few of these were rallied and took part in the later charges led

by Prince William; some again helped to cover the retreat which never denegated into the rout of Jena, but which finally ended with the capitulation at Ratkau. More than once did Blücher turn upon his pursuers—notably at Lychen—and of his regiment it is recorded by von der Goltz that ‘not one man passed the Rhine; little by little they reassembled under the Prussian Colours.’ And Lettow-Vorbeck tells us that ‘three brave sergeant-majors of the regiment succeeded in getting 300 of the men through to the province of Prussia in a closed body, in reward for which the King made them officers.’ Moreover, in that terrible retreat there was cemented between Blücher and Scharnhorst a bond of friendship and mutual confidence, which in the future was to work so powerfully for the regeneration of the Prussian arms.

Blücher was eventually exchanged with Marshal Victor, and after the Peace of Tilsit was appointed Military Governor of Pomerania.

The army of Prussia had disbanded itself utterly during its retreat; the German strongholds had fallen disgracefully, the one after the other; the whole kingdom was conquered and enchained; and by the terms of the Peace of Tilsit the strength of the Prussian army was limited, and even the proportion of the different arms was prescribed and dictated by the conqueror. But with Napoleon’s defeat in Russia in 1812 there came a national uprising in Germany, and the Convention of Kalisch, signed by the rulers of Russia and of Prussia, led in 1813 to the establishment of what is known as the Sixth Coalition, under which England, Russia, Prussia, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, and Austria were by the middle of that year ranged against France and the Confederation of the Rhine.

When the new campaign opened Blücher was given the command of the army of Silesia, numbering, with a Russian contingent, nearly 40,000 men. Napoleon, having by extraordinary exertions, created a practically new army of 200,000 conscripts, was advancing on Leipzig, and the allies—Wittgenstein on the right, Blücher in the centre, and Miloradovitch on the left—were moving forward to meet him. This led to the battle of Lützen, or Gross-Görschen, where the allies, trying to envelop Ney, were themselves enveloped and fell back upon Berlin and Dresden, Napoleon failing, owing to his weakness in cavalry, to turn his victory to full account. Blücher and Wittgenstein took up a strong position near Bautzen, where on May 20 they

were attacked, by the evening Bautzen being in the hands of the French. The allies—Blücher on the right—fell back during the night to a second position in which they were again assailed on the morning of the 21st, and Blücher was at one time in imminent peril of being attacked in front by Bertrand, while Ney had established himself in his rear. Ney, however, in doubt as to what was happening in front, hesitated to push home his advantage, and though the position of the allies was carried, they succeeded in retiring in good order on the Oder, the Emperor once again failing, owing to the fatigue of his



young conscripts and his weakness in cavalry, to secure a decisive success. It was during this retreat that the genius of Blücher prepared for his pursuers the celebrated ambush at Haynau, whereby the French advance was checked, and the allied cavalry captured many guns and covered themselves with glory.

Napoleon now offered an armistice which was accepted, and which was eventually extended to the middle of August, and during which negotiations for a general peace were actively conducted. These, however, came to an end owing to the refusal of Napoleon to relinquish any of his conquests, and as a consequence Austria went over to the allies, and on all sides preparations were feverishly put in hand for an autumn campaign.

The allies now formed four great armies; and the second of these, concentrating at Breslau and Striegau, was placed under the command of Blücher; it consisted of 40,000 Prussians and 70,000 Russians, and the general plan of campaign devised by the allies was to surround the Emperor on three sides—from Berlin, Breslau, and the Eger—to threaten his line of retreat, and to wear him out without risking a pitched battle, in which his unrivalled leadership might assert itself to their disadvantage. Blücher then commenced his forward movement on August 14, but coming at Löwenberg in contact with Napoleon and the Guard, he endeavoured to retire, in accordance with the general plan of operations, but was forced back upon Goldberg and Jauer. Macdonald was left with three corps to pursue Blücher and halted on the Katsbach to collect his troops; here on the 26th he was attacked and defeated by Blücher, who, as the old German song says:—

Da hat euch Franzosen
Das Schwimmen gelehrt,

and in which action the French lost 8,000 men prisoners, sixteen guns, two eagles, and the whole of their Artillery pack.

Space does not permit of describing the events of the next few days, but it may be claimed that during that momentous period Blücher's loyalty, firmness, tenacity, and power of initiative were never more conspicuous. He crossed the Elbe on October 3 at Wartenberg, defeated Marshal Marmont at Möckern on the 16th, and the movements of the corps he commanded exerted a very considerable influence upon the issue of the battle of Leipzig. For his services Blücher was now raised to the rank of field-marshal.

At the opening of 1814 the allies formed four great armies, exclusive of that operating in Italy, and on January 14 the army of Silesia, 60,000 strong, under Blücher, crossed the Rhine; on the 29th Napoleon defeated him at Brienne, was himself beaten at La Rothière, won again at Laon, until finally, uniting with Schwarzenberg, the indomitable old hussar general, pushing on to the capital, defeated Marmont and Mortier in the battle of Paris on March 30 and captured the city.

After Napoleon's return from Elba in 1815 Blücher was appointed commander-in-chief of the Prussian army, but there would seem here to be no particular object in discussing events so well known as his



GEBHARDT LEBERECHT VON BLÜCHER.



FIELD-MARSHAL BLÜCHER IN PERIL AT LIGNY.

(June 16th, 1815.)

defeat, after a stubborn resistance, at Ligny, the timely and loyal assistance which he was able to afford Wellington at Waterloo, the relentless pursuit whereby defeat was turned into disaster. Blücher, now Prince of Wahlstatt, did not very long survive the war of liberation, the regeneration of his country, for which he had laboured so continuously; he died in 1819 at his estate in Silesia, and at Breslau a noble statue of him by Rauch was erected the following year.

His intrepidity and warlike fervour gained him the appellation of 'Marshal Vorwärts,' but he cannot be said to have been a great strategist or tactician, though unquestionably a wholly admirable leader. He was intensely patriotic; thoroughly loyal; his integrity was beyond question; his letters do not give the idea of being those of a man of very good education, and his speech and manner were rough; but he was deservedly the idol of those who followed him. Blücher was a man of intense vitality, of great vigour of mind and body, with an extraordinary capacity for endurance. He loved fighting and danger for their own sake, and possessed a firm determination to 'see a thing through' at all costs.

As a Cavalry officer, pure and simple, he was a fine rider and a good judge of horses; he was cautious and yet bold in attack, paid great attention to detail. He was usually successful in his Cavalry charges, partly no doubt by reason of the inefficiency of the firearms of that date, and partly owing to the unsteadiness of the troops to which he was opposed, but he was less successful against good troops, as at Auerstädt.

But perhaps the attribute which endeared him most to the Prussian army and the Prussian nation was his cheerfulness and courage in adversity; he never despaired of the future of his country, never dreamt that the days of humiliation would not pass away. Prussia during her *dies irae* had many passable generals, many admirable military advisers upon whom she could rely; but few of these possessed the indomitable energy, the driving power, the supreme confidence that *alles soll recht kommen*, that characterised that splendid hussar, Prince Blücher of Wahlstatt.

The illustration on page 401 is taken from a line sketch, done at St. James' Palace, London, on July 10, 1814.

HOW NOT TO DO IT.

By CAPTAIN H. M. JOHNSTONE, R.E., *ret.*

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THAT the Cossack Cavalry in the war in Manchuria proved very disappointing is now well known, and indeed the Russian official account of the campaign makes no secret of the matter. It publishes despatch after despatch in which Kuropatkin voices his complaint.

Thus, on June 12, 1904:—‘The Commander of the Army has directed that attention be called to the fact that the advanced fractions frequently lose contact with the enemy. His Excellency demands that, once established, contact be absolutely maintained, even if little engagements are necessary to attain that result. It happens often that after a meeting units retire too far, whole marches even, when the situation compels no such thing. The Commander of the Army directs also that it be remembered that in presence of the enemy our attitude should not remain passive, but that it is important to alarm him constantly by attacking his advanced guards, launching small parties unexpectedly against his bivouacs, laying ambushes, &c.’

Thus was the unfortunate Commander trying, in the field, to teach his squadrons what they should have learned in peace. The cause of the weakness appears in a despatch of General Keller, commanding the detachment of the East, of date May 19, 1904:—‘I inspected to-day four sotnias of the Cossack Regiment of Oussouri . . . The officers did not produce a good impression on me; there are some of them who have hardly done any service with troops, but have had only administrative work; others started in the Infantry, and only joined the Cossacks quite recently. . . . Among the Cossacks called in on mobilisation many had, till then, received absolutely no military training, have passed no musketry course, have had no riding drill.’

It is to be expected that Kuropatkin’s ‘demand’ of June 12 had little effect, and that complaints continued. On June 16 the chief of

staff issued a circular :—‘ In spite of repeated orders the detachments in contact with the enemy and the Cavalry in first line lose completely from view the necessity of using every means of procuring information about the enemy, and of establishing exactly what are the Infantry and Cavalry units which the Japanese have in face of our troops . . . it is as important to obtain shoulder-straps, helmets, slings, documents, as to determine the points where bodies of troops are. Information concerning numbers and colours of facings. . . .’

Intermediately, on June 14 :—‘ Detachments are constantly sending reports that are at once recognised as inexact, often based solely on rumours and always unverified by reconnaissance. Such reports, bringing nothing but confusion in our ideas of the situation and in the dispositions that result, are simply a nuisance. . . .’

Two months later :—‘ Liaoyang, 27 August, 1904. Some days ago the Commander of the Army had occasion to confer with the officers of several Cossack units, and he was glad to have an opportunity of expressing to them what he thought of the methods of the Cossacks in the course of the present campaign, and to show the discontent which the operations aroused in him. . . . Our Cavalry has hardly procured us any information about the enemy. Excuses are made that the Japanese surround themselves with a dense chain of posts; but it is the Cossacks’ business to find the flanks of this protection or the gaps through which they must slip into the rear of the elements of security, there to observe the forces and dispositions of the enemy.’

The Cossacks had now obtained some experience, it is true, but they had entered the campaign badly trained, and seem to have made up their minds that they could not achieve this sort of thing. Telling them to do it was of little use.

‘ Up to now the Cossacks have procured no prisoners for us; they have not thrown themselves upon convoys, which is nevertheless their peculiar duty. It will be sad if in the history of the present war inaction of the Cossacks stands out. Great hopes were founded upon them; we reckoned that the Japanese had only 50 squadrons, and we can put forward 150 sotnias; we were sure that the Cossacks would harry the enemy, deprive him of rest day and night, slip on to his rear, sabre his convoys, &c. . . . Not only have our troops not inspired fear, but it seems that the reverse has come about; a patrol of 20 to 25 Cossacks retires before three Japanese riflemen appearing out

of the millet; a whole sotnia flees before half a score of Japanese. The excuse is that the Japanese fire upon our Cossacks; but then we must dismount and drive them from their ground, if courage is lacking to ride them down with the sword. . . .'

On July 5:—' . . . The Cavalry is to take contact with the enemy and not to lose it again. To maintain a solid communication with neighbouring units. To get ready for a strong reconnaissance, then for the passage to the offensive. To organise, without sparing money, reconnaissance of the hostile dispositions by the help of spies taken from the native population. . . .'

Futile orders—if men do not know how to set about a work, to order them to do it is not of much avail. Moreover the mounted arm, however capable it may be, will often find itself in circumstances in which it requires the close support of Infantry. If in these cases it does not have that support, it either becomes impotent for work or it tries to work as Infantry hampered by the care of a lot of horses.

'In country which is very enclosed or otherwise unfavourable to the employment of Cavalry, detachments composed of Infantry and Cavalry will often give good results. The Infantry is able to assist the Cavalry in the actual fight, *and affords the Cavalry freedom to reconnoitre*, even while its Infantry is actually engaged with the enemy.'

Thus one of the best little books on military training that has appeared for a long time in our language or any other—I refer to the latest edition of Field Service Regulations. The Japanese used these Infantry supporting detachments in the hills because the ground was unfavourable for pure Cavalry work, and in the plains because the Russians overmatched them in number and quality of horses. So that our book might well have added hostile superiority in Cavalry as another case for joining Infantry parties to the Cavalry. The real object of the addition of Infantry is underlined by the writer in the quotation just given.

If the ground is very bad for mounted work, and there are no Infantry men in immediate support, the horsemen are plainly handicapped. The horses cannot be hidden with the ease with which a man can hide, and are a good target at a far longer range. They dare not run the risk of being immobilised, even if for the moment the mounts are in shelter, unless the ground is such, to the rear or to a flank of the shelter, that the speed of the horses can be utilised at the right moment.

This is when circumstances necessitate retreat after contact and a skirmish. When, on the other hand, it is likely that we shall be able to advance, we should like to have good going forward from our flanks, the direct advance being made by dismounted men followed by their horses.

Are not these matters to consider when determining how far forward to send a Cavalry post in mountain country? If it is to be established at a point, and to send out thence its reconnaissances, let it be considered whether the party is likely to have to retreat after contact and exchange of shots, or whether it is likely to be able to dispose of the enemy. If the former, the emplacement will be such that trotting or galloping ground is available rearwards to the extent of longish rifle range; if the latter, let the emplacement have practicable ground forward from one of its flanks.

If Infantry can be called up to take charge of the frontal work, the whole of the Cavalry can make use of its speed in the case of advancing.

Order by General Keller, July 16, 1904:—‘Sub-Lieutenant Nikiforov, of the 11th Regiment of Chasseurs, placed with the commando of scouts at the disposal of the chief of the 2nd Cossack Regiment of Tchita, allowed himself, without the authority of the chief under whose orders he was, to take the commando back to its regiment without reporting to the Commander of the 2nd Cossacks; he simply informed him of the thing done, giving the reason that the scouts’ boots were in bad condition and many of the men were ill. Acting thus, Sub-Lieutenant Nikiforov has given proof of an absolute ignorance of the obligations of a subordinate and a lack of knowledge of military duty. . . .’

This speaks for itself.

General Levestam, commanding an important force at Simutcheng, on the road from the Taling Pass to Haicheng:—‘8 July, 1904. On 6 July some single Japanese appeared before a post of Outpost No. 3. . . . Informed of this, Captain Oletkevitch gave the order to a young officer, Sub-Lieutenant Potapov, to send a Cossack to the reserve of the outposts with the verbal report—enemy has appeared and is firing volleys. Sub-Lieutenant Potapov transmitted to the Cossack Ali Abduline of the 7th Cossack Regiment—gallop to the main body and ask help; we are surrounded and our numbers are small. This was passed on to Cossack Ivan Oulitev of Post No. 2,

who took it to the commander of the regiment of Irkoutsk; this chief sent up immediately half a battalion and the scout commando. The incident just related is eloquent enough by itself and needs no commentary. This time I inflict no punishment. . . .'

In the middle of May the Japanese were solidly established on the railway north of Port Arthur, and the Russian Army was full of rumours of a probable landing of the enemy on the west coast of the Liaotung Peninsula. Colonel Voronov, commanding a dragoon regiment, was watching a part of this coast; he reported on May 16:— 'Captain Karnitski sends the following report at 3.20 P.M.—enemy has landed at Kouantsiatouen; he has occupied a hillock to the east of that place and put a gun on it. The Japanese are advancing very rapidly.' During the following night General Samsonov, commanding the advanced Cavalry, sent in word that no landing whatever had taken place; Japanese boats had fired a few rounds on patrols, and had drawn off at 5.30 P.M.

The events were these. Telegram arrives at Liaoyang at 4 P.M. from Samsonov that the party on the coast reports 17 Japanese ships at noon firing on the coast. Samsonov, near Kaitcheou, goes south towards the point at 2 P.M. with 2 squadrons. Then comes a despatch from Voronov that 3 ships are closing on Kouantsiatouen, and at 4.40 P.M. a second report (quoted above). Kuropatkin is naturally concerned about this; he sends the following to Stackelberg, commanding the South Group:— 'It is very important to determine the strength that has just landed, and for this purpose not to lose contact with the enemy. It is probably the 3rd Japanese Army. If the troops landed are not numerous, do you not think it desirable to advance the 1st Corps . . . ?'

Stackelberg, also believing in the landing and much concerned, gave the order to disarm the gunboat 'Sivoutch' at Yingkeou, lest the enemy should capture it, to send the guns of the ship and the Russian offices to Liaoyang, and to take all the Chinese junks up the Liaoho. The Viceroy Alexeïev now joined in with an order to evacuate Yingkeou, and to destroy the gunboat; and Stackelberg was told that, while the moment for evacuation was left to his discretion, 'it was better to evacuate a day too soon than an hour too late.'

From Samsonov, who was approaching the scene of the alleged trouble towards night, there arrived at 9.5 P.M. a telegram that he had

reached Paositchai and was making a reconnaissance in person :—
' It seems the enemy is landing in two places, at 3 kilometres north-west of Paositchai, and between Tsaotsiatouen and Sieounotcheng. Several large ships are in sight in the offing (*qui se tiennent loin du rivage*), torpedo-boats going and coming between these ships and the shore, transports and a large number of sailing vessels.'

At 11.35 P.M. from Samsonov :—' There has been no landing north of Kouantsiatouen. It has taken place apparently between that point and Sieounotcheng.' A little later the bubble was pricked by his report that there was no landing anywhere.

We now go back to see what Captain Karnitski had to say for himself. This officer was at Sieounotcheng with a reconnoitring party on the night of May 15-16, and had been warned of the probability of a hostile landing. He began to move towards the coast, and was at Kouantsiatouen (on the coast) when a Japanese torpedo boat opened fire against a height west of the village, on which was a tower. Seven more ships then appeared, and shelled the height, near which the shore was good for landing. Karnitski went on to a hill east of the village to observe; but shells falling there forced him to move further north. During this movement the lie of the ground prevented him from seeing anything, and when he next saw, at long range, the hill he had left he perceived a flash on it and took it for a gun. He said the sound was less loud than that of the ships' guns, and he assumed that the enemy had landed a field gun and taken it on to the hill. He retired his squadron out of range and rode to the railway to send his report.

The gun on the height was nothing more than an exploding shell sent from one of the men-of-war.

General Keller, commanding the detachment of the East, which was facing Kuroki in the mountains, began to despair of his Cossack Cavalry, whose reconnaissances were very superficial and who found the ground too troublesome. He proposed to form, *under picked officers*, light 'commandos' of scouts of forty to eighty men, each with some pack animals, reconnoitring squadrons having often retired and lost touch simply from having no supplies. This is an important point, and it seems that all Cavalry that may have to operate in such country should carry in the wagons of its train a good outfit of pack harness, to be used either on animals picked up in the country or on some of the

animals of the train. General Keller was immediately in difficulties owing to lack of pack equipment.

One more instance of trouble of another kind. Kuropatkin, after complimenting General Rennenkampf, who commanded a mobile force on the left flank of the detachment of the East, asks him his frank opinion on his officers.

Rennenkampf: 'Colonel Kartsev gives me the impression of a chief always in fear of being turned, of being pressed by the enemy in flank or in rear, and is an officer, consequently, who does not manifest a sufficient confidence of success or of a happy issue out of any difficult situation. . . Lieut.-Colonels . . . and . . . , Cossack officers, are of little experience, incapable of maintaining discipline with a firm hand in their regiments; that is why I have warned them both that they will be removed if they do not keep better order; Colonel Volkov's chief staff officer, Lieut.-Colonel Foukalov, manifests more inclination for retreat than for advance, which produces a vexatious impression on the officers.'

Keller also had a dig at Colonel Kartsev: 'I do not know him personally . . . but if I judge him by his acts during recent times, by what I have heard of his inaction during the days on the Yalu, by the speed with which he abandoned Saimatseu before an imaginary Japanese detachment, by the difficulty General Rennenkampf had in convincing him that instructions of your Excellency were not meant to induce him to end by retreating but by advancing; if I judge him again by other facts I permit myself to give the opinion that Colonel Kartsev has not the qualities that one can demand of any commander, and especially of a Cavalry commander. If my left flank is to be guarded by a detachment under his orders, I avow frankly that I shall not be easy.'

And Kartsev was recalled from the detachment of the East.

Finally, a case of fancy reconnoitring on the extreme right of the same force may be noted. Towards the end of June the commander of the advanced guard on the Taling Pass route reported: 'Sub-Lieutenant Nebo has just arrived from the leading detachment. He observed the movement of the enemy from the height. . . . The Japanese advanced to the attack . . . following the valley and the crests in nine columns, of which two actually fought. The officer estimated the columns each at a minimum of three battalions. After having passed

Wantsiapoutseu, they assembled . . . 5 kilometres from there on the Sieouyen road; about three regiments of horse were also there; three batteries were seen, and four mountain guns took part in the firing. Between 4 and 5 P.M., a column of three battalions and a squadron left the place towards the col of . . . three columns, of three battalions each, went to the left towards . . . ; finally, six battalions fell back, the rest remaining. Lieutenant Nebo noted the uniforms of the Infantry—khaki tunics, red shoulder-straps, red turbans, black horses . . .’

The Russian history says that a report of such precision naturally inspired confidence in its truth, and it was passed on to Kuropatkin. For some time Russian headquarters had had the idea that Kuroki would probably edge to his left and join the southern Japanese army in an attack towards Haicheng. Nebo’s twenty-seven battalions naturally reinforced this idea, and great movements of troops were hurriedly made to strengthen the route Taling—Simutcheng—Haicheng, and the next pass to the south of that, the Tchapanling. Other reports brought up the number of enemy on these two lines to three and a-half divisions. As a fact, Kuroki’s army was still opposite Keller away to the north, and between Kuroki and the army of Oku on the railway, a stretch of 70 miles of mountains, there was only the 10th Division and a brigade of Guards lent by Kuroki.

Lieutenant Nebo had exaggerated what he saw to the extent of four times, and on the Tchapanling route there was only Major-General Togo with three battalions, one squadron, six mountain guns and a company of sappers. This force had been reported as a whole division. Sometimes it is better to over-estimate than to under-estimate your enemy, but when the over-estimation leads to your seriously under-estimating on some other front trouble may arise.

There is no campaign in which absurd mistakes may not occur, and it will seldom happen that a few mistakes by subordinates can jeopardise the whole affair. But a continuous series of errors of the kind mentioned above has the bad effect of inducing nervousness, which became conspicuous on the Russian side from June onwards in the mountain region. And it is in the spirit of an army that reside the issues of victory or of defeat.

*THE CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS
WITH GREEN TROOPS*

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(Extract from Journal of the U.S. Cavalry Association.)

WE may not all be able to give a precise academic definition of 'Strategy' or 'Tactics,' or quite able to make oath that an 'appreciation' is not the same as a 'mentioned in despatches.' But we all have been reading more or less military history; some of it by compulsion, as when the classics suffered by our attention to Xenophon or Cæsar; some of it voluntarily owing to a diseased appetite for historical fiction, and some of it by habit—the habit of reading day by day the newspapers. From all this reading any of us could, if industrious, construct systems of strategy and tactics; but, being busy, we neglect this. When we want to know the principles of these things we consult text-books, and there are great numbers of these; very clear and precise and dealing with selected campaigns, so that a child could see where Napoleon or Wellington broke some of his teeth. But reflect, gentlemen! Do not nearly all of these text-books deal throughout with what some soldier with vast experience of the highest grade of military work did with the obedience of other soldiers who had long been both disciplined by drill and seasoned by war? We read reverently these books and we read also the Sermon on the Mount; but our environment postpones their application.

What is this environment? Let us see.

The Army of the British Empire consists in part of an admirable over-seas force similar in qualities to those historic bodies that enabled Wellington and the Emperor and the other text-book heroes to give us their rules of war. But, numerically, by far the greater part of the Army of the Empire, if ever the Empire shall come to handgrips with

a real opponent, must come from the Territorial Army of England and the militias of the Dominions beyond the seas. In other words, what the Navy cannot do must ultimately devolve on the green troops of the Empire. The United States is still more pointedly in the same position, for with a quite excellent though small army, even in contesting with so backward a nation as Spain, she immediately resorted to her green troops. The Spanish-American Republics are in like case, and must, like all the English-speaking countries, depend for success on their *conduct of operations with green troops*.

I shall not attempt a strict definition of 'green troops.' Their greenness may extend to some only of the qualities of a soldier, as in the case of the Russian troops in Manchuria. These were green in shooting and skirmishing, but had a regimental organisation which enabled them to be rallied and returned to duty in a manner that is highly creditable to their nation. You in Canada and your American cousins are resentful of drill and discipline, because these hamper the natural bent of our genius, which is towards baseball. But we are superlative marksmen, except for the fact that the vast majority of us have never done any shooting. If you want to know what I mean by green troops, let each C.O. look at his neighbour's corps.

Now, to pass from the abstract to the concrete, let us begin with one historical operation by green troops where the proceedings were of a sufficiently startling nature to challenge attention.

In the operation I refer to, we have an officer with a splendid record as a professional soldier, trained in France and at West Point in the learning of the text-books, seasoned by campaigning, only forty-three years of age, and of the finest physique, intrepid in character, self-controlled, and still full of initiative, having, in fact, all the qualities (short of genius) which you look for in a commander. Nevertheless, when you add to him an army called blue force, but composed of green troops and as gorgeous in raiment as the Toronto garrison, and when he establishes tactical contact with the grey force, the result is Bull Run.

What were the phenomena of Bull Run? These: An army of unbounded enthusiasm, marching with the war cry 'On to Richmond,' so brilliant with their uniforms and silken banners that it all reads like a page out of Lord Byron. And when they encamped at Centreville, almost within cannon-shot of the Confederates, so thronged were they

by visitors—ladies, senators, sightseers—that it had all the appearance of ‘a monster military picnic.’ And, nevertheless, there were those strange fits of depression, of sulky funk, such as when the Pennsylvania Regiment and the New York Battery looked at the clock, found their time up, and went home; as the unfortunate General said, ‘Marched to the rear to the sound of the enemy’s cannon.’ And all day on July 21, 1861, until about 4.30 in the afternoon, General McDowell’s green troops fought wonderfully well; and then, according to one of his aides-de-camp, ‘the men seemed to be seized simultaneously by the conviction that it was no use to do anything more and they might as well start home. Cohesion was lost, the organisation, with some exceptions, being disintegrated, and the men quietly walked off.’ After they had thus quietly left the danger zone and there was a rear-guard formed up between the Confederates and themselves, they were seized by delusions of pursuit, resulting in a frenzy of panic that carried them first to Centreville and then twenty miles further to the Potomac, a total distance for some of them on that day of forty-five miles, in addition to the fatigues of the battle. Their enemy, the grey force (also green troops and arrayed as Solomon never dared), likewise fought well, and if we can believe General J. E. Johnson, who claimed to be their commander, they were worse disorganised by their victory than the others by their defeat. That was Bull Run.

Now, who or what was at fault? Not even his contemporaries felt that McDowell was to blame. His reports before the battle showed that he correctly estimated the enemy’s force and intentions. Also we must admit that he showed fully as profound a knowledge as most regular officers of the dubious character of operations with green troops, and attempted to make their work light for them by turning the Confederate flank. It is safe to say that few officers of his time or our own would have known how to take any better precautions to prevent happening the things that did happen.

On the other hand, it will not do to blame the green troops. Popular instinct is against such criticism. Richard Harding Davis was not publicly thanked for saying in 1898, after the battle of San Juan, ‘What the public needs to know now is that in actual warfare the volunteer is a nuisance.’ Probably the popular instinct is right. At any rate, after Bull Run, public opinion in the United States settled the blame for the extraordinary things done before and after the battle

squarely on the shoulders of Russell, the war correspondent. It was clear that in exposing what he saw and heard he was guilty of a gross indelicacy, for the proceedings of green troops should be treated as highly confidential, except, of course, when they secure a victory, encumbered more or less by the regular troops, who officiously drive out the enemy for them.

But to return to the question, *what* was at fault? The answer is simple. *The military education of that day, and for that matter of this day, is at fault.* The phenomena of Bull Run, while quite exciting to witness, are as normal as colic in a baby. But military science has barely condescended to deal with the warfare of the undisciplined, which to us on this Continent is the normal type of warfare.

Is it not clear that in West Point, as at Kingston and Sandhurst, there has been a missing series of text-books, the books that detail all those endearing little tricks that green troops will do if they are not headed off; the precautions that must be taken in using green troops in certain operations; the other operations in which they must not be used at all; the methods of turning their enthusiasm as volunteers to good uses; the devices for relieving those inevitable fits of depression and disillusionment of their rank and file, and for counteracting the dangerous omniscience of their officers?

The materials for text-books on this subject are numerous and entertaining, but they do not deal with the campaigns that are usually studied. It is not of much use for this purpose to read Napoleon literature, for Napoleon's first Italian campaign as commander was in 1796, and the war with the Allies began in 1792. The French campaigns of 1792-3 are well worth reading for our purposes. Likewise 'The People's War in 1870-71,' which, fortunately, is the subject of a text-book. Likewise the beginnings of any war joyously entered into by a people without military preparation. All the wars of America have been people's wars in this sense.

Let us now outline a few of the uses made of green troops by astute officers. We may begin with the mobilisation of the Twenty-first Illinois, under Ulysses Grant, recently made colonel and replacing an elected colonel whose reputation illustrated the difference between gaining popularity and securing confidence. Grant had the advantage of limited text-book attainments and a great knowledge of civilian nature. After taking a few coarse measures to introduce discipline

he started to march through the friendly country from Springfield to Quincy. This marching of green regiments to the concentration point is a very wholesome measure even in peace training. In war it has at least three secret advantages besides the obvious ones of building up the regimental organisation and hardening the men's feet:

1st: During the time occupied something may arise that will obviate the necessity for bringing the green regiment into action.

2nd: By making all the company officers walk it eliminates some of the unfit.

3rd: It enables everybody to send back home from twenty to a hundred pounds per man of absolutely indispensable clothing and equipment.

Before approaching debatable land it is good practice to accustom the men to falling in for repelling an assault at any or all points of the compass and at any hour of the day or night. A veteran of the Northwest Field Force of 1885 has described to me the effect on green troops of the alarm sounding at night, when done for the first time. It had a thrilling effect. An officer who served in the Philippines says that when posting an outpost of volunteers it was his practice to call up the non-coms. shortly before dusk and say to them: 'That is a stump, and that is a stone. The reason I point them out to you is when it begins to get dark that stump and that stone will begin to steal up on your sentries and try to injure them. You had better point them out beforehand.' In fact, a very interesting volume could be written on the devices for hardening the courage of green troops, so that they will not be terrified by anything but a real enemy.

When in the actual tactical zone the best use to make of green troops appears to be in straight defence or straight attack, and on no pretext in retreat. I intend writing a monograph on 'Retreats by Green Troops' as soon as I discover some instances in history where the army survives. The rules of defence by green troops are alarmingly simple. Their flanks must be absolutely secure. Andrew Jackson quite understood this. His troops were, as he knew, manœuvre-green, and the one thing he dreaded was having to meet flanking moves. His troops were not shooting-green as some of England's best soldiers found that day in 1814, when Old Hickory's Riflemen 'picked their turkeys' by New Orleans.

In Grant's Memoirs you will find that Abraham Lincoln was kind

enough to pick a battle-ground for him. 'He pointed out on the map two streams which empty into the Potomac and suggested that the army might be moved by boats and landed between the mouths of these streams. We would then have the Potomac to bring our supplies and the tributaries would protect our flanks while we moved out.' Grant did not accept the suggestion; but Lincoln on that occasion voiced the soul of green troops.

Having protected the flanks, the next thing is to prevent the display of military genius in front. For military genius from the time of Hannibal has concerned itself with devices by which certain troops trained to the part will engage the enemy and artfully fall back to lure them within reach of the main body. Devices of this kind are always practised in that pastime The War Game when played by volunteer officers. They never fail to have a lot of outposts skilfully posted where in case of actual operations with green troops behind them it is an even bet whether the green outposts will carry away the main body in their frantic retirement or be killed by their comrades' well-directed volleys before they can get back into line. Just here I may mention that at Niagara* any year you may see groups with sentries seventy-five yards in front, and may form your own conclusions whether the group could hit the sentry during the seven seconds he would take to sprint back.

Of attack by green troops, I should like to speak, but it is too long and intricate a branch of this subject.

Of the preponderance of green troops required as against regulars, we have the opinion of General Wolfe that 100 soldiers were a match for 500 Highland clansmen, and the opinions of various authorities that modern rifles demand about five to one superiority of attack. The French won some victories in 1792 with a two to one majority, but that was due to an inaptitude in their opponents that we cannot hope ever to see in ours. The troops that secured the surrender of General Burgoyne were about four to one. But some of Gates' army were not what we should call green troops. On the whole we had better call it five to one, and if we have to meet 50,000 disciplined invaders, the quarter of a million will be about fair.

I wish to say a few words about the fits of depression that affect green troops. This disease has a very simple cause. You know that

* Camp of Instruction, not the waterfall.—J. V.

with regulars their home is where the regiment is. The regiment may be in comfort or in bivouac or in difficulties, but the private's abode day or night is just where the regiment is. When he gets up, dresses, goes to work, eats, drinks, or sleeps, it is always with the regiment. Whether he fights or runs he still cannot get the regiment out of his head. But a civilian knows a lot of places more familiar and more pleasing than the spot where his military lodge may happen to be assembled on the battlefield. When proceedings get tedious he impatiently awaits the motion to adjourn. Towards evening he has the instinct of the mechanic that it is time to quit work and go home. If you want to overcome this eight-hour movement you must keep feeding up his enthusiasm by a constant stream of supports, and the more noise the supports make in coming up the better the result. If you want to turn this instinctive depression into panic, merely withdraw a body of troops, preferably mounted men, through the midst of the green troops. This is what the Greeks did in 1897, when the rapid retirement of the staff pulled the whole Greek army inside-out like a wet sock.

And now, lastly, let us consider the approved and traditional methods of destroying that great strength of green troops—their enthusiasm. This is where the text-book regular officer is hopeless. Like the doctor whose only practice has been as house-surgeon, and who then turns to family work, his bedside manner is atrocious and kills his business.

In passing from peace to war a regular regiment easily shifts from the dual control of the adjutant and the colonel's wife to the single control of the commanding officer. Not so a volunteer regiment, which in time of peace is a collection of debating societies and social clubs, with features of military entertainment. It is not easy for a captain who has been nursing along his company with all sorts of blandishments, to make the company suddenly realise that it is a unit, 'and that the captain is it.' Nor is it easy for the colonel, who has had to keep sweetening up eight or ten captains and a host of other dangerous cranks, suddenly to announce that all debates are adjourned *sine die*. Of all persons to effect this change in habits of thought and speech, the average type of regular officer is the second worst agent to select; the first worst being the officer who, without their merits, imitates the styles of the regular officers.

It is not surprising that young men who thought they were doing

something rather decent in volunteering to serve their country should experience strange emotions to find their officers possessed of that austere manner which has been abandoned as unnecessary in most schools and some reformatory prisons. War correspondents who found the Japanese officers fraternising and exchanging cigarettes with privates when off parade were amazed. But that shows the perverse and unscrupulous character of the Asiatic, who, in adapting foreign military methods, has the curiosity to take off the red tape and look inside the package.

The time-honoured methods used in English-speaking countries of teaching drill by a series of scoldings, of teaching duties by wrapping them up in a quaint phraseology that has come down from the Romans, of teaching shooting with sedulous instruction by shouters who cannot shoot, of making a religion of the absurdities of barrack housekeeping, and above all, of making the patriotic private feel that he is a verminiferous brute who must not approach his officer unless herded by a non-com.—these methods explain why whole regiments ask their discharge when the time is up, and why many an officer has unwittingly walked with God when the men he brutalised had dipped their hands in the hat for the marked bullet.

The one chance of green troops lies in the constant and mutual replenishing of their numbers and enthusiasm; enthusiasm constantly bringing greater numbers into the field, and these reinforcements constantly adding fresh fuel to the fire of enthusiasm. As Carnot, the organiser of victory, declared, 'Cover the want of discipline and skill by numbers and enthusiasm.' This, and not the 'exact squareness of the body and shoulders to the front,' is the first and great principle in the 'conduct of operations with green troops.'



A STUDY OF PATROL WORK

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1. *Patrols.*—*Lieutenant Stumm, August 6 and 7, 1870.*—August 1 to 6, 1870, the 13th Division of the 7th German Corps marching from Huttersdorf was about to debouch on the Sarre at Wolklingen. General Von der Goltz, commanding the advanced guard, gave about noon the following order to Lieutenant Stumm of the 8th Hussars: 'With one N.C.O. and twelve men of the 3rd Squadron go and reconnoitre the left bank of the Sarre. Form to some extent a small body of independent partisans. Reach St. Avold as quickly as possible. It is thought that the enemy's principal forces will be found there. Try to reconnoitre the hostile positions as far as possible, especially on their rear and left flank. According to circumstances you can remain two or three days absent completely independent. That will entirely depend on the initiative of the patrol, which will as soon and as often as possible send reports to the rear.'

The form of this order shows little experience in the organisation of this sort of service.

Stumm crossed the Sarre about midday. At 6 o'clock in the evening he sent from the neighbourhood of St. Avold (14 miles from Wolklingen) the following report: 'I have approached to within three miles of St. Avold, and have found no enemy anywhere; they seem to have all gone towards Forbach, where gunfire is heard. The last French patrol was seen at 7 o'clock this morning at Carling. There ought to be some hundreds of men in a camp in front of St. Avold. I am going to approach it.'

On leaving Carling Stumm went towards St. Avold by the main road. He then met a commercial traveller, who stated that three or four hundred yards further on there was a hostile Infantry post, that St. Avold was strongly held, and that there were generals and staff

officers there. Stumm advanced on the road at the trot with drawn swords. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened on him at four hundred yards : a horse was wounded and the lieutenant got a bullet through his saddle. The patrol jumped into the wood to the left. Moving through the wood it arrived at the southern edge of the forest eight hundred yards west of the outpost which had fired on it. Eighteen hundred yards off he saw St. Avold ; between him and the town he saw a hostile camp of all arms, on the heights behind another camp, and a troop train on the railway.

The lieutenant sent a second report towards Lauterbach by a road though the wood. Having learnt from the country people that there was another camp at Bouche Porn, although night was now falling, Stumm went in that direction, passing again through Carling, through which he galloped in fear of ambush. On getting out of the wood he saw a mill ; he stopped his troop in the wood and went towards the building with three mounted men. He called the miller and compelled him to bring victuals, forage, and water for the patrol, which had had nothing since morning.

The officer went forward under the shelter of the edge of the wood and saw the camp fires about Bouche Porn. He then wrote a third report, which was sent by two orderlies.

The patrol passed the night in the wood on the alert, with their reins over their arms.

On the 7th, about 3 o'clock in the morning, a patrol of three men was sent towards the camp at Bouche Porn. Strong hostile patrols prevented it from advancing, but it thought that it saw fresh troops arriving at Coumes.

At 4 o'clock the patrol marched under cover of the wood towards the farm of Grumhof to get supplies ; while it was making requisitions shots were heard, and the Hussars of the point fell back at the gallop, reporting the advance of a French squadron followed by Infantry. Stumm retreated at a gallop on Diesen and from there to his position during the previous night. But he had been seen ; the French Dragoons tried to corner him ; he went on at a trot towards Carling, where he met two other hostile squadrons ; he only just had time to dash again into the forest. At last he got clear, thanks to the wood, and made for the south of Creutzwald, whence from a distance he could overlook the whole of Longeville. There he saw masses of troops

which seemed to increase every moment. Stumm then sent to General Von der Goltz at 7 o'clock in the morning a fourth report containing news of great importance for the army. This report reached the 3rd Division at Forbach at 9.30 A.M. It was transmitted to the G.O.C. 7th Corps, who received it at Sarrebruck at midday, and to the Staff of the 1st Army, who got it about 7 P.M. But it did not reach Army Headquarters until 10.30 A.M. on the 8th, some 28 hours later.

At Creutzwald Stumm received an order to rejoin his regiment.

COMMENTS

Excepting his imprudence at the commencement in trotting down the high road Stumm did his work vigorously and cleverly. From a study of it we learn several lessons—some concerning the mission to give such reconnaissance, others the carrying out of the march, observation, writing of reports, and transmission of information.

1. *The Mission Given.*—According to the military situation the G.O.C. determines the *distance* to which it is necessary to search for information and the *time* necessary.

The G.O.C. 13th Division only received Stumm's first report at 10 P.M. For all that, when this division reached Wolklingen at 2 P.M. and marched towards Forbach it was imperative for its chief to know if the enemy were at St. Avold or at Ueberherrn, Creutzwald, or Carling.

The reconnaissance should have been sent out in sufficient time to give the clear information that was required of it by 2 o'clock. A precise answer will only be given to a precise question. Really the mission given to this single officer required a breadth of view beyond that possessed by the advanced guard commander. When the latter had to go towards Forbach what did the situation towards Teterchen matter to him; also what would he do? He would recall the officer and he would have the opportunity of making him rejoin. It was the business of the army commander to despatch a distance reconnaissance to seek contact with the French masses, to enable him to direct the march of his army accordingly, keeping in view the conditions of time and space necessary for the movement of such large forces.

The duty of the advanced guard commander was confined to seeing

that the enemy was not going to attack him about Wolklingen, and to find out under what conditions the march of the Division towards Forbach could be made.

The method of reconnaissance cannot be formally laid down, but it is always the carrying out of the special operations for which it is despatched.

II. *The Conduct of a Reconnaissance.*—(a) A reconnaissance cannot follow an itinerary—it cannot search a zone of country. There is only one master idea which directs it.

Stumm had just discovered hostile masses at St. Avold; for all that, he leaves them and goes off to Bouche Porn, then next day towards Longeville. In the meantime, what is his enemy at St. Avold, that it is his especial business to watch, doing? He certainly finds most interesting things at all these points of contact. This clearly shows that the Army Commander ought to have sent to this district a reconnoitring detachment organised so as to search it thoroughly. To get information it is first of all necessary to have a mission possible to execute. Now, Stumm could not be everywhere at once: a reconnoitring patrol has not the gift of ubiquity. It can go to one point to throw light on a situation; we will see later that a detachment can make good a front and thoroughly search a zone.

(b) The best protection for a patrol consists in its mobility. Every movement, however, is a critical period for it, for when it moves it reveals its existence and can no longer observe. This critical period may be diminished by making use of the ground to conceal the march and by making its bound at a quick pace.

(c) Woods are very valuable for patrols. Thanks to them Stumm was able to evade the look-out of the Infantry posts and go and see St. Avold, Bouche Porn, Coumes, and Longeville without being seen, and to escape from the Cavalry which pursued him.

(d) In six hours the reconnaissance had only covered $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles. This was very little considering that it had the exact order to reach St. Avold as quickly as possible, and that a part of the march was made in German territory in complete security. Still, it is a great mistake to think that a reconnaissance can be made at the pace of a fox-hunt. At manœuvres officers are often surprised at getting no information. The reason is that they do not give the patrol leader time for observation. Patrols are always to be found at full gallop.

The result is they see nothing and send in no information or bad information.

(e) The communication from troops in rear with a reconnoitring patrol is practically impossible. It was a pure chance which allowed the order for Stumm to rejoin his regiment to reach him. A patrol which is hiding from the enemy cannot be found; essentially mobile, it is as difficult to find by its own friends as by its enemy. Once in contact there is only one idea—*i.e.* to keep in touch and get its information in.

III. *Observations.*—(a) Guile is necessary for patrols to be able to see. This implies that they must be light to get about everywhere, to take advantage of the least cover so as to see without being seen; be composed of experts, both men and horses. The men must be specially trained in scouting, the horses well bred and well muscled, and for choice not less than ten years old. They must be both daring and prudent; one must risk everything for the success of the enterprise, but also restrain one's taste for adventures which do not tend directly to the achievement of the object. Stumm got off very lightly for his imprudence in dashing hot-headed against the Infantry outpost.

Patrols must be spared—*i.e.* avoid being seen. This necessitates taking everything at a glance and keeping perfectly cool; what de Brack calls 'a genius for war.'

(b) Observation is only possible when one is halted. An officer must consequently make a series of bounds from one observing point to another. The choice of these posts necessitates reflections on the tactical situation and a close study of the map. The officer has constantly to consider the problem of the hostile parties that he has seen and those that may be hidden, in order to tell at once where he should stop and whence he can see in certain directions which are specially important. This study of the map must be made before starting. When on the march all objects such as towers, bridges, streams, watersheds, woods, villages, will be quite familiar, and when the point of observation is reached the panorama will seem already known to the observer.

Stumm did not make this study of his map. First of all he bumped up against a company of Infantry, then he dashed off to St. Avold, then to Bouche Porn, to Longeville, and so on. The direction of his march was a chance one, and he risked singeing his wings in consequence.

If he had kept asking himself the question, 'What is it that I have got to do?' he would have found the answer, 'To see St. Avold.' Is it necessary to go to St. Avold to see it? The map answers, 'No; go to the ridge running east and west a mile south of Porcelet.' From

RECONNAISSANCE OF LIEUTENANT STUMM, 6-7 AUGUST, 1870.



1. 1^{er} Rapport le 5, à 5 h. du soir.
2. Observation de grands bivouacs. 2^e Rapport.
3. Réquisition, stationnement, observation des bivouacs de Bouche Porn. 3^e Rapport.
4. Petite patrouille le 7, 5, 3 h. du matin, observation de bivouacs vers Coumes.
5. Pointe sur Grumhof: le 7; contact avec un escadron ennemi. Retraite.
6. Retraite sur Creutzwald, bivouacs aperçus sur la hauteur de Langeville. 4^e Rapport.

this height there is a view of the whole valley of the Moulin Ambach, and the horizon extends beyond St. Avold for some 5000 yards to the heights south of the town, on the slopes of which the French camps were placed. From the same spot there is a view towards Bouche Porn, Ham, and Diesen. That was the spot that he ought to have

gone straight to, and there hid himself, dismounted, and swept the horizon with his glasses quietly and in detail. The best information is always obtained with glasses or telescope, because the observer is at his ease and not hurried or disturbed by hostile bullets or hostile Cavalry suddenly appearing in unexpected directions.

Such reconnaissance is far better than that of a scout frightened, wounded, chased, and out of breath, stammering out words to the man who sent him out. One is lucky if such reports are not absolutely the reverse of truth.

For an officer on patrol work a good glass is more useful than a sword or revolver.

IV. *Transmission of Intelligence*.—An officer on reconnaissance can only count on a mounted orderly for the transmission of intelligence. Telegraphs, telephones, motor cyclists, and cycles can only be used well in rear of our own protective line. Thought for the rapid transmission of news must be continual so as not to miss showing the men all landmarks that will enable them to get back quickly. There are many means of helping this transmission of information—duplicated mounted orderlies, sending a man on foot, in a cart, on a bicycle, or motor cycle—which may be adopted under certain circumstances; but it will always be a mounted orderly that must carry reports for the first stage, and sometimes it will even be wise to escort the orderly some miles to the rear, till he reaches open country that he can gallop across. But information of the enemy will be incomplete if the officer does not know how to observe and to estimate the number of the enemy, or guess what his formations indicate, how his protection is put out, or his method of march or fighting. The qualities of a vigorous hard horseman, courage and endurance, are not enough; a Cavalry officer must have complete knowledge of military science.

V. *Report Writing*.—Lieutenant Stumm wrote that the enemy *ought* to have a camp about St. Avold. Now, he had not yet been there; how did he know it? Who told him? What is the value of this assertion? All this ought to be stated exactly. One of the most difficult tasks of the commander is extracting the truth from a lot of contradictory reports; it is therefore necessary that reconnaissances give him exact and precise information. This is what de Brack says: 'Should a report never contain anything that one has not accurate knowledge of?' It can contain an official portion and an unofficial

portion, but they must be distinct: thus, for example, one must not say: 'I have arrived at the village of (Netheravon); the enemy appeared there this morning and retired towards (Marlborough).' He must say 'I arrived at (Netheravon) at 9.30 A.M., where I found no enemy: a policeman told me, and various individual reports confirm, that the enemy had retired towards (Marlborough).' We must always make a clear difference between what we have actually seen and what we have only heard.

RECONNAISSANCES

(a) A patrol can only answer a question as to a point or a single road.

(b) When it is a question of examining an area a detachment must be employed to:—

1. March concentrated to a certain jumping-off point.
2. Fan out its patrols from this point.
3. Secure the safe return of its patrols.
4. Act as a patrol reservoir.
5. Ensure the transmission of the information obtained.

(c) Reconnaissances must be sent out to obtain information both as to the strategical and tactical situation.

(d) Aerial reconnaissance is normally employed by day, but the endurance of airmen is limited, and in any case aerial reconnaissance must be supplemented by Cavalry reconnaissance. For example, an air reconnaissance can report bodies of troops in a certain district, but a Cavalry reconnaissance is necessary to ascertain what portion of the hostile army those troops belong to.

(e) Night reconnaissance by Cavalry is always necessary. If for no other reason, our own security is best provided for by patrols observing the hostile halting places—*i.e.* picketing the enemy.

(f) Reconnaissances should always be sent out so that their information may arrive at the time when it is required. This cannot be done unless early information is to hand as to the projected moves for the following day.

(g) Normally the information obtained at night should be available at daybreak, and the information obtained by day should be available at nightfall. This requires very thorough arrangements for the transmission of information. It enables the aerial and Cavalry reconnaissances to dovetail in and supplement one another.

RECONNOITRING DETACHMENTS

Missions and Strength.—From our study of Stumm's reconnaissances we have learnt that a patrol cannot explore a zone of country and that for this purpose detachments are necessary.

An account of the operations of the 4th German Cavalry Division, September 22 to 26, 1870, will show a certain number of the rôles that they may fill.

The 4th Division sent out a detachment whose story gives us an instructive example both as to the methods of march and observation.

GENERAL SITUATION

The German Army was investing Paris.

The 4th Cavalry Division (Prince Albrecht), marching from Melun, arrived on September 22 at Malesherbes. In order to cover the investment, it had received the mission of exploring the country south of Paris towards Orleans and of reconnoitring the forces reported to be in process of organisation at that town.

At 6 A.M. on the 23rd, the 4th Division despatched six strong patrols with objectives as under :—

Boisseaux	.	.	.	1 troop	} detailed from 2nd Hussars.
Bazoches	.	.	.	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	
Chilleures	.	.	.	$\frac{1}{2}$ troop	
Château Landon	} detailed by 5th Dragoons.
Beaune-la-Rolande	

Vrigny.

At 9 A.M. the Division marched on Pithiviers.

Thus the exploration had only three hours' start of the main body. Three hours means information discovered 10 to 12 miles in advance. If the enemy advanced the arrival of the information might coincide with that of the first shell.

These various patrols were to report to Pithiviers, on which place

the Division was marching, and come in at night unless they got touch with considerable hostile forces.

Let us follow each of the first three detachments, and at the end of the study decide what missions ought to have been given them and what should have been their strength.

We can also see how the exploration in the directions Château Landon—Beaune-la-Rolande and Vriigny should have been carried out.

I. *The Patrol to Boisseaux (one troop).*—Its mission was to cut the railway and reconnoitre in this direction. It cut the railway, but in a straight where it did little harm. Whilst doing this it detached a patrol, who soon reported a small convoy with five or six French Cavalrymen. The convoy was abandoned by its escort at the first threat and captured. The wagons were loaded with requisitioned arms on their way to Orleans. The troop burned the convoy and remained in observation till nightfall, returning to Pithiviers at 9 P.M.

COMMENTS

(a) *The Objective.*—Since information was required of forces that might be eventually collected in the Orleans district, and moreover Orleans was to be cut off from Paris, it was necessary to:—

(i) Search some important centre where documents at the Town Hall, Station, or Post Office might afford valuable information.

(ii) Occupy the railway at a junction or at some station, bridge, or tunnel, where its destruction would be more serious.

(iii) Reach some point on the high road to Paris.

The town of Toury seems to fill all these conditions, and considering everything it should have been given as the objective rather than Boisseaux.

As a matter of fact, on this particular day some French squadrons were in Toury, and this would have been interesting news to receive, but the troop at Boisseaux never found it out.

(b) *Strength.*—To carry out these missions the detachment would have to remain for some time in a largish town. Now, towns are as dangerous for detachments as villages are for patrols, unless they are strong enough to:—

(i) Take precautions against attacks from outside.

(ii) Carry out the necessary works—i.e. search the various offices and destroy the railway.

(iii) Keep the hostile population in order.

(iv) Form a reserve for the unforeseen.

A troop is quite insufficient for the above. A whole squadron would be required.

(c) *The rôle of a detachment as a patrol reservoir and support.*—To cut railways and search offices are only secondary objectives: the main objective is to reconnoitre.

Considering the vagueness of the situation to date, feelers should have been pushed out to the north, west, and south, to get trace of the enemy.

Nothing less than a squadron has sufficient officers and N.C.O.s to be able to do this.

Sent out by the detachment itself in a comparatively restricted area, the patrols send back their information to the detachment. These messages will not have very long journeys without meeting support in case of pursuit and a relay in case of the orderly's horse being tired. Being informed of the contact established by the patrols the detachment will take measures accordingly; it will follow close on the steps of its guides. Thus the German patrol which had blown up the railway five miles north of Toury certainly should have pushed at least one patrol right up to that town and have sent another on the tracks of the escort of the convoy that had fled to find out the direction of their retreat. The troop leader really discovered nothing, and does not seem to have had the wish to find the enemy.

The commander of any reconnoitring detachment must have enthusiasm for fulfilling his mission.

(d) *Captures legitimate for a reconnoitring detachment to make.*—A detachment is a force: whilst its reconnoitring rôle compels it to avoid skirmishes if they are not indispensable to enable it to see, it ought nevertheless to do everything it can to widen its own knowledge of the situation. The German troop was therefore perfectly right to capture the convoy. If it could have taken prisoners it would have been better still. Prisoners always give a certain amount of information, if it is only the number of their regiment, which shows the order of battle of the hostile troops.

In the case under consideration this would have been a valuable indication, since the French armies were in process of being reorganised in new groupings.

(e) *The importance of negative information.*—On arrival at Boisseaux the troop ought to have sent back negative information. Although it sounds a paradox, negative information is the only information that can be positive, because it secures quiet and rest for a given time.

(f) *The permanence of the mission.*—Finally, this troop breaks off its mission at 6 P.M. and falls back on Pithiviers. As the patrol sent to Bazoches committed the same imprudence, it followed that the Division at Pithiviers was liable to surprise on the evening of the 23rd, because there was nothing between it and the enemy to warn it of possible danger.

The commander ought to inform a detachment of his night halting place if he can; if he cannot reach it, he should say so, and say where he is halted, and in what directions he is protecting himself, so that the detachment may know.

Contrary to the case of a reconnoitring patrol, which is always very difficult to find, a certain amount of communication is possible between the rear and the reconnoitring detachment, and instructions and orders can reach it.

II. *Study of the Patrol to Bazoches.*—The 4th Division also despatched half a troop of the 2nd Hussars towards Bazoches. On arrival in this neighbourhood this patrol learnt that a French squadron had crossed towards Oison the evening before; this was the first trace of the enemy, and it ought to have initiated fresh activity. Thenceforward it was a question of verifying this information, and for that purpose sending to Oison, Saint Lye and Neuville-aux-Bois. A simple patrol would not be able to perform this task, and here, again, we feel the necessity of a reconnoitring detachment which could despatch patrols in all these directions and search the whole zone of country. A half squadron would probably have been sufficient; there was no demolition to undertake and no large town to search. Bazoches, however, should not have been its final objective; it is too close to Pithiviers (10 miles), too far from the forest, the northern boundaries of which should certainly have been reconnoitred.

This detachment might better have been directed on Villereau with the mission of searching the country between the railway from Pithiviers, Neuville-aux-Bois, to the edge of the forest on the south and the line Bazoches—Artenay.

III. *The detachment to Chilleurs-aux-Bois.*—In this district the

2nd Hussars furnished another half troop directed on Chilleufs. This detachment had a more exciting experience. On reaching the first houses of Escrennes the N.C.O. commanding the patrol thought that he saw five or six hundred yards from him Cavalry and Infantry in red breeches occupying the village; it was not, therefore, prudent to approach nearer. But as he wished to make sure of what he thought he had seen, he left the main body of his patrol under cover on the road and himself advanced at a gallop with two Hussars towards Moreau-aux-Bois. All of a sudden some thirty French Hussars, led by Lieutenants de Broc and de Vibrayie, charged out of the village. The two German Hussars were captured, the N.C.O. fled towards Pithiviers; he was lucky enough to run into some of Krosnick's brigade of Dragoons at Courvillers which were putting out the outposts to cover the Division halted near Pithiviers. This is the way to treat hostile Cavalry whenever one can; charge it energetically and pursue it. It is the way to make it timid, and also sometimes the way to see things.

As a matter of fact, the two French officers reached the main body of Krosnick's brigade, which, surprised whilst dismounted when it was making dispositions for the night, mounted in haste and prepared itself for an attack which it thought was following. Deceived by the dash of a few horsemen this brigade considered that the French had considerable forces north of the forest. In reality they only had two squadrons there.

Anyhow, the French officers had a whole brigade under their eye for a moment, and if they had known how to estimate these groups they could have gleaned precious information.

This incident gives us an idea of reconnaissance in the next war, and it is as well to study German tendencies in this respect. Their Field Service Regulations, 1908, say: 'It is most important to drive the hostile Cavalry from the field and to acquire a moral ascendancy over it as soon as possible; consequently all parties of Cavalry down to patrols inclusively ought, whenever the situation and their mission allow of it, to attack the enemy's horsemen wherever they may show themselves. Thus exploration will be hastened and the possibility of further advances will be assured. The service of protection will also be made considerably easier.'

This story shows that by temperament the French Cavalry of 1870



lacked neither dash nor vigour. It is very necessary to accustom all ranks to this idea so that they may not be surprised by it—that they will have opposed to them a Cavalry animated by a highly offensive spirit, and that the only way to get the better of it will be to show still more dash and enterprise than the enemy.

Certainly use stealth to enable you to see; but where stealth is imprudent go bald-headed for the enemy with drawn swords, without counting his numbers or giving him time to appreciate our weakness.

This, then, is another *rôle* which a reconnoitring detachment must fulfil. When its patrols are powerless, when they are hindered by the enemy's reconnoitring detachments, our detachment, which is a fighting force, must intervene to pierce the screen and open a new field for reconnoissance.

Was it necessary to detail detachments to explore the region north of the forest, and, if so, what mission should have been given them and how should they have been composed?

Before determining the strength which is necessary the commander must know what his missions have to do and what is possible. When he sent out the reconnoissance from Malesherbes the divisional general, who had his eyes on the map, knew that the two roads leading from Pithiviers to Orleans by Chilleurs-aux-Bois and Vriigny passed through the forest. He also knew that the Cavalry Division should avoid getting mixed up in a forest of this sort, where it could not use its strength, but would be blocked in columns of route on the road itself. He should, therefore, have concluded that if an intervention was necessary towards Orleans his only hope that he could have reached that district was by marching round the west of the forest in open country by Artenay and Cercottes. Beyond the northern boundary of the forest what did he want to find out? If it was occupied, and, if so, if the enemy were coming out of it. This is a very much enclosed and very thickly inhabited country. A single patrol on the road could not suffice to give absolute information because a patrol only lives by its mobility and would be running perpetual risk of capture in these narrow and enclosed lanes. Thus we come to this conclusion: 'To reconnoitre a close and difficult country it is necessary to employ a detachment which can search it thoroughly by small patrols. The latter will feel in every direction whilst the main body of the detach-

ment remains ready to support them at once if they get into trouble, just as the post at Courvillers did for the German Hussar N.C.O.'

In this case there was no necessity for the detachments to be very strong. Theirs is a different *rôle*, though, to that of the detachment sent to Toury; their radius of action is limited to three or four miles; they have not to stop in important localities; thus, whilst a troop on each of the two high roads to Vrigny and Chilleurs would seem sufficient, they are absolutely necessary.

IV. *The Reconnaissance towards Château Landon and Beaune-la-Rolande.*—The 5th Dragoons sent towards Château Landon and Beaune-la-Rolande patrols which did not meet the enemy. Nevertheless we should determine how the exploration in these directions should have been organised.

We have seen why the divisional general ought in the first instance to have decided to march westwards by Pithiviers and Artenay and to give up in some measure a south-easterly direction *via* Montargis. But although this latter direction would become divergent from the probable march of the division it should not for all that be neglected.

Deep soundings should have been made in this district, considering that the transmission of information was going to become more difficult as the distance from the division increased. Moreover, if by chance contact with the enemy was established it was urgently necessary to make it precise and to send sufficient patrols to determine the exact composition of the enemy's force and the direction in which it was moving, and afterwards to keep touch with it. The task of establishing contact belongs to patrols, but unsupported they are powerless to fulfil those other missions which we have just named; that is why they must have strength behind them, and here, again, we arrive at the conception of a reconnoitring detachment in the case of searching for information in a direction divergent from that of our main body.

This detachment, strength one squadron, should have directed an officer's patrol on Château Landon and another on Montargis. The squadron should have marched itself on the intermediate road, should have searched Puisseaux and Beaune-la-Rolande, reconnoitred and watched the eastern edge of the forest up to the road Châteauneuf-Bellegarde inclusive.

*A POSSIBLE USE OF STRATEGICAL
ADVANCED GUARDS IN MODERN WAR**

To cover the advance of the Grand Army in 1806 through the Thuringer Wald Mountains into Saxony, Prince Murat had at his disposal 72 Squadrons (18 Regiments) of Cavalry and an Army Corps.

His objective was to drive back the enemy's detachments, to open the northern exits of the three passes for the army, to reconnoitre and ascertain the position of the enemy's masses, and so enable the army to concentrate, to manœuvre, and finally to fight.

The advanced guard of an army can only fulfil its task satisfactorily if it is provided with an ample force of Cavalry. In fact, Cavalry is indispensable to an advanced guard. That arm is required to protect its flanks, to extend a screen of patrols in its front, in order to get touch across the whole extent of country which the enemy's posts and patrols are covering.

Thus protected by its numerous Cavalry, the Army Corps of the advanced guard is able to advance and pierce the enemy's system of protection in whatever direction the advanced guard commander may wish.

Applying to a future war the idea of the strategical advanced guard, as employed by Napoleon in 1806, General Bonnal writes in *Manœuvre d'Iéna*, page 319:

'We see an advanced guard army, provided with several divisions of Cavalry, on the march towards the nearest or the most threatening of the enemy's concentrations, in order to strike a decisive blow at the very outset.

'Masses of Cavalry, closely supported by an advanced guard army, will inundate the enemy's country, beat his Cavalry because it is scattered or less numerous, hold and then invest those of the enemy's formations which are first concentrated, and thus compel them to accept the first battle under conditions of undoubted inferiority.

* See *Manœuvre d'Iéna*, by General Bonnal.

‘Results of this kind can only be obtained provided the covering army (which becomes the advanced guard of the principal group) is stronger, sooner ready, and better provided in Cavalry than the opposing covering forces.

‘In 1806 the Prussians had only two advanced detachments in the Thuringer Wald, *viz.* at Saalfeld and at Hof.

‘Were the Germans at the end of July 1870 better situated to beat back a sudden counter offensive of the French in the Saarbrück Valley?

‘During the campaign in 1870-71 the Prussians had no cause for being well satisfied with the rôle played by their Cavalry before, during, and after the battle. Some of their military writers, and amongst them the remarkable author of the *Arming, Instruction, Organisation, and Employment of Cavalry*, carried on a campaign in favour of the independent and often decisive action of the Cavalry divisions.

‘Forgetful of the fundamental idea of the strategical advanced guard, some German Cavalry writers claimed for Cavalry alone the task which was allotted by Napoleon to his advanced guard, which was always very strongly provided with Cavalry.’

In 1883 Fritz Hoenig wrote: ‘In the case of the very strong armies of to-day it is inevitable that 60,000 to 70,000 horsemen will come into collision in front of the two opposing forces (for instance, in the case of Germany versus France, or Germany versus Russia). This numerous Cavalry, at the outset, will be disposed along a very extended front, but as the time for the decisive battle approaches it will concentrate.

‘Moreover, since it is the duty of the Cavalry of both sides to face one another up to the last moment, to impede or prevent its enemy from carrying out his plan, it is probable that, in the future, all the principal battles will be preceded by a great Cavalry fight in which the main work of the decisive battle will be accomplished.’

Bonnal considers that it would be difficult to collect more false reasoning in fewer words, and says that the author argues as if the opposing armies in the next war will have some five or six marches to make before meeting; whereas, after the third or fourth day of mobilisation, the covering troops will have their outposts in touch, and whichever of the two adversaries happen to be weaker numerically in Cavalry will take very good care not to take part in a duel in which the conditions must be so unequal. We can imagine how advantageous it would be for one adversary to surround his army with

an impenetrable veil and dash out the eyes of his opponent, and so to be able to manœuvre with perfect freedom against an enemy who is marching blindly forward.

'In 1806 Napoleon formed a true estimate of the superiority of the Prussian Cavalry in the matter of their number, quality of their horses, and their training, and so he chose the upper valleys of the Saal and Elster for the first phase of his operations. Up to the day of the battle of Iéna the French Cavalry carried out its duty of reconnaissance without trying to obtain by force that information which a good system of espionage, and the fear inspired by the vicinity of masses of the Grand Army, were able to procure for Napoleon.

'The idea that a great Cavalry tournament must precede the next war in Europe has led to the formation of permanent Cavalry corps. . . .

'To sum up, we think that Cavalry is required to discharge duties of various kinds at the beginning and in the course of a campaign, either in Cavalry Corps formed provisionally and acting directly under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, or in divisions attached to the armies; but we are strongly opposed to the "particularist" tendencies of certain Cavalry writers, and especially to the idea which is so dear to some, that Cavalry can operate *on its own account* in front of the zones in which the concentration of the armies takes place.'



CAVALRY IN THE REIGN OF QUEEN ELIZABETH

The greater part of this article is from *History of the United Netherlands*, by John Lothrop Motley, D.C.L., London. John Murray, 1867.

THE year 1597 opened with the Battle of Turnhout, the first decisive engagement in the struggle of the Netherlands against Spain. The old year had closed with an abortive attempt of Philip of Spain to invade Ireland and England with a second Spanish Armada, but scarcely had the fleet put to sea when it was overtaken by a gale, in which forty ships foundered with 5000 men, and the shattered remnants took refuge in Ferrol to refit for a renewal of the attempts in the spring. Philip, undismayed, in his armchair in Madrid, issued orders for an army to be collected at Calais for the purpose of invading Britain without delay, in vessels of light draught.

A concentration of Spanish troops was made at Turnhout in Brabant, the largest open village in the Netherlands, lying twenty-five miles E.N.E. of Antwerp. Here the Cardinal-Archduke had gathered at least 4000 of his best Infantry and several squadrons under command of the General-in-Chief of Artillery, Count Varax. It was uncertain in which direction it might be intended to use this formidable force. It might be the Cardinal's intention to assault Breda, or to take advantage of a hard frost and cross the frozen morasses and estuaries into the land of Ter Tholen to overmaster the strongholds of Zeeland.

Marcellus Bax, that boldest and most brilliant of Holland's Cavalry officers, had come to Maurice of Nassau early in January with an urgent suggestion to attack the force at once. The Stadholder conferred secretly with the State-Council, and it was agreed that the enterprise should be undertaken.

On January 2, fifty companies of foot, including the Buffs, and sixteen squadrons of horse (comprising English Carabineers), had assembled at the rendezvous, Gertruydenberg, 25 miles north of Turnhout. The Artillery and transport was awaiting them, and Maurice,

attended by Sir Francis Vere and Count Solms, took command. Next day, before dawn, the march began. Six companies of Hollanders were in the van, then came Sir Francis Vere with eight companies of the reserve, Dockray with eight companies of Englishmen, Murray with eight companies of Scots, twelve companies of Dutch and Zealanders, two demi-cannon, two field pieces, and the transport.

The general command of Cavalry was entrusted to Hohenlo, and they met the expedition after it had proceeded a few miles. Maurice of Nassau is given the credit of having organised and employed the first considerable force of Carabineers upon the field of battle on this occasion. The long lance of chivalry was replaced by the carabin, but the trooper retained his sword and the pistols which were already in vogue. The equipment included complete armour, except that at this period leather boots covered the legs from the knee downwards. The troops of Carabineers were formed of picked men, and on this expedition only the best-mounted English and Dutch horsemen were taken from the neighbouring garrisons.

It was a dismal and foggy morning, changing to a steady down-pour as the column advanced. There had been alternate frost and thaw for some weeks, but the roads were now under water and marching, though difficult, was possible. By nightfall over twenty miles had been accomplished and the force reached Ravels, about a league from Turnhout. Maurice discovered by his scouts that he was almost within cannon-shot of several of the most famous regiments in the Spanish army, lying fresh, securely posted, and capable of making an attack at any moment. He threw forward four squadrons of Cavalry to cover his front and hold the bridge over the River Neethe, one of the tributaries of the Scheld.

The Spanish had reconnoitred the advancing foe, but no attack was made, and the soldiers of the Republic were able to sleep off their fatigue. With the dawn of January 24 it was found that the Spaniards were in retreat, doubtless intending to occupy a better position. They had passed a narrow flooded passage where a plank causeway had been used by the Infantry, but the Cavalry had forded the waters. Sir Francis Vere and Marcellus Bax with a handful of horsemen dashed on in advance. Two hundred musketeers followed, using the plank causeway. The Spanish soldiers guarding the extremity of the defile retired without firing.

Maurice lost no time in pushing on with his 800 Carabineers, Englishmen, Zeelanders, Hollanders, and Germans to the heath of Tiel, where he found himself in presence of the Spanish force which was still moving in the direction of the strong fortress of Herenthals which Varax hoped to occupy.

Along the left of the Spaniards was a continuous fringe of scrub oaks, forming a leafless but almost impervious screen. At the end of the open heath was another extremely narrow passage which formed the only outlet from the plain, and beyond lay a swampy country, in which to circumvent the retreating army would be impossible. The Spanish force was preceded by the Germans of Count Sultz, musketeers and pikemen, the two Walloon regiments followed, and the famous Neapolitans of Marquis Trevico came last. The Cavalry squadrons rode on the left and were commanded by Nicolas Basta, a man who had tyrannised over the Netherlands ever since the days of Alva, with whom he had first come to the country.

Was it not madness for the Stadholder to assail such an army as this? but the painstaking, cautious Maurice did not hesitate. He sent Hohenlo with all the Cavalry of Brabant to gallop along the edge of the plain, concealed by the tangled woodland, and intercept the enemy's vanguard, which was still a mile from the exit.

In a few minutes Hohenlo's trumpets were heard sounding the charge, and he fell upon the leading regiment, while the rearguard was assailed by Sir Francis Vere, Marcellus Bax, and the bulk of the Carabineers, a reserve being kept in hand by Maurice. The Spanish squadrons broke at the first onset and galloped for the pass, most of them escaping into the swamps beyond.

The assailants on their powerful horses trampled over the panic-stricken mass of musketeers and leather-jerkined pikemen, and wherever a stand was made the carabins were brought into requisition, fired from the saddle. The Spanish army was demolished. In less than an hour the whole force was shattered, Varax himself lay dead upon the field, too fortunate to survive his disgrace.

Nine o'clock had scarce chimed from the old brick steeples of Turnhout, yet 2000 Spaniards had bitten the dust and 500 were prisoners of war.

It was as if the arm of each Netherlander had been nerved by the memory of fifty years of outrage, as if the spectre of their half

century of crime had appalled the consciences of the Spaniards. But there had been a crisis when victory trembled in the balance. A detachment of the States Cavalry which had pursued the Spanish squadrons too far retreated in confusion, pursued by about forty of the enemy's lancers. They swept by the spot where Maurice with not more than ten men around him was directing the battle, for a grave error had been committed by Parker, who had charged with the whole reserve. At this juncture, Maurice himself would have been swept off the field had not Marcellus Bax and Egmont with half a dozen heavy troopers come to the rescue.


All the standards of the Spaniards, thirty-eight in number, were taken besides nearly all their arms.

The true and abiding interest of the battle is derived from its moral effect on the people of the Netherlands.

Thenceforth for foreign Powers to talk of mediation between the Republic and the ancient master was to offer gratuitous and trivial insult, and the world was soon to mark the simple eloquence with which the Spanish standards of Turnhout, hung up in the old hall of the Hague, were made to reply to the pompous rhetoric of an interfering ambassador.

The recently opened Palace of Peace at the Hague is not more likely to witness the settlement by peaceful argument of national quarrels which may arise from injustice or racial animosity.






THE BATTLE OF TURNHOUT.
1597.

*From an old coloured print
in possession of
Major-General G. Fergus Graham.*

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL—No. 32.



FOX HUNTING

THE VALUE OF FOX-HUNTING

By 'UBIQUE'

EVER since the Peninsular War, when the Duke of Wellington added a pack of hounds to the forces under his command, and set an example by hunting with them himself, it has been recognised by those in authority that the sport of hunting is the finest recreation for all officers, and for staff and mounted officers in particular.

Of late years continental nations have come to recognise the military value of this sport, and the Italian, Russian, and German governments have introduced it to their armies. In fact, Germany, with her habitual thoroughness, has made hunting compulsory at certain Cavalry centres and riding establishments. Fox-hunting forms part of their education, and it is made a point of honour that all officers should ride straight.

In England to-day facilities are given to officers in almost every station in the United Kingdom to allow them to get as much hunting as possible, having due regard to their military duties. In fact, many commanding officers rightly regard fox-hunting as a parade, and actively encourage their juniors to hunt. In addition, the majority of those hunts, in whose countries lie the garrison towns, are most hospitable in welcoming soldiers and most generous in asking from messes a smaller subscription in proportion than if the hunting members of those messes were civilians. For strategical reasons the bulk of our Regular Army is quartered in the South of England, consequently the shires are out of reach of most officers; but hunting can be obtained near every big military station, and no hunting is so bad that it would compare unfavourably with any other sport or recreation.

Now of those officers belonging to the mounted branches of the Service who enter the Army year by year, a certain proportion have been, so to speak, brought up in the saddle, and are familiar with the laws and literature of hunting; but a large proportion have, on entering the Service, but little knowledge of the sport, and though

they usually meet with every encouragement, they are inclined to under-estimate the value of hunting to themselves as soldiers and as men. The old adage that 'if a thing is worth doing at all, it is worth doing well' holds as good for hunting as for all other sports, and the young officer, on starting to hunt, should give his whole attention to it, and not allow the social amenities to divert his attention from the real business of riding to hounds. It has been said that 'hunting is the sport of kings, the image of war without its guilt and only twenty-five per cent. of its danger,' and there are certain qualities necessary to a successful squadron or battery leader that are fostered, developed, and brought out in the hunting-field. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that the combination of professional knowledge and the ability to ride to hounds makes the ideal Cavalry officer.

There are certain advantages of hunting that are shared by most field sports. A man who is hunting regularly remains as fit and hard as he would were he giving up his leisure hours to boxing or Rugby football; one has only to go for a day's hunting after a long illness to realise that it is not a sport for weaklings, and, conversely, one finds that after a season's hunting the longest route march does not tire. Again, hunting, in common with other sports, keeps a man out of mischief and occupies his spare time in a way calculated to develop that factor of manliness essential to a leader of men. Every sport that brings men together conduces to good fellowship, and hunting develops this to a marked degree—the pleasantries exchanged at the meet, the friendly rivalry across country, the long ride home at the end of a day with one or two companions, all help to establish that comradeship among officers that makes their life so pleasant.

To appreciate fully the advantage of hunting to the soldier, we should inquire what are the special qualities necessary to make a first-class man to hounds, and then we shall see that they are just those qualities which are most required in officers who are to be leaders of men. The most important of these qualities are courage, horsemanship, and judgment, and of them the most essential is perhaps courage, for without courage, either in war or in the chase, all other qualities will not avail. Both in the hunting-field and on the field of battle the man is most likely to distinguish himself whose daring is tempered with coolness, whose heart is always stout and hopeful, and who never

loses his head. Danger there is in both; "under fire a guinea's worth but it comes to you, in the hunting field a penn'orth but you go to it," and to surmount these dangers, courage of a high degree is necessary.

Now, courage may be subdivided into pluck and nerve, which are themselves two distinct qualities. Whyte-Melville separates them as follow: "Pluck takes you into a difficulty, and nerve takes you out of it." Imagine a man riding to hounds on a horse that does not like water. Hounds splash into and over a brook; he must follow, so puts his horse at it, determined to get across somehow. It is pluck that makes him keep his horse's head at it, but it is nerve that makes him, as the horse sticks his toes in the ground, swing him into the brook sideways, and, floundering down the stream, guide him scrambling up the opposite bank and away after the disappearing pack.

So in the real thing, when the same man is battery leader and has to bring his battery across a zone swept by the enemy's shrapnel: It is pluck that holds him to his resolve and will not let him flinch from his task, but it is nerve that makes him watch for the flashes that herald the next rafale, then shoot up his hand, stopping the teams short of the danger zone, and, when the shells have harmlessly expended their fury, give the signal that makes the battery dart like lightning across the dangerous space before the next outburst can arrive.

Assheton Smith, perhaps the finest man to hounds that has ever been known, had three favourite maxims: Throw your heart over and your horse is sure to follow; There is no place that you cannot get over with a fall; No man can be called a good rider till he knows how to fall. Now, to live up to these maxims requires courage; there have been men who have consistently ridden well to hounds without ever getting a serious fall, but he who would excel must be prepared to have several falls and occasionally a bad one. Though it is these bad falls that do sometimes destroy the incipient pluck in a man, yet more often they improve it, temper it, and weld into it the rarer quality of nerve, thus producing the first-rate man to hounds. More falls are caused through lack of nerve than through over-boldness. The doubts as to the capabilities of one's horse to jump a fence are communicated, as if by telepathy, to the animal, and he loses confidence in himself.

The wrong application of the leg, or the interference with his head as the horse takes off, or the clutch at his bridle if he pecks on landing—all due to lack of nerve—cause more falls than one generally realises, while a disposition to crane or shirk is fatal to the would-be first fighter. On the other hand, the willingness to take risks, the knowledge of how to avoid interference with the horse, and, above all, the determination to get to the other side lead to the development of a strong nerve that will help out of all difficulties. The highly strung temperament of the average man to-day is an outcome of civilisation, and as modern inventions make weapons more deadly, and increase the range of projectiles, so the nervous strain on combatants is ever increasing. Thus the possession of a cool nerve, as distinguished from the impetuous hot-blooded valour of a Crillon, becomes more and more desirable.

The acquisition, then, of pluck and nerve, invaluable to the man who rides to hounds, cannot fail to be equally valuable to the soldier, and he goes into battle doubly armed who has already acquired these qualities in the hunting-field. That every mounted officer should be a good horseman and a good horse-master is undeniable, and it must be conceded that the hunting-field provides the best opportunities to acquire proficiency in both. A firm seat is as necessary to the hunting-man as it is to the soldier, and it is by hunting that a firm seat is gained. Young officers on joining have usually a rather stiff seat in the saddle, acquired in the riding-school, and lack that suppleness of the body combined with the iron grip of knee and thigh that comes after long days spent in the saddle and over fences.

Grip and balance, which are interdependent, come only with practice, and the best opportunities for gaining them are to be obtained by hunting.

Not only will the rider learn how to sit on his horse, but he will learn how to assist him, to bend his body in sympathy with his movements, by bearing forward to take the weight off his quarters as he rises to a fence, by pressure of the leg to hold him at a fence and make a refusal impossible, by sitting firm and not rolling in the saddle to save his back at the end of a long day.

Although it might be too much to say that hunting confers the gift of hands, which is rather a gift of nature, yet hunting undoubtedly improves it. At any rate, one learns by experience to leave the horse's mouth alone, especially over fences, to guide him over rough

country, to turn him quickly, and to stop him when necessary. Above all the young rider, if he is of the right sort, acquires in the hunting-field confidence in himself and in his horsemanship that will always stand him in good stead on service. Not only that, but hunting establishes a comradeship between horse and rider that is invaluable to both. The rider learns the capabilities of his mount, appreciates his efforts, and feels himself bound to reciprocate by studying his horse's comfort as well as his own. A man who learns to buy a horse, keep him fit, know when he is fit and when he is tired, and to spare him all unnecessary work in the hunting-field, will in war undoubtedly get the best value out of the horses under his charge.

The quality of judgment is developed in the hunting-field to a greater extent than any other quality. The term 'judgment' is very comprehensive and embraces such qualities as initiative, quickness of decision and action, and the possession of an eye for country, all of which are shared by the leader of men and the first-rate man to hounds. Judgment comes by experience and observation; reading the acknowledged authorities such as Surtees and Whyte-Melville will assist in forming judgment, but reading is useless unless it be with understanding; personal experience will bear out the truth of what has been read and will drive it home. But in order to gain advantage from what he has read and what he has experienced a man must ride with his head, must use his eyes, and observe what other men do, what the hounds are doing—what the fox has done. He should, like Facey Romford, ask, 'What should I do were I the fox?' and by so doing train himself to appreciate the situation from the enemy's point of view in war. Thus, in time he will learn how to take advantage of every check and turn, how to ride for ground, to pick the best place at each fence; in short, will make himself master of the art of riding to hounds.

As in war, it is the object of a commander to seize the initiative, so it is initiative that makes for success in the hunting-field, and the possibility of showing initiative comes only with experience and observation. 'Take your own line' is advice so often given and so seldom acted upon. But a man cannot take his own line and ride it with success until he has studied the elementary rules and principles correctly. For instance, at the covert-side he should make a mental note of the force and direction of the wind; how the cover is being

drawn; and should then decide for himself how he can best obtain a good start without interference with the sport. Having watched the movements of the best men in the hunt, he will decide whether he will follow them or whether he will—if allowed—follow the huntsman. But it is when hounds go away after their fox that the critical moment comes, for it is then that initiative is so important, and the quick decision followed by the quick action will make or mar the pleasure and success of the day. 'Shall I follow that crowd that is making for the gateway or shall I jump these rails in the corner and get away by myself?' An instant's hesitation is fatal either to your chance of getting a good place at the gateway, or to your chance of getting over the rails, for in the latter case your hesitation will be communicated to your horse, and he will probably decide that it is better and safer for him to join the other horses.

As in hunting, more runs have been lost through indecision and uncertainty than from want of courage, so in war, more battles have been lost through the same causes.

The study of ground is of the greatest importance both as a means of acquiring that 'eye for country' so important for the squadron or battery leaders, and also as a means of acquiring the art of riding straight to hounds with the minimum of discomfort to horse and rider. A judicious choice of ground is essential to success in this direction. In every run occasions abound when a man who keeps his eyes open and rides for ground may save hundreds of yards and be in a position to take advantage of every check that may occur. The rider should always make for the ground where the foothold is smooth and sound; in plough the furrows where the water is standing offer the best and easiest passage; ridge and furrow should be crossed aslant; the rider should keep an eye to blind drains; the fox will, as a rule, travel down wind, so the rider should choose a line to leeward of the pack but not so far from them that a turn into the wind would leave him far behind. The tendency of many young riders is to follow close upon a pilot or upon tail-hounds; both practices are reprehensible, and will bring their followers into deserved unpopularity. In a strange and intricate country one is often obliged to choose a pilot and follow him, but this does not mean that his footsteps should be dogged as if he were a criminal! The follower must give his pilot plenty of room and avoid jumping directly behind him. The feeling that if one falls one will probably be jumped upon is most unpleasant and

calculated to upset the nerves of the boldest rider. It is usually possible to jump to one side of the pilot, and the follower should harden his heart and pick out his own spot in the fence even though it is stiffer than that selected by the man he is following. An even worse crime is to ride close upon hounds; nothing upsets them more, and the rider who does this spoils the sport for himself and for everyone else. The rider must then first gain for himself a quick start by making up his mind what is the right thing to do, and then doing it at once; secondly, whether he is shaping his course by hounds or by pilot, he should make the best use of the ground he will traverse, pick his own place in each fence, and ride for that place with resolution and determination. He should always keep an eye forward for indications as to what direction the fox has taken, such as distant hollows, ploughmen waving, sheep bunching in a field. If hounds check and cast themselves, he should stand still, dismount to ease his horse, still with an eye forward; ready to be up and away the moment hounds hit off the line. As it is the soldier's business in war to take risks so as to be able to strike quickly, so in the hunting-field should one be prepared to jump an ugly place at short notice so as to get away quickly; but as the soldier, so the rider must, by using his judgment, reduce to a minimum the risks that he must run.

Experience and observation will show the best way to overcome all obstacles; by observation the rider will learn that the banks of a stream are soundest in the neighbourhood of trees, and by experience will learn to estimate correctly the strength of rails. It is observation that makes the rider to recognise country as he gallops over it, to foresee obstacles, to take in features and remember them again. In no way can this eye for country be acquired so well as by riding one's own line to hounds, and officers on the staff, and, in fact, in every branch of the Service, gain incalculably by its acquisition.

As officers are given such exceptional facilities to hunt, it is 'up to' them to give a thought to their profession when hunting. Many keen hunting-men when on a railway journey amuse themselves by imagining that they are hunting over the country parallel to the line, and are able to pick out their places at each fence as it comes into their field of vision. Similarly many keen soldiers will find that a ride to and from a meet is made more interesting by imagining oneself to be one of a reconnoitring patrol; and the study of features from a military point of view will be of considerable assistance. Even a

late arrival at a meet after hounds have moved off may often be of use to the soldier, as he will have to exercise on occasions considerable skill and ingenuity in finding hounds quickly.

The advantage of the ability to ride across country was brought home to the writer very forcibly during last year's manoeuvres. On one occasion he was sent out on a night reconnaissance in a country over which he had hunted some years previously. Remembering the lie of the ground he was able to reconnoitre mounted up to within half a mile of the enemy's main position by riding across the fields that lay between the cross roads held by the hostile outposts; and he was able at dawn to lead a battery into a position that enfiladed the enemy's trenches at a very close range. Again, on the last day of Army manoeuvres, while employed as reconnaissance officer, he saw troops debouching from a village on the other side of a strongly fenced mile of country. His hunting experience enabled him first of all to ride up unseen so close that he could distinguish clearly the tartan of the Highland regiment that was leading, and then to gallop back straight over the country to report what he had seen without loss of time.

Generally speaking, there can be no doubt that to all arms the practical knowledge of country gained in the hunting-field is of inestimable value.

The leader of the Cavalry patrol can tell at a glance what is his best way over a country, that this fence can be jumped by his troopers, that those pollards winding along the vale mean water, that that plough just ahead should be avoided if the horses are to be kept fresh; while the gunner will be able to pick out a good position for his battery, and ride the straightest way to reconnoitre positions. The Infantry man will show his section leaders the best way through this wood, and how to take cover in the ditch that will be under that fence—all the hundred and one little points that come instinctively into the head of the man who has ridden to hounds with his eyes open.

In conclusion, the writer would ask those who have had experience of young officers if they would not choose for initiative, resourcefulness, nerve, horsemanship, and judgment the really good man to hounds? such a man of whom Whyte-Melville has written :

‘To whom naught comes amiss

One haze or another, that country or this;

Who through falls or bad starts undauntedly still

Rides up to the motto “Be with them I will.”’

THE SECONDARY ARMAMENT OF ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY

By LIEUT.-COLONEL MALCOLM PEAKE, C.M.G., R.H.A.

ON reading the article under the heading of the above, in the last number of this *Journal*, it appears to me that the writer jumps at the conclusion that what he calls 'the pistol crank' has managed to work his wicked will in the R.H.A., and he seems to forget that such a drastic change must have been well thought out. I am no 'pistol crank,' but I venture to put forward what seems to me to be valid reasons for the recent change; personally, I have no axe to grind in the matter, but feel that, in all fairness to whoever is responsible for the change, one ought to look at all arguments in favour of and against rifles as secondary armament.

I think that in the first place one ought to consider whether the Horse Artilleryman should be armed with one or two weapons. Major Thompson appears to fancy two weapons; now in this I join issue at once with him. All recent military history, in my opinion, conclusively proves that we must reduce the weights on horses as much as we possibly can, and considering the amount the Horse Artillery charger already has to carry, I feel sure the consensus of opinion will be with me that one personal weapon is sufficient. I am leaving entirely alone the question of the amount nowadays the gunner in particular has to learn, which can be adduced as another argument in favour of one weapon.

If we allow that one personal weapon only shall be carried, the next question we must ask is, what weapon shall it be? The choice rests between the following :—

- (1) The sword.
- (2) The rifle.
- (3) The automatic pistol.

Now taking the relative utility of the three weapons, personally I

am inclined to rule out the sword altogether; of course, we are all justly proud of Norman Ramsay's splendid action at Fuentes Onoro, but looking at the matter from an absolutely practical point of view, are we likely ever to charge with our Horse Artillery gunners? I should say the chances are 1000 to 1 against it; if these are anything like the odds then let us discard the sword at once. For the life of me I cannot see where else we are likely to want it.

We next come to the rifle, and I confess that in my opinion it is the weapon we ought to have, and that the rifle *qua* weapon beats everything else; I will point out later the arguments against the rifle.

The third weapon is the pistol. I thoroughly agree with Major Thompson that the revolver or automatic pistol, used with the hand only, is 'certainly a source of immense danger to everyone, certainly friend, perhaps foe'; I will go further and say that I think for the driver it is a deadly weapon for his next-door friend.

But it seems to me that there is no reason why a good automatic pistol with a shoulder-piece attached should not be obtained. There is an automatic pistol on the market, sighted up to 1000 yards, which fires with a shoulder-piece; this pistol has, I am told, a good pattern up to 400 yards. If such a weapon is available I feel certain that every trial ought to be given it.

We now come to the crucial point of Major Thompson's article. He does not discuss whether the weapon should be carried on the person, nor does he enter into the question of whether everyone should be armed.

I may be a 'crank' in this matter, but I am absolutely of opinion that the personal weapon of the gunner should be carried on the person of every gunner and driver. This point of view may be taken exception to by many; if they are of opinion that it is not necessary for every gunner and driver in action to have a personal weapon on him, then I have no doubt that Major Thompson's allotment of rifles would do well; if I was of their opinion I should say there is no question that the rifle is the weapon for us to have. The first time I ever heard the question raised was in 1896; at the commencement of the first Dongola campaign the Sirdar (now Lord Kitchener) issued an order that every gunner and driver was to carry his carbine and to sling it across his shoulders in action. The battery commanders objected, but, as usual, he was immovable. We carried them for four

years on service. I do not consider that the Horse Artilleryman could possibly do this, as in the first place the carbines were light and the men averaged 5 feet 11 inches, and secondly they did not ride, but I consider the principle is absolutely sound. I am inclined to believe that this is the real reason of the selection of the pistol.

Now if my theory that every gunner and driver should carry a weapon be admitted, what is the best weapon? I am sure a gunner or driver cannot carry a rifle, therefore it comes down to the pistol. Of course, I am dead against the revolver, but am sure, as I said before, that a good pistol with a range of about 500 yards fitted with a light shoulder-piece could be obtained. This could be carried on the man himself; I should make it so that it could only be fired from the shoulder.

I do not pretend to have argued out these points, but I merely bring them forward as they seem to me to give a probable line of thought of those who are responsible for the recent change of weapon.



MEXICO'S UNIQUE CAVALRY CORPS

By PERCY CROSS STANDING

CHANGES and improvements are pending in the *personnel*, equipment, and organisation of the far-famed 'Rurales' of Mexico, who were not long ago engaged in the pursuit and capture of the younger General Diaz and his friends. The Rurales are a unique institution—they date as an organised arm of the Service from the time of Porfirio Diaz's second term as President of the Mexican Republic. In this sense, indeed, to President Diaz belonged the credit, amounting almost to an inspiration, of having of his own initiative evolved order out of chaos by forming a mobile Cavalry contingent out of the formidable bands of banditti that infested Mexico right up to and beyond the period of the unfortunate Maximilian's 'Empire of Mexico.'

The Rurales are soldiers of fortune. These roving bands of well-mounted, well-armed freebooters were accustomed to take little heed as to what power ruled in Mexico, though ostensibly their motto was 'Mexico for the Mexicans.' At the time of poor Maximilian's downfall one band of them alone, owning the leadership of the notorious Tronsaco brothers, numbered four hundred strong. Ex-President Diaz tells in his memoirs how these villainous Tronsacos were responsible for the death of the brave General Comomfort—who is incorrectly described by the late Mr. Archibald Forbes, in his 'Napoleon the Third,' as having been killed in battle. It seems that Diaz had warned General Comomfort as to the disturbed condition of the country-side. 'He did not, however, attach much importance to my report,' says the ex-Dictator, 'and a few days after my departure, in trying to make the trip from San Miguel Allendo to Celaya in a coach with an armed escort of fifty mounted men, he was assassinated by the Tronsacos near Chamacuéro.'

It is only fair to state that the Emperor Maximilian had anticipated

events slightly, inasmuch as his advisers had taken steps to enroll into his service as many of the *cuerdádodos* as could be reached, forming them into a contingent known as *casadéros* ('hunters'), and conferring the command of this somewhat bloodthirsty and unruly organisation upon one of Marshal Bazaine's Crimean War veterans—himself a man of so saturnine a disposition that he was locally known as *El Tigre*. But the greater number of the wild *cuerdádodos* preferred to throw in their lot with the party of freedom under Benito Juárez and Díaz. Thus was seen the curious spectacle of sections of these partially reformed bandits fighting furiously on opposite sides in the struggle for Mexico.

Pages could be written concerning the exploits of those fighting *against* the French in the 'sixties, but a couple of incidents must suffice us. Their principal leader was the redoubtable Ramirez. In one big and picturesque engagement the wild horsemen wielded their lassoes with terrible effect against the 'solid squares of Zouaves bristling with bayonets.' Again, one of their most marvellous performances, also against the African troops in the French service, took place amid the lofty Sierra Mountains near Tepic.

To this day the scene of the bloody tragedy there enacted is known locally as 'the Frenchman's fall' (*El Salto Frances*). With a devilish ingenuity which reminds one of the wild ways of Redskin warfare, the assailants masked their onslaught by letting loose a crowd of mules and mustangs upon the French as the latter were passing a particularly perilous point of the abyss! The sequel, needless to say, was a crimson pandemonium. The moment had been so cunningly chosen that the unfortunate Zouaves perished almost to a man, flung into the dizzy deeps by the impact of the terrified and infuriated beasts.

To return to Díaz and his peremptory enrolment of these men as police, setting a thief to catch a thief in the true spirit of that popular phrase. When matters had 'settled themselves' (?), and poor Maximilian was no more, General Díaz took resolute measures and employed a large force of Government troops to bring about the arrest of the *cuerdádodos*. Then, addressing himself to Ramirez in a little speech bristling with grim humour, and gripping a revolver in one hand, he said to the guerilla chieftain, 'Now, which will you have—this hand with the five bullets, or this one with the outstretched fingers?' His prisoner had the good sense to choose the hand of



'ROPING-IN' A PRISONER.

THE RURALES OF MEXICO.

friendship, and the enrolment of the desperadoes as Rurales speedily followed. It was the splendid solution to a very tough problem.

True to his salt, Ramirez became commandant of a splendid mounted force. Superbly horsed, well drilled, well armed, 'thoroughly well heeled' (to use an expressive Westernism), the Rurales remain as much a factor in the life of Mexico to-day as when they were originally enrolled by Diaz's clever initiative. Now, as then, if not so employed, many of them would doubtless take to the road, for some of the finest shots and most accomplished horsemen among the Rurales at the present time are reputed to have been notorious highwaymen. I should perhaps have made it clear that it was not until after the second election of Porfirio Diaz to the Presidency of the Mexican Republic that he took the drastic measures against the banditti that have been outlined in the foregoing. It is good to know, from every point of view, that the plan has turned out so eminently successful.

It stands to reason that in a country such as Mexico the Rurales are often called upon for work of difficulty and danger. Their pay is good, but they earn every dollar of it. In the event of any recrudescence of the political storm that broke over Mexico in 1910-11, this splendid body of horsemen might profitably be counted on to assist in repressive measures other than the duties incidental to the policing of a vast and sometimes turbulent area. No more strangely picturesque a sight can be seen than that of one of these warriors 'gently leading' a prisoner by means of the lasso which every good Rurale carries at his saddle-bow in case of eventualities.

A brace of revolvers and a heavy sabre compose the business 'armament' of these dashing Cavalrymen. The life of the Rurales is interesting, but it must be borne in mind that in so wild and unsettled a region the risks are correspondingly high. Their existence is necessarily one of continuous adventure. They live in the midst of alarms, yet there is an undoubted fascination and romantic halo surrounding their lively calling, which indeed demands the exercise of all the highest qualities of the skilled Cavalry scout.

*BALAKLAVA AND THE FOURTH REGIMENT
OF CHASSEURS D'AFRIQUE*

By PERCY WHITE

No doubt some of the survivors of the Light Brigade can well recollect these bronzed-faced horsemen who by their brilliant charge saved the remnants of our men from total destruction on that memorable day!

The 4th Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique was raised at Bône (Algeria) in 1839 and disbanded in 1856, to form the nucleus of the Chasseurs de la Garde Impériale (Second Empire), when that regiment was raised in the same year. During the short period of its first existence (having been raised and disbanded several times) the 4th Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique took every opportunity to distinguish itself, and its regimental standard bore the names of the following notable battles: Milianah, 1842; Taguin, 1843; Isly, 1844; Balaklava, 1854. In this last-named battle, the part played by them in saving the survivors of the Light Brigade gives the regiment a just claim to our regard and admiration. Perhaps one of the best accounts of their timely action in that glorious though unhappy charge is given by Viscount de Noé, who was serving in the 1st Regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique at the time. He describes the incident as follows:—

‘When the Light Brigade started on its famous ride through the valley we were merely spectators, but suddenly an aide-de-camp arrived with orders for General Morris and his cavalry to descend into the plain. We set off at a trot, and were soon joined by the 4th Regiment. Hardly had we formed up in battle array when a shell burst over the Eagle* of the 1st Regiment, but without causing any fatality. A deafening noise from the Russian guns then reached us from the far end of the plain, and, amid clouds of dust, we saw emerge the remnants of the unfortunate Light Brigade, who were shouting “hurrahs” in truly British fashion. The Russian artillery placed on

* The Chasseurs d'Afrique carried their standards into battle at this period.

the heights to our left commenced to pour shot into these noble fellows. General Morris, without a moment's hesitation, ordered two squadrons of the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique to charge the Russian battery, which was doing so much execution. They gallantly rushed the slopes, silenced the Russian guns, and, after cutting their way through two lines of sharpshooters, rode back to us! For the rest of that day we



4TH CHASSEURS D'AFRIQUE.
1854.

remained in the presence of the enemy, our sharpshooters thrown out against theirs, without a shot being exchanged. During a lull in the fighting I noticed an officer coming towards us who had won the esteem of the whole French army. I speak of Colonel La Tour du Pin! This brave soldier was on foot, an ear-trumpet in his hand (on account of his deafness), his horse having been killed under him; he came to ask us for another mount, which, however, no one was able to supply.

Colonel Kosielski, who was a few paces in front, pointed out to him an English horse which had escaped during the charge, and was wandering about at the foot of the slopes on our left, in which many of the Russian infantry were still in ambush. La Tour du Pin coolly essayed to take possession of it, when some of our men ran out in order to prevent him, as probably he would have lost his life. This officer sought out danger wherever it was to be found, and I remember his expression of despair at Inkerman when he knew that furious fighting was going on in the trenches simultaneously with an equally strenuous struggle on the hills. He would dearly have liked to have been in both places at the same time ! ’

Viscount de Noé also relates an interesting interview he had with an English officer—the Colonel of the 5th Dragoon Guards. ‘ In the



course of our conversation, I expressed my opinion regarding our African képis, which were of so little use in protecting the heads of the French Light Cavalrymen in a European battle,* and I quoted a case where a non-commissioned officer of the 4th Chasseurs d’Afrique had his head split open at Balaklava.

‘ The English officer having something of interest to show, asked me to lunch with him in his tent on the day following. After our repast, I reminded him of his promise, and he brought out a helmet that he had worn, split nearly in two by a sword cut which would have penetrated his head had it not been for a silk “ muffler ” which he had luckily stowed away inside the helmet. He received this cut from a Russian Hussar, but had disposed of his adversary with a shot from his revolver.

‘ “ Now, you see,” he said, “ that our helmets are not of much greater use than your képis ” ! After this he produced a shako which he maintained was proof against our sabres, and which had been captured from a Russian Uhlan. He thereupon made a vigorous cut at it with his sword, but without splitting it in any way. He ordered one of his dragoons to bring him an axe, and this he used against the unshapely shako without any better effect. I could not help laughing, and told him that though the Czar of all the Russias was often robbed, it might

* The Arabs only used the downward cut on a dead or wounded foe.

safely be assumed that at all events he had a good contractor for this sort of equipment.'

It was only at Balaklava that the 4th Chasseurs d'Afrique were enabled to distinguish themselves in the Crimea, and in this affair they were led by General d'Allonville, their casualties amounting to two officers and twelve men killed and about eighteen wounded. In recognition of General Morris's services, the late Queen Victoria conferred upon him the Order of the Bath.

The original formation of the regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique dates from 1831, when two regiments were formed—the first at Algiers and the second at Oran. In the following year the third and fourth regiments were raised at Bône in 1832 and 1839 respectively.

The 1st and 2nd were composed of six squadrons of Frenchmen and two squadrons of Spahis. The 3rd and 4th each contained five squadrons and one squadron of Spahis, the Spahis being placed on the left of the regiments.

M. Martin de Bourgon, the first colonel of the 4th Regiment, was a remarkably clever and energetic officer, and under his command this regiment became the *régiment d'élite* of the Chasseurs d'Afrique, combining the fiery courage of the 1st Regiment with the smart appearance and excellent organisation of the 2nd Regiment.

In Africa their enemies had dubbed them 'the lions of the desert' in recognition of their cleverness and bravery in battle and their generosity towards the vanquished.

Their uniform consisted of a pale blue tunic, with pale blue cuffs and collar, edged pale yellow; wide booted-overalls serving the purpose of kneeboots, the officers sometimes wearing a braided dolman. A leather 'czapska,' which was first worn, was soon replaced by a high képi. Their arms consisted of straight sword, pistols, and carbine.



THE NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED RIFLES

By Major-General A. J. GODLEY, C.B., *Imperial General Staff*,
Commanding the Military Forces of the Dominion of New Zealand.

THERE are twelve regiments of Mounted Rifles in New Zealand, and they are the Cavalry of the Citizen Army.

Their history dates from the formation of independent squadrons of the Volunteer Yeomanry Cavalry at the time of the Maori wars, and the four senior regiments have traditions handed down to them by their original squadrons of which they have every reason to be proud. They are the 1st Mounted Rifles (Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry), whose original squadron was till lately composed entirely of gentlemen, and which has a lady—Lady Plunket—for its Honorary Colonel; Queen Alexandra's 2nd (Wellington West Coast) Mounted Rifles, whose original squadron was the old Wanganui Light Cavalry of the Maori wars, and which was named after King Edward's bride at the time of his marriage; the 3rd (Auckland) Mounted Rifles, a regiment to which his Majesty the King has done the honour of becoming its Colonel-in-Chief; and the 4th (Waikato) Mounted Rifles, of which Lieut.-General Sir Herbert Plumer is Honorary Colonel. The 5th Mounted Rifles (Otago Hussars), of which Major-General Babington, late 16th Lancers, who commanded the New Zealand Forces from 1901 to 1906, is Honorary Colonel, was originally formed as a squadron of Hussars, and wore a Hussar uniform. The remaining regiments have been organised from independent squadrons or corps of Mounted Rifles which were scattered all over the Dominion.

Prior to the adoption by New Zealand of Universal Training in 1910, the regimental organisations existed only in name. Squadrons, about sixty strong, as a rule went to camp independently, and it was the exception for two or three of them to assemble at a so-called regimental camp. Now we have four squadrons to each regiment (two regiments for geographical reasons have a fifth), and the latter

are brigaded on the Imperial Cavalry pattern—three regiments to each brigade. So far we have no higher organisation than the brigade. Each brigade has a signal troop.

Each military district has its Mounted Rifles' Brigade, that of the Auckland district being composed of the 3rd (Auckland) Mounted Rifles, the 4th (Waikato) Mounted Rifles, and the 11th (North Auckland) Mounted Rifles; that of Canterbury of the 1st Mounted Rifles (Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry), the 8th (South Canterbury) Mounted Rifles, and the 10th (Nelson) Mounted Rifles; that of Wellington of Queen Alexandra's 2nd (Wellington West Coast) Mounted Rifles, the 6th (Manawatu) Mounted Rifles, and the 9th (Wellington East Coast) Mounted Rifles (this last-named regiment has an ex-Imperial Yeomanry officer, Lord Islington, as its Honorary Colonel); that of Otago of the 5th Mounted Rifles (Otago Hussars), the 7th (Southland) Mounted Rifles, and the 12th (South Otago) Mounted Rifles. The senior regiment in each brigade is affiliated to King Edward's Horse, and arrangements have been made whereby any young New Zealander at home can fulfil his liability for universal service in the ranks of that regiment.

In 1911, when the reorganisation of the forces took place and the first quota of recruits were posted to the regiments, the old Yeomen were encouraged to stay; and most of the officers, a good many N.C.O.s, and a small proportion of the men did so. This enabled the reconstituted regiments to build up on the old Yeomanry basis and gave them a good start.

The four Territorial brigadiers were then appointed, all good men and country gentlemen, three of them sheep-farmers, of whom one had been a captain in an Imperial infantry regiment. Commanding officers were also appointed, or confirmed in appointments which had hitherto existed on paper. It may be of interest, in order to show how in some cases the officering of the Mounted Rifles of New Zealand corresponds to that of the Yeomanry at Home, while in others it is obviously more democratic, to categorise their pursuits in civil life. Of the twelve, three are 'squatters,' country gentlemen, or sheep-farmers; two saddlers; one Minister of the Crown; one doctor; one lawyer; one surveyor; one schoolmaster; and two business men, of whom one served his time in the ranks of a German Cavalry regiment.

The men are practically all drawn from country districts; few come from the towns. A large proportion of them are either shepherds or farm-hands, or are engaged in some country pursuit for which the ubiquitous motor-car or bicycle has not yet replaced the horse. Consequently, in a country where all shepherding and most farming operations are done on horseback, they practically all can ride and find their way about.

At present the expenses of starting the new scheme of Universal Training have been so great that the New Zealand Government has not attempted to provide horses or equipment for them, and each man brings his own horse, saddle, and bridle. So far there has been no difficulty in getting men to do this, in view of the alternative of being posted to a dismounted branch. But the Dominion was sadly denuded of horses at the time of the South African War: every little 'cockatoo' farmer now drives a motor-car instead of breeding a hack or a horse for his buggy; horses are therefore gradually becoming scarce, and the question of breeding remounts will soon have to be faced. The quality of the horse-flesh varies very much in different localities, and the horses are of course of all sorts and sizes—from the racehorse brought by the jockey-boy down to the pony which, when not employed as a troop-horse, carries the children (two or three together) to and from school. But they are all hardy and can get about the country, and, when not too big, are on the whole well suited for the work of mounted riflemen. Most of them are chiefly grass-fed and get little oats throughout the year, and one of our chief difficulties is to restrain their owners from stuffing them with oats and hard food immediately on arrival in camp and so getting a large proportion laid up with colic.

The collection of saddles brought to camp, with a bit of sacking or a saddle-cloth put under them to take the place of stuffing, would not be an ideal equipment with which to take the field, but we hope by degrees to provide better saddles; and already, during the last two years, there is a slight improvement both in horse-flesh and saddlery. Horse-mastership is not a strong point with the average New Zealander.

The Mounted Rifles go to camp for eleven days annually (exclusive of the days of arrival and departure), and in addition do six whole-day parades, each of six hours, or twelve half-day parades, each of three

hours; ten drills of an hour and a-half apiece; also a prescribed course of musketry. The latter, with a proportion of the drills and parades, are as a rule 'lumped' together and done at squadron week-end camps, for which in many cases forage is supplied free by neighbouring farmers, rations being provided by the men themselves, or sometimes by their squadron officers. In the future it is hoped that the Government will recognise, and provide money for, these week-end camps. Owing to the scattered nature of the organisation and the difficulties of communication in the 'back-blocks,' the ordinary drills are done by troops.

In 1912 the annual camps were held by regiments. The widely scattered squadrons for the first time really got to know each other, and the regimental organisation was properly established. The training was very elementary as the large majority of the men were recruits. This year brigade camps were held with very satisfactory results, and the first attempt at brigade training in the Dominion was a great success. Not only have the brigadiers had the opportunity of handling their brigades, but a most healthy rivalry and *esprit de corps* has been engendered in the various regiments.

Classes of instruction for officers have been held in all districts, and an instructional squadron, composed of the permanent adjutants and sergeants-major and a certain number of Territorial officers and N.C.O.s, has been formed this year for a six weeks' course under Captain Macarthur-Onslow (16th Lancers). Of the permanent adjutants (all captains or subalterns of the New Zealand Staff Corps), two were N.C.O.s of British Cavalry—Dovey of the Scots Greys and Walker 9th Lancers. Their efforts are ably seconded by a Corporal-of-Horse of the Blues—Norris—Sergeants-Major Beer (Queen's Bays), Wood (3rd Dragoon Guards), and Nicholls (5th Lancers), whose services have been lent for five years to the New Zealand Government; also by about a dozen other ex-Imperial cavalrymen who have taken service as staff-sergeant instructors of the New Zealand Permanent Staff, and who all worthily uphold the traditions of the British Cavalry. I am fortunate enough to have a Cavalry officer—Captain Estcourt of the Scots Greys—as my assistant military secretary, and he is always ready to give a hand in any instructional work when his other duties permit, so that altogether the Imperial Cavalry is well represented in the Dominion. Of the other permanent officers and N.C.O.s

of the New Zealand Staff Corps and New Zealand Permanent Staff who are adjutants and sergeants-major of Mounted Rifles, many had experience in the field with contingents in South Africa.

The full establishment of Mounted Rifles in the Dominion, which will be reached in 1916, is 5972 of all ranks. The present strength is 4887, of whom 81.74 per cent. attended camp this year.

The recruits obtained under the Universal Training system are of a good stamp, and their keenness and suitability for mounted work leave nothing to be desired. Their conduct in camp is exemplary. With time, and more training of the commissioned and non-commissioned ranks, who are at present the weak spot in the organisation, the existing mounted rifle regiments of New Zealand will be in no way second to the first and best of the New Zealand contingents which did such good service in South Africa.

For the Expeditionary Force the idea is to take one-fourth, which would make a squadron, of volunteers from each existing regiment. A regiment of three squadrons would thus be formed from each military district—the Auckland Regiment, the Canterbury Regiment, the Otago Regiment, the Wellington Regiment—making a total mounted force of four regiments, or twelve squadrons, available from the Dominion. Three of these regiments would probably be organised as a brigade and the fourth used independently.



COLD STEEL AND INDIAN SWORDSMANSHIP

By P. BRAMLEY, ESQ., *North-Western Provinces and Oudh Police*
(now Deputy Inspector-General)

A lecture addressed to the officers and men of the 5th (P.C.W.) Dragoon Guards at Meerut, 1897.

'COLD steel' is at the best of times a creepy subject, and is not a pleasant one to discuss in cold blood. I am therefore much afraid that the grim array of lethal weapons exhibited will give rise to a variety of horrid creepy sensations in the regions of our ribs and craniums, which will no doubt be fully appreciated by those who have ever felt the keen edge of the metal as it cleaves its way through the tissues of our vile bodies! Still, as all soldiers, and especially Cavalry soldiers, must learn to *receive* 'cold steel' with as much fortitude as they *deliver* it, a close study of the weapons that might some day be employed in making us into mincemeat will by no means prove unprofitable, since (as the generals always say) it is only by such study now in these piping times of peace that we shall be able to smite our adversaries hip and thigh when it comes to actual blows. And familiarity in the use of such weapons will, I can assure you, breed a good deal more respect than it does contempt, for it gives you a correct idea of the dangers to be encountered—and therefore avoided—in a hand-to-hand fight with persons armed with them.

With us, swordsmanship as a fine art, commonly practised as such amongst men, may perhaps, in some respects, be considered a thing of the past. But even in prosy, practical England there are still schools of instruction wherein enthusiasts are endeavouring manfully to remedy this retrogression. That the development of the art received a severe check by the sudden and marvellous advance in the invention and manufacture of fire-arms there cannot be doubt. But, believe me, that so long as there are stout hearts and strong arms on the face of this earth, and so long as there are warriors whose pride and valour cease only in death, there will always be a time, even in a

battle against a foe equipped with all the most modern appliances, and well versed in all modern methods of war, when your sword and your lance will play a no unimportant part.

On the Continent of Europe, and especially in France and Italy, the old schools of swordsmanship retain many of their ancient traditions



FIG. 1.—IRANI.

and still command respect and exercise a proportionate amount of influence amongst European fencers, and it is from them that we ourselves have from time to time received

most of our instructions. With the European system, however, I presume you are familiar—your instructors have imparted this knowledge to you—and the subject therefore need not be referred to or explained by me. But what is a matter of considerable surprise to me and to other lovers of sword-play in this country is the fact that though no nation in Europe has had greater opportunities of studying Asiatic swordsmanship than ourselves, yet our professors have not at any time, it seems, made a definite effort to study that system with a view to ascertaining its advantages or defects; and therefore, as a contrast to our own methods, I propose in the course of this lecture to give you a description of certain kinds of Indian and Asiatic weapons, and will illustrate the methods of using them, as far as is possible, with a practical display by local native professors—trained on entirely different and in many respects totally opposite principles to our own, but which, for this very reason, are deserving of close and careful study; for the soldier, like the detective, must not only be always prepared to pick up a clue or a wrinkle when he finds one, but must be equally prompt in either adopting it for his own use or in employing it as a means of hoisting an enemy with his own petard! And from no school of fencing in the world can you receive more instruction in the use of all *cutting* weapons than from the Asiatic school of swordsmen, with whom the use of the point or thrust as a means of attack is practically unknown.



FIG. 2.—GUZERATI.

Opinions of course differ, and in the face of such a one as has been recorded by Captain Burton—of the 'Arabian Nights' fame—it is not for me—a man of peace—to advocate the cause of Oriental swordsmanship. He says, in describing swordsmanship amongst the Arabs, that the 'Bedouins boast greatly of sword-play; but it is apparently confined to dealing a tremendous slash, and to jumping away from a return cut, instead of parrying it either with sword or shield. The citizens have learned the Turkish Sainitic play, *which in grotesqueness and general absurdity*




FIG. 3.—SAIF.

rivals the Indian school. None of *these* Orientals know the use of the *ptino* which characterises the highest school of swordsmanship: their intellect could never reach it' ('Pilgrimage to Mecca,' Volume III., page 75). This may be the case with the Bedouin Arabs, but nobody who knows anything about the natives of India can accuse either the Hindus or the Mahomedans therein of a want of intelligence; and, therefore, however absurd some of their sword-play may seem, it will, I think, be found on close examination that their system is based on correct principles and is in its own way a sound one, and one well adapted to the weapons with which they were armed. In some respects it is the most ancient system of sword-play in the world. Our own elaborate system has been evolved from lessons originally taught us by the Moor and the Turk; in fact, history incontestably shows that it was only with the invention of gunpowder and fire-arms that the Oriental nations began to disappear as military Powers, and the rifle has now completely superseded the sword.



FIG. 4.—SIROHI.

The difference, therefore, is that we have advanced with the times while they have not; though, when it comes to a discussion on 'cold steel,' it must perforce be admitted that all our great knowledge, and all the inventions of this wonderful age, will be of no avail when it comes to an honest fight, sword in hand—man to man. The calm, practised swordsman will then in nine cases out of ten beat the modern prodigy who can put on a string of bull's-eyes at 800 yards, but who has not taken the same trouble in acquiring a similar dexterity in the use of his humble but trusty sword.

There are numerous, and far more convenient, methods of demolishing the said skilled swordsman before he can reach you at all. You can of course shoot him, or possibly hit him in the eye with a brickbat—or you might even bash him over the head with a barge-pole—but that is a shabby way of disposing of a chivalrous and brave enemy who may have challenged you to a fair fight in a fair field. No soldier can, properly speaking, decline so honourable a challenge, and you should therefore be prepared to polish off such opponents with your sword or your lance, with the same amount of confidence, nicety, and precision as you would display in picking him off at 500 yards with your rifle. And, in some parts of India, and in Afghanistan and in Persia, you will to this day meet foemen worthy of your steel, with whom a passage of arms will, as old Sir Nigel Loring used to say, 'Peradventure bring much Honour'!



FIG. 5.
KATAR.

In British India swordsmanship as a science received its death-blow in the Great Indian Mutiny of 1857, and the complete disarmament which followed the introduction of the Indian Arms Act has resulted in the gradual eradication of the old methods and the old customs for want of the weapons. And at the present time, therefore, excepting in the Native States, high-spirited swordsmen, bred and trained in the use of their weapons from childhood upwards, can nowhere be found in any numbers. From purely an enthusiastic point of view this fact is to be regretted; but, as a wise measure of State, its wisdom cannot for a moment be questioned.

At the same time, the people of India are conservative people, who abhor anything new, and adhere to their old customs with a tenacity which is remarkable, and in all great cities and towns, even in British India, there are still recognised and properly organised 'akharas,' or schools of instruction, in which the arts of swordsmanship and dagger and lance play are still carefully fostered and taught with dummy weapons.

Each 'akhara' is under the superintendence of a 'khalifa, or leader; and, besides the actual instruction in the use of arms, all old forms of ancient Indian duelistic etiquette are carefully studied and maintained, and, on certain festivals in the year, all 'akharas' in the



FIG. 6.
BUTCHWA.

town, accompanied by their drums and banners, parade in procession, vying with each other in exhibitions of sword-play, and thereby revive the tradition of the past, when the sword was a greater power than the pen.

In many of our Native Cavalry regiments Asiatic swordsmanship has been assiduously kept up and encouraged, though the regulations only permit of its being indulged in as a pastime. And, in the old days, the one regiment which excelled above all others in these exercises was the famous Rissala of 'Skinner's Horse'—a regiment whose historical associations are closely connected with Meerut and its neighbouring districts; and if old Colonel Skinner, its founder and first chief, were to return to this earth and see the '1st Bengal Lancers on parade or in the field, his pride would to-day be as great as when he himself led them, one of the finest regiments of Native Irregular Cavalry in the service of the Honourable John Company.'

I will now ask you to follow me while I describe a few of the weapons I have selected from my collection for the purposes of this lecture. You will observe at once that all the Oriental weapons here shown, with the exception of the '*Saif*,' and omitting of course the daggers also, have obviously been built for *cutting* only. Of swords there are, of course, many kinds; but a detailed description of the different styles, or the particular classes of metal used in their manufacture, would entail a lengthy digression, of no interest to anybody but a 'blade fancier'; though it is as well that we should know that Asiatics, and especially Hindustanis and Persians, are experts in the matter of sword-blades, and many of the weapons obtainable in this country are both costly and beautiful. In fact, a close examination of these weapons will be sufficient to demonstrate the thorough knowledge of all essential details possessed by the manu-



FIG. 7.
AFGHAN.
KNIFE.



FIG. 8.—KUKRI.

facturers. The smallness of the hilts or handles is a peculiarity which will at once strike the European expert. It is a palpable defect, but one which can, to a great extent, be accounted for by the fact that natives, and especially high-caste Hindus, have as a rule either very


small or very long, narrow hands, and thus a grip which seems to us cramped and confined will ordinarily be found quite sufficient for the requirements of our Aryan brethren. On the other hand, in discussing 'cutting' blades, a hilt like this has certain advantages which we cannot overlook. Take hold of a 'tulwar,' for instance, and you will then find that it effectually prevents any false wrist-play, while the bulge in the middle of the 'grip' is exactly what is required to keep the fingers in a correct position for cutting purposes, and that it also enables the full strength of each finger being utilised in maintaining



FIG. 9.—BHALA.

a firm, strong grasp of the weapon—a fact the value of which will no doubt be fully appreciated by those of

you who have ever been disarmed in the course of a fight owing to your inability to get a proper 'hold' of your weapon by reason of defect in the construction of the 'grip' or 'handle.' Still, the construction of the hilt is undoubtedly defective, inasmuch as it is adapted exclusively for a weapon built for cutting purposes alone. But in other respects the details of these swords are perfect. The blades are well balanced, and the metal excellent, and they are provided with scabbard clips, which answer the double purpose of preventing the blades from falling out and also as a safeguard against the edge being destroyed by friction with the wooden sheaths, which would be the case if the blades were not properly secured. And, lastly, the weapons are light and handy. Heavy swords are all very fine, but you want big men with big arms and powerful wrists to use them, and as natives are as a rule light and wiry men themselves they have wisely given proper attention to this important point.

FIG. 10.
SIKH RING.

The two tulwars illustrated are representatives of the two chief classes, on the lines of which most Indian and Persian swords are built; they will be quite sufficient for our purpose.

Fig. 1 is an '*Irani*,' or Persian blade, and, as its shape and construction shows, has been specially designed for the use of horsemen and may be regarded as the product of Mahomedan ingenuity, while the '*Guzerati*' (fig. 2) is a lighter and handier weapon, more adapted for the use of footmen, and is of Hindu origin. Its blade is broader than the other, and you will observe that it is double-edged from the

point downwards to very near the whole length of the 'foible.' Our instructors call this the 'false edge,' and its use is little understood by us. The blades of both are of the finest tempered steel, with edges as keen as a razor; and a single sweep, well-timed and well-delivered, by a powerful, mounted swordsman, will sever the head from the body; a gash of similar severity can be inflicted with the 'Guzerati,' while the deadly 'undirect' delivered back-handed with the blade reversed seldom fails to reach and disable the unfortunate and uncautious antagonist who is unacquainted with this method of attack. With us such a stroke would be regarded as 'foul play,' but with Asiatics it is a perfectly fair one; and its advantages are recognised and admitted by both the French and the Italian schools. It is just as well therefore that we should know it also.

Fig. 3 is a 'Saif,' and, with the exception of the 'Sirohi' (fig. 4), is, as far as I am aware, the only straight sword in use amongst the natives. It is provided with a 'gauntlet handle,' and an Indian warrior, who fights with two of them—one in each hand—looks much like a windmill.

Fig. 5 is a 'Katar,' and fig. 6 a 'Butchwa.' Fig. 7 is an Afghan knife. Daggers were usually worn by gentlemen of fashion, who frequently used them in an amicable sort of way for stirring up the vitals of obnoxious persons whose removal from this sphere had been confidentially decided on. They are uncanny and unsportsmanlike weapons, and very dangerous in the hands of those expert in their use, and the natives of India have a very excellent and elaborate series of dagger exercises.

Fig. 8 is a 'Kukri,' the national weapon of Nepal. Its use is, however, so well known that it calls for no further comment from me. For close in-and-in fighting in the hands of a man who knows how to use it no more terrible weapon has ever been devised. They vary in size from a foot to about two feet six inches, and you can judge of the severity of its blow when you see a stout little Gurkha cutting, with one stroke, clean through the neck of a fair-sized buffalo.

Fig. 9 is the double-pointed spear or 'Bhala.' It is used for attacking purposes alone, as its exercises include points to both front and rear, without any parrying or defence of any kind. It is never thrown



FIG. 11.
LATHI OR
BANA.

and therefore cannot come under the same class as 'javelins' or 'assegais.'

Fig. 10 is the Sikh '*Ring*.' It is a harmless-looking little weapon in itself, but, when thrown by a skilful performer, it is capable of making a most grievous and ghastly wound. It has a pleasant little dodge of ricochetting along for a very considerable distance if the ground is hard, and, if it happens to meet a man on its way, it does its best to take off his head! At the same time it forms an excellent means of defence from sword-cuts, and the Sikhs used to wear them in their puggrees for this purpose.



FIG. 12.
AXE.

Fig. 11 is another and very ancient article used by natives in certain parts of the country for fighting purposes. It hardly comes under the category of 'cold steel,' but, as it answers the same purpose equally well, it is also worthy of an earnest contemplation. In the districts of Benares, Ghazipore, and Ballia, in these provinces, the natives excel in the use of this '*Lathi*' or '*Bana*.' It is much the same as an old quarter-staff, or great stick-play, and a very similar practice is now in force in both Italy and France, where it is employed in the army, 'partly to supple the men, for which purpose it is an admirable and highly gymnastic exercise, and partly to lead to proficiency in wielding the musket and sword bayonet' (Hutton). In India, however, its exercises are specially designed to keep off a crowd of assailants with its far-reaching circular strokes and rapid thrusts.

Figs. 12, 13, and 14 are 'axes' and also nasty weapons in their way. One comes from the confines of Nepal and is used in the same way as the 'great stick.' It looks very much like the old 'Locharbar axe,' and is capable of inflicting a terrible wound. The smaller one was much used at one time by the Bundela Thakurs, but is now to be found only amongst the wild men in the woods along the southern borders of these provinces.

A 'knobkerrie' is used by certain nomadic aboriginal tribes, and it does equally well for bowling over a hare at fifty yards as for knocking a policeman off his horse at the same distance when he comes prying round the encampment.

Having now introduced you to the instruments of torture it only

remains for me to give you some idea of the persons who are likely to use them, and the best way of fighting them. I allude, of course, to single combat alone, and am now addressing Cavalry soldiers in particular.

For the brave and chivalrous horseman, who leaves the serried ranks of the foe, and, riding forth, boldly flings a challenge to mortal combat with sword or spear, the English soldier has nothing but admiration, and military history has shown that English soldiers have, on many occasions, accepted such challenges, and have fairly met and vanquished such proud antagonists. And, therefore, those who have given so good an account of themselves in the past may be trusted to uphold their traditions in the future. But at no period of military history have we been in greater need of practised swordsmen than the present, for the revolution in modern armaments has caused most European nations to forget the practical lessons taught in days when in-and-in fighting was the rule and not the exception—a fact which has caused the modern school of military experts to discard various apparently trifling, but in reality valuable, additions to a soldier's equipment as superfluous and obsolete. Now, however much this principle may be applied to rifles and revolvers, the sword and the lance are the same weapons to-day as they were in the times of the 'Iron Duke,' and though cuirass and epaulettes may at first sight appear worthless ornamentation, they were the outcome of practical experience, and had been designed with a sound object in view. The heavily embossed bridles, head-stalls and reins of Napoleon's Hussars; the thick puggree and cotton-quilted coats of the old Indian Irregular Cavalry; and the stout, leather gauntlet of the Dragoon, have each in their respective way served many a good horse and many a good soldier. But you have not these now, and thus the imperative necessity of your being an expert in the use of your swords and lances as your sole means not only of attack but also of defence is at once demonstrated. The first thing, therefore, for you to do is to look to your own physical training. If you wish to be a good swordsman you must be active and strong, without a particle of superfluous flesh, for every pound you can take off yourself will be fully appreciated by the



FIG. 13.
AXE.

steed which has to carry you. Now, Englishmen, in addition to having thews and sinews, possess big bones, which is rather a nuisance in its way, for not only do bones weigh such a lot, but they sometimes get broken just at the time we do not want them to break. Then again your saddlery and accoutrements weigh a good deal, and you therefore require big horses to carry you. On the other hand, Oriental warriors do not drink so much beer or eat so much meat as ourselves, and are as a rule thin wiry men, on fast horses, smaller in size but far handier than the generality of our own mounts. This, therefore, is the main difference between European and Asiatic mounted antagonists, and from what I have seen of them and their methods of training it seems to me that they get a good deal more work out of



FIG. 14.
SMALL AXE.

their horses than we do. An Asiatic horseman's main endeavour will be to gallop and manœuvre around until he sees an opening, when he will rush in and deliver a tremendous slash. They are as a rule very chary of *beginning* the fight, and, being in perfect condition, if not promptly hustled and brought to bay, can play a waiting game very well, which may end in their ultimately tiring you out, when of course you will be more or less at the mercy of the foe. When fighting such a man, therefore, *lose no time* in closing with him, and once you get into close quarters you will distinctly have the advantage, for as a rule you will find yourself above your antagonist (unless he also happens to have a 16-hand waler); and, if you succeed in stopping the one strong stroke he is sure to deliver, a sharp quick point will probably end the fight. You will always find it pays to act up to the motto '*De l'audace, toujours de l'audace*'—never hesitate to open the attack—strike hard and true and learn to kill and, once you get your enemies on the run, keep them on the run! But at times it is not so easy to kill the gentlemen, and then it will be necessary for you to exercise your own judgment, and you will have to consider not only your own condition but must also have a thought for the strength and endurance of your horse; you will have to patiently bide your time, and husband your strength, and keep your mount well in hand and sit tight, and keep your eyes skinned, ready to pounce down upon your opponent the instant he gives you a chance, and above all you must never forget that 'cold steel' must be controlled and

directed by a cool head, for, when guided by a hot one, it is usually productive of disaster. In fact, some very useful lessons with regard to the proper handling of 'cold steel' are to be learnt out of pig-sticking, for until a man has known what it is to ride down and fight and slay the 'unclean beast,' single-handed, he does not know what it really is to kill a pig. To fight him single-handed is a very different thing to polishing him off in company with two or more equally bloodthirsty companions, and after getting your horses and possibly yourself badly cut in single combat, you very soon learn how the brave brute *ought* to be ridden and demolished. Amongst others, the chief lesson you learn is that it never pays to deliver faulty thrusts, and that it is always better to avoid striking till you are certain of delivering a telling thrust, unless of course it is necessary to stop the beast in order to prevent his escaping into cover. You also learn the full extent to which you should make use of your horse in either receiving or evading charges, or in coming round instantly to continue a pursuit, and you soon see for yourself that, if you wish to use your weapon with precision and effect, it is essential that you should in the first instance be a good horseman. And these are all facts which should be borne in mind when fighting Oriental horsemen. They are brave enough, but they have not our notions of chivalry, and are heartless enemies, who, if they once disabled you, would probably proceed to take off your head as a trophy with the utmost composure, and in spite of all your earnest protestation!

But, in the course of Oriental warfare, there are swordsmen of quite a different type to those I have just referred to, and who will also have to be met and overcome, and it is to some of these that I specially wish to direct your attention. To begin with, let us take the Afghan brigand, so common all along our frontiers; but, if what the newspapers say is true, it appears that he also has now forsaken his 'tulwar' for a breech-loader.

In case, however, there may still be some of the old type in existence, I will give you some idea of their methods of fighting. If, when on vedette or scouting, or on any duty of an isolated nature, and when he thinks you have no supports at hand, you see a man standing clear against the sky-line on a neighbouring hilltop, 1000 yards away, suddenly leave his coign of vantage and rapidly descend towards you, you can reasonably conclude that he is desirous

of cultivating your acquaintance. When about half-way down the hill, he will probably introduce himself to you with a long shot from his elegant shooting iron (a Jezail). If not hit, keep moving about and have him into the plain if possible. Watch him closely and you will see him creeping stealthily down the hillside, from bush to bush, like a jungle cat, for they are splendid skirmishers. He will probably have a pot or two *en route*, but you must not mind that—a little further arrangement, and he will burst from his cover sword in hand, and advancing with great leaps and gesticulations will suddenly without checking his attack whisk off his puggie and continue his onslaught under cover of its waves—a manoeuvre which in most cases has a most disturbing effect on your horse, for whose benefit it has been specially designed. But I hardly think such a man is worth fighting with 'cold steel'—shoot him the instant he gives you a chance. Failing this, keep moving rapidly round him, and never give him a chance of closing in or hamstringing your horse. Use your lance in preference to your sword, and endeavour to strike true, so that one stroke or thrust will suffice to end the fight. Show him no mercy, for he is a crafty enemy who would assuredly turn and slay you were you weak and unwise enough to offer him the assistance you would to any wounded civilised antagonist.

Another type of man is the 'Ghazi'—a fiend who rushes straight to his death, with the name of his God on his lips. He is, as his name implies, a fanatic, bent on achieving martyrdom, and he comes at you straight as an angry boar, and ends by delivering a crashing stroke at your skull or shoulders. He is not as a rule a good fencer, and his blood being up he is always in a frightful temper and allows his ferocity to get the better of his discretion. A strong guard and sharp return will generally end his career, but his vitality is extraordinary, and, if you want to escape an ugly mauling, kill him dead. But his acquaintance as a swordsman is not worth cultivating, and he can therefore be just as expeditiously despatched with a bullet.

The reptile with the knives which I have described, for him should be reserved all the outcome of modern ingenuity in the mantrap and spring-gun line, so that he should be disposed of after the manner of vermin. But when attacked alone and unarmed by a man with a dagger, there are a number of excellent 'seizures' and 'stops.'

There remains the man with the 'great-stick.' His antics will at

first amuse you, but beware! Watch him closely. Get him, if possible, to deliver a stroke. This you must 'evade'—not guard—and then rush in before he recovers. This will be your only chance. Once you get within the dangerous zone of his sweeping strokes he ought to be more or less at your mercy.

From the above you will see how necessary it is for every man who wishes to become a good horseman and good swordsman to keep himself in good hard condition, for, failing the use of your weapons, you will then at all events have strong arms; and there are no people in the world who can use their fist with greater effect than the English. The amount of damage which can be done by a fair blow on the mouth, when a man is riding hard and has both weight and muscle at his disposal, is something astonishing; and we have an instance on record, in which no less a personage than a British General, who, when beset by a French Lancer, at the battle of Albuera, overcame his dangerous antagonist by a good honest drive on the face, which not only sent 'Monsieur's' teeth down his throat but hurled him off his horse to the ground, after which General Beresford went on his way rejoicing, and was molested no more.

With the display my lecture comes to an end, and if the show has proved of any interest at all to my friends, my humble object in taking up so much of your time will have been achieved.

The display by native local professors consisted of certain preliminary exercises, illustrating the methods by which the arms and limbs are trained and developed, with a view to the student becoming an expert swordsman. The '*Banetti Exercises*' came first, and it was pointed out that they had evidently been devised to ensure suppleness of the joints, and that they trained a man to be ambidextrous—a most important item in a swordsman's training.

A system of free gymnastics was also then exhibited and explained.

This led up to the '*Sword-play*,' and the following points were carefully noted:—

1. Method of holding tulwars.
2. Five cuts—note the '*Coup Jarnac*.'
3. Method of approaching an enemy under cover of the '*Marlinets*.'

Peculiar guards and defence.—Agility and dexterity a great feature. Blows *avoided* rather than *guarded*, and much ingenuity displayed in guarding with shoes, handkerchiefs, shawls, etc.

Exercises specially designed for keeping off a crowd of assailants.

The '*Bana*' or '*Great-stick*.'—Very similar to our quarter-staff, and to the continental 'great-stick' play—exercises carefully designed.

The '*Batchwo*' or '*Dagger-play*.'—Very elaborate and scientific practices. Italian system evidently outcome of Oriental instructions.

THIRTY YEARS AGO

BY MAJOR A. HUGHES ONSLOW, *late 10th Royal Hussars*

THE Editor has asked me to write an article on the lighter side of soldiering, so here goes for a few reminiscences of life in India thirty years ago, which I hope may recall some good old times to my contemporaries and also amuse the subalterns of to-day.

I left Portsmouth for India in the good ship *Jumna*, H.M. Indian transport, in October 1882. Most of the officers on board were quite young, and about twenty of us were going to join our regiments for the first time; the men were entirely Artillery drafts with hardly any N.C.O.s. None of the officers and hardly any of the N.C.O.s had ever seen one of the men before, so we were a pretty scratch lot. It was blowing hard, and directly we got out into the Channel we met a horrid choppy sea, which changed into a good old-fashioned roll, pitch, and toss when we reached the Atlantic. I shall never forget the horrors of the first five days. The *Jumna* was, I believe, a most seaworthy ship, but about 12 knots was her best pace with everything in her favour, so it took us five days to get to Gibraltar. The junior officers were stowed away in a place called 'Pandemonium' somewhere in the bottom of the ship, where eternal darkness, only mitigated by the feeble flicker of two lanterns, reigned. Of all the blessings which electricity has conferred on man I think the electric light at sea is the greatest. When it came to going round the troop decks as officer of the watch at night in the Bay of Biscay the limit of misery was reached. The melancholy procession, headed by the representatives of the Navy, groped their way in the darkness, stumbling over the prostrate forms of suffering soldiers; and as the ship lurched and rolled it was with difficulty one avoided treading on them or taking a header into the tubs placed at intervals to receive their contributions. But there is an end to all things, and once we got into the Mediterranean we had the best of weather and a cheery time on board. I have said that our men were entirely Artillery drafts; one

afternoon after we had been about a couple of days in calm water, I happened to be subaltern of the watch and had just gone up on to the bridge to report and was looking down into the waist of the ship, which was crowded with men; suddenly one called 'Field,' another yelled 'Horse,' and the finest rough-and-tumble I have ever seen began. It lasted about ten minutes; supporters of each side swarmed into the waist from every part of the ship; and the fighting only stopped when the crowd was so dense that it was absolutely impossible for anyone to use their arms.

Bombay was duly reached in twenty-eight days, and I went up to Lucknow to join my regiment; there was an outbreak of small-pox at the time, and as one of our officers caught it everybody was vaccinated again. When I and another subaltern who joined at the same time were going to be operated on, our Vet., a dear old fellow who had been with the regiment for many years, said that sort of thing often made young fellows feel very faint, so we had better order a bottle of champagne. We did not feel faint and we did not drink much of the champagne, but the old boy saw to it that the wine was not wasted.

Riding-school followed its accustomed course, and I have the kindest recollections of the old white country-bred mare, B. 40, who carried me through it with the greatest comfort to us both. About half our troop horses were country-breds, and half Walers, but the officers rode Arabs as first chargers. A few years before the whole regiment had been mounted on Arabs, which accounted for the officers still keeping them. Our riding-master was a capital fellow and full of go, but like most old soldiers he had a grievance, which was that he had not got the Crimea and Indian Mutiny medals. He was a pretty good hand at spinning yarns, and after he had been relating some of his adventures somebody always used to say 'But why haven't you got the medals, Barney?' 'That's what I want to know,' he used to reply—and then one heard all about it. He was unlucky enough to be landed in the Crimea shortly after the date for getting the medal; and much the same thing happened about the Mutiny. He was a good rider but had what might be described as a somewhat aggressive seat, especially when he rode anything in the nature of a gallop, and thereby hangs a tale. It was at a little gymkhana meeting in the hot weather in a race for polo ponies; among the

starters were Barney and a local sportsman, Frank Johnstone by name, who was a first-rate jockey. Barney had the race well won and was finishing on what is now described by racing reporters as 'a tight rein,' when Johnstone by a great effort got almost up to him and caught him one fair across the breeches with his whip; the effect was electrical; poor Barney did not know what the devil had happened, but he sat down such a flump in his saddle and gave his pony such a job in the mouth that Johnstone did him a lead. Of course, Barney got the race, but the whole thing made everybody laugh so much that Johnstone's explanation that he had meant the stroke for his own pony, but that owing to a swerve a most regrettable accident had happened, for which he profusely apologised, was readily accepted by the Stewards.

There was another notable happening in connection with these half-holiday gymkhanas. Sergt.-Major Holmes had mounted old B. 40 with a view to riding up to the racecourse, when he was furiously attacked by the familiar Syce's stallion pony, which was a well-known 'Budmash' and 'Bobbie Wallah.' Holmes fled for his life and was pursued at full gallop round and round the lines till the old mare was about done and things were looking desperate. Regimental Sergt.-Major Bradshaw, however, was a man of resource and action; he loaded his carbine and shouted to Holmes to gallop past him. Holmes did so and Bradshaw shot the pursuing stallion stone dead a short half-length behind the old mare's tail.

These gymkhanas were great fun and we also had paper-chases for the men about once a fortnight during the hot weather. Sixty or seventy used to turn out, and as there are a certain amount of mud walls and other obstacles in the country about Lucknow we used to have quite an amusing ride. About half a dozen men in white jackets were told off to act as hounds and the rest of the field had to keep behind them, but when the hares were viewed I'm afraid the hounds were a good deal pressed, and the finish was something very like a race.

Of course we had lots of polo. The summer of 1883 was remarkable all over the world for an extraordinary return of light or after-glow after the sun had set; this phenomenon was very marked in India. In the hot weather we used to begin our game as late as possible, so as just to get it in before dark. For about a month during this summer

some five minutes after we had been stopped by darkness it suddenly became much lighter again and we were able to get in another 'Chukker.'

When we got our orders for home we had a big sale of all our polo ponies, horses, &c., at Lucknow, and a first-class sale it proved from the vendor's point of view. To show how the price of polo ponies in India has altered since then I may say that this was the first occasion on which more than 1000 rs. was given for a polo pony with no racing value. I have not a doubt, however, that the best-class polo ponies now in India are far better than those which we had. We were quite content with country-breds, and often very small ones at that, but we had some jolly good polo, and I daresay enjoyed it just as much as the fellows do nowadays.

One of my first brigade field days had a dramatic conclusion. Our Colonel was brigadier, and after a goodish outing he wound up with the parade movements. He was not satisfied with the way the regiment galloped past, so he dismissed the two Native Cavalry regiments and kept us at it. I forget how many times we galloped past, but we were not improving, and the outlook was very black. Just as we were getting to the saluting-point for the ninth time the kettle-drummer's horse, utterly bored with the whole proceeding, went to sleep and fell down with a crash in front of the band; the fall woke him up; he sprung to his feet, kicked off the drummer and galloped home to barracks as hard as he could lay legs to the ground. It was obviously impossible to go on without a kettle-drummer, so all we could do was to follow him; and I believe his health was drunk more than once in the canteen that evening. He was a tall, narrow, dun-coloured, Kattiwar horse, with very prick ears; by order of the Colonel he was degraded from his high position and a skewbald country-bred got the job in his place.

There was not much shooting to be had close to Lucknow, but during the cold weather we got some first-rate duck and snipe shooting by a few hours' railway journey. We used to start about 9 o'clock on Friday night in sleeping-carriages with our servants, ponies, &c., and were shunted into a siding at the nearest station to the wheels sometime in the middle of the night. We were up before daybreak, and after a bit of breakfast, galloped off to the lakes, so as to get into position in clumps of rushes just before it was light enough to shoot. When all

was ready a shot was fired and the roar of wings as thousands of birds rose in the air at once was a sound never to be forgotten. For a couple of hours shooting was fast and furious, a native in a canoe preventing the birds settling in the open water, and they kept flying round and round, giving the most sporting shots as one stood knee-deep in water in a thicket of rushes. When the sport slackened owing to the birds flying too high and getting shy of the places where the guns were posted, we came out and gave them a rest for some hours in the middle of the day, and then had another go at them in the evening.

A gallop back to the railway, a cheery dinner, and a comfortable night in the sleeping-carriages put us in fine trim for the shoot next day, and then another night in the train landed us back at Lucknow in time for parade on Monday morning. I have never enjoyed any other shooting so much as this. A bag of 200 or 300 head, including four or five varieties of duck, geese, snipe, and a few various, to six or seven guns was indeed grand sport, and I at any rate have never wished for anything better.



THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE HORSE

By R. S. TIMMIS, *Royal Canadian Dragoons*

Being part of a lecture on 'The Modern Care of the Horse' delivered by the author before Field-Marshal H.R.H. The Duke of Connaught, and afterwards in the leading cities of Canada.

I DO not suggest for one moment that I lay any new theories before my readers, but merely the methods of making practical use of common-sense facts; facts that any observant horseman, who possesses any true sympathy for the horse, must know exist. It is waste of time to repeat information that one finds in most modern books. I shall therefore merely touch on facts that we do not often see touched upon, and sincerely trust that this much-abused quadruped may reap a little benefit from my humble efforts. I shall commence by considering the horse's intelligence, then the general care of the horse, both in his education in the stable and at work, and, lastly, I shall deal in detail with the cruelty that our so-called friend is such a victim to.

In no science has there been less progress made than in that of equine science. The daily cruelty on the streets is only too apparent, and it is the result of want of education on this subject and the 'slip-shod' way many owners of horses allow their stable arrangements to be carried on. Horse owners should remember that the best horsemen are learning every day of their lives, and that a good horseman spends much of his time, even if it is valuable, around the stable.

On Psychology.—The horse is born ignorant as we are, and must therefore be educated in a progressive manner, as we are. The degree to which this can be carried on depends partly on the horse and partly on the intelligence of the master. The horse develops the character of his master to a marked degree. Bad masters make bad horses, and *vice versa*. The horse possesses the usual five senses, but two of these, smelling and tasting, are very acute, as they guide him in choosing food and water. His sense of hearing is also very acute, and for this reason a horse should never be shouted at, but should always be spoken to quietly. Shouting at a horse exposes ignorance of the horse on the part of the person who shouts. Shouting in many cases causes fear. Dark stables ruin many horses' eyes;

if a horse is kept in a well-lit stable his sight will generally be good. It is generally thought that a horse smells an object when he holds his muzzle close to that object; he is really feeling it with the tactile hairs on the end of his muzzle, which represent our fingers. Although he probably smells it as well, he would not have to approach it so closely merely to smell it.

Contrary to some opinions the horse possesses intelligence, which is often very well developed in horses that have had very intelligent masters. By intelligence the horse learns obedience, to oppose a cruel master when the latter is off his guard, to break loose at night to get at the oat-bin, to go around a jump rather than over it, and thus avoid a jerk in the mouth, &c. His strongest characteristic is his extraordinary memory; this is responsible for our being able to train him to the extent we often are. He possesses considerable natural instinct, and many of his actions are due to his natural instinct of self-preservation and fear. He is very susceptible to fear because his imagination magnifies everything, and he is extremely observant of details. Hence we must never cause him fear or make movements that we do not intend should be taken as indicators while we are training him.

His excitability to motion is intense, and is the cause of his being the valuable animal that he is. He is very forgiving and readily gives way to our kind treatment. He dislikes hostilities and is not naturally vicious, as is so commonly believed. He may be predisposed to it, if bred from vicious parents, and if teased he may become vicious. Grooms and little boys are responsible for most vicious horses.

In training a horse we must first gain his confidence and love, and then his obedience. Obedience is gained by a judicious mixture of love and fear—fear of punishment if strict obedience is not adhered to. In the early days of training punishment must not be given—not until confidence has been gained. Horses must be brought up in the same way that we should be. Punishment must be given when the pupil deliberately disobeys a command that the trainer is quite sure the pupil understands. While inflicting a punishment the temper of the trainer must be perfectly under control and perfectly calm. If not, the horse will not understand what the trainer is doing. Soon afterwards the horse must be caressed, so as not to leave too much of an impression upon his mind. Most people punish a horse when

in a violent temper, and when not in a temper they do not punish the horse at all. If a horse is punished while he is in fear, his fear is greatly increased. Speed also increases fear, so that when a horse bolts from fear it is of the greatest importance that he be stopped as soon as is possible. This sounds rather unnecessary advice.

On account of the horse's wonderful memory we are able, by using different voice-sounds for different indications, to teach him to go through all kinds of performances. A horse does not understand words, but he soon understands tones. By giving hand or leg indications together with tones, we teach him to do certain acts, and later make him do these acts without using the voice-tones. His memory allows him very soon to go through a succession of acts directly he is told to do the first one. Upon this principle the high-school and circus horse is taught, and in a milder form all well-trained horses. Horses object to the smell of tobacco smoke; for this reason, I never smoke until I have finished handling young horses, because they are very fond of licking one's fingers. The horse associates everything he sees or does with the sensations he experiences at the time of this seeing or doing, and unless this fact is understood, successful horse-training is an impossibility. Thus, when a horse jumps a fence we must cause a pleasant sensation; were he to be jerked in the mouth he would associate the pain that he felt with the jump and not with our bad riding. Absence of pain followed by a caress or a tit-bit will cause the horse to like jumping, because he associates it with pleasant sensations. Again—and this is a most important point—a horse shies at a motor-car; he is thrashed by a fool and afterwards associates the car with pain—an unpleasant association—and from mere fear he shies next time he sees a car. If he had been left alone on the first occasion, and caressed and given a tit-bit directly the car had passed, he would associate cars with these nice sensations and soon like to see cars coming. This may take time, but it is the principle upon which successful horse-training is based; and I have never known it fail with the worst of horses. Excessive exuberance of spirits through over-feeding and want of exercise may cause a horse to become refractory. No horse must be trained while in such a state; but must be lounded or otherwise exercised, preferably in an enclosed space, until this is got rid of. The horse is far superior to us in strength; but through our superior mental power we are able to deceive him that this is the case, and only while he works under this mental delusion

is he of any real domestic use to us. At first he tries to react, and we are able to prevent him having his own way : he thus believes that we are his superior. As long as we treat him with kindness his good nature does not wish to fight against us. Yet, it is still fashionable for horse-dealers to treat him as if he had no feeling at all, and this is encouraged by fashionable horse people and horse-shows. A horse learns his superiority by ignorance on the part of the master, which is very common. The master ill-uses a horse in the stable until the horse reacts and kicks at the master, who is probably a coward and ceases then to ill-use the horse; who then discovers that his kicking causes cessation of pain, *i.e.* that his reaction benefits himself; thus he finds that he is master. It is very difficult to convince such a horse afterwards that we intend to be master.

If we cannot prevent a horse from doing an act, we must let him do it *pro tempore*, and take great care that the next time he tries we will be well prepared to stop him. If we first try to stop him and eventually give way he learns his superiority; if he is going to do it anyway it is far better that we let him think that we want him to do it.

Some horse-dealers are the cruellest of people that we come across, which says a great deal. The horse suffers much in the hands of these parasites, and so many horse-owners know so little that they do not realise that these men are really cruel. Horse-dealers attract a horse's attention by keeping him in fear of the whip, and in lively motion by insufficient exercise and feeding on fattening food, and by the use of drugs and by other cruel practices. We must remember that kindness never pays so much as it does with horses; horses are trained, as Xenophon said 350 B.C., by kindness, and not by harshness. Some trainers fascinate their horses, but I do not believe that they can mesmerise them, as some of them claim they can.

On Riding.—Terrible cruelty results from bad riding. It always makes me feel ill to see the way beginners ill-use their horses, without meaning to. And all this pain that our friend the horse has to bear is solely due to the want of knowledge on the part of the riding-master. Riding is the finest form of exercise that we can go in for, and I think that every one who has the opportunity to ride should realise how lucky he is. More encouragement to civilians and soldiers alike should be given to go in for mounted sports, &c. A few shillings spent a week on horses will save many more on doctors' bills. Very few good riders exist, and I think that there is no doubt whatever that this is

due to the wrong way most people are taught. I had the best opportunity to prove my theory, and have proved it over and over again with all classes of Cavalry recruits. Once confidence is gained by the pupil, he must be prohibited the use of reins and stirrups for several months, which depends upon the pupil. He must not use them again until he can go over a fairly high jump without in any way losing his seat. The use of the reins during this time will not matter so much if the pupil is merely hacking along the roads, but he should not really leave the school or closed *manège* until he has reached the above stage. The absence of stirrups is necessary to give the pupil a good seat, and that of reins to give him good balance and to improve his hands. Of course, bad hands cannot be made into good ones, but fair hands can be greatly improved by the pupil not being allowed to hold on to the horse's mouth. The most inexcusable crime is that of allowing the pupil to jump with reins. It does not matter so much letting him jump with stirrups the first few times. The best way to get rid of fear is to allow him to ride on a numnah and to tell him to hold on to the surcingle if he feels he is coming off, but with the above method it will take a very short time for the pupil to feel quite at home while going over the jump. Learning to jump with reins will ruin the horse and never teach the pupil to jump properly. I regret that there is so much cruelty practised in the show-ring and in preparing for the horse-show; this is done, of course, by indifferent horsemen, who think that they are perfect, and who will listen to no one. I wish these idiots would remember that the best of expert horsemen are learning every day; in fact, the man that comes in and says that he has learnt nothing new is not a first-class horseman. The only saddle in which a correct seat can be obtained is the English hunting saddle. The correct seat is very similar to the seat of a man sitting bare-back, the only difference being that his toes are down when he is riding without stirrups. The fault of our military saddles is that they are far too short in the seat, necessitating the rider having to ride with his stirrups too long, and that means that he must ride with his leg too straight, in which position his thigh muscles become quite round, instead of being flat. There is no need for this type of short seat now that heavy packs are forbidden on the Cavalryman's saddle. There is only one seat: there is no such thing as the hunting seat and the military seat, as we often hear would-be horsemen talking about. A man cannot ride his horse with a straight leg.

From the point of view of humanity and safety ladies are better if they ride astride, but I fear that many people do not agree with me on this point. A lady while riding astride has more control over the horse, because she has two legs to ride him with. She can also mount and dismount herself, and is not in such danger if the horse runs away, nor is she at the mercy of the girths. A great number of ladies have in the past permanently injured themselves physically by riding crooked on a side-saddle, and the number of horses that get horribly sore backs is only too apparent to one who has visited livery stables in a hunting district, as I have on many occasions. Of course, I do not for one moment suggest that a lady that rides well will do herself any harm by riding side-saddle, but what I do emphasise is that there are comparatively so few side-saddle riders that do ride really well. So many rise off the horse's wrong leg and others rise crooked, whilst others sit crooked with their left shoulder too far back instead of level with the right one.

On Biting.—Ninety-nine per cent. of the bits we see hung in most harness rooms should be thrown on to the scrap-heap. They are used by men with bad hands and a worse knowledge of driving. A snaffle and a simple curb-bit (as the Liverpool for driving and the Weymouth for riding) are all that are necessary for 99 out of every 100 horses. In fact, I do not believe it would be necessary to use any other bit on the one horse out of the hundred if that horse were in the hands of a competent man from the first. Good hands can do wonders with a bad mouth in a very short time. There is no doubt that most runaways are caused by brutal bits, and nearly all pullers are made by them, together with a bad pair of hands on the other end of the reins.

On Spurs.—Spurs are not by any means the best things with which to punish a horse. A whip is the correct article to use. Sharp spurs, except with a very few horses that have already been spoilt by abuse of the spur, are absolutely unnecessary, and are only used by people who know no better or else are brutally disposed. Thousands of good horses are ruined by the use, or rather abuse, of sharp spurs. The real use of the spur, which should be quite blunt or without any rowels at all, is a most valuable indicator or 'aid.' A horse should be ridden as much by this indicator as by the gentle touch of the hands, transmitted through the reins.





BATTLE OF FLEURUS.

(June 26th, 1794.)

THE AIR SERVICE IN THE TIME OF NAPOLEON

By COLONEL N. M. SMYTH, V.C.

IN August 1783 M. de Montgolfier, who had invented and constructed balloons, sent up the first aerial voyagers, which were a sheep, a barn-door fowl, and a duck. In the descent of these historical passengers the duck broke its wing, but the *nacelle* and aerostat were uninjured. In November the Marquis d'Arlandes and M. de Rozier ascended to 3,000 feet in a balloon, which was seventy feet high and was raised by the agency of rarified air, heated by a fire which was stoked in the car. On December 1 M. Charles in a hydrogen-lifted balloon attained a height of nearly two miles. Two years later Blanchard and Jeffries first crossed the English Channel in the air, narrowly escaping falling into the sea.

Napoleon while yet a cadet went on one occasion to witness the ascent of a balloon in the Champs de Mars (*O'Meara*). He entered, unperceived, the enclosure which contained the machine, which was then very nearly filled and about to ascend, and straightway requested the aeronaut to allow him to enter the car. This, however, was refused, the reason given being that the feelings of the boy might embarrass the experiments; on which Bonaparte is stated to have exclaimed—'Though I am young I fear neither the powers of earth nor of the air.' On being requested to retire the little cadet, enraged at the refusal, drew his sword and, slitting the balloon in several places, destroyed the apparatus which had been constructed with infinite labour and ingenuity, and disappeared. Such was the last notable act of the boyhood of Napoleon and his first and last attempt to ascend in a balloon.

Early in 1794 the Convention established the first company of aeronauts for the service of the army of the Republic (*Official Records*), and in due course Captain Coutelle, as director of experimental aerostatics, inaugurated his work in the grounds of the little *château*

of Meudon. Four months later he had joined the Army of the Sambre and Meuse at the head of his first corps of airmen, composed almost entirely of Parisians, of very different social conditions, but animated by the right spirit of indefatigable determination. Their patience was soon put to the test by the laborious operations of balloon construction and inflation, the hydrogen being obtained by bringing a complex structure of cast-iron pipes, containing water, to a white heat, the chemical action decomposing the water and the gas being collected in small quantities at a time.

Coutelle practised ascents, during which he remained from seven to ten hours in the air, and at the Battle of Fleurus, on June 26, 1794,



CAPT. COUTELLE.

he contributed to the success of the French arms. Taking as passenger Adjutant-General Morlot, he ascended to a height of nearly 1,000 feet, and by a system of visual signals was able to maintain constant communication with General Jourdan, transmitting information as to the strength, dispositions, and manœuvres of the Austrian army. He repeatedly moved his position with the assistance of sixty-four soldiers manning the six guy-ropes, in spite of the strength of the wind, which blew in gusts at thirty miles an hour. One of the stays attaching the basket to the balloon was cut by bullets twice in

succession, but the balloon remained for ten hours at work, even drifting over the hostile line of battle.

During the course of the campaign two ascents were made daily for purposes of reconnaissance in all weathers, and frequent extended expeditions were accomplished.

On March 23, 1795, a second company of aeronauts was raised, and on October 31 Conté was appointed director of the School of Aeronautics at Meudon, charged with the duty of training a corps of sixty officers. According to the scientific men of that day, the course of instruction at the School of Aeronautics was a model of clear, accurate, and practical learning.

Within a year the central school had sent four balloons to the army of the Rhine and to that of the Sambre and Meuse. Of these

balloons the *Entreprenant* and the *Martial* soon called forth the admiration of the Austrian staff officers, by the daring feats of aerial reconnaissance which were effected.

The 2nd Company was present at the battles of Rostadt and Donauwerth, and after a series of brilliant services on the banks of the Danube, took part in Moreau's celebrated retreat, during which the balloons were deflated and placed on wagons.

As to the 1st Company, after a new campaign with Jourdan, it was besieged in Wurtzburg, and with its equipment fell into the enemy's hands.

For Napoleon's expedition to Egypt the whole material, stores, and instruments of the aerostat companies were lost on board ship at the Battle of the Nile.

Coutelle subsequently devoted his talents to the exploration of Upper Egypt, while Conté made himself useful to Napoleon by his inventive genius.

Napoleon disbanded the 1st Company on its return to Marseilles on February 18, 1802. The Directory had previously abolished by an edict the 2nd Company, on February 17, 1799, but, as if mistrusting its own decision, had provided that the decree should not be recorded in its proceedings.

It was not until the war of 1870 that the armies of France were again to profit by the use of balloons, more especially for the transmission of information, and the *Armand Barbes* during the siege of Paris carried Gambetta from the beleaguered city, with the fortunes of his country.

Our illustration of the Battle of Fleurus is taken from an old lithographic print of the period by Martinet, and depicts Captain Coutelle making observations and taking the dispositions of the Austrian army from the captive balloon.



CONTÉ

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

Revue de Cavalerie. June.—Lieut.-Colonel Henri Mordacq opens this number with an important paper entitled *La stratégie et la cavalerie au vingtième siècle*; he deplores the evil days upon which the mounted arm seems in a measure to have fallen, more particularly dating from the war in South Africa, but points out that despite all that has been said by its many detractors in depreciation of the present and future value of Cavalry, all the more important of the military nations are adding to the number of their Cavalry units. He then announces his intention of reviewing all that has been achieved by this arm during the most recent wars, and he takes more especially the campaign in Manchuria, as being the most modern in point of time, and the War of Secession as being, in his view, and in that of the late General Négrier, the most up-to-date from the Cavalry point of view that we can study. He adds in a note that this last war, its events, and its lessons are but little known to French military students. He then proceeds at once to a consideration of Cavalry employment *dans la couverture*, during the initial or preparatory stages of a great war, and comes to the conclusion that the Cavalry rôle during this period will be one purely of *surveillance*; that in the case of opposing armies effecting their respective concentrations within a comparatively short distance of one another—as in the case of France and Germany—the covering troops must consist largely of Cavalry if they are to do their work thoroughly, but of Cavalry *très fractionnée*—there will be no use for Cavalry masses in the sense of corps or divisions. These large units must be permitted to effect their concentration undisturbed and reserve themselves and their energies for the operation period; one, moreover, for the commencement of which the Cavalry should give the signal, which it is to their interest to enter upon as soon as possible, and which, Colonel Mordacq considers, may be commenced much earlier than is generally believed. Larger units of Cavalry may, and probably will, be employed when concentration is effected at a greater distance, e.g. Russia and Germany, Austria and Italy, but these bodies again will confine themselves to a purely defensive rôle. The writer does not ignore the possibility of an incursion of large Cavalry bodies during the period of *couverture*, designed to disturb mobilisation arrangements, but seems to opine that a body thus employed might conceivably pass, but not repass, the frontier. The writer then discusses the employment of Cavalry in the *manœuvre stratégique*, and affirms that from this point of view the most recent of wars has by no means proved the failure of the Cavalry; it has merely been shown incontestably that the arm can only render good results when properly used. Finally in this number—for his article is to be continued—Colonel Mordacq deals with the action of Cavalry on the *lines of communication, strategic raids*; he reminds us of Stuart's raids in June and

August 1862, of that of Stoneman in May 1863, of that of Sheridan in June 1864, and of that by Mischenko in January 1905, and finds that to fulfil its strategic rôle Cavalry must 'bluff,' must give the enemy the impression that he has to deal with a force of the three arms; that it must always attack, and that in so doing there will be always *de beaux jours pour la cavalerie*. As regards raids, the enormously increased importance of lines of communication, especially of railways, makes it desirable that Cavalry should run *any* risks in attempting their destruction or interruption. Such raids should not, however, be carried out by a Cavalry force so large that the chief command may seriously feel its absence on the day of battle. Mordacq suggests a limit of 2000 mounted men, with a few guns, and a body of cyclists. General Armand Lucas continues in this number his *Causeries cavalières*, and discusses the fire-fight by Cavalry, shows that Napoleon was convinced of the need for Cavalry being armed with a firearm and of knowing how to use it, gives several instances of Cavalry being 'held up' in the past by numerically small bodies of riflemen, and seems to urge that the rifle or carbine in the hands of the Cavalry is an offensive rather than a defensive weapon, and that its chief use is to create opportunities for the *arme blanche*. To this follows a description of the very interesting *Musée du cheval* lately opened at Saumur and which has found a home in the Château de Saumur. Captain Lelong continues his account of Mischenko's raid in January 1905; this goes largely into detail.

July.—Captain Tulasne, of the French Flying Corps, writes on 'Cavalry in combination with aircraft,' and offers an interesting study by reproducing Colonel Bourdériat's strategic and tactical scheme carried out in 1906-1907 at the *Ecole de Guerre*, and showing how it might have been modified, improved, and altered by the employment of the new science. He takes the events and orders for each day—the situation was similar to that of the early part of November 1870—adding orders for and the information gathered by the aviators. From the reconstitution of the original problem he draws the following conclusions: *Reconnaissances by officers*; these will be sent out and conducted as at present, except that, the aviators having located the enemy, the reconnaissances need only be sent in the required direction where the enemy has been reported. *Détachements de découverte*; these can now be economised. *Cavalerie de sûreté de première ligne*; its rôle is now modified, since there is no longer any need for erecting a network of security which the opposing aviators can pass over; for protection mixed detachments of great mobility—the Infantry moving on bicycles or in motor wagons; the bulk of the Cavalry to be held at disposal for the battle. He sums up by saying that the aeroplane is a factor of offence, permitting the chief command to secure that rapidity of manœuvre which Grandmaison holds to be the real element of success. The account of Mischenko's raid is continued in this number, and the paper by Lieut.-Colonel Mordacq is concluded. He discusses the rôle of Cavalry in the battles of the past, makes some suggestions as to its employment in those of the future, but without, however, offering any solution which grips the reader, closing on the somewhat disappointing, if well-worn note, that much must depend upon the strategic views of the general in chief command, upon the general situation, and upon the force of Cavalry at disposal. Lieut.-Colonel Mordacq has not much that is new to tell us about Cavalry in the pursuit, except that he does not seem to believe that it will have the same opportunities for effective action as of old, though

he does not say why; but on the other hand he considers that in retreat its rôle has developed, and especially in the interruption and destruction of the railways, whereby alone the pursuing army can ensure the arrival of its supplies. In conclusion he declares that the tactical employment of Cavalry has diminished in proportion as its strategical rôle has developed, the war of the future will not end with one big battle, the struggle will be prolonged over the whole theatre of operations, and that it is in these circumstances and under these conditions that the mounted arm will pre-eminently assert itself. General Armand Lucas continues his *Causeries cavalières*, and deals in this paper solely with the dismounted fight; he emphasises again the expression of the idea that the fire-fight is for Cavalry the preliminary to and the auxiliary of the mounted action, that especially in the pursuit must the rifle or the carbine open the path for the sabre or the lance; he closes with a fine passage: *par l'offensive de son feu elle ouvrira la voie à ses tout-puissants moyens de terreur: sourd grondement du galop des escadrons, sonneries stridentes des trompettes, clameurs sauvages des cavaliers, fer de leurs lances.*

Spectateur Militaire.—The two numbers for July of this fortnightly contain an article of some importance on Cavalry tactics, divided under the headings of methods of action, usual modes of combat, its chief missions, and its future, and written, of course, mainly from the point of view of the French Cavalryman. The regulations issued in 1911 are, says the author, so far an improvement upon those of 1904 in that they breathe the spirit of the offensive in a more pronounced degree, but on the other hand they were admittedly framed with the view of passing the recruit with the least possible loss of time into the mobilised squadron—a necessity arising from the reduction of the period of service to two years. Attention was also therein paid to the modifications and improvement in armament generally. In order also to make things easier for the Cavalry recruit, it was laid down in the 1911 regulations that he was only to be mounted on a thoroughly broken horse, and that in order that he should be taught always to attack, and attack *par la pointe*, all parade and fencing exercises were to be done away with. As the author points out, this seemed to take it for granted that the opponent would offer no resistance and would facilitate the use of *la pointe* by obligingly turning his back upon it! The regulations of 1911 were all in the direction of inducing simplicity in command and manœuvre; it was laid down that there should be *groupes de combat*, the attacks by which were to converge on the enemy; while, so far as concerned the dismounted action, it was invariably to be looked upon as the continuation of a forward movement which for some reason had become temporarily impossible for the mounted body. In laying down general principles to govern the employment of large bodies, it was specifically stated that these were never to be absorbed into hard-and-fast rules for conduct. Captain Servagnat then says something about the French troop-horse and his rider, and passes to the armament—the eternal question of sword or lance. He favours the sabre, and while admitting that the lance is beyond question the weapon for the *individual* combat, he refuses to recognise its special value in the pursuit, while holding that for the majority of French horsemen the lance is no better or more effective weapon than would be any pole of equal length. In the second part of his article the author discusses the meeting of two Cavalry bodies in the actual shock of the charge. Most people, he declares, say that such a thing

is impossible, that one or other body will avoid the actual *abordage*, accepting the *choc moral* only. Captain Servagnat is no believer in this: he is of opinion that the meeting of two Cavalry bodies, both riding home, will be by no means exceptional and that the *mêlée* is the normal result of the meeting of two Cavalries each imbued with the same offensive spirit, further, that history, when recording Cavalry actions of the past, seems to take the *abordage* for granted, while silent on the subject of *la crise fugitive qui a déterminé le succès ou le revers*. It is, however, frequently mentioned by those who took part in such charges—by Blücher, de Brack, and von Colomb. Let us then, says the writer, realise that such a meeting is possible, and let us count no longer on '*le choc moral*.' As to the dismounted combat, it may, he says, be used but not abused; the aim and object of the mounted man is to 'get there.' *En avant, toujours en avant; en avant, à cheval, et avec le sabre, en avant, avec la carabine*. He then treats of the different missions allotted to the Cavalry, and finally of the future of the arm: he finds that aircraft may aid but can never replace Cavalry, and that whatever organisation may be in the future adopted—and he asks for more Cavalry divisions, supported by guns and accompanied by Cyclist Infantry—it is after all the *leader* that really matters, first and foremost and all the time.

The numbers for August and September contain well-informed and appreciative descriptive articles by Lieut. Durette on the British Horse and Field Artillery.

Militär-Wochenblatt.—There is very little of Cavalry interest in the numbers of this journal for the last three months, but No. 117 of September 4 contains an account of the origin and organisation of the *Jäger zu Pferde*, regiments which owe their existence to the present Emperor. By a Royal Decree, dated March 30, 1895, there was created a despatch-rider detachment for the Guard Corps, the 1st, and the 15th Army Corps, respectively attached to the Life Guard Hussars in Potsdam, to the 3rd Cuirassiers in Königsberg, and to the 9th Hussars in Strassburg. Two years later the name of Mounted Jäger Detachments was given to these bodies, and two more were created, attached to the 14th Dragoons in Colmar (14th Army Corps) and to the 1st Guard Hussars in Danzig (17th Army Corps). After a further two years—in 1899—the name was changed from 'Detachments' to 'Squadrons,' and three more were organised, two squadrons going to the 14th Hussars in Cassel (11th Army Corps) and one to the 11th Hussars in Düsseldorf (7th Corps). In 1901 these were numbered—except the squadron with the Guard Corps, which retained the name of Guard '*Jäger zu Pferde*'—and in October of the same year five new squadrons were organised in Posen and there formed into a combined Jäger Regiment. This received in 1905 the title of the 1st Regiment of Mounted Jägers, and, when later the Emperor appointed himself its Colonel, it received the additional appellation of Königs Jäger. On October 1, 1905, some of the existing squadrons were united and formed into a 2nd and 3rd Regiment, with the addition of newly raised squadrons, and in 1906 the 4th Regiment was organised, each being now made of a uniform strength of five squadrons. No. 5 Regiment was raised in Mülhausen in 1908 and No. 6 in Erfurt in 1910, and later in this same year Nos. 7 and 8 came into existence in Trier, No. 9 in Insterburg, No. 10 in Angerburg, No. 11 in Tarnowitz, No. 12 in St. Avoild, and No. 13 in Saarlouis.

Kavalleristische Monatshefte. June.—Lieut.-Colonel von Immanuel commences this number with a paper on the lessons which he considers may be learnt by the Cavalry arm from the Balkan War of 1912-13. He describes very briefly the organization, strength and armament of the Cavalry on either side, has something, though not much, to say as to the manner in which mounted troops were employed, mounted and on foot, and thus epitomises the lessons to be taken to heart: 1. No army which does not possess a numerous, thoroughly trained, and efficient Cavalry can venture upon a war; 2. Cavalry must work in closest possible combination with the other arms; 3. In spite of the development of technical inventions of all kinds Cavalry remains the arm of reconnaissance; and 4. That Cavalry must be specially in its element in the pursuit, owing to the fact that the increased physical and mental exhaustion produced by the modern battle prevents the other arms from participating in the following up of a defeated enemy. Lieut.-Colonel Kerchnawe, of the General Staff, writes on the French Cavalry of 1813, describes the extraordinary efforts made by Napoleon to collect men and horses, shows how unequal was either to the requirements of war—the men mostly recruits called up against their will, the horses either young and unbroken or old and broken down—and yet invites attention to the extraordinarily good results obtained on very many occasions against a Cavalry which in almost every single quality was its superior, well mounted, and composed of well-trained men filled with a spirit of national enthusiasm—almost indeed of fanaticism.

Rittmeister Stadelmayr, of the 3rd Bavarian Chevauleger Regiment, puts forward certain proposals for the better training of officers in the duties of patrols. Major-General von Gersdorff writes on the much-vexed question of the permanent organisation of Cavalry divisions in the German army, and quotes in support of the increasing demand for such an organisation the opinion expressed in letters to General von Pelet-Narbonne and Colonel von Alvensleben by General von Schmidt, who was one of the chief Cavalry divisional commanders in 1870, and who had afterwards so much to do with the development on modern lines of the German Cavalry. Lieut.-Colonel Spannochti continues in this number his translation of the Russian Riding Instructions; and Colonel von Müller-Kranefeldt has a short paper, based upon an article in the February number of the *Revue de Cavalerie*, on the 'French Cavalry in the autumn manœuvres of 1912.'

July-August.—This is, as usual, a double number. It opens with an account, by Lieut.-Colonel Immanuel, of the work of the Cavalry in the battles of Grossbeeren, of the Katzbach and Dennewitz. At this period, as is pointed out, Napoleon no longer possessed the Cavalry of Friedland, Wagram and Borodino; there was such a want of horses, and especially of trained horses, that the men of the mounted arm, both those who had returned out of the snows of Russia and the new levies, had to march on foot into Germany, there to take over such horses as had been obtained for them. The old leaders were there, but their fire was beginning to die down, and Immanuel reminds us that the only really effective Cavalry bodies were the regiments of the Old Guard, certain corps which had been recalled from service in Spain, and part of the Polish Cavalry. The writer makes the somewhat unusual statement that 'if Russia ever possessed a really good Cavalry it was in the campaign of 1813; the regular Cavalry was admirably mounted, well trained, and splendidly equipped.' More difficult is it to determine the value of the Cossacks of that period, but we are told that those to whom they were opposed—who may be accepted as

tolerably good judges—speak of them with respect, saying their swarms were ubiquitous and that their remarkable mobility created a lasting impression. Colonel Immanuel then describes the action of the opposing Cavalries in the three great battles above mentioned, and declares that the Cavalry of the Allies was never used in combination, but that the ground was very unfavourable to its traditional employment. The lesson of Grossbeeren is that even a numerically weak Cavalry body, as was that of Fournier, can by surprise exercise a very great moral influence upon the opponent. In regard to Blücher's successful action on August 26, it is considered that so far as the Allies are concerned the action of their Cavalry was too much by isolated regiments, but that the portion of that arm with Sacken was very opportunely employed. On the French side the Cavalry was very unfortunately used; it should not have crossed the Neisse either before or with the Infantry, but should have been used to operate against the Russian right. Hence Immanuel draws the lesson that Cavalry should not commit itself too early, but should preserve as long as possible its freedom of action. He compares the situation at Dennewitz with that at Vionville at the moment of the intervention of Bredow's brigade, and claims that all these battles of a hundred years ago plainly prove that while the *tactics* of Cavalry have changed, the *principles* governing its employment have remained unaltered. Colonel Kerchnawe writes about the Cavalry of the smaller German States at the same period, reminding us that these furnished contingents to both sides, and that actually as many Germans fought for Napoleon at Leipzig as against him. Then follow a very short paper on the qualifications for the Cavalry commander, and some suggestions for the organisation of the Austro-Hungarian Cavalry. Lieut.-General von Tritsch is of opinion that recent manoeuvres have shown up the shortcomings of the Cavalry—whether he alludes to the German or the Austro-Hungarian is not clear—in regard to distant and close reconnaissance, and he has some proposals to make for improved training in these particulars. Rittmeister Sametzki, of the 3rd Guard Hussars, makes a contribution to the question which at the present moment seems greatly to vex the souls of our Continental brethren in arms—viz. as to the systematic instruction of Cavalry officers in the conduct of patrols. The translation of the Russian Riding Instructions is concluded in this number. Among the remaining papers of interest is an account of the origin and present importance of the Cossack Cavalry.

‘Training Young Horses to Jump,’ by Lieut. Geoffrey Brooke, 16th Lancers. Lawrence Jellicoe, Limited, 5s. net.

This is a most valuable book, with a preface by Colonel John Vaughan, of the Cavalry School, which should be read by all Cavalry officers and men interested in the training of horses to ride across country. No one has proved himself better qualified to write on this subject than Mr. Geoffrey Brooke, who is an expert in the show ring, the hunting field, and on the polo ground. It is an excellent work and the precepts and advice given in it should be studied by all. Readers may know what to expect, from previous articles in the CAVALRY JOURNAL on this subject by the author.

NOTES

The Managing-Editor and Staff of the CAVALRY JOURNAL beg to offer their heartiest congratulations to Colonel John Vaughan, D.S.O., Commandant of the Cavalry School, Netheravon, on his approaching marriage, and wish him the best of good luck and happiness.

This we feel sure will be cordially shared by every reader of this Journal, on which he has devoted so much time and energy.

SOLANO TARGET.

The War Office, after experimenting for some months with a new pattern of the Solano Battle Practice Target, has adopted it for use on the miniature ranges of the Regular Army and Territorial Force. Over one hundred of these ranges will be equipped with the target in the immediate future. About eighty of these ranges belong to the Territorial Force.

The target, besides being used for all ordinary practices, provides what is known as a 'field firing area' for miniature ranges—that is, a track of natural country, the features of which may be varied at will, over which troops of all arms in battle formations reduced to scale for various ranges can be made to manœuvre so as to practise men in the duties of the firing line under conditions approximating to those of service.

The policy of the War Office in equipping ranges with the target will facilitate musketry training during the winter months and help to relieve the shortage of range accommodation for the Territorial Force. It is a development of the policy of the Army Council in regard to the provision of ranges as contained in a statement issued with Army Orders in November last.

OBITUARY.

It is with regret we have to record the death of Second Lieutenant Terence Sharman-Crawford, 15th (The King's) Hussars, which occurred at Aldershot on July 24 as the result of an accident whilst riding a motor-bicycle. He was the only son of Colonel R. G. Sharman-Crawford, of Crawfordsburn, Co. Down, and was educated at Winchester, and gazetted from Sandhurst to the 15th Hussars, his father's old regiment, February 7, 1912, joining shortly afterwards at Potchefstroom, South Africa, from whence he came home when the regiment left that country.

We regret to announce the death of Lieut. T. C. Harman, 20th Hussars, as a result of a polo accident in the Subalterns' Tournament. The deceased was the only son of Major Harman, of Carrigbyrne, Co. Wexford, and was born on October 17, 1887. He joined the 20th Hussars in 1908 from the Gloucester Yeomanry, and was promoted Lieutenant in 1911. At the time of his death he was a student at the Cavalry School. Lieut. Harman was a most popular officer, both in his regiment and with all who had anything to do with him. A very keen sportsman, he will be much missed by his regiment and friends.

'OBSERVATION AND JUDGMENT'

THE INAUGURATION ADDRESS TO THE ROYAL VETERINARY COLLEGE, 1913

By MAJOR-GENERAL F. SMITH, C.B., C.M.G., F.R.C.V.S.

We all have to learn from the beginning in everything, our knowledge starts from the simplest elementary cell of experience, and by no process can the period of multiplication and differentiation of the cell be hastened, and no other than those provided by the body can be of any use to it. I do not say that in intelligence and wisdom all men are equal or equally endowed. There are many who learn little or nothing from experience, and who go through life with an astonishingly small amount of wisdom. It is evident to all who have lived long enough to observe, that every man must fill up that portion of his brain devoted to knowledge with the facts of his own laborious accumulations, and that those belonging to other people are of little or no use to him.

There is very little intuitive knowledge in the world, but there is an intuitive capacity for acquiring knowledge and an intuitive skill in utilising it. Speaking generally, all knowledge is the outcome of experience, and the two tutors of experience are observation and experiment. The application of experience in order to elicit truth is the quality known as judgment. I propose to deal with the two qualities, observation and judgment, in the construction of the veterinary practitioner.

It must be evident to you that in clinical work, especially with dumb patients, you cannot gain knowledge excepting by observation; and in order to become skilful all your efforts must be devoted to observing your patients. If you could learn about disease from books there would be very little reason for the existence of veterinary schools. No book, however, will present an exact picture of the case you are searching for, for the good reason that no two cases of the same disease are ever exactly alike. I may illustrate this all-important fact by reminding you of the doctrine of combinations and permutations, or the art which teaches the number of possible ways in which a given number of things may be mixed.

One of the simplest examples I can select to convey this lesson is to ask you to consider the number of possible ways in which the names of the seven days of the week can be arranged. It can be shown mathematically that the number of possible orders, including the existing one, is no less than 5040. In the example selected, as few as seven things can be so mixed as to be capable of arrangement in 5040 different ways, so that if we chose we could for 5040 consecutive weeks have a fresh order in which the days should follow each other. Accordingly, if we started with the existing order it would be ninety-seven years, less four weeks, before it would again be reached.

Now, it seems more than probable that the number of possible ways in which the factors which make up disease may be mixed, accounts for the fact that no two cases of the same trouble are exactly alike. We do not know what these factors are, they may be purely chemical changes, they may be partly chemical and partly tissue, they may be wholly tissue. We know nothing of the subject at present, so that in speaking of chemical and tissue changes I am only employing convenient terms to express my thoughts. Whatever the changes occurring in the body may be, which admit of its passing from a physiological into a pathological condition,

it appears certain that they are capable, like the days of the week, of a large number of possible arrangements, which explains why every case of the same disease is a problem in itself. This cannot be too seriously committed to mind if we are to appreciate the surprises which await us in practice. It is the inability of the public to learn this lesson which supports the race of quacks, of cure-all remedies, and the publication of the Family Prescriber and the Stable Companion.

In every observation one or more of the senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell, and occasionally taste are employed. All these senses are not of equal importance in clinical work, yet none of them may be neglected if we are to keep our powers of observation at the highest level.

There are many varieties of observation, and probably no one man possesses them all equally developed. There are some people who never forget a face, the mental picture formed is ineradicable; some never forget horses they have once seen, others can never remember them. There are people so unobservant as to locality that they do not recognise a street they have seen before, and others who never fail to remember one along which they have once passed. Similarly there are men who can see clinical features and differences when they are pointed out, but fail to find them for themselves, yet the recognition of these differences in practice is of the utmost moment, and there are even commoner features in connection with the sick or their surroundings which some utterly fail to notice.

I intend to present to you to-day, as the basis of my remarks, a part of the satirical story entitled 'Zadig,' written by Voltaire in 1747. It illustrates the power of observation, and, though it is doubtful whether he ever intended it to be taken seriously, you will recognise, when I have related it to you, the framework of the far better known Sherlock Holmes.

'Zadig was a young man who sought for happiness in the study of nature. He believed there were no delights equal to those of the philosopher, who reads in this great book the truths which are always set before him. He retired to a country house on the banks of the Euphrates, in the vicinity of Babylon. Here his especial study was the properties of animals and plants, and he soon acquired a sagacity that showed him a thousand differences in these where other men saw nothing but uniformity.

'One day when walking near a wood he met several of the palace attendants running hither and thither like men bewildered, and searching for some precious object. "Young man," said one of them, "have you seen the queen's dog?"

"It is a very small spaniel," replied Zadig, "it is not long since she had a litter of puppies, she is lame in the left fore limb, and her ears are very long."

"You have seen her, then?" said the attendant.

"No," answered Zadig; "I have never seen her."

'At this moment the finest horse in the king's stable broke away from his groom on the plains of Babylon. The Grand Huntsman and other officers ran after him, and, passing Zadig, asked him if he had seen the king's horse pass that way.

'Zadig replied, "It is the horse which gallops best, he has small feet, and is 15 hands high, his tail is $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet long, the bosses on his bit are of gold, and his shoes are of silver."

"Which road did he take? Where is he?" asked the Grand Huntsman.

"I have not seen him," answered Zadig, "and I have never even heard anyone speak of him."

The palace officials had no doubt that Zadig had stolen the dog and horse, so he was arrested and brought before the Court, which condemned him to a flogging and transportation for life. Scarcely had the judge pronounced sentence than the horse and dog were found. The judges were accordingly under the disagreeable necessity of amending their judgment, and consequently fined him heavily for having said that he had not seen what he must obviously have seen. He was allowed, however, to plead his cause before the Court, which he did in the following terms:—

"Inasmuch as it is permitted me to speak before this august assembly, I swear to you that I have never seen the queen's dog nor the horse of the king. Hear all that happened. I was walking towards the little wood, where later on I met the palace officials, and saw on the sand the footprints of an animal. I easily decided that they were those of a little dog. Long and faintly marked furrows, imprinted where the sand was slightly raised between the footprints, told me that it was a bitch whose teats were drooping, and that consequently she must have given birth to young ones only a few days before. Other marks of a different character, showing that the surface of the sand had been constantly grazed on either side of the forepaws, informed me that she had very long ears; and as I observed that the sand was always less deeply indented by one paw than by the other, I gathered that the dog was a little lame.

"With respect to the horse of the king, you must know that as I was walking along the road in the wood I perceived the imprints of a horse's shoes all at equal distances. There, I said to myself, went a horse with a faultless gallop. The dust upon the trees, where the width of the road was not more than 7 feet, was here and there rubbed off on both sides $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet away from the middle of the road. This horse, said I, has a tail $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet long, which by its movements from right to left has whisked away the dust. I saw, where the trees formed a canopy 5 feet above the ground, that leaves had lately fallen from the boughs, and I concluded that the horse had touched them, and was therefore 15 hands in height. As to his bit, he had rubbed its bosses against a stone. Lastly, I inferred from the marks that his shoes left upon the stones on the ground that he was shod with silver."

I have ventured to give you a detailed transcript of this being of Voltaire's imagination, inasmuch as the penetration and close observation of Zadig should be imitated by you if you are anxious to succeed in life. It is perfectly possible by acute observation to be able by his methods to learn for yourself what your patient can never tell you, what the attendant may deliberately misrepresent to you, and even the owner may lend himself to measures opposed to his own interests. The observant man by the employment of his senses is rendered independent of outside assistance.

Though Voltaire's story, in the above connection, stops at the point mentioned, I propose to take the liberty of retaining the creation of Zadig, transforming him into a veterinary surgeon, and continuing the story, which might run somewhat as follows:—

The King of Babylon was so impressed on hearing of the subtle discernment of Zadig that he determined to test his powers by directing him to inspect his stables and horses. He had long been dissatisfied with their management and care, and this was an opportunity not to be lost. He,

however, directed that no help of any kind should be given him, and Zadig, who readily accepted what appeared to him to be a challenge, undertook to ask no questions, and to base his opinion on his own observations. One by one the horses were seen, some in the stable, others outside for further observation, but in no case was a word spoken.

'The king then requested a report to be made him. Zadig was ushered into the royal presence, and spoke in the following terms :—

"The stables of your Majesty are not conducted on a modern system of sanitation, for the bedding has never been removed from beneath the horses, nor the stalls and boxes swept out."

"How can that be true," said the king, "for with my own eyes I observed that the straw is always clean and new?"

"True," replied Zadig, "but only that on the surface; beneath, and hidden from your Majesty's eyes, is soiled material, compressed into a mass through frequent lying and standing upon, and it could not have reached its present condition under several weeks."

"Continue," said the king.

"Your horses do not get sufficient water to drink, for I observed that though by the hour of the day they were already watered, the sound of the stable bucket when moved caused many to prick up their ears and look anxiously around.

"The majority also receive too much corn, for their excrement is foul from excess.

"Your grey horses are not permitted to lie down at night, in case they soil themselves."

"How is this known to you?" said the king.

"For the reason that their hindquarters bear no marks of the straw, and as they had not been groomed when I saw them, the straw marks should have been evident. Moreover, though grey horses, their quarters were unstained, which they certainly would have been from lying on their dung at night."

The king motioned that Zadig should continue.

"Your forage store is badly placed, and there are indications that corn is carried away from your stables and given to others."

"In what way do you arrive at a charge so serious?" said the king.

"By the fact," replied Zadig, "that I saw corn on the ground, and following the trail it led away from the stables, and through the garden of the palace to the high road beyond. Oats are out of place in a garden, and there was doubtless a hole in the sack which contained your Majesty's property. Nor," added Zadig, "is that matter of recent occurrence, for some oat plants have grown up, the result of seed dropped weeks ago."

"Proceed with your report," said the king.

"Your young horses are being worked beyond their strength and years, for many are brushing, and already the legs of some are looking worn, though the age of the horses tells me it is not long since they were broken.

"Among those responsible for riding your Majesty's horses is one with a temper unsuited to the work; he is rough in his methods, for the chastisement of yesterday may still be discerned by the marks of whip and spur. His violence and roughness in dealing with these horses is shown by their extreme nervousness and apprehension when approached, and more than one bore marks of injury to the eyeball where it had been struck by a whip. The man who did it was left-handed, for in each case the near eye of the

horse was the injured one. That the marks on the side were inflicted by a spur is evident from their position, and I also observed dried blood and hair on the spurs of one of your servants. Your Majesty, as a humane man, will be pleased to learn that one of the horses so treated threw its rider."

"How can that be known to you?" said the king.

"By the long spur mark up the horse's flank," replied Zadig.

"Among your Majesty's young horses is one with a severe cold, but I did not see him."

"In that case," said the king, "how can you possibly know?"

"I entered the empty stall, and the wall above the manger, and the manger itself, bore the fullest evidence of being occupied by a horse with a severe cold, for a considerable amount of discharge had been snorted about, and some rubbed on the wall. Moreover, the case is a recent one, and was in that stall this morning, for some of the discharge was still quite fresh."

"Leave the young horses," said the king, "and tell me something of those which are at work."

"Your Majesty would be well advised to have the windsucker standing third on the left in your sixteen-stall stable removed."

"How can you so precisely indicate the horse which is windsucking? Did you see him doing it?"

"No," replied Zadig, "I heard him."

"But that might be any other horse than the one you mention."

"It might, your Majesty," said Zadig, "but the one I have indicated is the one so affected, for the manger bears the marks of his teeth, and the teeth themselves are worn away."

"What of the others in the same stable?" said the king.

"The seventh horse on the left has some affection of the back teeth, for I observed that he dropped the food out of mouth when partly masticated, and I found several such masses in the manger."

"Has this long existed?" inquired the King.

"Not long," replied Zadig, "for the horse's condition is scarcely yet affected thereby."

"Continue," said the king.

"In the same stable were several cases of thrush."

"How do you know of their existence?"

"By the smell," replied Zadig. "You have also a roarer in that stable, though I cannot indicate him without more time."

"Then how do you know of his presence?"

"I heard his cough," replied Zadig.

"But many horses cough which are not roarers," said the king.

"True, your Majesty; but a horse which coughs as a roarer coughs cannot be other than a roarer."

"Is there much more wrong in that stable?" inquired the king.

"Only that you have a case of stringhalt in the bottom stall on the right, for I noticed he snatched his hind leg up when made to move."

"You also have a confirmed kicker in that stable, for, apart from the fact that the woodwork of the stall has recently been repaired, I observed the off hock was capped, and the replaced woodwork on the right of the stall was already deeply indented with the shoe. He would be better placed by himself, for he kicked his stable companion this morning."

"Did you witness this?" said the king.

"No," replied Zadig, "I saw a small wound on the near hind shank, which could only be a kick, and it was fresh."

"Is there any further trouble in that stable?"

"It would be well to place in a safer position the horse that stands near the door on the right, as he both bites and kicks."

"How do you know that?" asked the king.

"The expression of his face and eyes and his ears laid back tell me that he bites; the whisking of his tail informs me he is a kicker."

"Tell me something of my sick horses," said the king.

"It is a great pity that nice young horse in the first box will die," replied Zadig.

"Die," said the king; "why, the Grand Huntsman said he was better to-day!"

"He is worse, your Majesty; he has acute pleurisy, and since yesterday he has got water in his chest."

"How can this be known to you?" said the king.

"He is young, and pleurisy is common in the young; he stands in one position with his elbows turned out; he is breathing rapidly, and grunts every time he breathes."

"Why?" inquired the king.

"Because it hurts him to fill his lungs with air."

"Explain how you know there is water in the chest."

"The peculiar movement of the flanks in breathing tells this with certainty, and I judged that it occurred since yesterday, as your Majesty was under the impression the horse was better to-day. An apparent temporary improvement commonly follows effusion."

I think at this point we can dispense with the further service of Zadig. I have endeavoured to illustrate how much may be learned about anything by keeping your eyes open, and your common sense at concert pitch. The value of close observation in veterinary practice can never be exaggerated; by means of it the puzzle may be put together piece by piece, and the examples given of the methods of Zadig are no exaggeration or flight of fancy.

As a familiar example of acute observation, I would remind you of the extraordinary ability a woman possesses of taking in, with an almost imperceptible motion of the eyeballs, the entire costume from head to foot worn by another. The tints, the texture, the cut, the nature of the lace or embroidery, nay, even the price, are known at a glance, and, moreover, are not forgotten. The same sweep of the eye, though with greater deliberation, is what your patients should receive from you; be certain that there is something to learn if only you can see it.

It is true that there are some clinical conditions where the symptoms are so obtrusive that they cannot be overlooked. For instance, one can diagnose lockjaw or laminitis as far off as the horse can be distinctly seen; they could even be recognised at a considerable distance with glasses. Choking, or, more correctly, impaction of the œsophagus in the horse can be diagnosed at a glance. There is no occasion to doubt the existence of an acute sore throat if food or water returns through the nostrils at every swallow. You need not believe the horse is unable to urinate, if with the hand in the rectum you find the bladder empty. Yet some extraordinary stories of such difficulty will be told you, even in the face of the floor being found wet when the litter is turned aside. If a man tells you he has picked out his horse's feet every day, and on looking at them you find them full of moss-litter on

which the animal has not been standing for a week, you are under no obligation to believe him.

There is no case in which the veterinary surgeon gets such credit for sagacity as in that rare affection arterial embolism of the hind limbs. This may be diagnosed from its history alone, though, unless you intend to ride for a fall, you will never make any diagnosis before seeing your patient.

I would warn you, however, against regarding observation as a something readily acquired. As a matter of fact, accurate observation is most difficult to secure, owing to defects in memory, but more commonly to actual defects in observation. To prove this show the same object to a dozen people, and then let each separately describe his visual impression of it. People have to be trained to observe, though here, as in everything else, there are men who possess a natural aptitude for the work. I doubt very much whether without this natural aptitude a man will ever become an acute observer. Training, and training only, will make an accurate observer, and such training cannot be begun too early; there are endless common objects which lend themselves to study. No horse should pass us that we should not look at. There is always something to see, something to observe, especially in the make and shape of the limbs and feet, and locomotion, even a footprint, is full of interest.

Not only the sense of sight, but the senses of hearing, taste, smell, and touch have to be educated for the purpose of diagnosis. A case of canker in a stable may be detected by its smell; a roarer and a broken-winded horse may be known by the distinctive coughs without in either case the patient being seen; the feel of a sprained tendon in the dark tells us as much as though it were broad daylight. By the sense of hearing we can detect with certainty the existence of a loose shoe, though we may not see the horse. The sense of taste, though rarely employed, may occasionally be found of service. On this point a useful object lesson was one day imparted in the wards of a hospital in Vienna, and the story will bear repetition.

The professor of medicine was lecturing at the bedside on the disease known as diabetes, and the urine of the patient was produced for demonstration purposes. Addressing the students the professor informed them that in acute cases of diabetes the amount of sugar passed may be sufficient to give the urine a strongly sweet taste. Dipping a finger in the urine, he put a finger in his mouth. The students crowding around did likewise, and there was a consensus of opinion that the urine was sweet, very sweet. The professor then continued his address as follows: 'And now, gentlemen, you have learned an important lesson as to the necessity for close and careful observation. If you had only observed me carefully, you would now know that I dipped my first finger into the patient's urine, and put my second finger into my mouth!'

I must pass now to a consideration of the other quality, i.e. judgment. This is defined as the comparison of ideas to elicit truth. It is infinitely more difficult than the art of observation, and requires a longer apprenticeship. The judgment required of a practitioner is not only that which pertains to the study of disease, but to the no less difficult subject of the study of man. Unless you become a good judge of human nature you will not make a successful practitioner, though you may be a veterinary surgeon of more than average ability. The judgment, however, that I desire to refer to is that connected with the diagnosis of disease. Every horse suffering from a pain in its inside is not suffering from colic; our judgment must decide

the point. Every animal with a swollen leg is not necessarily suffering from a sprain of the back tendon. Every horse that rubs himself is not affected with mange. And, generally, it may be stated that the mental analysis of symptoms and evidences constitutes the essence of judgment, which is directed by experience and the application of the senses. Of two horses discharging from a single nostril, in one case the discharge being odourless, in the other foetid, the sense of smell has at once differentiated—I had almost said diagnosed—these cases. In the examination of horses for soundness—the most responsible part of our difficult work—the judgment is largely aided by the sense of vision. It is with the eye we take in all four limbs from every aspect, and the eye catches irregularities of shape and size that may not be felt.

Errors of judgment arising from defects in the sense of touch are also considerable. Some men have a very indifferently marked tactile sense, and are utterly unable to appreciate minute and important differences, a determination of which is probably of the utmost value. In the examination of horses for soundness, curb, spavin, ringbone, and sprain of the ligaments and tendons of the limbs are by some wholly decided by the sense of touch, but even when vision is brought to its aid touch is still of extraordinary importance.

Errors of judgment from defective hearing are not so numerous, though a man who misses the 'grunt' or faint whistle of a roarer may have to pay dearly for his loss of acoustic sense, while in clinical work it is a serious drawback in auscultation and other ways.

Defective eyesight is doubtless responsible for defective powers of observation. If the image is blurred it cannot be seen. Even a low degree of shortsightedness will make all the difference between a sharp observant man and an apparently stupid unobservant one. A man cannot observe what he cannot see, and I am certain that one of the qualifications for entering a veterinary school should be a correction of any visual defect. So much of our important work is done at a distance, that it is impossible to train a man properly with uncorrected defect in his sight. This will be clear to you when you remember the examination of horses for soundness, and the inspection of cases of lameness.

In order to be good practitioners I urge you to train your observation and judgment, and be, as far as possible, independent of outside help in the diagnosis of disease. Look and see whether the patient does not tell you what is wrong. The absence of speech is no very serious disadvantage excepting in cases of lameness, and though the truth-saving advantages of a dumb patient may be neutralised by the untruthfulness and gross inaccuracies of those in attendance, the observant practitioner can silently afford to neglect most of what he hears.

Lastly, I have avoided, for the reasons previously explained, making any references to the duty you owe your parents and your teachers while students of this College, but this does not absolve me from reminding you of the duty you owe the profession, the ranks of which we hope you will shortly join. You are the heirs to all the ages. You succeed to an estate in the construction of which you have hitherto taken no part. It is left to you as an inheritance, its upkeep and the maintenance of its standard are in your hands, for you will be living and in active practice when most of the present tenants are dead. On your shoulders, and that of all the younger men in the profession, rests the grave responsibility of maintaining the honour,

dignity, and technical standard of your calling. The future of the profession lies in the hands of its younger members. I am a firm believer in young men; mistakes they will make, no one is free from them; but remember, the man who makes no mistakes makes nothing. Youth is essential to progress, to new ideas, to energy and vitality. Youth in its broad sense of freshness and receptivity lasts until forty, and a man who has not been heard of before that age will never be known.

Speaking recently on the Universities of the Empire, Lord Rosebery said he did not ask that its members should have brains, because brains come wherever there is a career for ambition. If I were asked to place my finger on the weakest point in our constitution I should point to defective ambition. The remedy lies in the hands of the younger men. Ambition is the very essence of a useful life.

Take, therefore, the opportunity now afforded you of equipping yourselves for the responsible duties which await you, strive for exactitude in everything, think for yourselves, be ambitious, and bear in mind that only the fringe of the great subject of disease has hitherto been touched. Endeavour to add something to the stock of common knowledge, and thereby leave the estate the richer for your tenancy.


A SUGGESTED ALTERATION TO THE PRESENT SHACKLE

By SERGT. E. G. WARLOCK, *4th (R.I.) Dragoon Guards*

The working of the alteration is readily understood by examining the explanatory sketches attached.

Advantages.


1. Ease of adjustment.
2. Easily released as there is no knot to be untied, and wet does not therefore affect it.
3. Can be carried round the horse's neck, the leather shackle having an extra hole punched in it and the T head being passed through.



Shackle with wooden T affixed.



Twisted Peg Loop.



Method of Adjustment.

4. The end of the rope being spliced and seized prevents its fraying, and should therefore lengthen its life.

There is no doubt that the present method of attaching the shackle to the heel rope is far from satisfactory, owing to the fact that when wet it is almost impossible to unfasten, with the result that during night operations a large number is left behind or cut, and much delay is caused in getting troops under way.

The T attachment has been carefully tested and shows no tendency to come undone.

N N

PRACTICAL BILLETING

By THE ROYAL WILTSHIRE YEOMANRY

It seems that in the event of the Yeomanry Cavalry of this country being called out for service that billeting would be a most suitable, and, indeed, the most likely, method of providing the necessary shelter and rest so essential for both men and horses on any campaign.

England is an agricultural country, and nearly every one of her innumerable farms is capable of providing cover—or at least shelter—for a squadron of men and horses. Even if the horses cannot be stabled or provided with cover, they can, in the smallest farm, be *sheltered*, and at all events cover can be found for 100 men, together with their saddlery, arms, and equipment.

The Commanding Officer, the Royal Wiltshire Yeomanry, thought that the experiment of billeting would be worth a trial, in that the regiment would benefit:—

1. Be seen on service conditions in many parts of the country where it had never previously been.
2. It would give officers and men an opportunity of practising that form of billeting most likely to be used if the regiment were called out.
3. That it would give Squadron Quarter-Master Sergeants the opportunity of learning the practical foraging and rationing requirements of their squadrons.

As this scheme was carried out under strictly peace conditions it was necessary to obtain beforehand the sanction of farmers to billet at their farms, and this was arranged by a regimental Staff tour, at which officers made a report on the billeting capacity (accommodation, water, forage, &c.) of each farm, and in other cases by private arrangements made by the officer commanding. Subsequently, on each squadron being allocated its billets, this information was handed to the squadron leader.

In no instance did farmers refuse to extend their hospitality to us when asked.

Two days before the commencement of the trek, each squadron was given its list of billets, together with particulars of local butchers, grocers, and—if farmers were unable to provide forage—address of nearest corn merchant. The Squadron Quarter-Master Sergeant then wrote to the several butchers and bakers and gave them the order for each day's bread and meat to be delivered at stated time and date at the respective farms.

On each day the Squadron Quarter-Master Sergeant proceeded in advance and bought groceries, provisions, &c., which were delivered by shopkeepers in time for the arrival of the men.

In this way the regiment was literally living on the country, and every day each local butcher and baker profited by the troops being in the vicinity.

On arrival at the billets horses were picquetted—one man holding four horses until the lines were ready—groomed, set fair, and fed. They were usually watered before entering billets. The men took their saddlery, arms, and equipment to their sleeping quarters.

By this time tea or soup, together with bread and jam, was ready. After this a wash, rifle inspection, and saddle cleaning occupied their time until dinner was ready, about two and a-half hours after arrival in camp.

This consisted of roast beef or mutton, vegetables, or Irish stew, with bread, butter, and tea.

On each day some tactical scheme against neighbouring Yeomanry regiments was carried out, and consequently transport was not able to get its billets until the day's operations had ceased—usually about 5 P.M.

The officers slept in barns or in the open in valises, and officers of each squadron messed separately.

There was a Headquarter-Mess, to which were attached adjutant, doctor, veterinary officers (who acted as baggage officers), together with the umpires; its transport was one spring cart, one small hospital tent, one bell tent for cook and mess sergeant, and an oil stove.

Squadrons were received at the farms in the most hospitable manner. Barrels of beer in many cases were given to the men by the farmers.

The men thoroughly enjoyed their practical experience; from their point of view the trek (fortunately favoured by fine weather) was voted a great success and produced a large number of recruits.

It did the men untold good to learn to 'rustle' for themselves. The boy learned that if he left his mess-tin dirty overnight he had a dirty one to eat out of the next morning; if he did not bring his knife and fork with him no one else would; and, further, he learnt that if he did not make his horse his first care and provide for his comfort before his own, also if through neglect on his part his horse went sick, he became for the time being a 'foot soldier' and walked with the wagons. This last lesson forcibly demonstrated to young soldiers the all-importance of horsemaster-ship.

It was most noticeable after two or three days of this trekking how much quicker and 'handier' the men became.

In case any regiment is anxious to carry out the same form of billeting these few practical points of detail may be of service.

The regiment was out for three days and nights. At the commencement of the trek, squadron leaders were each handed a cheque for aggregate allowances of 2s. 1d. per horse, and 1s. 6d. per man in the squadron.

2s. 1d. per horse being Squadron Command allowance in lieu of forage.

1s. 6d. per man—1s. C.O.'s messing allowance; 6d. Government allowance—in lieu of rations.

With this sum a small account was opened at the local bank, on which each Squadron Quarter-Master Sergeant drew for payment of forage, rations, &c.

Transport.—Regimental transport: Two wagons and two carts, supplemented by two wagons and two carts with drivers hired locally at cost of £18. This £18 was the only additional expense incurred, and of this the Government allowed £14 by special grant. This gave each squadron (four) one wagon and one cart.

Cooks (Mounted).—Two per squadron enlisted men, with wages made up to 5s. 6d. a day out of profits from men's messing fund.

Batmen.—Four per squadron mounted on cyclists' horses or spare horses—travelled with baggage.

Cyclists.—Two per squadron and one motor-cyclist.

Field Ovens.—Each squadron carried a Fowler's field oven, excellent in every way; indeed, these ovens were the chief reasons for the trek being the success that it was. Bought out of profits of men's messing fund two years ago. Very light and capable of cooking on the move if on four-wheel wagon at tail.

Latrine Screens were carried and used.

Equipment.—On horse : Built-up ropes, head rope, picquetting peg, heel shackle, mug, mess tin, and horse blanket.

On wagon : Man's blanket, horse rug, picquetting peg, and squad bag.

This equipment could have been materially lightened by carrying only one peg and shackle for fore leg, men's blanket under saddle, and no built-up ropes; leaving only squad bags, horse rugs, and ovens to be carried, in which case one wagon would have sufficed.

Officers' kit carried on men's wagon—allowance 50 lb. Men's allowance 4 lb. Both strictly adhered to.

Alarm Posts.—Fixed usually at the farmyard watering trough, where available buckets were placed.

Insurance.—A floating insurance for four days of £1000. Premium £3. Messrs. Lloyds. This insurance covered risk of fire at all farms at which the regiment was billeted.

Below is the Squadron Quarter-Master Sergeant's account for three days for 'B' squadron, showing that this particular squadron cleared on the three days, other squadrons doing equally as well.

1913.

TOTAL PAID TO O.C. Squadron, £57 16s. 3d.

Carried on men for mid-day meal.	May 22	May 23	May 24	Total
Tinned Meat . .	50 lbs. £ s. d. 1 13 4	50 lbs. £ s. d. 2 5 5	40 lbs. £ s. d. 1 5 10	£ s. d.
Bread	12½ qtn. lves. 0 6 3			
<i>For other meals.</i>				
Bread	150 lbs. 0 18 9	100 lbs. 0 12 6	50 lbs. 0 5 8½	
Meat	52 lbs. @ 1/- 2 12 0	40 lbs. @ 9½d. 1 12 8	46½ lbs. @ 8½d. 1 12 11	
Butter	10 lbs. @ 1/3 0 12 6	4 lbs. @ 1/2 0 4 8	6 lbs. @ 1/3 0 7 6	
Sugar	12 lbs. @ 3d. 0 3 0	12 lbs. @ 2½d. 0 2 6	3 lbs. @ 3d. 0 0 9	
Potatoes	1 Bushel . . . 0 3 6	½ Bushel . . . 0 2 0	10 lbs. 0 0 8	
Tea	4 lbs. @ 1/4 0 5 4	4 lbs. @ 1/4 0 5 4		
Bacon (this lasted all the time)	50 lbs. @ 11d. 2 5 10			
Onions (one meal)	12 lbs. @ 1d. 0 1 0			
Milk	6 tins 0 2 6		2 tins 0 0 11	
Coal	1 cwt. 0 1 2			
Salt		0 0 4		
Mustard			0 0 4½	
Sausages		15 lbs. 0 11 3	15 lbs. 0 11 3	
Candles for Cooks		0 0 2		
	<u>£9 5 2</u>	<u>£5 16 4</u>	<u>4 5 11</u> <u>5 16 4</u> <u>9 5 2</u>	
				Total of Men's Messing 19 7 5
Extra-straw for men to lie on, May 22				0 10 0
Beer, mineral waters, tobacco for sing-song and camp-fire, May 24				2 2 1
<i>Forage.</i>				
Oats	4 qrs. @ 22/6 4 10 0	3½ qrs. @ 25/- 4 7 6	2 qrs. @ 22/- 2 4 0	
Hay	5 cwt. @ £5 ton 1 5 0	5 cwt. @ £5 1 5 0	6 cwt. @ £5 1 10 0	
	<u>£5 15 0</u>	<u>£5 12 6</u>	<u>3 14 0</u> <u>5 12 6</u> <u>5 15 0</u>	
				Total of Forage 15 1 6
Charge for 4 sacks lost				0 4 0
				Total Expenditure 37 5 0
				Balance in hands of O.C. 20 11 3
				<u>£57 16 3</u>

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HELMETS OF DRAGOON GUARDS AND DRAGOONS

By C. R. B. BARRETT

AT the first glance it may appear that there can be but little difficulty in giving both a chronological and detailed description of the helmets of the Dragoon Guards and Dragoons. Unfortunately, however, this is far from being the case. In the first place no official record exists prior to 1822, which states clearly the patterns of the helmets of either Dragoon Guards or Dragoons. That helmets had been worn for very many years by Light Dragoons we know, and the type with its vizor may well be exemplified by the helmets of the 15th Light Dragoons (now 15th Hussars), which are of two dates; the earlier bearing the long 'Emsdorf' honour around the top of the vizor, the later with simply the single word 'Emsdorf' on the lower part thereof and in front. But helmets for Dragoon Guards and Dragoons did not make their appearance until much later. Prior to 1811 in these regiments the 'cocked hat' was worn.

According to Cannon the 2nd Dragoon Guards were the first to don the new head-dress, and this helmet was of brass.

The 1st Dragoon Guards followed suit in 1812; the helmet had a black skull and peak, with a brass crest and edge. On the crest was worn a



No. 1.



No. 2.



No. 3.

long black horsehair mane with a thistle tip, and very little ornament. Two brass bands which were quite narrow crossed the helmet skull from side to side, and there was a triangular-shaped brass front piece. Luard (page 103 [1760-1820]) figures 'a heavy dragoon' of 1812 wearing a helmet with horsetail mane, but gives no details.

From the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution we get the helmet No. 1; from Luard's book No. 2. Both represent the helmets of heavy Cavalry of this date, but the thistle tip of the actual helmet in the Museum lacks its knob and does not project straight out from the crest as it should. It is, however, an original horsetail and is plaited along the top of the crest. The scale of the chin strap is given in detail beneath.

It is also to be noted that Luard shows a brass band across the skull of the helmet which does not appear in the Museum specimen. For 1824 Luard gives No. 3 for heavy Cavalry, and Cannon No. 4 for the 1st Royal Dragoons in 1825. In these the laurel leaves appear on each side of the back of the skull and the bear-skin crest cover. For the period 1824-37 the helmet of the Dragoon Guards, according to the same authority, modified the shape of the helmet to one resembling that of the present day. The horsetail mane disappeared to make way for the bear-skin crest cover, and laurel wreathing was to be seen on the sides of the skull. The date he assigns to this is 1824. His next illustration lacks detail, but marks the appearance of a horsehair plume instead of a bear-skin crest; its date is 1852, and it would seem as if the regulation helmet of 1846, in which a return had been made to the horsehair mane with thistle-shaped brush, was either unknown to him or, if known, unrecorded.*

Whether the helmet was or was not a fitting head-dress for a Cavalry soldier need not be discussed. As far as light Cavalry are concerned Tomlinson certainly did not favour it. He writes in his diary under date September 17, 1809:



No. 4.



No. 5.



No. 6.

'We here [San Miguel] received our new helmets from England, and not before they were wanted. The old ones were completely worn out and so warped by the sun that the men could scarcely wear them. They are bad things for a soldier, only looking well for a few months; the first rain puts them out of shape. All the silver of the edging comes off with both men and officers, and the sooner we adopt some other head-dress the better.'

The first printed Dress Regulations are those of 1822. There is an earlier regulation in manuscript in the War Office dated 1811, but it concerns itself not with helmets. Now with regard to the helmets of Dragoon Guards and Heavy Dragoons we are face to face with a curious fact. The helmet belonged to 'Dress' and 'Undress' only. For full dress—that is to say at drawing-rooms, levées, and in the evening—a 'hat,' i.e. a cocked hat, was worn by regulation in 1822, 1834, and 1846.

* In the reminiscences of Captain Anstruther Thompson he tells in an amusing way how he and his friend, Lieut. John Edward Madocks, decided to exchange into the 13th Hussars from the 9th Lancers. Madocks was inclined to exchange into a heavy Cavalry regiment. 'Don't do that,' said Anstruther Thompson, 'and wear a brass hat.' Both officers exchanged in October 1841.


We will now quote as far as need be the Official Dress Regulations from 1822 to the present date.

1822 :—Helmet—Roman; black glazed skull and peak, encircled with richly gilt laurel leaves, rich gilt dead-wrought scales and lions' heads; bear-skin top ('Dress').

It will be observed that the 'crest' is not mentioned, but a 'crest' is implied in the word 'Roman.'

1834 :—Helmet—gilt metal, with ornamental scroll on the sides; oak-leaf ornamented brass crest, with a separate bear-skin crest ('Dress'). This means that the bear-skin crest would not be worn on the march or in barracks, &c. See illustrations 5 and 6. The ornamental tip to the crest, consisting of a lion's head, hide, and paws, was detached when the bear-skin crest was worn.

1846 :—Helmet—gilt brass with regimental ornaments and devices in front, and an ornamented crest ($3\frac{1}{2}$ inches deep) in which is inserted a mane of black horsehair (2 feet 10 inches long) flowing loose behind, and terminating in front in a thistle-shaped brush confined by a gold-embroidered boss;



No. 7.



No. 8.



No. 9.

gilt brass scales. It may be noted here that the European Cavalry of the Honourable East India Company wore an almost similar head-dress, but with a red horsehair mane, in 1851.

1855 :—For the seven regiments of Dragoon Guards the helmet was of 'gilt brass, the front and back peaks ornamented with a scroll wreath, a band of the same character round the bottom and up the back of the helmet; front ornament, within a shield, a diamond-cut silver star, upon which is a garter bearing the title of the regiment and encircling the cypher V.R.; above the shield a crown, and below it a wreath of olive and oak extending upwards. A chin strap of plain chain lined with black leather fastening on each side to a rose ornament. On the top of the helmet a socket for a plume.' See No. 8. For the 1st (or Royal) Dragoons and the 6th (or Inniskilling) Dragoons the helmet was of the same pattern, but composed of white metal, and the star in front was gilt instead of silver.

The differences in the plumes were first noted in this year, and the

several regiments were distinguished by the colours of them. They were as follows :—

1st Dragoon Guards, red; 2nd, black; 3rd, black and red; 4th, white; 5th, red and white; 6th, black; 7th, black and white. 1st Royal Dragoons, black; 6th Inniskillings, white.

It will be seen, therefore, that at this date only the 2nd and 6th Dragoon Guards had similar black plumes, and the 4th Dragoon Guards and the Inniskillings white plumes.

As the 2nd (or Royal North British) Dragoons (Scots Greys) wore by special permission a bear-skin with a white hackle we have not concerned ourselves with their head-dress.

1857, no change; 1861, no change; 1864, no change; 1874, the height of the horsehair plume was raised from 5 inches to 6, and the Carabiniers changed their plume from black to white.

1883 :—There were certain alterations made in this year. See No. 9.

Helmet for Dragoon Guards: Gilt brass, bound round the edge. At the top a cross-piece base and a gilt plume socket 4 inches high from the point of insertion in the base. A laurel wreath above the front peak and an oakleaf band up the back. A diamond-cut silver star in front; on



No. 10.



No. 11.



No. 12.

the star in gilt metal a garter pierced with the motto 'Honi soit qui mal y pense,' or the designation of the regiment. In the 4th Dragoon Guards the garter is pierced with the motto 'Quis Separabit?' Within the garter the regimental device or number. Plain gilt burnished chain $\frac{3}{4}$ -inch wide, mounted on black patent leather and fastened on each side with a gilt rose ornament. For the 1st and 6th Dragoons a similar helmet, but of white metal with gilt ornaments as before.

The plumes as regards their colour remained the same, but they were now to rise 2 inches from the point of insertion in the socket and to fall as far as the bottom of the helmet. The gilt rose remained at the top and was screwed on to the metal stem of the plume.

The Dress Regulations for 1891 and 1894 show no change. In 1904 the only alterations were as follows :—

The helmet was of gilt or 'gilding metal.' The plain burnished chain was increased in width from $\frac{3}{4}$ inch to 1 inch. When a garter was not used there was 'an elliptical ring' with the designation of the regiment, and within either garter or elliptical ring the regimental device or number.

For the 6th Dragoon Guards the rays of the star were to be plain and not diamond cut. The illustrations 10 and 11 show the difference between the 3rd Dragoon Guards and the other six regiments as regards the star, but the star figured in the case of the 3rd Dragoon Guards belongs to a private and not an officer. Since this year there has been no change.

From Cannon's histories we gather the following facts according to the illustrations and letterpress :—

1st Dragoon Guards : Replaced cocked hats by helmets in 1812. These had long black horsehair manes on the crest, a black skull and peak, brass crest and edge, thistle tip to horsehair mane. Very little ornament, two brass bands crossing the skull and a triangular brass front-piece on which no ornament is shown.

2nd Dragoon Guards : Replaced their cocked hats by helmets in 1811.

3rd Dragoon Guards : Wore a helmet ornamented on its front and crest entirely of brass, bear-skin top, chain scales 1838. A scale of this period is shown in No. 12.

4th Dragoon Guards : No mention and no illustration.

5th Dragoon Guards : Cocked hats at Salamanca in 1812 (July 22).

6th Dragoon Guards : Brass helmet, rayed crest with lion's head in front; worn with or without bear-skin. Chain scale 1839. How this lion's head in front differed from the lion's-head and paws helmet of 5 and 6 will be sufficiently seen in two of the other illustrations, and there is no need to give more detailed sketches thereof.

7th Dragoon Guards : As 6th Dragoon Guards.

1st (or Royal) Dragoons, 1839 : Brass helmet, rayed ornament in front, bear-skin top.

6th (or Inniskilling) Dragoons : 1815, helmet, black, brass mounted, crest brass rayed, horsehair mane with thistle tip, chain scale. 1825 : black helmet, black plain crest and peak, bear-skin crest cover, front of crest gilt, edge of peak gilt, ornamental device in front, laurel decoration on sides of skull, bottom of helmet gilt band, chain scale. 1843 : brass helmet, brass crest, much ornamented, black horsehair mane, thistle tip and gilt ring, chain scale.

From these notes it will be seen that the history of the helmets of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons is somewhat involved, and is, indeed, in some places contradictory as far as details go. The writer has endeavoured to sift the evidence for or against the periods ascribed to the changes. It must be remembered, however, that the scanty sequence of Official Dress Regulations complicates matters, and also that 'Regimental Custom,' which obtained of yore, causes the student of uniforms much perplexity to this day, and will probably to the end of time.

From the Museum of the Royal United Service Institution the illustrations numbered 1, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 are derived; the remainder have been taken from various books in their library and engravings or coloured prints on their walls.

APPOINTMENTS AND COMMANDS

Major-General G. A. Cookson, C.B., Commanding Lucknow Cavalry Brigade, has been gazetted Colonel of the 29th Lancers (Deccan Horse).

Captain H. A. Tomkinson, 1st (Royal) Dragoons, has now succeeded Captain Hon. R. Bruce, 11th (P.A.O.) Hussars, as Adjutant and Quartermaster of the Cavalry School, Netheravon.

Captain A. C. D. Graham, 9th (Q.R.) Lancers, has been selected as aide-de-camp to Field-Marshal H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, Governor-General of the Dominion of Canada, vice Captain W. Long, D.S.O., Royal Scots Greys.

FOREIGN

Belgium.—By Royal Decree of February 13 of this year the appointment of Inspector-General of Cavalry has been created, the incumbent of which will be *ex officio* a member of the National Defence Committee and of the Army Committee. He will be immediately under the Minister of War and will take his orders from him in regard to all technical, tactical, and administrative questions. Lieut.-General Clooten, commanding the 2nd Cavalry Division, has been nominated to the new appointment.

Denmark.—The Remington carbine now in possession of the Cavalry is to be replaced by one of the same model as the Krag-Jørgensen M. 89, the issue commencing this year. The Remington carbines will on replacement be handed over to the field artillery, the pistols with which the *personnel* of the batteries is now armed being withdrawn.

Holland.—In the Budget for 1914 provision has been made for arming the Dutch-Colonial mounted troops with Madsen guns. Each squadron is to have a machine-gun section of three guns, with a detachment consisting of a European sergeant-major as section leader, two native Cavalrymen, each to carry a gun, and other men to lead the ammunition horses. As the Madsen gun heats very quickly under rapid fire, and occasionally has on this account to cease fire, three guns are provided in order that two at least may always remain in action. The gun-horse carries the rider and gun with 200 rounds on the man; the ammunition horses carry each 2000 rounds. Despite the great weight carried by the gun-horse—232-275 lbs.—the section is expected to keep up with Cavalry under all circumstances. The detachments, men and horses, are extra to the establishment of the squadron.

Italy.—A Royal Decree lately promulgated provides for the creation of a legion in Libya, the effective strength of which will be forty-five officers, 1213 mounted men, and 744 Infantry soldiers: one third of the *personnel* will be Italians, the remainder being locally-raised troops.

Lieut.-General Berta, Inspector-General of Cavalry, has retired after fifty years' service, and has been succeeded as Inspector-General by Lieut.-General the Count of Torino.

Japan.—The equine population of the country is at the present time some one and a half million horses only, but a very small percentage of these being suitable for military purposes, and during the late war the want of horses was much felt. During the current financial year fifteen depôts are to be established where stallions will be maintained for covering purposes, also three Government studs, and a remount establishment. By 1922 it is hoped to increase the number of stallions to 1500.

Russia.—In a *Prikas* dated June 13 the following details are given of the new Cavalry lance: it is nine feet nine inches in length, weighs just under six pounds, and has a diameter of 27.7 c.m. The point is double-edged. The lance is fitted with a hempen grip and has an arm and foot-straps. The pennons vary in shape and colour with the different regiments.

Spain.—The region of Loukkos, comprising the territories of Larache, El Kasar and Arzila, is to be formed into a general's command, and a group of Cavalry is to be told off to it, formed for the present of three squadrons of the 28th Regiment of Cavalry, each squadron being composed of one captain, four subalterns, and 150 of other ranks.

SPORTING NOTES

PIGSTICKING SONGS

(Continued)

THE BOAR OF THE SOUNDER

The sun was just tinging the Bheema's broad tide
When the Boar of the Sounder stood close to its side,
And nothing was heard save the water's low moan
As swiftly it rushed o'er the time-eaten stone.

As he stopped him to drink at the clear flowing stream
On the high bank above him five horsemen were seen :
Gruffly grunted that boar as their forms met his eye,
And he dashed through the flood as the hunters drew nigh.

' Wuh jata ! Wuh jata ! ' the hills echo back
Old Duttoo's loud shout as they pressed on his track,
And each heart beat high as they plunged in the wave—
Those riders of Nuggur, the bold and the brave.

He swims the wide river, he crosses the plain,
But the steep ' ghat ' before him he never shall gain,
For those now are near him who mean not to part
Till the blades of their long spears are thrust through his heart.

Like the whirlwind that sweeps over mountain and mead
Thro' the jungle of thorn is the crash of each steed ;
Yet *one* shoots ahead like a shaft from a bow
And the hunter's sharp weapon is poised o'er his foe.

It is done—he is speared—and the flank of that boar
So lately unscarred, is dripping with gore ;
He turns and he charges, but charges in vain,
For next moment he lies a corpse on the plain.

Now, our sport being over, let us drink to the day
When once more we assemble a grey boar to slay :
May his pluck be as good, and his speed as well tried,
As his who but now by the Bheema has died !

O. S. M.

March 1833.

' SCREW.'

THE BOAR! HELL TO HIS SOWL

(Tune : 'Bonnie Dundee')

We've eaten our dinner, we've drunk to our fill,
 Our horses are bedded, the camp is all still,
 There's just time for a pipe and to send the glass round.
 For to-morrow by dawn we must be on our ground.

CHORUS—Come, fill up your cup as full as you can,
 Come, fill up a bumper each pigsticking man,
 And drink to the boar with his grizzled old jowl,
 May we meet him to-morrow, and 'Hell to his sowl.'

The beaters are in and the parties are out,
 Our senses are tingling at every shout,
 Will the boar be a big one or will he be small,
 Will he break out to our side, or break not at all?
 Stop! The mare's ears are pricked, what is it she sees?
 A dusky form steals from the shade of the trees.
 He stops—then away for the open he hies,
 Displaying his form to our gratified eyes.

CHORUS—Come, fill up your cup as full as you can,
 Come, fill up a bumper each pigsticking man,
 And drink to the boar with his grizzled old jowl,
 May we meet him to-morrow, and 'Hell to his sowl.'

We give him a start just to make his line clear,
 And then hell for leather, we ride for first spear,
 He sees us and takes a deep bumba and wide
 In his wake we splash in and crawl out the far side;
 He lays back his ears, puts on his best pace,
 For he knows that he's running a life and death race;
 He jinks right and left, through the thorn brake he tears;
 All in vain, for he soon feels our sharp stabbing spears.

CHORUS—Come, fill up your cup as full as you can,
 Come, fill up a bumper each pigsticking man,
 And drink to the boar with his grizzled old jowl,
 May we meet him to-morrow, and 'Hell to his sowl.'

Though wounded and bleeding he's game to the last,
 And makes one more charge as a foe rushes past;
 But the firmly held spear stops the rush that he tries,
 And backward he totters, sinks over, and dies.
 And now when the monster lies dead on the ground,
 There's one thoughtful man sends his whisky-flask round,
 And we drink to 'The Boar,' good to run and to fight,
 And who never says die till you've killed him outright.

CHORUS—Come, fill up your cup as full as you can,
 Come, fill up a bumper each pigsticking man,
 And drink to the boar with his grizzled old jowl,
 May we meet him to-morrow, and 'Hell to his sowl.'



HOG HUNTING



CIRCA
1830



HOG HUNTING



CIRCA
1830

'SADDLE, SPUR, AND SPEAR'

(Air: 'My Love is like the Red, Red Rose')

Let others boast and proudly toast
The light of ladies' eyes,
And swear the rose less perfume throws
Than woman's fragrant sighs,
Whose bright red lips in hue eclipse
The ruby's radiant gem,
For woman's far the brightest star
In nature's diadem :
I'll change my theme and fondly dream
True sportsmen pledge me here
And fill a cup and drain it up
To saddle, spur, and spear.
And fill, &c.

When dayspring's light first crowns each height
And tips with diamond dew,
We'll quick bestride our steeds of pride
And scour the jungle through;
With slackened rein the jovial train
Slow to the cover throng,
But wouldn't stir without a spur
To coax their nags along.
We'll high uprear the glittering spear
Far flashing through the sky,
With hope elate anticipate
To see the grey boar die.
With hope elate, &c.

Oh ! who can tell the magic spell that fires the hunter's eye
When shout and roar have roused the boar
And scared him from his sty?
His rage at first, his glorious burst,
Dark dashing through the flood,
His bristly might, his meteor flight,
His death of foam and blood?
Who that hath been in such a scene
Such scene can e'er forget?
In sorrow's mood, in solitude,
Such scene shall haunt him yet.
At different times, in other climes,
He'll think of days so dear,
And fill a cup and drain it up
To saddle, spur, and spear.
And fill, &c.

While thus I sing, time's rapid wing
 This lesson seems to teach,
 That joy and bliss of sport like this
 Are still within our reach.
 Then let's away at break of day,
 Scour vale and hill-top o'er,
 Scale mountain side and stem the tide
 To spear the flying boar.
 And e'en may yet bring time again
 When we at pleasure's shrine
 To check his flight for one gay night
 Will wet his wing with wine,
 And ere we part pledge hand and heart
 Once more to rally here
 And fill a cup and drain it up
 To saddle, spur, and spear.
 And fill, &c.

T. MORRIS.

ATHLETICS

ARMY CHAMPIONSHIPS

The thirty-fourth Annual Army Athletic Meeting took place at Aldershot in July. Unfortunately Lieut. Alan Patterson, the half and quarter mile championship holder, was unable to be present. The entries were better than last year, and it was fortunately arranged that the Army manoeuvres should not interfere with the attendance. Capital sport was witnessed, and several records were broken. A fine feat was accomplished by Sergt. L. Keszler, Royal Flying Corps, who won the 100 yards championship in the record Army time of $10\frac{1}{2}$ seconds, only ten minutes after he had won the 100 yards race for N.C.O.s and men in $10\frac{3}{4}$ seconds. Corpl. Prince, Royal Army Medical Corps, won the half-mile championship in the Army record time of 2 minutes 1 second. Corpl. Hutson, 2nd Royal Sussex Regiment, won both the one-mile and the three-mile championships. A third record was broken in the long jump, in which Lieut. R. F. B. Naylor cleared 23 feet $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches. The relay championship race was won by the Hampshire Regiment. Lance-Sergt. Witherick cleared 9 feet 3 inches in the pole jump. The officers' 100 yards race was won by Lieut. H. J. I. Walker in $10\frac{3}{4}$ seconds, and the same officer secured the hurdles championship in $16\frac{3}{4}$ seconds. The quarter-mile championship fell to Lieut. E. B. Greer, Irish Guards, in the good time of $51\frac{3}{4}$ seconds. The tug-of-war was secured by the Royal Munster Fusiliers. The Challenge Shield was won by the Royal Flying Corps. The meeting was held under the patronage of Lieut.-General Sir Douglas Haig, Commander-in-Chief at Aldershot, with Colonel V. C. Couper, President of the Committee.

RACING

At the Leopardstown Meeting in August the Military Handicap Flat Race was won by Sir J. Tichborne's Earldom, ridden by the owner, and starting at 10-1. Major Dixon's Ballycadden was second, and Mr. McCalmont's MacRhu (owner) third.

POLO

SUBALTERNS' CUP TOURNAMENT

There was an excellent entry of thirteen teams, a record for this Tournament, which included: the Royal Scots Greys, 15th Hussars, 1st King's Royal Rifles, 5th Dragoon Guards, Coldstream Guards, 9th Lancers, 12th Lancers, 2nd Life Guards, 11th Hussars, Royal Horse Guards, 1st Life Guards, 20th Hussars and Irish Guards. Last year eight teams competed, and the 9th Lancers won. It was played as usual at Ranelagh. In the final the 12th Lancers defeated the 9th Lancers by nine goals to five, thus becoming the holders of the cup.

Teams:

12th Lancers—Lieutenants E. H. Leatham, C. Bryant, B. Nicholas and R. S. Wyndham-Quin.

9th Lancers—Lieutenants H. Whitehead, F. Harvey, G. Phipps-Hornby and G. Reynolds.

The Coronation Cup, played at Ranelagh, was won by the Quidnuncs, who in the final defeated the Tigers by seven goals to four after a close match. Sides: Quidnuncs—Duke of Peneranda, Capt. E. W. S. Palmer, Lord Ashby St. Ledgers and Capt. F. W. Barrett. Tigers: Count I de Madre, H. G. M. Railston, Major B. Matthew Lannowe and Capt. L. H. O. Cheape. Captains Barrett and Palmer played a fine game for the winners, who were also favoured by ponies. The Tigers had previously defeated the Quidnuncs in the Open Cup, on which occasion Capt. Ritson played in the place of Major Matthew Lannowe, and Capt. Tomkinson in the place of the Duke of Peneranda for the Quidnuncs. Both were very evenly contested matches of good polo.

The Cup was presented to the Quidnuncs by H.S.H. Princess Alexander of Teck. Lord Ashby St. Ledgers' team of Quidnuncs had also won the Champion Cup.

It is cheering to hear that Lord Ashby St. Ledgers has most sportingly undertaken to endeavour to raise a team for the re-conquest of the American Polo Cup. Details are not completed, but it is proposed, if the players can be got together, to practise in the early part of the year in Spain, where King Alfonso and the Madrid Polo Club have kindly lent their grounds. It is hoped that our soldier players may be able to obtain the necessary leave for this scheme to be carried out, and that it will result in the recovery of the cup. Great Britain's thanks are due to the Duke of Westminster in his recent patriotic attempt to accomplish this object, and also to Lord Ashby St. Ledgers in his present endeavour.

The final of the Irish Military Tournament, between the 16th and 5th Lancers, played at Dublin, resulted in a victory for the former by five goals to four. On the handicap the 16th had the advantage, and at half-time led by three to nil, but the 5th made a fine fight and in the end were only beaten by a goal. Teams: 16th Lancers—Mr. Naylor-Leyland, Mr. G. Brooke, Capt. G. Bellville, and Major Campbell (back). 5th Lancers: Mr. E. Ramsden, Major Jardine, Mr. J. L. Wordsworth, and Mr. B. W. Robinson (back).

The Patriotic Cup, played for between England and Ireland at the Phoenix Park, Dublin, on September 1, was won by Ireland. It was a capital match, won by six goals to four after a fine exhibition of good polo. About 20,000 spectators were present to witness this popular victory of Ireland, it being their second win out of eleven matches. Teams: Ireland—L. M. Ryan, Capt. Bingham, Capt. Lloyd, and Capt. Barrett. England—H. Rich, W. Balding, Sir C. Lowther, and Capt. Wilson. After the game Lord Aberdeen presented the Cup.

LAWN TENNIS

The Army Championships at Queen's Club in July produced some excellent lawn tennis. Results :

ARMY SINGLES CHAMPIONSHIP

In the semi-finals Capt. E. Marsden, 64th Pioneers, beat Lieut. C. F. Scroope, 66th Punjabis, and Capt. E. D. Young, Devonshire Regiment, beat Lieut. J. L. Ritchie, Royal Army Medical Corps.

In the final Capt. Young beat Capt. Marsden (7-5, 6-1, 6-4).

INTER-REGIMENTAL DOUBLES

Semi-finals : Captains Young and Harris, of the Devonshire Regiment, beat Major Wright and Capt. Bell, Army Service Corps, Woolwich.

Capt. Whatford and Lieut. Scroope, 66th Punjabis, beat Lieut. Woodgate and Lieut. Blackburn, King's Own Regiment. In the final Capt. Whatford and Lieut. Scroope beat Captains Young and Harris (6-1, 6-2, 6-2).

This was a very sporting win for the Indian Army.

Probably the greatest lawn tennis struggle in history took place at Wimbledon last July, when America took the Davis Cup from Great Britain by a single point, the final scores being : America (two singles and the doubles) three points. Britain (two singles) two points. America has now won the Cup four times and Britain five times. The feature of the play was the fine display by the young American, Mr. M. E. McLoughlin, who was irresistible with his hurricane service. Messrs. Barrett and Dixon for Great Britain being unaccountably defeated in the doubles all depended on the singles. In these Mr. M. E. McLoughlin (America) beat Mr. C. P. Dixon (Britain) and Mr. J. C. Parke (Britain) beat Mr. R. N. Williams (America). There were 5000 spectators, the play was brilliant, and the struggle close.

FOOTBALL

The date for the Annual Rugby Match between the Navy and Army is provisionally arranged for Saturday, March 7, 1914, and will take place as in previous years at the Queen's Club, London.

ASSOCIATION

At the annual meeting of the Cavalry Football Association, held at the Union Jack Club, London, the draw for the first and second rounds of the Cavalry Cup resulted as follows :—


First Round (England).—(A) 19th Hussars v. Royal Horse Guards; (B) 1st Life Guards v. 2nd Dragoon Guards; (C) 5th Dragoon Guards v. 2nd Life Guards; (D) 11th Hussars v. 15th Hussars; (E) 9th Lancers v. 4th Dragoon Guards; (F) Royal Scots Greys v. 12th Lancers. Byes :—6th Dragoon Guards, 3rd Hussars, 18th Hussars, 20th Hussars.

Second Round (England).—Winners of D v. Winners of A; Winners of C v. Winners of B; 6th Dragoon Guards v. 3rd Hussars; 18th Hussars v. Winners of E; Winners of F v. 20th Hussars.

First Round (Ireland).—5th Lancers v. 16th Lancers; 4th Hussars a bye.

Second Round (Ireland).—4th Hussars v. Winners of First Round.

First round to be played on or before November 15th. Second round on or before December 6th.





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